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2ABSTRACT,
This is a study of Saiyid Muhammad Reza Khan who held the office of 
Nail# Nazim and Naib Diwan of Bengal from 1765 to '1772* It includes the 
early life of the Khan, but concentrates particularly upon the years from 
1756, when the Khan first held public office, to 1775 when after a lengthy 
trial he was reinstated at Murshidabad as Naib Nazim#
Chapter One takes note of previous work upon Reza Khan, appraises the 
sources used in this study, and considers the nature of Anglo-Iviughal 
relations at the moment when Reza Khan entered politics# The study proper 
commences with the Second Chapter which traces Reza Khan's early life from 
his birth in Iran, his arrival in Bengal and marriage into the ruling 
family, down to 1756 when he achieved office# Chapter Three describes the 
Khan's appointment to and dismissal from the post of Faujdar of Chittagong
and his first contact with the English, Chapter Four deals with his
elevation to the Naibat at Dacca in 1765, &Bd Chapter Five discusses the 
circumstances leading to the Khan's promotion to the Naibat Subahdari in 
1765* Chapter Six is devoted to the Khan's rise, within the system 
inaugurated by Clive after the grant of the Diwani, to the zenith of his 
power. Chapter Seven deals with the rebuffs the Khan suffered after Clive's 
departure, while Sykes was Resident at Murshidabad, and Chapter Eight is 
concerned with the politics behind the decision to introduce English 
supervisors into the districts in 1769* Chapter Mine provides an account 
of the Khan's activities during the great famine, and of the curtailment 
of the Khan's power by the newly created Controlling Committee in 1770# 
While Chapter Ten reviews the Khan's uneasy co-operation with that 
Committee in 1771 &nd 1772, Chapter Eleven, the last, seeks to explain the 
circumstances leading to his arrest in 1772, and the motives of Warrea
Hastings who managed his trial r The study closes with a brief note upon the
Khan's reinstatement in 1775 an<* to-3 career until his death in 1791 o
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CHAPTER ONE
I N T R O D U C T I O N  .
In a public letter of 25 November 1791 the government ©f Lord
Cornwallis reported from Calcutta to the Directors of the East India
Company in London,
"We are much concerned to advise you of the decease of the Nabob 
Mahomed Reza Khan ,,,
His honourable character, his regard to the English for a long period 
of time, and the services he had rendered in Bengal are testified upon 
the records of this Government and well known to the Company in 
England, His public and private worth equally made him an object of 
esteem, and they entitle his memory to respect", 1
Such was the obituary notice of a man who had been a vital part of Bengal*s
history for over thirty years and witness to its history for nearly half
a century* He had observed the irremediable decline of two empires, that
©f the Safavids in the land of his birth, Iran, and that of the Mughal8 in
India, the land of his adoption ; he had participated in the events which
led to the eclipse of the Nawabs and to the rise of the English Bast India
Company in Bengal, He had been the agent of the Company, the defender of
the Nizamat, and had been a leading figure throughout what may be called
the Anglo-Mu^ial phase in -Bengal*s history. That phase was brought to an
end on 1 January 1791 with Cornwallis*s abolition of the office of Naib
Nazim and the final transfer of the Sadar Nizamat Adalat, Nine months later,
having worked almost to the end upon cases which had been awaiting his
decision before Cornwallis*s regulations were passed, Reza Khan died. It is
the purpose of thi3 thesis to study afresh the important, formative period
of Reza Khan* s career, down te the year 1775# and to reconsider his part
in the events which shaped the pattern of British rule in Bengal0
1, India Office Records, Bengal Letters Received, Volume 50# p&gos 481-4&2,
8To understand Reza Khanfs career, and indeed to understand events in
Bengal between 175^ 1775 it is necessary in the first place to forgo
the benefits of hindsight0 To Reza Khan, as to every Indian of his day,
this period was not that in which the British Indian Empire was founded,
it was a phase in the long history of the Timurid empire* The overriding
reality was that Bengal was Mughal* The reigning prince was named on the
coin and in the Khutha and thus enjoyed the two prerogatives of sovereignty
He night he a tool in the hands of a minister, his mandates might he evaded
or disregarded, nevertheless he was deemed "the sole fountainhead of honour?
and " every outward mark of respect, every profession of allegiance ,
continued to be paid to the person who filled the throne of the house of
Timour" .Moreover no usurper, however daring, felt able to outrage the
general feeling by treating the Emperor* s name with disrespect t Nadir Shah
sacked Delhi, hut acknowledged Muhammad Shah as emperor ; the Ahdali invaded
India repeatedly, but did not subvert Timurid sovereignty* Bolts may have
been right in thinking in 1772 that "if the youngest writer in the service
had been sent with the authority of the Company to our Shah Allua, it was
certain that his Majesty would have granted away the remainder of his 
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empire ••••", but it was also true that the Mughal grant was necessary, 
however obtained* Reza Khan had lived in Mughal Delhi as a boy and in Mughal 
Bengal under the still vigorous and effective rule of Alivardi Khan as a 
young man* On the issue of Timurid sovereignty he remained unyielding to his 
dying day, and no account of his relationship with Warren Hastings and the 
Company is intelligible if this is forgotten*
It is also necessary to consider what the nature of the Angle-Mugh&l
relationship was when Reza Khan came to Bengal, and the character it took
after Plassey, if the Khan* s behaviour is to be understood aright* Before
175^t as Ghulam Husain noted, the English were known in Bengal "only as
merchants"^ The Mughal rulers and nobles were not unaware of the military
abilities of the Europeans, renegade Portuguese, Dutch, French and English
’had long served in the imperial armies, especially in the artillery* During
f* Malcolm, J*, Life of Robert, Lord Clive* Vol I* 402-1* *
2* Belts, 1*, Considerations on Indian Affairs* p 31
3* Tabatabai, Ghulam Husain KhaV». a-i i~7 ' —
Ithe Mar&tha invasion of 1742 Alivardi had sought the corporation of the
i
three European nations in Bengal, the Dutch, French and English, and in i . 
1744 he again asked the English for the loan of the services of thirty or
forty Europeans to command his troops as " his people were not trained up
^  2 
to the use of fire-arms" as the Europeans were . Again from Drake* s
narrative it appears that the Nawah Siraj ud daulah*s army when it captured
3
Calcutta in June 1756 contained several Europeans and Inde-Portuguese. The 
latter may have heen connected with the contingent which Murshid Cftili Khan 
had recruited through the Portuguese Padre at Bandel^ It is also known that 
the Bengal Nawabs continued to maintain Christian troops, most probably
Portuguese,at Chittagong right down to 1760-61 when the district was handed
5
over to the English
The fact remains that for a century the English appeared in Mughal 
Bengal as traders, and that contact with them had been mostly indirect© In 
their negotiations for the acquisition of the three villages of Kalikata, 
Sutanuti and Govindapur in 1698 from Azin us Shan , in those for the 
acqusition of further privileges from Parukh siyar in 1717» a*id in the 
political conspiracies of 1757 an* 1760, the negotiators most extensively 
used had been Armenians, Christian by religion and Persian in Culture© In 
more normal times the Company had been represented in the Bengal Subahdar*s 
court by native Vakils or agents, usually Hindu, and these would treat with 
the Nawab’s Mutasaddis, secretaries or clerks, also usually Hindus© Only 
on very rare and important occasions did the Nawab himself grant interviews 
to the Vakils, whose highest level of access was normally to the Rai-Kay&n
j
(a Hindu minister heading the revenue department)or to the Naib or deputy!
This was but natural ,for the military aristocrats of the imperial or
provincial courts did not hold merchants in any high regard t they were
useful subjects to be protected but not to be cultivated on the social levelc
Merchants did upgrade themselves by turning soldier or administrator| Mir
1 © BengaT public^Consultations ■ or $pQ. 29 July 1742, The English then did 
nox participate as it was thought "not for the Company* s interesfto do si, 
20 BPC 16 Nov 1744* IJhe request did not receive any better response*
3* Vide Hill, S.C., Bengal in 1756-57t Vol I, Appendix 66*Attempts were made
through priests to detach them from fighting for the "Moors'*©
4* Vide Orme Mss. ( India Office), IndiafVf)i jX, pp 2166 ff©
5© Firming©r, J.K*, Chittagong District Records £®r CDR) Vol I, p 150*
6. Such as KhtQdih Sarhad, Petrus e and Gregory*
7.'The Naib(usually a near relation of the Nawab7nea4ed the administration.
i n
Juala for example, a merchant in origin, ended as one of the greatest 
Mughal generals9 the conqueror of Assam] But the reverse process did not
take place9 though a prince or noble might engage in commercial transactions
2
as an extension of political power* The Nawabs long maintained & virtual 
monopoly9 exercised through selected favourites, of the trade in salt9 
betelnut, opium and saltpetre, or of the trade to Assam by way of Rangaaati, 
while the Faujdars of Sylhet and Chittagong, by virtue of their office, 
enjoyed certain exclusive trade privileges within their respective juris- 
dictions*^The presence of an English merchant company in Bengal, however 
considerable its trade, could net disturb the pioture of Bengal as &
Mughal Subah*
Moreover the pattern was not in its essentials broken even when the 
English returned to Calcutta in J jiuary 1757 at the head of forces from 
Madras, Admiral Watson of His Brittanic Majesty1s navy, Colonel Clive, 
commander of the Company*s forces were military leaders who could be 
recognised by and admitted to a Mughal society of military aristocrats*
Their attack upon Hugli bandar er port on 9 January 1757 and their plunder*-
4
ing of the merchants of that city called forth a protest from Siraj ud- 
haulah that the English were acting " not like merchants'*, but simultaneous
-ly the Nawab declared to Clive, H I know you are a soldier and as such 1
5
should chuse to be your friend"*; Clive had in fact struck the right note,
not only by his victories, but by bringing a letter of commendation from
the Nawab of Aroot and by demanding in another to be regarded as an officer
of the King of England, who as he told Jagat Seth was not "inferior in
power to the Padsha /or Mughal Emperor^ himself* f And with an intuitive
1* MWEtfem^ Mir Juala was a seventeenth century example/DQffft. IT2>2>c1~S~o)
One ooro reeent example was Mir H*bib,"fbr sometime a peddling broker
at Hooghly" ( F. Gladwin, Transactions in Bengal * 141) *
2. Instances being the viceroys Shaista Khan and Azim us Shane^^UW,(7,373dr) 
5* J* Reedfs letter, 17 Dec 1770*(Vide Proceedings of the Murshidabad 
Council of Revenue, or MP 20 Dec 1^70*)
4« This attack was undertaken according to a resolution of a Council of War 
dated 30 Sep 17 5^ ”to attack Hughley or any other Moors town or to take 
reprizals in the river on any other Moors vessels" (vide Hone Miscellan­
eous Series,(India Office), or HIS , vol 95 f 85)£he hardest hit among 
the merchants being Khwaja Wajid, called the Fakfew ut tujar(HHS* 193 s 14* 2Q
5# Siraj ud daulah to Clive, 1 Feb 1757, HMS, 193c f27*
6, Clive to Jagat Seth, 21 Jan 1757* HMS* 195 f 17o
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understanding of the Indian attitudes he had appealed directly to the Nawab
Siraj ud daulahy decalaring
*I esteem your excellency in the place of ay father and mother9 and 
myself as your sonv and should think myself happy to lay down sy life 
for the preservation of yours" #1
Colonel Clivef Admiral Watson and Major Killpatrick, known to the
Indians then hy their Mughal titles respectively as S&but Jang ( or Firm In
War) t Dilir Jang ( or the CouragSus in War) and Di^rar Jang ( or Couragous 
2in War) were acceptable as soldiers, men of rank# They had also a claim to 
acceptance because they vere Christians# The Nawab in his letters to Clive 
could appeal for his due regard to the treaty relationship between them on 
this ground t
"After having made peace to begin war again no religion can justify# The 
Marattas have no Books of Cod, yet are just to their contracts# You 
have the Book of God0 if you are not just to your contracts it will be 
astonishing and unaccountable"** J
The fact that Clive and his fellow countrymen were people of the Bock in
itself gave them a statuhi^superior to that of the heathen natives^# However
it was Clive's soldierly virtues and his professions of filial attachment
which made him a particular objeet of regard# To the Nawab, and his nobles,
Clive was one of their sort, a soldier and a nobleman, who would appreciate
the gift of two leopards "extremely good at catching deer", because he
doubtless shared their own taste for hunting# Sy 30 March 17571Clive could
report with satisfaction to the Nawab of A root that "the Nawab in this
£
country respects us”# The redpeot was paid to the soldier, not to the
merchants of the Company# "Tell Roger Drake* not to "disturb our affairs", 
Siraj ud daulah wrote to Clive on 10 March 1757* in a tone which showed
7
scant respect to one who was constitutionally Clivesuperior in Bengal#1 
1# Clive to Siraj ud daulah, 5 Feb 1757o H>JS*195l 30 *
2# Clive was known in India as Sabut Jang ( correctly Sabit Jang), a title 
which was conferred on him by the Nawab of Arcot (Malcolm,op cit,1,400-1), 
Ghnlaa Husain referred to Watson as Admiral Dilir Jang Bahadur(Seir*II * 
225) while the Major is referred to as "Dilhir Jung"in the Nawab1 s letter 
to Clive dated 10 Mar 1757(HIS, 195l 65)#An appendix is added to this 
chapter giving the Hugfral names and titles of some of the early English 
officials of the Company in Bengal#
3. Siraj ud daulah to Clive, 19 Feb 1757* HIS, 193» 56#
4* Hafiz ullah Khan, eldest son of Sarfaraz Khan appealed to Clive for
protection " for the prophet Jesus's sake"(recdt 19 Jul 1757»HI S»193>t%0) 
5* Siraj ud daulah to Clive,24 Mar 1757# HIS,193l 80*
6# Tide HIS,1931 SO 0 7* HJli, 193} 64-65,
n
In the same letter again Siraj ud daulah had asked Clive to "send Dilher
Jung (the Major) that I may speak my mind to him and send him hack to you**l
The Nawab was greatly annoyed at Drake’s correspondence with Manikchand -
he was Siraj ud daulah’s governor of Calcutta during occupation in 1756-
and complained M I have delivered to Mr* Watts the three Lack of rupees
and I will finish the rest of the business in ten or twelve days, then
2
why should Roger Drake write these letters privately*** Even William Watts 
enjoyed a better status in the eyes of the Nawab*The reason was not merely 
the Nawab’s disgust for Drake for causing the late trouble, but also the 
fact that irrespective of his official position (as Second of the Calcutta 
Council holding the chief ship of Kasirabazar) he was the accredited agent 
of Clive at Murshidabad* Watts was all the more welcome because he had 
brought with him a contingent of artillery troops, one officer,one serjeant 
one corporal and fifteen privates^ for which the Nawab had sent an urgent 
request to Clive0 "I desire that when you dispatch Mr* Watts to Muxadabad", 
the Nawab had written to Clive on 14 February 1757# "you vfill send 25 
artillerymen with him for my service"f Clive had readily complied with 
the Nawab* s request , offering politely to pay for the troops from 
himself0 Watts could have no better way of creating a favourable impression 
at the city* Tiile Clive and the Nawab corresponded direct or through Watts^ 
Company business at the Durbar continued as before through a Vakil*
Hie development of this new relationship between the Nawab and the 
English commanders was cut short of course by the development of a 
conspiracy at Murshidabad against Siraj ud daulah* As a new element 
introduced through Watts into the political life of Jlurshidabad, the 
English also became for the first time involved in it* Hie Anglo-Mughal 
relationship thus entered a new stage of development*
The newness was not in the origin- of the conspiracy, but it lay in the
direction of its development* Soon after his accession to the Masnad in 1756
the Nawab had faced a conspiracy at Murshidabad and a revolt at Pumea* Mir
1* Siraj ud daulah to Clive, 10 Mar 1757* HmS,193s q4-£5« Major Killpatrick 
was meant*
2* ib-d* Drake had written to Manikchand urging the early return of goods 
plundered in Calcutta by the Burdwan mutasaddis and servants, adding 
"Don’t look on this as a trifling thing below your notice1*0(HIS, 193;65)
3* Clive to Sirajud daulah, 16 Feb 1757•HkS,193157•
4, Siraj ud daulah to Clive, 14 Feb 1757* HMS,193I57•
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Jafar then urged upon Shaukat Jang to fight the Nawab, assuring him that 
several commanders and grandees at Murshidabad including himself looked 
upon Shaukat Jang "as their only resource against the growing and daily 
cruelties of Seradj-ed-doulah* s"J almost in the same way as a conspiracy
headed by Haji Ahmad, grandfather-in-law of Reza Khan, had invited Alivardi
' *  2 
to rise against Sarfaraz Khan on the latter*s accession in 1739»Sir&j ud
daulah had a better success in 175& against Shaukat Jang than Sarfaraz had
against Alivardi in 1740* One reason of Siraj ud daulah* 8 success had been
his tighter grip over his capital, for all thoughts of getting rid of the
Nawab, says William Watts in his jpmoirs, "availed little, since the
attempt was equally difficult and dangerous; and failing in it sure to be
attended with sudden and certain destruction"• In the conspiracy of 1757p
however, there was for the conspirators "one way to move, or rather to
lessen the risk; and this also was easily discovered,, It was procuring the
4
countenance and assistance of the English"; The English were no longer 
merely merchants of Kasimbazar, cut off from from the social and political 
life of Murshidabad, as they had been only the previous year, they were 
now in Murshidabad,enjoying the friendship of the Nawab, and what is more, 
being courted by the latter for military assistance against the threatened 
invasion of the Abdali*The recapture of Calcutta by S&but Jang and Dilir 
Jang^ and the forcing of the treaty of Alinagar^in February did not , to 
the Murshidabad nobles,mean anything more than emergence of powerful rivals
7
of Siraj ud daulah, and to be courted against the latter* The presence of
Watts at Murshidabad was an additional advantage, and to avail thisfone
of the enemies of the Nawab, Khuda Yar Khan took the first move and "sent
8
several messages to Mr* Watts" * jy 26 April 1757 Watts had reported to have 
had a message also from Mir Jafar two days earlier saying that if the 
English were "content" Rahim Khan, Rai Durlabh and Bahadur Ali Khan and 
others " are ready and willing to join their force, seize the Nabob and 
set up another person that may be approved of"? A revolution got . a start
i* Seir, II, 1^6* 2« F* Gladwin, Transactions in angal, 15^-155«
3* W0 Watts, Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal, rjGm 4» ibid*
5* That is,Clive and Watson. 6. This was the name given to Calcutta*
7, There was no sense of alarm* Similar was the reaction of the Mu^ials in 
Oudh, after Plassey* Omar hili Khan-Mir Jafar* s agent wrote t"your
reputation is lost by the ^engees^^ristian^having beat you {therefore 
they all cry out they are no soldiers in Bengali"(HIS, 1951201-2)
8,Watts, opcit ,?6* 9.Watts*s letter,26 Apr. BSC 1 May 1757.
14
but ittfas not yet olear who was ts replace Siraj ud daulah*
The determination of this matter came ultimately to lie in the hands
of the Knglish. The Port St* George Council had already advised the Port
William Council on 15 October 1756 "to effect a junction with any powers
in the provinces of Bengal that may be dissatisfied with the violences of
the Nawab*s government, or that may have pretensions to the nawabship* o • • ^ •
On 25 April 1757# the Calcutta Council directed Clive to sound out the
" great people'* at the Durbar and "learn how they stand affected with
2
respect to a revolution'*. By 1 May the Select Committee had received 
information of a conspiracy at Murshidabad and they spoke of themselves 
as allies, for they thought that a revolution being imminent " it would 
be a great error in politics to remain idle and unconcerned spectators of 
an event, wherein by engaging as allies to the person designed to be set 
up we may benefit our employers and the community very considerably****"^ 
But a further consultation of 12 May shows that they were quite ready te 
act as principals, for they then seriously considered whether the M&rath&s 
should be supported before finally deciding upon the "project of estab­
lishing I/ier Jaffier in the Subaship if it can by any means be effected*^ 
Even later, when the deter.dnation of Mir Jafar seemed in doubt even a week 
before the battle of Plassey, Clive was putting up for consideration the 
notion of bringing in the Birbhum Raja, the Marathas or even Ghazi ud din 
Khan after the rains1*
The conspirators at Murshidabad, before Plassey, scarcely appreciated
the nature of the English power which they were calling to their assistance,
Mir Jafar, an immigrant into Bengal during Shuja Khan*s time was an almost
£
uneducated soldier , accepted into the ruling aristocracy because of his
noble birth - he was a Najafi Arab Saiyid - and then because he had married
7
Shah Khanura, Alivardi*s half sister* He was no politician and unlike
T.~ S. CV'lll, ?en.:?l in 1756- ffiT.l. 259-40. "
2* Consultations and proceedings of the Bengal Select Committee (or BSC)
25 Apr 1757.
5. 3SC,1 May 1757* 4* BSC, 12 Khy 1757. 5. BSC, 25 June 1757.
6* A.C.Roy, The Career of Mir Jafar Khan (1757*1765). 2*
7. It is interesting to note Umiohand1* assessment of Mir Jafar*He told 
Robert Gregory on 15 Feb 175® that "the present Nabob Meir Mahomed 
Jaffier would not keep the Government long that he was a soldier and not 
fit to govern"(Gregory*s letter 16 Feb* BSC 18 Feb 1757).he proved rue*
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Alivardi whose name,Mahabat Jang, he later took for himself,Mir Jafar was
never able to act as principal*(He had twice before been involved in
conspiracies, one led by Ata ullah Khan , Reza Khan#s fathor-ir^law in
1747, and tiie other when Shaukat Jang had revolted in Pumea in 175^2 )Bv«a
now he does not seem at first to have aimed personally at the Masnad* In
settling terms with the English he depended entirely on Rai Durlabh -
Ghulam Husain statos positively that the agreement was concluded in Mir
2
Jafar* s name by Raja Durlabhraa - and Scrafton reported on 30 November
175® that "the Nabob had only a cypher treaty and even that is lost*' \
The pivotal figure in the conspiracy appears to have been Rai :)urlabht
eldest son of Raja Janaki Ram, brought up ushered into Kilit&iy c
aristocracy by assignment of army command, and on his failure as deputy
4
governor of Orissa,made the Nizamat Diwan, the job of a nutasaddi which
fitted him* Rai Durlabh had been warned that "if we ^Ehe English^ were once
5
permitted to march this way we should not quit Muxadabad these 3 years", 
and it was he who objected to the lavish monetary promises in the treaty 
drafted at Calcutta, saying "where shall he and Meer Jaffier be able to 
raise such a sum as two crores and a half in a month's time.•*•"^However, 
he was silenced by the promise of five per cent for all that he could get 
for the English. *Iir Jafar was made to sign an obligation about the 
implication of which he had not the least idem , and the manoeuvre was an 
achievenent af Watts for he knew well that Mir Jafmr was a *tool in the 
hands of Roydulub"? ihen at last on 24 June 1757• the day following Clive*s 
victory at Plassey, Mir Jafar received a message ef congratulation from the 
real victor, expressing a "hope to have the honor j of proclaiming you HaboV*^ 
the new Nawab could not but look upon Clive as the maker of his fbrtune.
It was only natural, for Mir Jafar nad been used to serving the Masnad 
for nearly thirty years, never even dreaming perhaps, of himself ascending 
it. To Clive personally he was very much grateful and gratefulness soon
I. Seir,II, 24-25,196. 2. 3«ir. 11.257-38.
3•Nuke Scrafton to Hastings,30 Nov 1758(Add Kss 29132 f 52)* With Walsh 
Scrafton had been introduced to Siraj ud daulah by Clive as "a relation of
mine and another person" on 3 Eeb 1737 (KMS,195l30) •Thou^ d* Sorafton belong­
ed to Dacca establishment, at Clive*s request the Select Committee had 
posted him to Murshidabad to assist Watts(BSC 28 Apr 1757)*
4# Seir, II, 2-6,117-18*Ke was opposed to Siraj ud daulah because the latter 
had raised aMa^ -Tniri Hindu, Rai Mohan bal to the post he Gnce held*
5. Watts's letter to Clive, 6 June,1775 (BSC 11 Jun 1775)
£  :v«++O m - i v o . X  T i i r m  1 7 C i 7 . r m j R - A A R i * ; 7 l *  7  .  - i h - l d . .
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developed into fondness for the "brave young soldier of thirty* Clive for
his part addressed Mir Jafar in terms of personal devotions
“Whenever 1 write to your excellency it is the same as if I was 
writing to my father. Such regard and friendship as a son has for his 
father such have I for your excellency, and whenever I have any favour 
to request it is for your excellency’s advantage* ** 1
It is important not to lose sight of the nature of the Angl&»Mugh&l
relationship immediately after the battle of Plassey* Clive was
serving the interests of the Company, even of Britain, but to Mir Jafar
government meant personal government, and his approach to Clive was also
personalo The Nawab did not know the Company and felt no obligation to it «
it was Clive to whom he felt and expressed his gratitude* This was under^
stood, moreover, by the Company’s servants in Bengal, and that was why when
Drake departed in June 1758 Watts, Manningham and Becher who had been
appointed governors by rotation in a ;Joint minute resigned their post
2
which was unanimously offered to Clive*
The Nawab did know a few Englishmen besides Clive, some of them quite 
well, but even these, Watts, Amyatt and Manningham wore seen rather as 
agents of Clive rather than of the Company* Again Hastings gained the 
Nawab*s confidence as Clive’s man and at Clive’s commendation* On 18 August 
1759 Hastings acknowledged this in a letter to Clive* He wrote saying that 
the Nawab “knew no body amongst the English but yourself to whom he had 
every obligations and that nothing but his friendship for you restrained 
him from retaliating the many insults which he pretended to have received 
from the English** He went on, * I am much obliged to you for the desire 
you are pleased to express to maintain my influence at the Durbar, which 
(though not on this occasion) I fear will shortly fall very low indeed* It 
is ( I own with great concern I learn) that your resolution is fixed to
A
return this season to Europe*? Curious though it may appear , the Nawab 
does not appear to have understood that the Company was not an individual 
but an impersonal and corporate body of merchants* When Clive was about to 
go home, early in 1760, Mir Jafar sent with him seven packets of curiosities
i* Clive to ydr Jafar* 15 July 1757• HHS, 195> 100*
2* Joint minute of Watts,Charles Mannigham and Richard Becher^BPC^fi Jun 175® 
5* Warren Hastings ,Resident at Murshidabad to Clive,18 Aug 1759#
( Add Mss* 29096 f 169)*
4* ibid*
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for his ally, Clive1s master in London, and with them a letter addressed
as thou^i to some Individual chief or ruler* The letter in Warren Hastings^
translation, reads t
"After particulars of my earnest desire to see you w^ 5ich]7 w/oul/d 
prove ye /the7  greatest advantage to me : which exceeds anything 
yt ^ thaycould be written or spoke I proceed to address myself to 
your heart ye repository of friendship*
The lights of ray eyes, dearer yn /thaiy ray life, the Nabob Zobdut ool 
I.lulk Mayenodowls Sabut J ang Bahadr ^ JliveJ' is departing for his own 
country* But his continuance in Bengal was in every respect satisfac­
tory* It is my perpetual wish that the return of the *jj light of 
my eyes above mentioned may happen very speedily} because I call him 
my son though X esteem him more yn a son* A separation from him is 
most afflicting to me* If you dispatch him speedily, to these parts 
and grant me ye happiness of seeing him again, it will be a real 
obligation"* 1
The wording of the Nawab9 s letter also serves as a reminder that to
Mir Jafar and to his contemporary Indians ( except perhaps a few merchants
of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay) Clive was no Englishman as we might
understand the term, but Nawab Sabut Jang Bahadur* Clive had been inducted
2
into the Mughal system under this title by the Nawab of Arcot as the
Armenian KhojeJk Gregory had been transformed into Gurghin Khan by the
Nawab of Bengal*Beforo he left Bengal in 1760 Clive was a full- blown
I'ugftal m&nsabdar with the rank of six thousand zat and five thousand horse,
and the title of Zubdat ul Mulk conferred by the Mughal Emperor* The
title,-particularly that of Nawab indicated that he was placed at par
with the Ihi^ ial nobility » and above that of nobles of non-Mugfral and ,
Indian origin, who irrespective of whether they were Hindus or Muslims
bore the title of Raja^* After Clive, all the governors of Fort William,
( except Hoi well) and principal officers of the Company9 s array and civil
service were similarly granted Mughal titles and so included within the
imperial system? Of the months immediately preceding Plassey Watts
commented in his Memoirs that the nobles at Murshidabad " were persuaded
W  Vide Warren Hastings Papers* Add Has 29096* ff 215*16*
2* Malcolm, ClivopI, 400-010 3•ibid*,405*He makes a raistake*Zat'means rank# 
4* Tuo current examples were Raja A.sad uz Z&man Khan of Birbhus and his 
kinsman Raja Kamgar Khan of Narhat^emai in-south Bihar*
3* A list mentioning some of them is given in appendix to this chapter*
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they could merit very much from the Company*s servants* by laying ©pen his 
^the Nawab*e^secrets* and thereby shewing them* what these people thought 
they did not least suspect* the danger to which they stood exposed*! After 
Plassey the acceptance of Englishmen into the Mughal system became even 
more complete*$y January 1759 Clive had also been offered the Diwami of 
Bengal from Dmjhdisoaa had been found in the past for all nationalities 
in the imperial service $ there was no reason why the English should not 
be found a place*
Clive* though more considerate towards Mir Jafar than many of his 
countrymen* could yet urge William Pitt* on 7 January 1759* to consider the 
possibility of establishing a British dominion in Bengal arguing that 
•Hnbsulmans are so little influenced by gratitude* that the llawah would 
doubtless M break with us" whenever his interest would require iiS The 
Mughal attitude however was that m working partnership was perfectly 
possible* This is perhaps best illustrated by the conditions which a 
number of Mughal chiefs proposed to Major Munro in 1764 as the basis #f 
agreement to be signed by the English in the name of Jesus and Llajqff j3w 
first article of the proposed agreement ran*
*
" The Company should in every respect regard as its own the honour and
reputation of the Moghals who are strangers in this country and make
then its confederates in every business*«
Other articles laid down that
* whatever Morals whether Iranis or Turanis come to offer their 
services should be received on the aforesaid terms*
and that
•should anyone be desirous of returning to his own country «,« 
he should be discharged in peace** 5
This was the political climate of Bengal when Reza Khan first came to
prominence* and sharing with the Nawabs and other Mughal leaders an
absolute ignorance of English attitudes and objectives* the Khan like the
Nawabs lies to have aimed at a sort of Anglo-Jfaghal rule within the
framework of Tir.urid sovereignty*
T*,W» Watts* op cit* ".7 ~ — ~ ~ "
2, Clive to itfil 11am Pitt* 7 J*n 1759# quoted s (f*f*Forrest* The Life of 
Lord Clive* Vol II, 412.
3 * ibid*
Calendar of Persian Correspondence ( or CPC) Vol I* Nos#2416*2418*
39 CPC* I* 2423*
Reza Khan, coming into Timurid India from outside* was accepted 
into the ruling community* was granted office and jagir\ and in return 
accepted the Mughal pattern ©f government as right and proper© Alivardi 
provided the example of what a Nawab should be* Haji Ahmad* Alivardivs 
brother and Reza Khan1 s grandfathezwirwlaw* and Nawazish Muhammad Khan 
who headed the civil administration of Bengal under the Nawabs Shuja
Khan and Alivardi Khan* provided him with liLs yardstick or ideal as an
2 3administrator * .As Naib at Murshidabad Reza Khan was to work in
conjunction with the English towards the model which these men had
provided* What the Alivardian traditions in Bengal were* Reza Khan has
set out in his own words as follows g
•The ryots ^ cultivators^tho not rich* were content* The Zemindars 
and Talookdars were father and friend of the people* They maintained 
a proper police and were accountable for every branch of it* 
Complaints were readily heard and justice administered*
The lands were well cultivated and the Zemindars and Talookdars 
found their interest in encouraging it and promoting an increase 
of inhabitants* If either fell off* a supervisor was sent to assist 
the Zenindar and relieve the people*
Rents were proportioned to the value of produce of land and new­
comers were assisted with utensils***** 4
As for revenue*
*in former times there was none determined* the landlords gave a 
present or tribute to the soveipLgn* In the reign of King Akbar the 
revenues were settled and increased under his successors* but still 
the general interest was considered* The people were not oppressed,, 
The Zemindars and Talookdars being men of property paid their rents 
duly and were honoured and encouraged* If they failed Anils were 
sent* not to dispossess them* but to inquire into the causes of their 
default and to relieve them*** 5
H*'it may be interesting to observe that though it would have been none 
too difficult for him to acquire a Zemindar!* the Khan could never 
think of acquiring one* due perhaps to his inability to shake off his 
sense of identity with the ruling community* A Zemindar however 
powerful was after all a subject of the Nughals whose invariable 
maxim* Ghulaa Husain says* was to *keep them low*(Seir*111*181),India* 
Reza Khan maintained* was a conquered territory* a Dar ul Harb* and 
therefore no homeland of the Hughals who lived in India as sojourners* 
(Reza Khanfs note*Francis Mss.*I*0«Eur E 13 f 417) A jagir*however 
insecure* like an of flee under government* conferred a status which 
was unattainable otherwise*
2* The Naib* assisted by the Hindu chief of the Khalsa* the Rai Rayan 
and the Jagat Seth acting as government banker administered the 
country since Shuja Khan* s time* This model was adopted by Clive0 
3* Reza Khan* s designation underwent several changes*
4* Reza Khanfs note*Feb 1775(^1^010 Mss**I.0**Eur E 28,345-56)* 5* ibid*
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For collection of revenue
"the Kistbund/~7 or rent was settled yearly, vizt upon the first of 
April /the Bengali month of Baisakh which begins in April/.
The Zemindars and Talookdars received rent for inhabited pl&ees monthly 
and for corn grounds at the time of harvest*
They made their own payments 6/16 at the end of the first half year and 
10/16 at that of the latter* But a monthly examination was made by the 
officers of government, respecting the state of farms,probable 
prospects of collecting rents or reasonable grounds for raising them"
As a result, the Khan declared, in Alivardi*s Bengal
"ballances were formerly very uncommon; whenever they arose,inquiry 
was made into their causes. If they appeared reasonable the rent was . 
lowered and the deficiency was remitted. If not, it was charged to and 
recovered from the Zemindars".
Reza Khan also describes the traditional government policy towards trade
and manufacture* He says
"the workmen made /goods/ of their own accord, and sold to whomsoever 
they pleased. Merchants of all nations bought and sold without 
hindrance. The trading people were rich and consumption immense.There 
was then a great export of the produce of the country and a vast 
influx of specie. The governing power never interfered in trade, but 
encouraged the i.aerchants and redressed every grievance"!
and bankers then
"were a numerous and useful body.The people trusted their property 
readily in their hands and in return their assistance enabled the 
landholder to make good his engagement to government and rendered 
remittance easy and promoted cultivation".
He likewise sets out the pattern of judicial administration^recording that
"in this country justice has been administered to the people agreable 
to the ancient established laws. There are books in which laws are 
clearly expressed and set forth". 1
"Tww courts were appointed - vizt. the Adawlut Alia or King’s court for 
criminal matters etc. 'The sentence of this court was presented to the 
Nabob who examined the proceedings, consulted the judges, and confirmed 
or rejected it. The Khalsa decided all disputes relating to property, 
land, debts etc. But an appeal lay to the Sudder or city where cause 
was ultimately determined, lliese Khalsa courts were held essential 
towards a due collection of tne revenue..^ And/ they were established in 
the several districts of Dacca, Poorania /purnea/.Silhet /Sylhet/,
Rajemahal, Rangpur, Boglepore /Bhagalpur/"and Hougley /Hugli/t 2
1. By ’books*the Khan was obviously referring to the luran and tne Sunna or 
traditions ef Islam, as also, perhaps to the law books of the Imam Abu
Hanifa and the Code of Alamgir (Aurangzeb).
2. Reza Khan’s note, Feb 1775 ( Francis Mss.,1.0., Eur E 28, pp 345-556)*
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Reza Khan also had a clear picture of the nature of landed property in
Bengal and of the reciprocal duties of the ruler and the ruled which
appears to be based on the traditions to which he was heir. He states,
"The Zemindars and Talookdars are masters of their own lands. The 
Prince may punish them but cannot dispossess them. Their rights are 
hereditary.Princes have no immediate property in lands. They even 
purchased ground to erect mosques and buryal places**.
"The Prince is to receive the revenues of the state, to make such laws 
and regulations only as are consistent with justice; to study the 
general good of the country, and to cherish all his subjects.
The Zemindars and Talookdars are to protect, encourage and comfort the 
ryots and others under them and it is duty of them all to pay their
rents faithfully and to give obedience to the laws".
Finally he sums up the whole tradition by describing what he believed to
be the essence of the ruler’s duty* It was
"To issue such orders and regulations only as are consistent with the
customs and manners of the country;
To enforce obedience thereto in the officers of the state as well as 
in the people;
To protect and encourage manufacturers, merchants,bankers and all 
ranks of people;
To hear and decide all complaints impartially and without 
delay ;
To pay attention to the local customs of the several Mahals or 
districts in settling their Bundobust and mode of collection;
To obtain a constant commmication of all events and observation of 
consequence in every part of the province*. 1
Reza Khan’s whole career as Naib at Murshidabad can be seen as an 
attempt to hold as far as possible to his traditional ideal of government, 
to protect the old Ifughal ordering of society against the changes and 
encroachments which the English sought to impose. Or, to put it another 
way, his constant aim, especially in the period which forms the subject of 
this study, was to persuade his English masters to accept Mughal ideals 
and practices as their own.
1. Reza Khan’s note, February 1775* (Francis Hss, 1.0. Eur E 28, pp 345-56)?
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This study is not tne first to be made of Reza Khan in recent years®
As early as 1925 Imtiaz Muhammad Khan wrote two articles for the Calcutta 
Review, published by the University of Calcutta! These sketched the whole
career of the Khan, but concentrated particularly upon his trial, in the
2
author's view the "dominant feature of his life"*' His study necessarily 
suffered from the limitations of space within which it was published, and 
contains some errors, but above all it suffered from not being broadly set 
against the political background of the period. The trial, however minutely 
described, cannot be understood except as part of a political campaign* 
Imtiaz Muhammad Khan's articles were soon followed by two other articles 
on Reza Khan and Chitpur family of which he was the founder by one Ameer 
Ali Midhut Jang, most probably of the Khan's family and these were published 
in Calcutta's Muslim Institute journal, the Muslim Review^These were less 
ably written than the study by Imtiaz Muhammad Khan,but the author brought 
to light a portrait of the Khan and also a genealogical table of the 
family beginning with Reza Khan and brought down to 1927*
Dr. N.Majuradar in her "Justice and Police in Bengal, 1765*1793 - a 
study of the Nizamat in decline", published in 1960, also dealt with Reza 
Khan and in broader fashion* However, her interest was primarily in 
judicial and police administration, and particularly in the changes which 
took place after 1772* Her work does throw considerable li^it on Reza Khan's 
role in the development of the judicial administration, but mainly in the 
post-trial period, when the Khan had been restored to the office of Naib 
Nazim* Her main emphasis thus falls on the period after 1773# the year at 
which this study enas* An earlier thesis but published in 1961, a year after 
Dr. Majumdar's book, "The Judicial Administration of the Hast India Company 
in Bengal, 1765-1782" by Jr.B.B.Misra also has an extensive notice of Reza 
Khan, but Dr. Misra's emphasis has been more on the evolution of the new 
judicial institutions than on Reza Khan,
1* "Reza Khan and his trial" by I/if.Khan, the Calcutta Review,Dec 1925»Feb 1
2. Vide, the Calcutta Review,Feb 1926,p 269* 1926*
3* "An Account of Muhammad Reza Khan" by A. A.M* Jang, the Muslim Review,Vol.II4 ttt m 7>a<\n  ^ — ■" - —
23
Apart from these studies there are no other modern works which have 
Reza Khan as their main subject. Of course no general work on the period 
fail8 to make some mention of the Khan, hut the whole weight of interest 
in the period after Plassey has been upon the military and political 
activities of the Company, upon the careers of suoh figures as1 Clive,Verels1 
Hastings, Francis, Shore and Cornwallis and even of Charles Grant or 
Jonathan Duncan, or more recently upon the European sources of their ideas* 
But thus to neglect the Indian side of the story, to fail to examine the 
activities,personages and ideas of Mughal Bengal, though natural, is 
distorting* Monographs, it is true,have been written on Mir Qasim and Mir 
Jafar of the post-Plassey period and there has also been a more recent 
study of the conflict between Siraj ud daulah and the East India Company 
but most of them, though excellent studies in themselves, fail to take 
any adequate notice of the great transition through which Bengal was then 
passing* The conflict of the age intensified in the career of Reza Khan, 
a Mugfral representing an old system and yet serving the English who 
were soon to introduce a new one* one result of which was his personal
tragedy* As Shore remarked in 1782, "he has often ••* been blamed, where
2
hia hands were tied up***
English contemporaries of Reza Khan had little doubt of the Khanfs
importance and stature* In England Dow thought it worthwhile to include
a violent propagandist attack upon the Khan in his popular History of
Hindostan* James Grant in his Analysis of the Finances of Bengal cast him
as "the great defaulter", the wholesale plundererf Colonel Caillaud
thought it necessary to pass on to Hastings the warning he had received
"from a man who sees far into things with much judgement and penetration"-
"To Beware of Mahomed Reza Cawn I" Warren Hastings’s Council, while the
1* There is however an article on "Some Records Rex Reza Khanfs trial" by 
Nani Gopal Choudhury in the Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records 
Commission, 1946*
2,QuotedxN»Vajumdar,Justice and Police in Bengal,1763-1793# p196* j
5*See ihfra Chapter 110 !
4*Grant "based his comment on the basis of twenty volume^ Persian accounts |
"procured through the influence of a light and private purse"which inffCi- j
end failed him <{to provide an adequate basis on which practical proposals
could be based",Grant however did not know the Khan personally but
from what he had learnt from report, "in Hindostan, a Mussulman could | 
not be found characterized by greater 
and moderation locally understood",(Fi
reputed" virtues of honour,sagacity 
rndhger ,jUftfr jteuort ,11, XX) '
Khan was still a prisoner under trial, on the other hand could write
"Although Mahomed /Reza. Khan^ can no longer benefit by our good opinion of
him, yet we cannot omit to express our thorough conviction that he ever 
served the Company with a fidelity , integrity and ability which they can
hardly expect to experience in any future officer of government whom they
may chuse from the same class of people"* 1
If Reza Khan loomed so large in the eyes of Englishmen of his day, it would
seem that a revaluation of the man and his career would not be out of place0
By reworking a limited but most important period in Reza Khan’s career, in
2
considerable detail, it is hoped that the balance may in part be redressed*
The sources used for this study have been relevant official documents, 
supplemented by contemporary private papers and private accounts, mostly in 
English and some in Persian* While basic facts have beon sought from official 
records preserved in the India Office Library and in the British Museum, and 
in one case also from the records in the National Archives of India, private 
records and accounts have been helpful in understanding them* In life Reza 
Khan and Warren Hastings clashed, but for light on the career of Reza Khan, 
Warren Hastings’s papers in the British Museum have been the most illumina-? 
ting '* Indeed no study of eighteenth century Bengal is possible without 
Hastings’s papers. When Hastings was absent from Bengal, Richard Earwell was 
there, and Barwell’s letters which are already published in Bengal Past and 
Present offer an insight into men and events of the period, which cannot 
perhaps be obtained anywhere else** Philip Francis arrives in Bengal about 
the time when ohr study of Reza Khan closes and yet Francis’s own papers 
and collections, now in the India office Library, fill? up some of the most 
vital gaps* The Committee of Secrecy’s letter of 28 August 1771 ordering the 
arrest of the Khan could only be found in Francis’s collection* For Reza 
Khan’s conception of Alivardian Bengal again wo are indebted primarily to 
him?* Where these three have failed, three Persian histories have been most 
helpftxlo Of these three Persian histories, two, the Seir and the Iviuzaffamamaj
T« For Caillaud*s letter to Hastings,27 Mar 1772 see Add Mss 19133 £ 9^1
for Calcutta Council’s letter to Court,10 Nov1773> see Monckton-Jones,M*E. 
Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772-1774$ p 199«
2* Reza Khan was acquitted and reinstated as Naib Nazim, but the damage done 
to his character and reputation was rendered permanent by the fact that he 
had been tried at all* Any recovery of his reputation was rendered diffi­
cult by Grant’s Analysis and it became almost impossible since the late 
19th century when Hindu nationalist, writings in Bengali, particularly 
those seeking to glorify Nahdkumar as a martyr, made him almost a villain*
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are available in English translation , though a major part of the latter
2
has yet to be translated from its Persian text; the third, the Tarikh -i-
Muzaffari, j is available in the Persian
------------------ at>3
original in the British Museum © The authors of these Persian histories, 
Saiyid Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai, Karam Ali and Muhammad Ali were no 
impartial observers; while Ghulam Husain was a critic of the Khan, the 
other two were admirers - they both named their works after Muzaffar Jang, 
that is Reza Khan0 The same lack of impartiality can of course be traced * 
in all contemporary accounts of men and events© Caution had therefore to 
be exercised while using all private accounts, whether in English or 
in Persian® While an attempt has been made to leave out no relevant 
official records, no claim is made to have exhausted all sources of 
information© The object has been to present a oonraoted aooount of the 
Khanfs career and that is what has been achieved, it is hoped, with some 
contribution to our knowledge of the man and a fresh review of the 
circumstances in which he lived and workedy
1* A part of the Muzaffamamah has been translated by Sir J.N.Sarkar in 
his Bengal Nawabs0 
2® Only the 1.0® copy of the manuscript has been used for this study®
i Til I r r t a a r  l a ani
3 A* The'British Museum Persian Manuscript No© OR
A 0* By *Official records* only the English East India Company records are 
meant. No notice has been taken of the records of other European 
nations which also had their trade connections with Bengal0 For 
detail, the Select Bibiliography may be seen©
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Appendix*
A list of some Company servants with their Mughal titles by which 
they were generally known to the Indians*
* Name 
1* Admiral Watson 
(of H.i . Navy )
2. Lord Clive
3* Major Killpatrick 
4* Col.Porde
5# Col. Coote
6. Gen* Camac 
7* Maj* Adams
8, Maj. Fletcher 
9* Capt* Knox
10* H. Vansittart
1 1 » *
11* J. Spencer
12. H. Verelst
13. ?. Sykes
14. H . Becher
15* S. Middleton
16. w. McGwire
17. H. Harriot
18. J. Johnstone
19. J. Graham
20. G. Vansittart
21. w . Hastings
Title 
Dilir Jang
Meaning of the Title* 
The Coura^us in Battle.
Saif Jang The Sword in War
Sabit(or Sabut)Jang The Fin* in War
Amir ul Mamalik The Grandee of the Empire
i‘Uin ud daulah The Eminent in the State
Zubdat ul Mulk The Select of the Kingdom
Lilawar(or Dilir)Jang Couragfeus in War
Shi tab Jang 
Saif Jang 
Nasir Jang 
Mahamu d daulah 
Easalat Jang 
Muzaffar ul Mulk 
Saif ud daulah 
Ghalib Jang 
Musta id Jang 
Dilawar Jang
I!unir ul Mulk 
Ali Jah
Shams ud daulah 
Nasir ul }<ulk 
Munawwir ul Mulk 
Mahamu d daulah 
Babar Jang 
Fakhr ud daulah 
Saif Jang 
Intizam ud daulah 
Izzat ud daulah 
Mushir ul Mulk 
Murad ud daulah 
Ikhtiar Jang 
Jasarat Jang 
Sarfaraz ud daulah 
Iftikhar ud daulah 
Babar Jang 
Hoshyar Jang 
Jaladat Jang 
Umdat ul Mulk
The Brisk in War 
The Sword in War 
The Succourer in War 
The Affairs of the State
The Valorous in War*
The Triumpnant of the Empire 
The Sword of the State 
The Subduer in War 
Heady in War 
The Couragfcus in War
The Illuminer of the Empire
High in Hank
The Sun of the State
The Succourer of the Empire
The Illuminator of the Step ire
The Affairs of the State
The Lion in War
The Pride of the State
The Sword in War
The Administration of the State
The Dignity of the State
The Counsellor of the Empire
The Desire of the State
Supremacy in War
Intrepidity in War
The Exalted of the State
The Distinguished of the State
The Lion in War
Wary in War
Daring in War
The Support of the Kingdom 2
Admiral Watson was not a Company servant but he came to fight a war 
in Bengal that was declared by (rather on behalf of) the Company in 1757, 
The list is taken riaialy from CPC, I, pp 467-68* ^or other* marnes see 
Seir.II, 225; CPCfIII# 372; W.Hastings Papers Add Mss 29096 ff 215-16*, 
ffiS, 193; 65: P.P. fdurtn Heport 1773»P 542(Motiram,s letter to John 
Johnstone)*
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Ml). RKZA KM AN
CHAPTER TWO.
THE EARLT LIFE OF REZA KHAN AND HIS FIRST PUBLIC OFFICE IN 1756#
About the early life and career of Reza Khan little is recorded. We 
know that he was bom in a Shi a family of Shiraz in Iran { or Persia) \  
probably in 17172, the third of the four sons of Saiyid Hadi Ali Khan, the 
physician, i uhammad Husain Khan, the eldest son,was his full brother ) 
Muhammad Ali Khan, the second, and Muhammad Ismail Khan, the youngest son, 
.were his half brothers, bom of a different mother .
When the Khan was about ten years old his father migrated with his four 
sons to Indiaf India under the Tiinurids had always attracted men of talent 
and fortune seekers from Iran(which also included the Persianised and Shia 
dominated Iraq)and from Turan or Central Asia? The break-up of the Shia 
empire of the Safavids begun by the revolt of the Sunni or orthodox Ghilzai 
Afghans in 1709# and accelerated by ten years of full scale war thereafter, 
made the Mughal courts even more attractive to the fugitive noblemen from 
Iran. The Saiyid first took his family to Delhi,where his brother Naqi Ali 
Khan was a court physician and favourite of the Emperor Muhammad Shah(1717- 
1746) .Then much later they moved to Bengal where the Saiyid secured the post 
of Hakim or physician at Murshidabad,the capital of the province,thanks to 
the good offices of another Delhi court physician,”the complement of doctors, 
the reservoir of the physical and philosophical learning, the Galen of his
7
time** ,Alavi Khan.The move was made during the nizamat or governorship of
Q
Alivardi Khan(1740-56)» probably not long after the invasion of Nadir Shah 
(1739) had destroyed and impoverished the city of Delhi.The Saiyid 
became the physician and courtier of Alivardi Khan?the Bihari historian
10Ghulam Husain calling him ”the honourable,the illustrious and respectable”.
Alivardi awarded him an annual salary of Rs 14,000. On the death of Hadi Alj*
1. Tarikh-i-JInzaffari or TM,f 473l <■ 3eir.III.4. 2. TH.f 473sSeir.III.150V
3. tm,473 4. 3^,474.
5* tfhile Turan meant a vast area north of Iran and of Khatai or China,Iran 
meant the extent of its Bmpire from Tigris in the west extending notion-
ally to the Attock or Indus in the east.Vast multitudes of Irani and 
„ Turani adventurers, in Timurid India were known as Mughals.Seir.1,51 fh.
6. L. Lockhart, The Fall ofthe Safavi Bynasty,8o-87t109# 7#Sdlf” irt 107.
6# TH.474 .9 Seir.II#153-9# 10# Selr,' 117 107. 11. ^.T""474.
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Alivardi Khan continued the post to his eldest son kuhamnad Husain Khan, 
who was said to he "A learned man and an able physician"0 ^
Of the life and education of the young Reza Khan in Delhi and kurshida-
b&d nothing is known , except by inference. Doubtless he received the
usual upper class training, learning to read and write Arabic and Persian,
to behave with gravity and circumspection, curbing every emotion and
2
inpatience, and to handle arms and a horse. By tradition his family
belonged to one of the learned professions, and there is some suggestion
3
that he had learnt something of medicine. In later life he was certainly
regarded as a patron of the Murshidabad physicians, who were said to belong
to his "cabal",^ and in 1767 when the English were busy cutting salaries
and officers in Dacca, the one item to stand intact was the R* 1519*10* 0
5
which used to be spent on medicine and a •black* doctor. Reza Kxian also
g
seems to have been fascinated by history. Ghulam Husain says that the
Khan made nothing "of talking much, and in relating during whole hours
together stories which he has picked up in ancient times and books,without
7
once minding the ignorance and unadequateness of his audience"0 ( The
sarcastic tone of the quotation may be due to Reza Khan*s having refused 
to look after Ghulam Husain*s property when he was on pilgrimage, and to
Q
interpose between him and his bankers). Reza Khan*s passion for the past 
may perhaps have been of use to him when, under the English, he was seeking 
to proserve the old society ; it seems certainly to have made him more 
tradition bound and backward looking than was desirable. He was also very 
particular about diction and form in letter writing,then considered 
a great art. Ghulam Husain also tells us, in his unfavourable way, that
9
the Khan enjoyed card3 and dice, and was fond of society, though he would
not allow others to behave informally in his presence, or even to smoke
1. Seir.III.'l50. His salary as paid from Dacca for 21 months from Aug 1763 to 
April 1765 amounted to Rs.76,871 (Factory Record ,D,cca Ho 6.Folio 31)*Ia 
addition he also had some jagir land in Dacca which was later exchanged 
for some other land near kurshidabad(PC 5,5&4>184-5.691). After his death 
five years before that of Reza Khan his son succeeded to his post(JH f474)< 
§. Lo Scraftfcn ,Reflections„19o 3. Seir.III.101-2. 4. SfiiliIII.13 9
5. , FoSykea deportee 1U Apr 1767# 6* 'ill £ 474 7? saig.11i.ldfl.
8. Seir.IIl. 10-711 y. asii.111,143.
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his hookah.• He obviously had his share of the ^ughal aristocratic pride
and looked down 011 the Hindustanis* the earlier* now naturalised* Muslim
2 . . 3
immigrants# Haji Mustafa describes Reza Khan more kindly as a man of
great sense* "when he pleases"* and a fine figure even at the age of
seventy: "...hi3 chest is so broad* his body so erect* his tone of voice
so loud, and his eyes so very full of fire,..".that he seemed likely to
4
live to be a*hundred#
As has been seen* Reza Khan’s father and his eldest brother were both
court physicians of Alivardi Khan# A further rise in the family fortune
occured when the Nawab chose Reza Khan to be husband of a daughter of his
niece Rabia Begura#vBy this marriage Reza Khan entered the ruling family,
linking his fate with their fortunes. There is still no record of hi3
occupying any government post * but he was provide^ for with the grant of
the revenues of a growing market as marriage dowry and presumably with
7
a suitable cash allowance o Besides the Nawab himself* taere were certainly 
many possible patrons for the Khan : his mother-in-law Rabia Begum* daughter 
of Haji Ahmad was married to one of the leading elder nobles*Ataullah Khan 
Sabut J.^ ng* who held the Faujdari of Rajmahal and Bhagalpur* and her 
brothers, the sons-in-law of Alivardi* Nawazish Muhammad Khan.Shahmat Jang| 
Saiyid Ahmad Khan* Saul at Jang and Zainuddin Muhammad Khan, Hai bat Jang, 
were the governors of Dacca, Pumea and Patna# Another daughter of Rabia 
Begum was betrothed to Sira^uddaulah* Alivardi’s grandson.but died before 
the marriage* and yet another married Ikram-ud-daulah* Sira^-ud-daulah*s 
younger brother. Reza Khan was linked through his mother-in-law with Amina 
Begun* the mother of the Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah (1756*57)• It is as Siraj- 
ud-daulah’s Paujdar of Katwa that we first find Resa Khan in public office* 
in 1756*
Hit 150. 2. Seir.IIl. 83.
3# ’Hajee Lustapha* was the name of a French Creole,}.!,Raymond* who published 
the translation of Ghulam Husain’s Seir under the pseudonym of Nota Manus 
in 1789 in 3 volumes and dedicated it to Hastings (Seir. I .Preface dated 
1 Mar 1902). Perhaps it was this ’Kustepha* who corresponded with Hastings 
in English and was made the Superintendent of Kurshidabad Pilkhana in 
1772 by Hastings in order to reduce the influence of the Khan’s favourite 
Niamat.( Add Mss 29133 p 298).Mustepha was interested in ’elephant buying 
in Svlhet*(ibid p 313) and he remitted Rs 3000 to Constantinople in 1772
Uiid.P 309).
4.S9i£ ,111* 150 fn 110.
5-Be married possibly in the early 1740* s while yet in his early twenties, 
6# Erhramgani granted under the seal of trie Diwan Nawazish Muhammad Khan 
was resumed by the English in 1796 (BRP (Sayer)1 Aug 1796)
7* Mir ^asim on his marriage received Rs 200 p.m. (JBCRS.V* 344)
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His appearance on the public stage was short-lived and not very
glorious. Alivardi Khan had died on 10 April, 1756 within two months
his successor Siraj ud daul&h had started his punitive action against the
English at Calcutta. Karu** Ali relates that Reza Khan, as Faujdar of Katwa,
was ordered to march "with a dasta (regiment) of troops by way of Hugli to
the sea for the purpose that in case the English tried to escape in ships
2
he would prevent them from going out of the country". The Khan failed in 
nis TQEL3sion, for despite his title of Kuzaffar Jang, the Victorious in War,
3
he was no soldier. Karam Ali explains that his failure was due to " lack 
of materi Js"f but the removal of the Khan from his post by Siraj ud. daulah 
soon after the capture of Cc*lcutta in June 175® suggests that the Nawab 
thou ht him unfit to command so important a position in the defence of 
i urohiaabadf The personal set-back of Reza Khan was swallowed up, however, 
in the general overthrow at llassey in June 1757* From that upne&val the 
Khan iid not re-appear on the political stage for nearly three and a half 
years.
Whatever tfafc wider results of Plassey, for the family of Alivardi 
it nade very existence precarious. True, Mir Jafar, by his marriage to 
Shah Kh&uum, Alivardi*s half-sister, had also been linked with the family, 
and it was this relationship which gave him a better claim than other rivals 
of Sirajuddaulah. Nevertheless, once he was raised to the masnad (throne) 
in June 1757 &11 members of the old ruling family became su3pQCt.
The first victim of the revolution was the Nawab Sirajuddaulah himself.
Mir Jafar might not have exerted himself much in the pursuit of the fugitive
from llassey and then I'urshidabad, but the English insisted. Clive wrote on 
24 June to Khuda Yar Khan, Khwaja Abdul Hadi and Rai Durlabh not to let their
5
enemy escape^ ', while his agents, Watts and Walsh pressed I-dr Jafar to 
*• use all possible means of apprehending Surajah Dowlat who would
1. The author of Kuzaffar-namah dedicated his work to Reza Khan.The work 
narrates Bengal*s history upto Reza Khan’s arrest in 1772.Karam Ali,who 
beiongtid to Alivardi1 s family,was a nroters of Reza Khan.
2. Ml (vide extracts i n  J.N.Sarkar ^  B e n g a l  Nawaba ? 63^ -64.)
3. Hie title meant formal lncorpora uion inAMughal military aristocracy.
4* The Khan*s successor proved no more successful.(Forrest,Clive 1,439-41).
5. HH5, 193; All the three were Alivardian officers who 'had joined
Mir Jafar against the Nawab Sirajuddaulah.
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*1
otherwise create him much trouble in future” #Again, when the fugitive 
was brought to Murshidabad and given by Mir Jafar into the custody of his
son Kiran, it was with the injunction 1 at all events to preserve his
2
life o Nevertheless, Sirajudaulah was murdered, apparently on Miran* s
3orders | a manner of death which as Scrafton commented l,fixtdw^the 
revolution# All members of Alivardi*s family thenceforth felt threatened©
The family* s troubles were only increased by the loyalty shown them 
from the country which they had governed for nearly 30 years including an
A
•independent* rule of seventeen years# At least two movements seem to
have been formed in favour of Siraj ud daulah*s younger brother Mirza
Mahdio Kolwell reports timt Rajballabh'* supported his candidature, and
even proposed it to Clive^ while Mir Jafar and his son apprehended the
same plot from Rai Durlabh who boasted to Scrafton early in October, " in
7ten days you may expect to see Bengal in a flame” • ITears of conspiracy 
in favour of the ousted family were certainly in the air, for Hastings 
warned Sumner on 12 November that the new government was in confusion
Q
and that there was ”no saying what party may be forming” # Whether 
Mirza Mahdi was actively concerned or not, before the month of November
9
wa3 out he was dead, crushed to death between two planks# Miran justified 
the act x n killing the snake and keeping its young is not the act of a 
wise in an” 0
The savage execution of a boy of fifteen marked the degree of
suspicion and enmity which l.Iir Jafar had come to feel towards Rai Durlabh,
his late partner in the conspiracy against Siraj ud daulah# It was not
only that Rai Durlabh* s name had been linked with a movement in favour
of the young prince, but that after the revolution Mir Jafar and Rai Durlabh
1 o Watts and Walsh to Clive 2& Juna f757* INJStSOS; £>0-£>1#
2# J#Watts* Uemeir*#H 5  3# Scrafton to Roger Drake,J Jul 1757oKMS#808| 65 
.4© Alivardi*s raraily held high offices also under Shuja KhanOT27-39) •
5© Rajballabh,not to be confused with Rai Durlabh* s son of that name, was 
like his father Krishnadev ajfiajmuadar (an officer in Qammgo*s office) 
and served under Saiyid Razi Khan (Sarfaraz Khan* s son-in-law)before 
Alivardi seized the masnad from the Nawab Sarfaraz Khan (1739-40) © Under 
the new regime he served under Gokulckand,Shahmat Jang*s Diwan,and rose 
to be the latter*s deputy at Daeca©His son Krishnadas took shelter in 
Calcutta which aggravated the Nawab* s rupture with the English in 1756®
(iV .Hastings to H# Tansittart 17&l*Ad,d Mss 29132 f 103)©
6# J,Z0Helfcoll, Address to Duke 3cnften(bereinafter)India Tract 378# 39 
7# Scrafton to Clive 8 6et 8©Add jviss^ VCjyt? f 2 •
9© SeirjII, 251© 10#A2Lf 100# /
were opposed in their relations with the English, Hir Jafar, when he was 
chosen to supplant Siraj ud daulah, had dreamt of establishing a regime 
on the Alivardian model* He had taken Alivardi1 s title of Kahabat Jang 
for himself and conferred on his son Miran the title of Shahmat Jang 
once worn by N&wazish Muhammad Khan*^ Rai Durlabh wsl3 concerned pot with 
the old regime but with the five per cent which he was to receive on all 
he secured for the Company, and with the profits which he, his son Raj- 
ballabh, and his brothers Kxmjabaharl, Rasbehari and Brindaban could 
secure for themselves from the revenue administration of the country,
Mir Jafar also felt personally deceived by Rai Durlabh, on whom he
had relied in the final negotiation with the English, The new Nawab
found himself indebted to the extent of over two crores of rupees to the
English and pressed for payment even at his very first meeting with Watts 
2
and Walsh* Rai Durlabh must have known that the sum demanded by the terns 
of the treaty - of which Mir Jafar had not even bothered to keep a copy ^  
were excessive,but the five percent commission had closed his oouth*^ The 
Nawab is said to have told Hastings in 175$* when the sanad for the 
Twenty-four Parganas was being claimed, that ” he only promised the Company 
a tract of land the revenues of which amount to a lack of rupees, and that 
if it was otherwise worded in th| treaty it was owing to the knavery of 
Roydoolub who had deceived hina0 Rai Durlabh appeared both disloyal and 
deceitful*
The Nawab1 s anger was further roused by Rai Durlabh1 s later actions* 
Scrafton, immediately after Plassey had reported to Drake, M The Gentoos
^iindus/ stand in awe of ua, Flatter promise and use every method to get
into favour* Roydullub even seems now attached to us1**^  Rai Durlabh showed 
his attachment by assisting Scrafton to buy up a large traot of land at
1* Seir* 11*258*.
2. Watts to Clive,3 June; Watts and Walsh te Clive 26 June 1757*10©,.808;57, 
60* The total amounted to Ra 229,00,000lA*C*aey, Mir Jafar KhanQ p.293>
3* ^fhere is one lucky circumstance*The Nabob had only a cypher treaty and 
even that is lost”*Scrafton to Hastings 30 Nov 1758oAdd ^ss 29132,f52*
4* Watts to Clive 3 June 1757* HH>*808j 57*
5* Hastings to Clive 1 Dec 175&* Add Mss 29096 f 65*
6* Scrafton to Drake 3 July 1757* HI S.*8081 65.
3 *
Berhampore, despite the Nawab*e "disgust",^ and by indulging Scrafton , 
Clive* s agent at Hurshidabad, in revenue farming under the fictitious names
of "Lit tin jay" (Mrityunjay) and "tlittoochund" (MJLtthu Chand) 9 where he
3
used his new wealth in lending to the Zemindars at exorbitant rates ♦ All 
such currying of English favour was done at the Nawab* s expense*
While Clive was writing to the Nawab blaming his ministers for the 
delay in paying off the promised sum ^ Scrafton at Murshidabad was busy 
setting up a party in opposition to the Nawab , designed 19 to be a 
continual check on him"*^Of this party, Rai Durlabh was most probably 
the central figure* The Rai Durlabh.** Scrafton entente was necessarily 
obnoxious to the Nawab with whom Scrafton, early in November 1757»caae 
almost to a breaking point • Clive intervened to restore working relation 
between the Nawab and Rai Durlabh on the one hand and possibly between 
Scrafton and the Nawab on the other but that was a patchwork which 
collapsed by the middle of 1759*
A major reason for the breakdown was that by January 1759 Nawab
had been forced, to his great dismay, to assign the revenues of Nadia ,
Burdwan, Hugli, Hijli and certain Dacca estates to the English as a means
7
of redeeming his debts * In the Dacca estates this led to a joint adminis-
Q
tration continued until January, 1759 * and eventually in the major
districts to direct English administration* The traditional image of the
Nawab* s government was gravely injured by this measure, for not only was Mir
Jafar prevented from exercising his legitimate authority in the assigned 
9districts, but also the English, particularly at Dacca, used their power^ 
to extend their trade privileges at the cost of the Nawab* s own revenues •
1. BPC 15 Lay 1759I Hastings to Drake 20 June 1759. Add Mss 29096 f 15*
2* Scrafton to Hastings 25 Aug 1759* Add Mss 29152 f 60 Not until 14 Dec 1759
did the Calcutta Council officially appoint any Resident at Murshidabad* 
Until then both Scrafton and Hastings held the post unofficially and on 
private nomination by Clive and Watts*For first official appointment 
of Hastings in December 1759 Add Mss 29152 f 101*
J*«In one case a loan of Rs 50,000 rose in one year to Rs 88,000* (vide 
Scrafton to Hastings 28 Nov 1759* Add Mss 29152 f 49)
4.,Clive to Mir Jafar 7 July 1757• KMS,193; 177*
5* Scrafton, Reflections, 99* 6o Scrafton to Clive 50 Nov 1757*HKS,808|10(
7. BSC ® Dec 1757 and 21 J a n  175a*
8* Hastings to Clive January 1759* Add Mss 29096 f 105
9o Hastings to Clive Nov 1*J59 and 19 Jan 1760. Add Mss 29096 ff 59-60,201.
10* Hastings to W.B.Suaner ( Dacca chief) 50 Jan 17591 to Governor Helwell
19 Feb 1760 . Add Mss 29096 ff 111-12, 223-25*
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Moreover the loss of these rich districts was imposed upon the Nawab at 
a time when his soldiery were starving and when his own life was repeatedly 
threatened by troops demanding their arrears of pay#^
The injury was the more unbearable because the joint administration
further strengthened the links between Scrafton and Rai Durlabh# So close
had their relationship become that the decline in Rai Durlabh* s power*
which became noticeable in July 175$# was described by Hastings as the
2
decline or’much of our power and influence at the Durbar" e Clive in 
May 1758 attempted to take some of the sting out of the situation by 
transferring the administration of the revenues of the assigned districts 
to Nandkumar^nd in August Scrafton* s position at Murshidabad was taken 
over by Hastings* the Second at Kasimbazar factory^  Since Nandkemar had 
been Rai Durlabh* s paid agent in Clive *s camp^ the Nawab cannot have been 
much mollified# In August* therefore* Clive moved the seat of Nandkumar*s 
administration from Murshidabad to Hugli* where he concurrently held the 
double appointment of Company*s Tahsildar (collector) and Diwan of the 
Faujdar Amir Beg Khan .
One of the declared objects of the move was "to avoid giving the
Nabob and the great men about him umbrage in seeing such large sums
coming into the public treasury and sent out again for the use of the
English"* The move did little to heal the breach between Kir Jafar and
Rai Durlabh* for all that it made plain was that the latter* s agent had
7
now become the "idol" of Watts* who had become Clive*s "vizir" in 
administrative matters* and had won the support of Clive#
When Scrafton left Murshidabad in August* Rai Durlabh felt so insecure 
that he sought and obtained the protection of English troops for his
1# Hastings to Clive 15 Sep 175®? C# Manningham 50 Mar 1759 and to Holwell 
19 Feb 1760. Add Mss 29096 ff 28,155* 225#
2. Hastings to Clive 24 July 175®* Add Mss 29096 f 20#
5# Watts,the Chief never resided at Kasimbazar since Plassey# Hastings the 
Second and Sykes the Third Managed all af^rs at Kasimbazar# Hastings*in 
addition assisted Scrafton at the Durbar until he became the successor# 
4« The task of Nandkumar* known to the people as * black* colonel was to 
•cement* and ’increase* the friendship between Rai Durlabh and Clive* 
(Richard Harwell*s note on Nandkumar*(no dats *_3PP,XIII, 104.)
5# BPC 19 Aug 1758 and Scrafton to Hastings 51 Aug#~ldd Mss 29132 f 14*
6* Clive to Hastings 10 Sep 1758* Quoted: (#*R#Crleilc* Warren Has tings. 1164*
7# Scrafton to Hastings 27 Aug and 51 Aug 1758. Add Mss 29152 ff 15-14.
family during their move from Murshidabad to Calcutta early in September. 
Earlier he had arranged through the English support his own escape to 
Calcutta as a member of the Nawab*s entourage when the latter visited 
Calcutta as the first Bengal Nawab ever to do so with a large party of 
Officers and Zemindars9the visit being especially arranged as a demonstra­
tion of the new status of the Englisn in Bengal particularly for the 
rival European nations to take note of ii.On the Nawab’s return from 
Calcutta Rai Durlabh had stayed back much to the Nawab* s relief* But he 
reacted sharply to Rai Durlabh* s canard that the Nawab had set troops 
upon his house at Murshidabad and characterised the report as motivated to 
create difference between him and Clive* Hastings admitted that the Nawab 
was right* Miran had placed spies upon Rai Durlabh* s relations and effects
so as to oblige them to render satisfactory accounts to Rai Umid Ram, the 
Rai^Rayaao But this had occurred while Mir Jafar was in Calcutta 9 and ,
Hastings said, he knew of * no such thing being attempted** since Mir
Jafar* s returS* The Nawab, however, had his own charges of conspiracy tw
make against Rai Durlabh* Immediately after Rai Durlabh* s family had left
-en 11 September for Calcutta , escorted by Ensign EacDowall, a plot t#
murder the Nawab was discovered on 13 September* The plan was to surround
the Nawab as though demanding pay, and to cut him down when he visited
the Imambara during the Muharram celebrations* The plot, Hastings reported,
was ** rendered ineffectual, the Nabob having received timely notice of it**?
A letter allegedly from Rai Durlabh to Khwaja Abdul Hadi was discovered,
saying that a certain Mir Ali had been directed to defray the expenses of the
conspiracy. Harun Khan, iorm^rly of Rai Durlabh*s risala or cavalry ,stated
that the money was sent by Rai Durlabh in the form of a bill for two
lakhs of rupees.^ The incriminatory letter also stated that Mir Kaxem ^
had only "half engaged his consent"to the scheme , for which Rai Durlabh
£
had obtained Clive’s approval through Watts and Scrafton*
1* John Malcolm, Robert, Lord Clive, 1,375** ' ►
•* The Nabob, thank Gpd, leaves tomorrow n Scrafton to Hastings ?4 Aug,175£ 
Add Mss 39152, f,6*
2* Eastings to Clive 24 Aug, 7 Sep 1756* Add Mss 29096 ff 22-25
3* Hastings to Clive-15 Sep 175$* Add Mss 29096 f 26
4. Hastings to Clive 18(?) Sep 1756* Add Mss 29096 ff 28-29*
5* An Arab,Saiyid and an old Alivardian officer, then Paymaster of
Kir Jaiur’s xroopa.Seir. 11,272,280.
6* The letter is quoted in Malcolm , Clive. 1,362-383,
37
A report of the plot together with the supposed letter of Rai Durlabh 
was sent by Mir Jafar to Clive as evidence of Rai Durlabh*s treachery.But 
though Hastings had treated the matter seriously at Murshidabad, as 
Scrafton told him , in Calcutta it was given little importance,^ Clive , 
who regarded the story as an instance of the • dark design of these 
Mussulman" , argued that while Rai Durlabh* s life and fortune were in his 
hands he would not have dared to attack a man so well regarded by Clive as
p
Mir Jafar, The story was believed it Murshidabad for Khwaja
Abdul Hadi when confronted could not deny the allegation and against
Mir Kazem*s oath on the '^ uran denying the allegations there was the seal of
A
that gentleman affixed to a secret agreement detailing the plot ,but 
also because the role of the alleged plotters fitted in all too well 
with their known attitudes,That Scrafton was hostile to the Nawab was well 
known* to him Mir Jafar was "an animal", a man compounded of "folly", 
"obstinacy and treachery", a rascal who needed to be"bullyed " and with 
a "rod of iron",** In September 175® he had expressed to Hastings his hope 
that on Clive* s departure "all personal connection" with Mir Jafar would 
stop, and that when "we have any thing of a force we shall not be long 
without a second rupture with the government",^ Scrafton* s intimates at 
Murshidabad included Rai Durlabh and Mir Kazem if not also Khwaja Abdul
7
Hadi , together with Ghulam Shah and Mirza Kazea ,who was a close relation
0
of Alivardi Khan’s Begum, The only part of the plot to which iir Jafar 
would not give credence was that relating to Clive, to whom he sent the 
letter as proof of Rai Durlabh*s mischiefs.
In Calcutta a jury presided over by Nandkumar declared the letter a
9
forgery, though the verdict did not satisfy Amir Beg Khan, the Faujdar of 
Hugli and llir Jafar* s pricipal channel of contact with Clive and the English, 
Amir Beg went away • greatly disgusted", particularly against latts,
1, Scrafton to Hastings 28 Nov 175®« Aud Mss 29132 f 48e
2, Clive to Hastings 6 Oct 175®• Quoted : Malcolm, Clive,!, 3®1*
3* Seir Ht 272,274*
4* SeiPf II,Z72»4* The seal was affixed by one of the iiir’s intimates who 
is said to have had access to it*The document contained a pledge by the 
disaffected amy leaders to "stand by each-other",
5* In different letters ef So raft on* Vide- KKS *808? 9? an^’Add Mss 29132 ff 52,71
6, Scrafton to Hastings 2 Sep 1758 .Add Mss 29132 f 18
7. Sorafton to Hastings Dec 1758. Add DSSJ9132 f62.Ghulaa Shah later
8. S K I 5K  ^  Ala" ( letter; BSC 21 * *  1761.)
9, Scrafton to Hastings 28 Nov 1758, Add Mas 29132 f 48,
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Nandkumar* s patron. In Murshidabad, however,Khwaja Hadi and Mir Kazea
2were forthwith dismissed and subsequently killed* while Miran laid his 
hands on tne wealth of Mirza Kazem.^The murder of Khwaja Hadi ©n his way to 
banishment from Bengal deprived Mir Jafar of an able officer while Rai Durlabh 
Nandkumar and Raj a ram (the head of espionage under Alivardi and Siraj-ud- 
daulah) came closer together in Calcutti* It also seemed to Calcutta to 
have finally weakened the English position at Kurshidabado Scrafton 
commented that he knew of no one in the city who would be found attached
5
to the English should a rupture happen* To the members of Alivardi* s 
family it threatened grave disaster©
Kir Jafar and Miran were naturally led to suspect all those closely 
connected with the old order, and in particular Alivardi* s Begum and her 
two daughters, Chaseti and Amina. Accordingly, after the three ladies had 
been "kept confined in the most indecent manner**, Kiran sent them all 
prisoners to Dacca, together with Lutfunnessa, Sirajuddaulah* s widow,and 
her four year old daughter.^With them also went Rabia Begum accompanied 
by her son-in-law Reza Khan.
Their reason for sharing the prisoners* circle in Dacca is nowhere 
stated. Rabia Begum and Amina Begum were known to be much attached to one 
another and after having both been widowed by the Afghans had been much 
together. The Khan may well have felt personally safer away from Irurshldabad. 
But it was certainly to the advantage of both to keep Rabia Begum*s large 
personal fortune away from the covetious eyes of the Nawab and his son.
7
The ladies of Mirza Kazem* s household were plundered of a crone of rupees.1
0
Rabia Begum may have been almost as rich, her son-in-law was considered to
9 *have a "family claim to Subahship", they were on every count safer away 
from the Durbar.
1.Scrafton to Hastings 28 Nov and 2 3 Dec 175^♦Add Mss 29132 ^f 49*60*
2.They were indirectly murdered by Miran*3 instigations,in Nov and Dec 175® 
(vide India Tract No 37® p45)hhwaja Uadi near Tellagajehi(Seir,II,275)by 
tne Afghans and Kir Kazam at Murshidabad bjr the Robillas(kN,ff 102-3) 
3»Seir,I,357 4* £FP,XIII.105
5.Scrafton to Hastings 27 Dec 175®* Add Rss 29132 f 62.
6.3eir, II, 281. 7* Seir,l ,357
8.SxIe leaving Bengal on banishment in 1747 Ataullah Khan carried with him 
a vast sum of 60 lakhs or rupees,70 elephants besides other precious stuff 
and gold(3eir,II,69)•Rabia returned to Alivardi "with all her fortune"
($£i£*IIffTOT
9.Hastings to Vansittart 15 Nay 1762* Add Mss 29097 p 57.
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For about a year Reza Khan and his mother-in-law were left in peace 
at Dacca* Indeed Mir Jafar seemed not to regard Reza Khan as any 
political threat, for he had readily confirmed the Khan* s elder brother 
as court physician* But by the end of 1759 Mir Jafar*a financial straits 
had driven him to contemplate a move against Rabia Begum*
The Nawab*s debts to the Company had not been paid off* The revenues
of the assigned districts of Nadia and Burdwan had been so mismanaged by
Nandkumar, despite the Nawab*s warnings against his method of collection,^
that they were retained beyond the stipulated period, and put under direct
2
English management* The increase in the privileged trade of the Company* s 
servants and their Gum&sktas £uid Banians had also begun to eat into the 
revenue yields from customs dues*^ As a result the Nawab was driven to so 
starve his troops that Hastings could report "their horses are mere skele­
tons, and the riders little better.Even the Jamatdars are many of them
4 .
clothed with ragsH0 By January 1760 the Nawab had been able to pay only
5
three out of thirteen months arrears of pay, even though hd had cut down 
the number of his forces,^had borrowed heavily from the merchant-bankers 
of Murshidabad and Kasimbazar —  fifty lakhs from Jagat Seth alone, and
7
had anticipated revenues from the Zemindars* When , in 1759# Prince Ali 
Gauhar, son of the Emperor Alamgir II 0754^*59) threatened the province, 
supported by many chiefs of northern India and also of Mir Jafar*s dominions, 
and Mir Jafar was forced to raise troops to resist him, the financial
9position became desperate* The Nawab was "advised** to despoil Rabia Begua0
Reza Khan bowed before7 the stera and saved his family, but to do so 
he had to secure trie powerful patronage of the English* From an account 
given later by Hastings it seems Mir Qasim had initiated the approach to
9
the Nawab through Hastings and possibly Clive and Caillaud too ,v.ho were 
1* Hastings to Clive, Nov 1759* Add Mss 29096 ff 59-60,
2* in Feb 1760 we find Hugh Watts in Burdwaa and Eowitt in Kadia.EPC 21 Feb* 
3* Hastings to Sumner, Jan 1759>aftd to Holwell 19 Feb 1760*Add Mss 29096, 
ff 111 and 224.
4^  Hastings to Hoiwell, 19 Feb 1760* Add Mss 29096 f 225*
5* Hastings to Caillaud,31 Jan 1760. Add Mss 29096 f 214*
6* Hastings to Clive, 14 Sep 1759* Add Mss 29096 f 134*
7* Hastings to Clive, 9 Aug 1759* Add Mss 29096 ff 164-5*
8* Hastings to Vansittart, 14 June, 1762, Add Mss 29099 f 57*
9 oibid*
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in Murshidabad in December 1759 and January 1760, Clive to take his leave 
of the Nawab before setting out for England and Caillaud to get introduced 
at Murshidabad before taking the command of the troops against the second
invasion of Ali Gauhar ( now Shah Alam )•
<
Mir Qasim* 3 part in the saving < of Rabia9 s1 wealth and in introducing
Reza Khan to the English is not clear* But we know that relations
between Mir Qasim and Reza Khan were bitter, and from Muhammad Ali* that
Reza Khan paid 25,000 gold ashrafis , say four lakhs of rupees, to Mir 
2
Qasim* Would it be too much to suggest tnat it was Mir Qasim who gave 
Mir Jafar the advice to despoil Rabia Begum, and that the 25,000 ashrafis 
were a bribe to win him over to the Khan’s side0 Certainly there is no 
other explanation available for the payment of so large a stun* This could 
well have been the occasion, of which Mir Qasim spoke later to Hastings, 
when Reza Khan was compelled to submit " to a neoessity against which he 
had no remedy**, and when the Khan "knew very well the dangerous situation
3
in which his mother-in-law , • •stood*. .on account of her great wealth".
It may perhaps this unscrupulous conduct of Mir Qasim - paralleled
4
by Hi* plundering of Lutfunnessa ,the Begum of Siraj ud daulah — which 
made Reza Khan his sworn enemy, and swung the Khan to the support of Mir 
Jafar and Mi ran, Mir Jafar was ready for a reconciliation for he was 
surrounded by disaffection. Prom Calcutta Rai Durlabh was continuously 
in correspondence with the Marathas and with the Prince , now the Emperor 
Shah Alam, and busy welding together the anti- Mir Jafar elements in 
Calcutta, notably Nandkumar and Rajaraa, who at one time were respectively 
soliciting from the Emperor the posts of Diwan, Naib Diwaa , and Head 
of the Intelligent* service, Moreover, since Prinoe Ali Gauhar had become 
emperor many chiefs and Zemindars of Bengal had declared their loyalty to
1* Muhammad Ali was an officer under Reza Khan * He was also the author of 
the Tarikh-i-I.iuzaffarl ,an historical work dedicated to Reza Khan*
2, 2J4 f 475 P 894* An Askrafi ,a geld c#in,was worth Rs 15-Rsl6,3#jrtI,50 fa 
3# Hastings to Vansittart, 15 May 1762, Add Mss 29097 PP 5®-59*
4« The event is of 1757 when the fhgitiv* Nawab was captured with his wife, 
Mir Qasim took a casket valued at lakhs of rupees from her•Seir,II, 329-40 s 
5* Harwell9b account of Nandkumar M " , BPP,XI11, *105,
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I him* Among them were Asad uz Zaman Khan, the Raja of Birbhum and his kinsman
[ , ‘1
Kamgar Khan, the Raja of Narhat-Samai * Two of Mir Jafar* s principal army
commanders, Rahim Khan and Ghulam Shah also seized the earliest opportunity
2of going over to the Emperor* Ghulam Husain records that there was a most
dangerous expression of regret for Siraj ud daulah*s overthrow,"whether
amongst the knowing one or amongst the simple, whether ift publid.or.ihi priva±I\! 
: In such a situation there was mutual advantage for both the Nawab and Reza
Khan in coming together*The .KhanrJh&d: besideshatred„for.LLIir^ Q^simjin: common 
with Miran who had begun looking with suspicion on Mir Qasim* s growing
4
friendship with the English*
The moves which Reza Khan had taken to save the family fortunes had also-
been of great importance to his future in that he was thereby brought into
contact with the English. What form that contact took in the early months of
1760 is not clear0 But there is some evidence that the Khan was in touch with
the governor, (probably Holwell), early in February 1760* on a matter seemingly
5of a great political importance* Holwell succeeded Clive as governor on 9
February 1760, and Reza Khan may have been involved in Holwell*s plans for
linking together the Alivardians, men such as Mirza Muhammad Ali, Siraj ud -
£
daulah* s Faujdar of Higli, in opposition to Mir Jafar, Clive protegeoHolwell
had many grievances against Clive, and also against Mir Jafar who did not pay
to him the regard paid to Clive o£ honour him with a title despite solibit&r 
7
tions for iti He had,therefore,concerted a plan for the removal of Mir Jafar
by a direct settlement with Shah Alam, negotiated through Rai Durlabh and
Kamgar Khan and supported by Caillaud and Suraner0 Whatever was Reza Khan’s
position in the matter, this much is known that in mid^1760 he was already
recognised by the English as a very important person in Bengal* When Henry
Vansittart succeeded Holwell on 27 July, the change was notified to the
6
Nawab, to the Nawab*s son, to the Raja of Nadia - and to Reza Khan,
1* Soir, II, 332* 2* Seir,II,339-41,244* 3* Seir,II,283*
4o see the next chapter ( ch0 III)
5* Reza Khan*s letter, received ( or reed:) 7 Feb 1760* CPC, I ,269*
6. In reply to Holwell*s request for supporting'Muhammad Ali*s candidature, 
Hastings replied on 30 1760 that it was too late to do it now0 He knew
nothing of Sulaiman Beg*s appointment "till I saw him clothed in the 
Kelleat ^ Chilai^"* Sulaiman succeeded Amir Beg who left for Basra*
(For Hastings* s letter, Add Mss 29096 f 211)*
7* " j; entirely agree with you that a title mth other suitable honours either 
conferred on you by the Nabob or ••• from the Court will add much to your 
dignity..*." Hastings'to Holwell,30 Jan 1760* Add Msa 29206 f 211*
8* Letters dated 24 July , 10 Aug 1760* CPC,I,280-82, 325q
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CHAPTER THREE
FAUJDAR OF CHITTAGONG, 1760-1761*
Reza Khan* s appointment as Faujdar of Chittagong committed him to
politics* only success in politics could ensure his survival* Yet the
appointment was an ambiguous one* Reza Khan himself described it as a favour
done by Kir Jafar on account of his relationship with the Nawab Alivardi Khan*
But the invasion of the Emperor Shah Alam and the concurrent swing in
public opinion in favour of the ousted family were to lead the Nawab and
Kiran to eliminate many Alivardians on suspicion of disloyalty* Between
January and June 1760 three favourites of the former regia#, Shah Abdul IS/ahab
Khan, Yar Muhammad Khan and A^aa Sadiq , son of Agha Baqar, a paoca Zemindar
wore all executed*^ As the alarm of Kiran and his father grew , the imprisoned
2
aunt and mother of Siraj ud daulah were also killed near Dacca * Ghulam 
Husain says that Kiran had another 300 suspects on hi3 list, for physical 
elimination after his return from Bihar*^ tfhy then was Reza Khan appointed ?
One an#w#r may be that Reza Khan* s known enmity with Kir Qasim had made
him more acceptable , for ITir Qasim was already a suspect by the beginning of
1760, though not yet an open rival of Kiran* While hiran was striving to make
/
himself independent of the English, recruiting European deserters, creating
5
a large body of Rohilla-Afghans, sending missions to the Deccan to recruit 
there and make contact with the French^ Mir Qasim was cultivating Hastings* 
friendship* Again while Miran was seeking to eliminate Rai Durlabh*s influence
1 • •tTficors of Siraj ud daulah* Agha Sadiq or Sadaqat
Munaauaaa iiian was engaged by Siraj ud daulah to murder Husain udain iJian 
who ruled at Dacca for and on behalf of his uncle Husain Quli Khan who again 
was deputy of the nominal Naib Nazin, Nawazish ruhazamad Khan* After the 
murder,Agha Sadiq fled to Murshidabad but the infuriated supporters of Husain 
uddin murdered his father A^ia Baqar and brother Kirzai. Kirzai's Taluq 
Lakshnipur was given to the English in 1757 while Agha Sadiq* a estate in 
Bakarganj came under Hastings* administration in 1758* Agha Sadiq, like
Shah Abdul Sahab was blown off from the mouth of a gun* Seir,II,123,332j
Hastings Papers, Add Mss 29096 ff 21,38* I India Tract 378, p 44*
2. Selr. II, 368-711 India Tract 378. p 54. *  3, Seir,II,367.
4.tUating3 to Clive 3 Oct 1758.Aid 1.33 29096 f45. 5. zZTr. 11.279. 
fi.dastings to Clive July 1758*Add Msa 29096 ff 17-20,
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in internal administration, and to substitute that of Itenerant, Munilal
and Rajballabh, whose well-established influence in Dacca was a barrier
to the growth of English power in the area, the English were seeking to
push Kir Qasim into the Patna post , by persuading Ram Narain to move
-|
to Murshidabad as Rai Rayan . The attempt to adavance Kir Qasim only
increased Miran*s hostility* Hastings wrote to Caillaud in July 1760,
Mir Qasim w has been recommended, strongly recommended to the Nabob by
the Colonel ^Clive^, Mr Holwell and yourself, the consequence of which
has been that both the Nabob and his son became his enemies and plotted
2
his destruction"*
Reza Khan's appointment may also be viewed as a banishment* The death
of Miran on 3 July 1760 by lightning —  or by machinations of Mir Qasim
x
or the English as rumour had it^—  brought Kir Qasim to power* On Miran* s 
death the Nawab*s starving soldiery throwing aside restraint, insulted the 
Nawab*s mutasaddis ( secretaries) in the streets, and surrounded the llawab*s 
palace* It was Mir Qasim who restored order, by advancing three lakhs of 
rupees to the troops and standing surety for payment of the,rest of their 
arrears of payf Though Kiran* s minor son Mir Saidu was officially invested
c
in his father's offices it was Mir Qasim who became de facto Diwan* With 
Mir Qasim at the head of Murshidabad administration there was clearly 
no place for Reza Khan near the person of Mir Jafar at the capital. 
Banishment to Dacca was the common fate of those out of favour, appointment 
to the even more remote, politically inconsequential and ecooemically 
unrewarding Faujdari of Chittagong , was even more effective*
But, it might be asked, why give any post to him when he is out of 
office? While part of the answer lies in the fact that until the revolution 
in October 1760 Mir Jafar and not Kir Qasim had the final say in all matters
1.Hastings to Holwell, no date,April or Kay ? 1760* Add Mss 29096 ff233-34« 
The scheme failed ,it is not known why.Perhaps Ram N&rain declined* 
2*Hastings to Caillaud, July 1760. Add Mss 29096 f 267*
3*5eir. 11,370 £n 194o
4*iiastings to Fort William, 18 July, BSC 26 July 1760*
5*L'ir Jafar to Governor, reed* 8 July 1760, CPC.I* 272*
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and that the Nawab was already thinking of putting Kirza Daud, the Safavid
prince who was betrothed to Kiran* s daughter, at the head of administration^ \
the main reason of the arrangement may have been the persistent demand of
the English for the removal of Agha Nizam from ChittagongfbesidHS also the
links which had been recently established between the Khan and the English,
2The previous Thanadar, Agha Nizam, who succeeded the Diwan ll&hasin^ i in
1165 B.5.( 1758-59) and was confirmed in 1166 (1759-60)^had fallen foul of
the English, They had been very anxious to open a factory at Chittagong,
but when in October 1758 Samuel Middleton was sent there from Lakshmipur
by the Calcutta Council , Agha Nizam had refused him permission, because
his parwana from Mir Jafar was addressed to Kahasingh and not to him.^ In
November, Verelst and his Council at Lakshmipur wrote angrily that Agha
Nizam was throwing every impediment on their way, and that the Thanadar
and his durbar "had determined not to permit the English to purchase cloth 
5
in his country", Agha Nizam also proved a stickler for legality over the 
concurrent question of the grant of Taluqdari rights of the Company in 
Lakshmipur,^ With the accession of Hastings1 influence at Murshidabad 
upon the rise of Mir Qasim*s power in government, the opportunity had 
arisen of removing Agha Nizam and of replacing him by Reza Khan, Some time
7
before October 1760 therefore, Reza Khan became the Faujdar of Chittagongo 
The Chittagong appointment of Reza Khan did not last long, The
Q
Company had long had its eye on Chittagong. Rebuffed in 1758 by the Nawab,
Scrafton had commented that Chittagong " will require a season when we can
9
command instead of requesting", Holwell, when governor, had again applied 
for Chittagong , but Mir Qasim replied that "Islamabad was nox in the
1, In October 1760 the Nawab being asked by Vansittart to name the person 
whom he considered the most proper to head the administration the Nawab 
named Uirza Daud first and then a few others including Llir Qasim,
Hastings* note on the transactions at I.uradbagh. Add Kss 29198 f 7*
2, The designation appears to be varying with persons holding the post,
3, CDR, I, 170 4q B?C 26 Oct and 27 Nov 1758,
5.B1C 27 Nov 1758 6, BPC 28 June 1759*
7*In Feb 1760 Reza Khan was in the Nawab*s camp at Suri(CPC.1.2o9) and on 
10 Aug Vansittart wrote to him for supply of boats at Daoca(CKC,I,326) when 
obviously the Khan was at Dacca,may be on his way to join the new post. 
Jasarat Khan,and not Reza Khan was the ruler in Dacca during 1757-60,
8,The Company’s earliest recorded interest may be dated from Dec l683(Forrest
Clive,I,281)which was renewed by Heath’s attempt to capture it in 1688 
(ibid,I,288),After Plassey, the Directors showed their Interest again 
in “their letter to Bengal dated 3 Ear 1758,
9»3crafton to Hastings,23 Dec 1758* Add Mss 29132 f 60,
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gift of the Divan'*, being a jagir of Mir Palouri, 1 ir Jafar*s second son. ^
When Vansittart took charge , he re-opened the matter in August 1760 when
the Rai Rayan, Umid Rai was in Calcutta negotiating a settlement of the
Nawab* s outstanding debts and reversion of the assigned districts of Nadia
and Burdwan to the Nawab. Umid Rai, perhaps a large sharer of the lavish
2
bribes distributed by Kasinath offered to use his influence to secure for 
the Company both a factory and the grant of Chittagong and Sylhet as their
3
Faujdari* On a further approach thereafter to the Nawab there was a refusal 
4
again* Meanwhile, with Miran*s death Hastings became busy not only to secure 
confirmation of the headship of the administration in Mir Qasim* s hands in 
opposition to Rajballabh who was now seeking confirmation as Mir Saidu*s 
Divan' but also to secure his eventual succession to the masnad in supezv 
session of Mir Saidu*s claims* As he put it, the choice was between two men,
" the Nabob Cossim Allee Cawn Qasim^ and Maharaja R&jebullub, for it
can hardly with propriety be asserted that the dispute any ways regards the 
infant ^ "llir SaiduJ^ who has been nominated to that honour"^*Caillaud backed
7
Rajballabh, urging that a "Gentoo** was more to be trusted than a Mislim* 
Hastings recognised the force of the argument and of its practice under 
Alivardi* s rule, but nevertheless backed Mir Qasim. It was sound policy nev^~ 
** to leave the Nabob without a subject for his jealousy to feed on and 
inculcate in him a due sense of dependence on the English alliance"© * and 
Mir Qasim was such a subject* He reinforced the case for Mir Qasim by poAnting 
out that he could secure Chittagong for the Company, and indeed privately
9
"declared himself ready to use all his influence to that effect*** Secret 
discussions with Mir Qasim followed, by which he was assured of English 
support on Mir Jafar* s death and the post of Naib Subahdar at once, ecnd he 
in turn promised to grant the Company, Chittagong, Midnapur and Burdwan 
districts for the maintenance of their troops, in aid of the Nawab* Imple­
mentation of the secret treaty was enforced in October by a demonstration of 
English troops* Mir Qasim was installed as Naib Subahdar, with all powers
^Hastings to Governor,no date (July ?)17&*Add Ms's 29132 f 110*
2*Iie negotiated for the Company to secure the Zeraindari sanad for 24 pargsr.as 
and spent Rs 67*067 for his expenses at the Dprbar*Add Mss 29096* f no.
3*BSC 1 Sep 1760, 4« Vansittart to Mir Jafar 18 Sep* CPC. LtAS&»
5* H astings to Caillaud,July 1760 .Add Mss 29096 f 267*
6* Hastings to Governor,no date. Add : ss 29132 f 103o 
7* Hastings to Caillaud,July 1760. Add Mss 29096 f 267*
8* ibid 9* Hastings to Governor,no date, Add Ms* 29132 P 11 0.
10*Vasittartfs evidence in 17b7. Add Mss I8469 f 5.
1
of the Nizamat, and Mir Jafar left for Calcutta in self exile, where he
2
abdicated a few months later* Kir Jafar to the end had resisted the grant 
of Chittagong^ which was nevertheless duly handed over by Mir Qasim to 
the Company in jagir*
The revolution of 20 October undermined Reza Khan*s new position as 
Faujdar of Chittagong* Soon after the changes at Murshidabad, Vansittart 
had written to Reza Khan to continue collecting the revenues, thou$i now 
for the Company.^ But his continuance in office was now temporary, for a 
Council, consisting of Verelst, Randolph Harriot and Thomas Rumbold, with
5
Walter Wilkins as assistant was created , and a force,consisting of two 
companies from Calcutta and another from Dacca,was prepared in late November, 
ready to take over the charge of the district* The Fort William Council were 
not at all sure how the Khan would react to his deposition*In Kidnapur and 
Burdwan ,the other two new Company districts, there was opposition to the 
change* The Raja of Burdwan and the Faujdar of Midnapur, summoned to Calcutta 
failed to come. Two requests to Mir Qasim by 15 November to compel them to 
obey had produced no effect, -nd ultimately military action was necessary
7
in both districts* The creation of a military force for Chittagong reflected 
the Company*s fear that Reza Khan too would resist the change. As the Council 
said they felt "uncertain as to the disposition of the Nabob of Chittagong
Q
in respect to the delivering up the possession of that country" *
The fears proved groundless , for the Khan replied to Vansittart* s 
letter of instruction with professions of obedience and of great attachment
9
to the Company, When in December Vansittart wrote again, asking him to wait
10on Verelst at Chittagong, Reza Khan was in Tipperah engaged in a punitive
I.Vidc secret treaty* BSC 27 Sen 176o and BPC 10 Nov 1766*
2*Vansittart to Mir Qasim, 20 Dec 1760. CPC.1,717*
3*Hastings^ note on transactions at I uradbagh*Add Mss 29198 f 4«
4*Vansittart to Rt.-sa Khan, 19 Nov 1760o 010.1*588*
5*B>C 8 Nov 1760. 6. BPC 17 Nov 1760*
TiNot only did TilokchBfliaL, the Raja of Burdwan^ not pay any heed to the 
orders of the Governor but also it was reported that he had fled with his 
family to the jungles{BPC 17 Nov 1760).The Raja was afraid of losing his 
estate since in 24 parganas the English had dispossed the former owners 
(Holwell*s evidence in 1767.Add Mss 18469 f 19)*Misri Khan apparently gave 
a quiet possession to Johnstone when he was sent to Midn&pur, but he soon 
joined Tilokchand in Burdwan.Capt 7/hite engaged them,killing $00 of the 
•enemy* in Dec 1760(BSC 5 1761).For Johnstone trouble was created by
Rajaram,whom 01ive once protected against Mir Jafar,BSC 9 Feb 17610 
8*BPC 17 Nov 1760* 9»Reza Khan to Vansittart,reed 16 jec*QIC.I.700
10* Vansittart to Reza Khan,28 Dec 1760. CPC.I*738.
expedition, but Verelst on his arrival at Lakshmipur on 21 December
another submissive letter from the Khan which induced a confidence in him
to enter Chittagong "in perfect peace'* *1 The Khan left the expedition in
Tipperah to his Diwan, Ham Mohan, and joined Verelst at Sitakund, 24 miles
from Chittagong, on 1 January 1761, entering the city with him four,days 
2later. The English had occupied the district "without molestation", and 
by the middle of February 1761 the Khan had already rendered a full and 
satisfactory account of his stewardship for the Comp any* ^He then left c
j
for Calcutta, K&ram Ali reports, for discussion, apparently with Vansittart
In his six weeks with Verelst in Chittagong, the Khan had established
a very close friendship with Verelst. He had also contrived to cause a
.dispute between the English and Mir Qasim - over the expenses of the
Tipperah expedition - which lasted throu^iout Hir Qasim*s period as
Nawab ( 1760-63) Mir Qasim complained that Reza Khan had endeavoured
to obtain a post, the Faujdari of Tipperah, by force, or the appearance
7
of it - a view Hastings put to Vansittart j the Khan would have argued 
that he was driven by Mir Qasim* s action in granting his district to the 
English without providing for him elsewhere*It might have been argued 
that the grant of Jagir of the district to the Company did not ipso facto
Q
terminate the Khan* 3 Faujdari authority in the district - but the English
practice in Calcutta , the 24 Parganas, and more recently in Uidnapur
suggested very clearly that the English^ would take ever the political
authority as well. It might equally be argued that Hir Qasim had not
intended any personal hostility to Reza Khan - but his action in depriving
the Khan* a elder brother of his post of Hakim strongly suggested that he
9
was at enmity with the family.
1. Verelst*s letter 22 Dec.SMC 29 Dec 1760. 2. CDR. 1,143-4
3. Letter to Court 5 June 1761. 4o CDR. If156
5. JHN f 127o
0. This was one of the 11 items of demand handed to Mir Qasim by Messrs 
Amyatt and Hay just before the declaration of war»QPCtI,17?6 A.
7o Hastings to Vansittart, 16 June 1762* Add Mss 29098 f 58 p 113♦
Q. Verelst did not take up Faujdari authority of criminal justice until 
after he was directed to do so by the Fort William authorities* He 
applied to Calcutta on 6 June#1760(CDR,I,178)and was asked in reply 
dt 24 June to •exercise the same authority in your cutcherries as we do 
in ours*(CDR,I,20)*In Calcutta the Mughal subject did not come under
English criminal jurisdiction until Aug 17580(BPC 3 Aug 1758),
9* Mir Qasim had deprived Muhammad Husain Khan of his Hakim* s post,
ostensibly to reward Saiyid ul Mulk Asad ullah Khan who had cured his 
son,but on the Saiyid* 3 refusal gave it to one Muk&rraa Ali* TM f474*
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What is certain \a that it was after he had been told of the
transfer of Chittagong to the English that Reza Khan , late in 1760, had
invaded Tipperah, and that he had inposed a two anna eess on Chittagong
revenues to defray the cost of the operation!
2
Krishna Kanikya, the Raja of Tipperah against whoa the expedition was
undertaken had been in charge of the administration only for the last two 
3
years , and he seems to have used the confusion caused by the revolution at 
i urshidabad to withhold payment of the revenues.He had engaged to pay 
Rs 100,001 for the year 1167 (1760-61) and it is clear from Harriot* s report 
of 5 April 1761 - virtually the close of the revenue year - that even by
4
that date he had paid nothing* Reza Khan had good cause for despatching 
his Diwan to Tipperah, and for himself marching when the Raja refused to 
surrender himself^
But he acted without Mir Qasim*s authority. It is not certain that any 
prior sanction was needed for marching his troops,for even according to the 
then current notion of the Faujdar* s function, it was his special business 
to keep the Zemindars in chteck M but in case he attempted to resist ... to 
attack him immediately1* so as to oblige him wto wear in his ears the ring 
of obedience, as well as to carry on his shoulder the trappings of submissio^ 
Imposition of a cess to meet the needs of a specific purpose was also a 
time honoured practice** In any event it was deemed by him no loss legal 
than the general increase that he effected in the revenue demands in the 
district** Since 1713*14 about four rupees had been added to the original
7
demand of one rupee by previous Thanadara and Diwans.
What caused the dispute was the English interpretation of their right
under the Jagirdari sanad to all the revenues of the assigned land as
a
though the district were ceded territory., The role of the English as 
J agirdar- was quifajQQW and Reza Khan can scarcely have foreseen the quarrel
1* Verelst*s letter , 3 J*** 1761 o CDR, 1,143*
2. About June 1761 he sou^t to create further complications in the Anglo-
Kawab relation by offering to the governor,the lease of the district. 
Vansittart was not totally opposed to the idea. CPC.I.12Q3 and 1212.
3. Previous to that the district was under Shajkshir, a Faujdar.Cb.i. U13
4. : arriot to Chittagong Council, 5 Apr 1761. £111,1,13*
\r nsittart to Mir Qasim,10 Mar 1761. £££,1,1008. 6.Selr.IlI>176-7.
7. The land which paid Re 1 in Mir Hadi*s time paid Rs 5-5-1 oi in /teza Khan*s 
time.Reza Khan* 3 contribution in this increase was 6 annas 4£ gandas0The 
two anna cess was further addition.(CDR.1.15b. 169-60^.20 gandas make
an anna, and 16 annas a rupee0
8, 'j he Company had a different interpretation when they paid Clive a fixed 
sum for his jagir of 24 Parganas.
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his action would cause* 111 the same it served his purposes very well*
It did so, too, because on 3 January 17&1# Verelst wrote to the Fort 
William authorities suggesting that the conquest of Tipperah initiated by
Reza Khan would be a valuable acquisition for the Company2 Calcutta, now
2
keen to acquire futther territory, responded very favourablyj and on 24 
February Verelst ordered Lt* Hathews to reduce the Raja " to a state of 
obedience to the government of Islamabad"o Harriot was sent from the
4
Chittagong Council on 15 March to settle and receive the Tipperah revenues, 
and by the 26th he had reached liunagarh, the Raja's residence near Corsilla ,
5
and forced the Raja to submit. The Raja was made to sign two agreements a 
by the one he agreed to pay the original revenue of Rs 100,001, together 
with Rs 45»463 to pay for the charges of the troops, and by the other to
6pay a Salami or Nazarana of Rs 1,11,191-6-3t both in 13 monthly instalments*
Meanwhile Reza Khan had gone to Calcutta to present his case to
Vansittart,supported by Verelst's recommendation* The outcome had been that
on 10 March Vansittart had written to ttir Qasim asking him to appoint
Reza Khan as Faujdar of Tipperah and promising that the Khan would pay,
7
through Verelst, the revenues contracted for by the Raja*' This the Nawab 
did not receive with any good grace, rather he replied asking Vansittart 
to direct Verelst to re-instate the Raja, despite his "misconduct", He 
followed this up with instructions that Verelst should instruct tlio Raja to 
wait on Jawan Hard Ali Khan one of the old, non-political servants of the
Q
government, the new Faujdar of Tipperah*
The appointment of Jawan hard Ali Khan annoyed Vansittart* He characterw
9
ioed the Faujdar-designate as "capable of nothing but creating disturbances" , 
he repeated his plea for Reza Khan, and he asked for the transfer of Tipperah 
to the Fnglish* These suggestions were turned down by the Nawub, end though
1*CuR.I* 143* The operations in Tipperah were by then plaoed under orders 
of the Chittagong Council*
2*Fort William letter, 20 Jan 17^1* CJ)JJ,If3 3. CDR. 1,156.
4.C1H1. I, 159* 5o Harriot's letter 26 Mar 1761* CJR.1*9*
6.The second agreement wa^ fcade out for fear of incurring the Kawau* a 
displeasure(Cj2R,I,9).It is not known '» why 'displeasure*.
7. Vansittart to L.ir Qasim, 10 ■ ar~17h1. £HG.,I©1008o
8.) ir Qaeda to Vansittart, reed* 2 Apr 1761.CPC*I*1067.and 1069. Jawan Hard 
apnears to have been « flawabi officer in another Tipperah campaign,of 1729*
(vide J*H.Sarkar~ Bengal Newabi ______ ?fj 5*7)
5.Vansittart to Hir ^ aaim,25 June 1761*gE£»I,1230,to Rai Rayan 14 July,CPC,
1,1258.
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the dispute lingered on until July, the Nawab made it clear that he could
not transfer the district to the English without grave discredit* Since
Vansittart was the person most keen to establish the influence and credit
Of I ir Q&sia, whom he had helped to instal as Nawab, he could not persist
further in his dem&ndSo On 5 July,therefore,he ordered the Chittagong Council
2
to hand over Tipperah to the Nawab*s people • By 10 August the orders had
x
reached Karriot at Comilla*
'.She dispute about payment for the military expenses incurred continued
>
however, ani this, political rather than economic, formed one of the eleven 
final demands made {upon Mir lasim before the outbreak of war between the 
Nawab and the English in 1763* English position was in fact unreasonable 
- their military action could properly have been thought of as part of
A
their obligation as jagirdar of the three districts including Chittagong, 
and in any case they had demanded payment of the expenses from the Raja 
and had received at least one instalment of Rs 10f0(X)5
Reza Khan had been at the root of all the disputes which had arisen 
between tne Nawab and the English over the district of Tipperan* Intention­
ally or not he had caused I.lir ^asin much trouble, and as a result the 
Nawab was hardened in his enmity* But the Khan won the admiration of those 
Englishmen with whom he came in contact, and this was to prove of the 
greatest value to\him0
Reza Khan was particularly fortunate in having had Verelst to deal
with as first chief of Chittagong, rather than Ellis or Sumner, who had
6both refused the post, for Verelst was a critic on principle of the
revolution which had brought Mir Qasira to power <> He had opposed Vansittart* s
7
action as the breach of **& treaty executed in the most solemn manner” 
with Mir Jafar* He had done so before he became, like the overwhelming 
majority of the Company’s servants in Bengal, a personal critic of 
Vansittart* Since he had disliked the manner of Mir '4asim*s elevation ,he
1*Mir Qasim to Vansittart, reod: 18 July 1761# CPC,I,1263•Vansittart on 20 
July wnile concurring with Nawab asked him to reconsider the matter(CPC,I, 
1266).On 24 July he wrote again asking the Nawab to honour the Khan with
** a post worthy of him” (^pid, 1268)but in a reply received on 3 Aug he was 
informed that the Nawab had appointed another man as Faujdar of Islamabad* 
(Ci-C* I, 1282)o Reza Khan was formally dismissed*
2. £2*1,1, 21 3. CUR*I*25.
I#i.ir ^asia referred to this condition in a letter recd*7 Ju11763qCPC.I.1815o 
5*By 5 Apr ils 10,000 was received by Marriot. jjJR. I, 13. Unless tho Raja 
had defaulted by July 1761 a sum of Rs 46,003 should have been collected 
from him according to agreement (vide cja.1.9).
6.B1-C 8 llov 1760 7. ibifi.
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already had common ground with Reza K h a n *  Vhe Khan*a "prudent and polite
behaviour",^ and the quality of his administration of Chittagong further won
Verelst*s regard.Verelst even advised the governor and the newly formed
Committee of New Lands to seek the Khan* s advice in matters of land grants
2
and other allied subjects .Reza Khan*s full co-operation in making Verelst
master of the detail and history of the revenue administration of the
district#^ a six week task , laid the foundations of a very stable personal
friendship between the two. It was with Verelst*s commendation and an excellent
reputation, therefore, that Reza Khan went to meet Vansittart at Calcutta^ He
too became a friend of the Khan, his protector and his strongest advocate,
.y
Vansittart* s first efforts to secure a post worthy of Reza Khan failed 
when H r  Qasim refused to appoint him Faujdar of Tipperah, It ended ultimately 
in his formal dismissal from the nominal appointment which he held till July 
1761 as Faujdar of Chittagong.^But the Khan* a action in securing payment by 
the Nawab of Rs 65,000 which he had collected at Chittagong and paid into the 
Nawab*a treasury, before he had heard of the district's transfer to the 
English encouraged Vansittart to further effort.liir Qasim in the beginning 
had denounced the Khan* s "false accounts" ^and urged the governor not to
" listen to his lies",^but the Khan was able to prove his point in the presence
rf'
hBatson, the chief of Kasimbazar factory and Umid Rai, the Rai Ray an, so that
Q
the Nawab had to admit the authenticity of the Khan* s accounts* He did so
9
grudgingly and was very slow in paying what the English held to be their due©
By contrast Reza Khan, indebted for a sum of Rs 10,591 when ho left Cnittugong 
paid the amount as soon as it was asked forl^The re cult of these incidents
1.Hastings to Vansittart, 15 Lay 1762, Add has 29097 p 5s*
2.CDR, 1,180.
3*H0V'»relst wrote a short accout of revenue history of Chittagong in 17<1.(CDR 
l69-80)©He nuoh appreciated the usefulness of these and when the scheme of~ 
supervisorship was introduced in 1769 his instruction to the young officers 
was to collect information on history of the districts.
4»nir Qasim complained later that the Khan went to Calcutta without his
knowledge or permission, (Hastings to Vansittart 16 June 1762.Add Lss29098f58)
5*Lir Qasim to Vansittart, reed 3 Aug 1761, CPC,1,1282.
6.Vansittart to Lir Qasim, 5 Lar 1761 .CPC, 1,552*0Reza Khan to Vansittart,reed:
16 Dec 1760 .CPL,1,700.Lir Qasim to governor,reedt16 Apr ,776^,CPC,1,1091 •
7oVansittart to ;.dr Qasim, 22 Apr 1761. CP£,I,1104#
Q.Vansittart to Reza Khan,27 - ay,to Rai Rayan,23 June 1761.CPC,I,1188,1231%
9*Lir Qasim to Vansittart, 18 July 1761, CPC,1,1263%
lO.The Khan was asked to pay to ^ at 3 on (CPC, 1,1054) and so he did(CPC,1,1188)
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was further to establish the Khan’s standing,They also opened a way to 
good relations with Batson, one of the severest English critics of Mir 
Qasim, Of course they also put an end to hope of receiving preferment for 
Reza Khan, who passed his days at tfurshidabad, with occasional visits to 
correspondence with Calcutta,^
That Heza Khan had no part in Kir Qasim9 s administration became 
increasingly an asset, however, for the revolution of October 1760 steadily 
became the focus for the discontent which had its origin in Vansittart1 a 
coming from Madras to head the government at Port William, The Company98 
servants in Bengal, headed by their most senior member, Amyatt, looked 
upon Vansittart* s coming as a blow to their interests. Their dislike of 
Vansittart came to be extented to Mir Qasim who was looked upon as Vansit­
tart * s creaturo*A suspicion that Vansittart had been a private gainer by 
the revolution only sharpened the ill feeling, Mir Qasim attempted te isolate
the two issues and to win Amyatt* s support by sending Ghulam Husain, the
2
author of the Selr te Calcutta, Ghulam Husain had been very friendly with Po 
Amyatt at Patna, but in the end he was told that since Vansittart had 
elevated Mir Qasim to the raasnad and declared himself his protector, Amyatt
3
could only side with Mir Jafar and Ram Narain<>
Two issues particularly roused antagonism against Mir Qasim and Vansit­
tart % the fate of Ram Narain and the duty free trade of the Company9 s 
servants, Clive had steadily protected Ram Narain against Mir Jafar, and 
Vansittart initially had continued that policy, ordering Carsae in
February 1761 to remember Clive* a promise to protect Ram Narain9s ■* person,
a 1 5
fortune and honour "* arid Coote,in April, to secure him in his government,By
£
20 Jung however English protection was withdrawn after Mir Qasim had
7already put his accounts under examination by Rajballabh, who eventually
3succeeded Ram Narain in the Naibat, in Augusto By September Ram Narain had
9
given a bond for fifty lakhs of rupees which had been adjudged due from him,
1. CFC,1,1188,1629. 2. Selr.IlUl^ ' 3. Seir.II.416-17.
4«"33C 9 Feb 1761. 5. BSC 21 Apr 1761 6. CPC. I, 1229
7, llir Q&sia to Vansittart, recdx 8 and 16 Jana.1761. CPCnI.1208.122Q.For
examination of accounts it became necessary to dismiss Ram Narain for 
otherwise accounts or appearance of collectors could not be enforced,
(Mir Qasim to Vansittart,recdil6 and 18 June,176tQ CPC,1,1220,1227),
8, Rajballabh,charged by Hastings in 1762,as the * chief author* of disputed 
between the Nawab and the English(letter to Vansittart,27 May)was replaoed 
on 25 June 1762 by Nobit Roy, AddN.ss 29097p 77-78;29098©pp 135-36,141,152-3
9, Vansittart approved it in a letter to Mir Qasia,21 Sep176l, CPC,I,1331,
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Vansittart supported the Nawab not only because the treaty obliged him not 
to protect any of the Nawab1s subjects against his master but also because 
it was very much essential to enable the Nawab to fulfil his financial 
obligations , but to the critics it was an act of betrayal — the 
abandonment of one who had served the Company well and had been assured of 
it3 protection. This was the more resented because by the end of 1761 - 
it became apparent that the Nawab*s growing strength was detrimental to the 
interest of the private trade of the Company's servants and their native 
dependents and servantd,Ever since 1752 when the Company's purchases had 
been taken from the hands of the established coterie of dadni merchants
( merchant contractors J and entrusted to the English servants of the
i
Company #acting through 'their gunashtas i  the problem of trade had been growing,
Th^ gunashtas, mainly Bengali Hindus, had increased the privileged trade of
the English, particularly the private trade of the Company*s servants; with
consequent loss to government revenues and to those merchants who did not
enjoy the protection of the English, This was one cause of the clash with
Siraj ud daulah, and though Mir Jafar had declared the gunashtas ef the
English entitled to all the privileges granted in their imperial sanads1,
the invasion of the internal trade ef the province by the Company's servants
and their agents soon became a cause of conflict with him too, while Clive
2was in Bengal some check was placed upon this new extension of privilege , 
but on his departure English pressure increased, Hastings bluntly complained 
to Holwell, in February 1760, "we have been at the expence of so much blood 
and treasure to little purpose, if we are to be bound by the precedents ^ 
drawn from the abject state in which we remained before the battle of Plassey!S
Vansittart's policy of strengthening llir :}asi* called, however , fer a 
reversal in such attitudes. By mid 1762 Hastings, as Resident at kir Rasim's 
durbar m s  speaking of a grievance " which calls loudly for redress w, but 
meaning this time " the eppressiens committed under the sanction of the
1, Mir Jafar*s sanad dated 27 July 1757• BPC, I.C.Range 1, Vol 50,pp 9-10,
2,,tWe have not ,,any right to trade in salt and betel nut,., I myself know 
that none of the Comp's servants,not even the CoI^ jCliv^ 7hiniself has ever 
engaged in it without the Sabob* s perwanah" (Hastings to Sumner,no date but 
abou* Jan 4259* Add Mas 2$0$6 l&U# Kir Jafar favoured Hastings and
Sykes and Handkumar as HAgli Diwaa favoured a few ethers with passes for 
sending up wait xo FataiUdd kss 29096,ff 45,46,58)the activities of the 
servants of Dacca factory caused too many complaints (Hastings to Sumner 
8 Dec 1758, Add Hss 29096 f 80,)
3©Hastings to Holwell, 19 Feb 1760; Add hss 29096 f 224,
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English name" which "bode no good to thq Nabob*s revenues, to the quiet of
the country or honour ot our nation" \  Criticism of Vansittart*» policy
here enlisted the strongest personal interests of the Company* s servants#
By October 1762 the Daoca factory was already preparing for war, on the
ground of the "general insolence of the natives, with interruptions put
2
upon the trade in general"#
A further threat to the private trade of the English was also seen in 
the power and influence of certain Armenians in fir Qi~sia*s government, 
notably the brothers Gregore and Petruse# Petruse had been a key figure in
3
the revolution of 1757» *a the link between Watts and Mir Jafar ; Gregore 
was equally important in the revolution of 1760^ Hastings argued that 
Gregore was a useful instrument who, "whether considered as a creature of the 
Nabob or a dependent' of the English, must see that his interests and safety 
depended upon the Nabob’s welfare and a good understanding between him and
5
the English"#' Hastings, however, had long had a trade connection with Petruse
£
to whom he was heavily indebted even as late as 1770© Others, .net&bly W# Ellis, 
had found the Armenians, merchants and officers, a source of serious rivalry 
and opposition to their private trade, especially in Bihar opium# They saw
7
their power at court in a far from favourable light#
The Armenians were equally the subject of general hatred by many of the
old officers of government, for to their influence was attributed the fall
<v
of many Nawabi officils after the revolution of 1760#As Scrafton put it, "the
power of the Armenians is one of the coffee-house arguments made use of to
&raise the mob against the revolution in favour of the present Nabob" Mir 
Qasim#
1# Hastings to governor, 25 Apr 1762# Gleig, Hastings, I, 107-060
2# Dacca Consultations, 7 Oct 1762#
3# In India he was Known as Gurghin Khan and not as Gregors#
4# Hastings’ note on Transactions at Muradbaug#(Add Mss 29198)
5# Hastings to Vansittart, 23 Hay 17620 Add Mss 29098 P 58#
6# Hastings to Petruse, 4 July 1770o Add Mss 29125 f 41#
7# For example Verelst wrote to Clive on 19 Dec 1764 ( after Mir Qasim was 
driven out from Bengal and Bihar) thus 5 For the adoption and execution of 
Mir Qasim*s independence " we are not a little indebted to that public spy, 
Coja Petruse, and in some degree to his brother Coja Gregory#Quoted : 
Forrest, Clive,11,269©
8# As quoted by Vansittart ,30 hay 1762# Add Mss 29152 f 195*
There v*as not perhaps a single group of old ruling class and aristocracy
which had not suffered from the revolution s the three principal lutaaaddis,
Keneram, Kunil&l and Chikan who were imprisoned on charges of iabezzle-
ment and made to disgorge their wealth] Ghulam Husain Khan, long Daregha
of the Nawab1 a Hall of Audienci and a revenue farmer^ the principal Jamadare
or army leaders in Bihar, many ef the* in service since Shuja Khan's ti*e|
Umid Hal, the Hal Ray an* Ram Narain, the Naib of Patna; Rajballabh of Dacca;
Raja Sitaramf and indeed most of the eld aristocracy of Bengal and Bihar,
who were dispossessed of their jagirs, altaaghas and other grants in BihaJ#
The army Jamadars saw themselves directly replaced by Gregore, who was
given the principal charge ef the Nawab' e sew modelled army, and whose
troops garrisoned the Bihar frontier posts# But, as Bastings observed,
"whatever act of the Nabob*s displeases any individual, how many soever
7
will be attributed to Gregore1s influence"#
Vansittart agreed with Hastings that any one placed in Gregore1s 
position would have incurred a similar general hostility, and he had no 
personal objection to the power given to Gregore and Petruse# But he saw 
the folly of Mir Rasim's behaviour by which "he exposes his favourites to 
universal jealousy and disgust by sacrificing all those who us1d to hold
Q
the chief places in the country"# Such behaviour weakened the Nawab, for
every complaint that the Nawab made against the Company1 s people could be
represented " as an indirect attempt of the Armenians to get all trade and
9
all powers in their own hands "#
The remedy for Kir Qasim was to "endeavour to make himself a succession 
of friends", by giving his favour to a wider circle, including the members 
of the old privileged class# Vansittart put Reza Khan forward as the sort
1# These three anti-English I utasaddis were the first to suffertVansittart's 
letter 20 Oct, BSC 24 Oct 1760 t Kalyan Singh1 s Khulaaat#J3CRS,V,p352 )•
2. He was a relation of Alivardi who made him the Darogah (SSir, II,395)•
3 .It appears that his relation with th* English, particularly Serafton and 
also possibly Hastings wa3 not good#(Scrafton to Hastings 28 Nbw 175&o 
Add 7/st; 39132 ff 48-50).
4.The first three were ultimately killed at the outbreak of war with the 
English CQH£,I,1973)but Sitaram ,one of the principal Diwans of the Nawab 
was tried and found guilty of treason and executed in 1762#(AddJ.iss 29097p54]
5.TBs Nawab had "called in all the Sunnuds most of which he destroyed"0 
itobold's letter, 6 July. BSC 21 July 1767.
6.Hastings to Coote,14 Hay 1762(Add Mss 29097P 52) t* Vansittart,23 Hay 1762 
(Add Mss 29098 p 55)*
7* Hastings to Vansittart,10 June,1762#Add Mss 29098 p102.
8, Vansittart to Hastings, 2 May 1762. Add Mss 29132pp172-3. 9# ibid#
of person who should be appointed. In 17&2, when Sulaim&n Beg, V&ujdar of
Hugli died, Vansittart suggested Reza Khan as a suitable successor, and neve
that Gregore was "pushing1* for the position , only made Vansittart more
2
urgent in pressing the Khan's elaims* Kir Qasim*s reply was that the Khan's
appointment would create jealousies between him and the governor , and
that he had chosen Mirza Saleh^for the post© Vansittart refused to accept
the argument, and he was suspicious that Mirza Saleh was only a cover for
Petruse or Gregore* Hastings pressed Heza Khan's claims again, on 14 hay 1762*
fA’he hawab refused to consider them, declaring that the Khan , who had a faraily
clriim to Sub&hdari, was disaffected and would be continually engaged in plots
against him," without appearing openly in them", Te appoint him at Hugli,
in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, would be "to nourish a snake in his bosom"*
Mir Qasim thus closed the question* In the process he succeeded in winning
Hastings to his own view of Reza Khan, so that Hastings wrote to Calcutta
£
upholding Kir Qasim* 8 attitude and condemning the Khan, It may be that the 
hostility which Hastings displayed against Reza Khan after his return te 
Bengal as governor in 1772 had its origin in this episode©
M r  Qasim may have been right in his judgement of Reza Khan's loyalty, 
but his rejection for office was but one more step in the process of isolating 
himself from the old holders of power and naking himself , much to Vansittart% 
regrets, dependent on "one or two new men of a different nation and religion", 
Before tne final rupture with the English in 17&3 he went to destroy the 
luilitary potential of the powerful Zemindars of Bengal and Bihar, aetably 
Raja Asad uz zaaan Khan ef Birbhua and his kinsman Kara gar Khan, with English 
helps Tto drive Mirza Baud, the Safavid prince, to take refuge with Batson 
at Kasinbazar^j to stiffen the confinement of the sons of Sarfaraz Khan at
1* Vansittart to Hasting3,12 Apr 17620 Add mss 29132 f 143*
2, vansittart to Hastings, 2 lay 1762, Add Mss 29132 ff172w3o
3* Mirza Saleh,not to be confused with his namesake who was governor *f Orfcos* 
was a merchant who suffered owing to English "reprisals against, the ^oors" 
in 1736-57(BPC 3 Apr 1738),Both Clive and Watts agreed to Mir Jafar's 
request that the Mirza should not be disturbed from his hereditary lands 
south of Calcutta when the district was made over to the English,but the 
Council disagreed(BSC 4 Jan 1758)*Th« dispossessed Mirza was then given a 
share in Jessoro JJemindari by hir Jafar and put in possession by Clive*
(Add Mss 29132 ff 48-50)©ibis became the endowed estate of Baji Moh3in*
4«Vansittart to Hastings, 7 May 17620Add Mss 29132 ff 177-78*195.96,
5,Hastings to Vansittart, 15 Hay 1762, Add Mss 29097 pp 57-65. _ . I
6*Hastings to Vansittart, 23 lay and 1o June 1762<>Add *ss 29098 pp 52»53t113*
7*'fhis led to Batson's dismissal ©Court's lottersi 3 Fob and 1 June 1764©
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Dacca ; and to raise the hanker Bul&kidas as a counterpoise to the house of 
2
Jagat Seth* The field was thus steadily cleared for Resa Khan# When Mir 
Qasim was defeated and driven into exile, and liir Jafar restored in July, 
1763» Reza Khan stood out as an obvious candidate for high office, 
uncompromised by his past actions either with the old nobility er the
English,^
1o Skukr ullah Khan particularly was “extremely suspected” by Mir Q&aim 
(Seir, II, 439)# Mir Qasim was evidently alarmed by the moves of 
Shuja ud daulah of Oudh to replace him by 3£ir Jafar, sons of Sarfaraz 
Khan or a person “from the presence". Whatever might have been the truth 
behind the story, the Nawab was evidently alarmed by a report to this 
effect from the Nawab Salar JAng,(Salar Jang*s letter to Mir Qasim *17^2, 
Add Mss 29099 ff 43-44o)
2, At the commencement of his war with the English the Nawab had both
Jagat Seth Mahtab Chand and his brother Maharaja Swamp Chand murdered. 
Twelve years later Iiir Qasim, in a letter to lias tings from his exile 
wrote in justification that "fate led me to despatch to the hells these 
two wretches, who had destroyed a world and whose cunning manoeuvre and
intrigues caused the death of so many Subahdars"0 In the same letter he 
also justified the destruction of the leading Kutasaddis," so many 
traitorous usupers and fomenters of strife^.kir Qasimfs latter,3PP,LVII,19
5, Rai Durlabh and Nandkumar had fallen in February 1761# plotting 
against the Nawab Iiir Jafar* a virtue in Holwall’s day, had become a 
crime when Hastings and Vansittart decided to strengtnen Mir ^asim in 
that office, Hastings1 long standing dislike of Nandkumar, dating perhaps 
from 175a, led to Nandkumar being the main sufferer then and in 1762q 
Nandkumar became also a cause of dispute between Coote and Vansittart0 
Carnao, a critic of Vansittart became Nandkumar* 3 main support after 
Coote had left,For special proceedings against Nandkumar in 17&1 and 
1762 India Office records, Range 168, Vol 16(31 Jan- 19 Feb 1761) and 
V®1 17( 31 July - 4 Oct 1762) may be seen.
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CHAPTER POUR
HAIB OP DACCA, 1763-1765*
The restoration ef Mir Jafar te the Subahdari ef Bengal in 1763 opened 
the prospect ef a new career for Reza Khan, Mir Jafar was proclaimed Subahdar 
at Calcutta on 7 July together with a declaration of war against Kir Qasim 
for alleged open acts of hostility to the English, The declaration invited 
."all manner of persons * to the standard of Mir Jafar and to assist him in
defeating the designs of Mir Qasim, By 15 August Reza Khan had reached Dacca
3
to take up his new appointment as Naih Nazim or Deputy governor.
Though the Dacca appointment was a very high distinction Reza Khan was 
not initially very enthusiastic ahout it,Two main reasons made it unwelcome to 
him ; the fear of the machinations of Nandkumar against him, and the disorders 
and confusion at Dacca,
Nandkumar had become the principal minister of Mir Jafar immediately on
the latter*s restoration. Despite very strong personal dislike of Hastings and
Vansittart for Nandkumar the English had to agree to the Nawab* s demand for his
appointment,^Mir Jafar was insistent possibly because Nandkumar being besides
a fellow sufferer since Vansittart*s arrival in 1760 , and his secret agent
5
working against Mir Qasim*s nizanat, was to him an expert on the English in 
Bengal, With a war in hand against Mir Qasim the English had to oblige Mir 
Jafar, particularly because the number of alternatives had also been reduced 
Mir Qasim, Mir Qasim,"the best Mutseddee in his own court" had taken away 
with him to Bihar " every Mutseddee and every officer in whom he could repose 
the least confidence** and he trusted none. With the turn of events going 
against him he had had them all physically eliminated,The mutasaddis so removed
1, The declaration of war, 7 July 17*>3« CPC, I, 1814,
2, ibid. The declaration of war followed the death of Amyatt who warn alleged ta
have been treacherously^murdered by Mir Qasim,Haji Muatapha who made an enqui 
ry on the matter gives a different story,Muhammad Taqi Khan had arranged a 
party in Amyatt*s honour and had sent two envoys inviting Amyatt to the shore 
but Amyatt refused to accept the General*s invitation^fter this Amyatt*s 
boatmen were ordered to bring the boats to the river bank. This order was 
anwrered "by two musketv* balls, and thenyby a volley". Boats were boarded and 
slaughter fallowed,(Seir,II,476,fh 251)•Earlier and oven before this Ellis
made a surprise attack on Patna fort in June(Seirs11,471.7 4)#
3* TP t I# 190. 4. BSC 7 July 1763, 5.BPP, XIII,105,
6, Hastings to Vansittart, 23 Kay 1762, Add Mss29098 PW57-58*
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1
wore Ram Narain of Patna, Rajb&llabh of Dacca, R&jballabh’s son , and the
Rai Rayan timid Rai0 In the circumstances the English tolerated Nandkumar
as the Nawab*s minister but sought to minimise the evil by forcing Rai
Durlabh also in the Nawab* » camp0 With the Nawab , as he left Calcutta,
2was also associated Nabakrishna, a further check on Nandkumar* Nabakrishna 
joined the camp , apparently, as EAjor Adam’s munshi or Persian secretary*
But though the English had started interfering in the selection of the 
Nawab1s officials, they do not seem as yet to hare done more than recommend 
Baza Khan in geneml taxxsLta thA. .Nawab* 3he lack ef interest on the part 
Vansittart ; the Khan9s strongest supporter so far, was inevitable* The 
disputes with the Council* a majority over relations with Iiir Rasim’s 
government had added to his frequent nervous complaints the fatigues “which 
have been and are the severer upon me" as. he complained in his letter of 18
April 1763 to the Directors asking te be permitted to return home * the next
3
season * By early July his spirits had revived by private reports that 
" the Compy* have resolved to support the authority of the governor - and 
that they will write in a manner to give me satisfaction* But alasI all is
too late; the news concerning Kr0 Amyatt*s party ... is too shocking to
4write“7 The declaration; of war against Mir 4asim spelled the ultimate
frustration of his mission in Bengal0 Vansittart certainly was in no mood
to commend Reza Khan to the Nawab with any enthusiasm*
Reza Khan, lacking any definite English protection, was reluctant to
accept office while his enemy Nandkumar held sway over the Nawab, and seems
to have viewed the Dacca post almost as a trap.Reza Khan later claimed to
have been a partyman of Iiir Jafar , as witness the advice of his elevation
to the Subahdari which Iiir Jafar took care to send hi5 •But the Nawab
initially intended the Dacca post for Muhammad All Beg, to whom & Khilat
£
had been given by Vansittart by 10 July at the Nawab* o desire* It was 
only after Iiir Jafar reached Murshidabad on 24 July that the arrangement
1* He wus Krishnadas who contributed t© the rupture between Siraj ud daulah 
and the English in 1756*He appears to have been in charge of Dacca revenues 
in Iiir Rasim’s time where by July 1762 the deficiency had risen to over 20 
lakhs, about 5 lakhs being attributed to the exactions of the English* 
(Hastings to Vansittart,23 I ay, 10 July 1762*Add* Map 29098, pp 56»153-!>4)
2. K.N.Ghoae,Maharaja Hubkisscn Bahdur*p257 «lie founded^ovabazar Raj family.
3* Vansittart-to Court.18 Apr 1763. 4•Vansittart to Hastings, Add Mss29132f245
Reza Khan’s memorial,TP,1,190 6.Vansittart’s letter,10 July*CPC,I,1817*
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about Dacca was reversed and the Khan was chosen for the postl Reza Khan
later explained the change as due to', ftundkuinar* s jealousy of the good
relations between Kir Jafar and Rez^.Khan established when they mot at 
2lurshidabad. When Dacca was offered, the Khan therefore at first declined
; 3
the posti telling the Nawab that he ,preferred te accompany him.
The Nawab insisted, however, that the Khan should go to Dacca , bring 
the Zemindars of that extensive province to obedience * by mildness and 
good management" and collect revenues in order te help the war efforts *
against Mir Q,asim<> Reza Khan, aware that Nandkumar* s * chief object was te
. ;  ■ - •  •
place me at the greatest distance possible from the Nawab1 s person",persis­
ted in his refusal. He made the fact that the affairs at Dacca were in a 
state of utmost confusion, and that four months of the revenue year had 
already elapsed the grounds for a refusal really based on the danger of 
becoming " a subject for calumniators to work upon". The Nawab thereupon 
used Nnglish mediation , and Major Adams on behalf of the Nawab pleaded with 
Reza Khan , assuring him that he did not foresee any " grounds of variance 
between him ^ ~Mir Jafar^and me "0 At the next meeting with the Nawab the 
Khan " was obliged to acquiesce", but even then he did not readily depart 
for Dacca, The army which was moving up against M r  Qasim left lurshidabad 
on 28 July and the Khan accompanied the Nawab upto Sooty despite the Nawab*o 
directions immediately te proceed to Dacca, The Khan* s purpose was to secure 
a written agreement from the Nawab to protect him from any future dispute* 
which night arise because of Nandkumarvs presence in the Nawab*s camp,During 
prolonged halt at Sooty until 2 August, forced on Mir Jafdr and Major Adana 
by the opposition ef Mir Q&siw's aray Reza Khan secured his written document 
On M r  Jafar* s again asking him to leave for Dacca the Khan presented his 
written memorial for the Nawab* a concurrence© Nandkumar sought te prevent 
the Nawab from signing the document and asked the Khan te leave this with 
his vakil at the Durbar for future determination on it. At this point , 
however, Mir Jafar intervened, rebuked Nandkumar for causing an unnecessary
1, The date giv^n by Reza Khan is 10 Muharram(TP, 1,190) but the letter te court 
dt 23 Sep 1763 puts Mir Jafar* s entry in tlurshidabad on 24 July,
20 In response to the Nawab* a appeal for help,Reza Khan had offered " all the 
money,effects, camels and elephants which I  possessed", (TP,1,190),
3«The account of Reza Khan*s appointment is taken from TP, I, 190-94*
4* It was/called ^dkstinate"I ando "uncenu»onH0 Letter t# Court 23 Se»t 17o30
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altercation and finally signed the memorial after writing down the answers 
to the Khan* s demands in his own hands#
The document, which eventually helped the Khan* s acquittal in his trial 
in 1772-74, embodied four demands of the Khan. In the first article the Khan 
covered himself by limiting his financial obligations, irrespective of the 
formal agreement for a stipulated bus, to the amount of the actual cell ac­
tions, •until the disturbances are at an end"0 By the second article, the 
Khan had the former establishment ef the Dacca force of * horse and feet* 
confirmed * By the third article the Nawab was bound not to entertain any 
application for any Dacca post, and by the last article the Nawab agreed te
allow the usual expenses of servants wages (Sihbundy), collection charges
2
(Seranjany) and contingencies (Lawaaimat) agreeably to the accounts#
Having thus secured himself against any possible harr as ament or 
interference , and having received permission te restore the Dacca estab­
lishment to its former strength the Khan returned to Lurshidabad and on 
11 August set cut for Dacca, where he arrived four days later!
The Khan’s fear ef intrigue behind his back at the durbar was not the 
only reason for his demand for a free hand in Dacca# His complaint that the 
administration was in disorder and confusion really was an understatement#
In fact there was no government at all in Dacca by 1763#
The attention of the Uurshidabad government had long been concentrated
en North Indian developments# Later the developments in and around the
European trading centres along the Bhagirathi also attracted notice# But
very little attention was paid to the eastern province ef Dacca# The result
was that immediately after the revolution of 1737 the Dacca Faujdar, Jasarat
Khan, for want of adequate troops and credit was obliged te ask for and
obtain the support of a company of English sepoys from Calcutta in order te
guard against any attempt by Am&ni Khan, one ef the sons of Sarfaraz Khan,
4to seize the Dacca fort# The Dacca administration lost further prestige in 
1759 when a sort of a joint administration was set up besides grant of 
Lakshnipur within its territorial jurisdiction to the English as a Taluq0
1# Reza Khan’s memorial. TP, I, 193* 2# jbid. I, 202-04#
5* After return from Sooty the Khan was at Murshidabad for 4 or 5 days.
I * 194.
4. oO 20 Oct 1757• The English also apprehended French attack ,
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The joint Administration ended early in*1759 but by then instances Ox 
successful and often violent defiance to the governmental authority by the 
Company*s servants and their dependants had become so common that the 
government had ceased to enjoy much respect* Its diminished prestige was 
further reduced by the grant of Chittagong to the English in 1760 and by 
the prolonged English interference in Tipperah in 176l#By April 1763,more 
than two months before the formal declaration ef war upon M r  Qasim , the 
English had made prisoner Mir Qasim* s Naib in Dacca* Muhammad Ali Beg * 
together r^ith Agha Nizam, Saiyid Badal Khan, Qamar Ali and the Faujdar ef 
Rangamati*^The managers of the administrative machine were thus swept away 
in April, and the machine itself was largely destroyed by the English 
occupation ef Dacca city0(The Company* 0 fabtory had been abandoned en 7 
July and a panic flight to Lakshaipur had followed, but with the arrival
o
of troops the Dacca Council had decided to take Dacca) % On their return to 4 
the city on 17 July the Council decided to try to run the government w in 
the name of our honourable masters "* But the sons of Sarfaraz Khan* the 
Sh&hr Amin who maintained order in the city, and several ether principal 
Mughal3 having all been taken prisoner, the Council soon found that they 
could not manage the administration of so large a district by English agency* 
Ad hoc local assistance had therefore t© be sought* One Agha Saleh was 
found willing te accept the task ef governing as also the Hindu mutasaddis 
or chief officers of the late Diwan and Shahr Amin* A person had also been 
appointed on behalf of the Company , a sort of a Resident to sit at the 
cutcheri to ensure that the new officers were not negligent in the discharge 
of their duties* Guards were also provided te protect the native officers 
from insults*^ Scarcely had this makeshift organisation been brought into 
existence when on 23 July M r  Jafar* s restoration as Subahdar was proclaimed* 
Agha Saleh,the governor for the Company, took the occasion to secure the 
release, upon his own surety, of the imprisoned Mughal nobles, but they were 
confined to their houses, while two companies of Barqand&zes or matchleckmsn 
occupied the city for the Companyfoutside the capital the control of the 
province was shared by Mir Qasim*s officers and the English* Verelst from
1. Letter to Court 18 Apr 1763; M r  Q&sim te Vansittart,Reed 50 Apr 1763*
CPC. It 1756*
2* Dacca Cons* 11 July 1763 3. ibid 20 July 1763. 4. ibid 23 July 1763.
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Chittagong had taken into his hands the Mughal administrative divisions of
Tipperah and S&ndwip besides establishing his grip over the Shiqdaris of
Homnabad and Patira ( Pattikera ?) both in modern Comilla district which
continued until the end of 1763 or early 1764#^On the other hand Abid Ali
Khan , Mir Qasim* s Faujdar at Rangpur held out until four companies were
sent against him in I oveaber 1763 and the Zemindar of Babupur remained
p
defiant until his reduction in February 1764#* v
This was the situation when Reza Khan reached Dacca in mid-August91763?
a situation as he said * even worse than it had been before reported"» All
the officers of revenue had absconded* In the like maimer the accounts and
records were not to be found in their proper repository*^Imaediately after
Muhammad Ali*s arrest and transfer to Calcutta in April some of the zeaindari
4
had run away and ethers were evading payment# The Khan in 1773 explained
the disorders by an economy of truth and by putting the blame on the
" disturbances of the Scnnasies "(Sanyaaia )and unstated " other causes"#
At least one of the “other causes" was cefiainly the commotion created
by Thomas French, a servant of the Company at Dacca.A week before Reza Khan**
arrival 9 the Dacca Council took note of various complaints against French
* who in opposition to our majority voices# asserts his ri>jit of sending
for any man whom he suspects to have stolen hie effects"* The matter waa
all the more serious because French waa exercising his assumed rights
principally on higher officers of the government* A* Wo Senior# then chief
ef the Dacca factory?failed to secure release of Gorachand# a naib of the
Shahr Amin* Consternation became general after French had put three principal
officers of the Subahdari into confinement under some pretext or other#
obliging the Diwan to ask Senior for a special guard for his "head Moorey"
or head clerk and driving Senior and Ralph Leycester to resolve on giving —
5protection to all officers of the government# French, justifying his conduct, 
denounced the majority for showing " extra-ordinary lenity and respect o • te 
the very people who had taken up arms against us ana some of them too 
inveterate enemies to the English" and deolared " it has always been 
customary here • • • for any member of the factory to secure any person
1, Mir Jafar*s letters reeds Oct 1763 and Jan 1764 (CPC»I#18995BSC 21 Jan*64) 
also Dacca letter, BSC 16 Jan 17640 
2* Dacca Cons 9 Nov t763;3SC 10 Jan#1o Jan f8 Feb 1764#.
3 ,TP, I, 194# 4« *toh* Saleh to Muhd Ali (Apr 1763) CPC# I# 1755°
^  Tacca Mona fl Ann* 176^
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who he suspected had rob*d or defrauded him"The dispute had not ended when 
the Khan arrived at Dacca to find his office totally deserted an, the 
records untraceable.
A yet bigger problem was to secure the retransfer of the districts
under the occupation of the English , and particularly of Verelst* It
seemed too delicate a matter to demand them directly from Verelst and the
Khan therefore asked the governor Vansittart for letters to the gentlemen of
Dacca, and LUcshcdpur and also to Verelst directing them to assist him*
Vansittart complied with the Khan9s request and sent the letters for use 
2
when necessary.The Khan* a extreme cautiousness in dealing with the English 
may also be traced in his care to secure from Major Adams a letter to the 
chief of the Dacca factory on 5 August asking the latter te deliver up te 
the Khan ** all the state prisoners and effects of the country government** © 
The Khan thus had the support of Calcutta, and Vansittart certainly welcomed 
the Khan*s posting te Dacca.^French was reproved for his actions, and with 
John Cartier*s arrival as chief at Dacca in November 1763* Reza Ehan*s 
problems must have been eased locally.
But while Verelst continued in occupation of many districts of the'
Dacca Naibat until early in 1764* R®za Khanfs position remained very 
delicate.lt seems that one move proposed by er through the Khan te secure 
the early return of the districts was for Sandwip to be given to the Companl 
The Khan also sought the English favour by paying money to them at Dacca 
without waiting for the Nawab*s orders0 Such moves, however, exposed the 
Khan to the ** insinuation of some designing person", for the Nawab wrote 
rather warmly to Vansittart, over the districts retained by Verelst and 
about the money paid to the English without his orders, both in October and 
again in December.^At the same time two letters written by Reza Khan te iiir 
Jafar reporting th«* English failure to restore the occupied districts were 
forwarded to Vansittart, perhaps with the intention ef sewing discord
1. French*s minute, Dacca Cons.12 Aug 1763°
2. Vansittart to Reza Khan, 6 Eept 1763* CPC, I, 1862.
3. Maj Adams to Fort William, 10 Aug f?63© BIT, VI, 248o
4. It appears that Vansittart was more interested in appointments near 
Calcutta(CPC,I,184o) and had even appointed one Ahsanull&h Khan at Jessow 
(CPC,1,1842).About Dacca he had.no say(CPC.I.1850)but welcomed the Khan*s 
appointment(CPC,I,1U38).Spencer13 Council ,however,claimed that the KhanV 
posting to Dacca was obtAined through English solicitations " tho with the 
Nabob*s also" (letter to Middleton ,B3C 1J Dec 1764).
5 ,CPC,1,1893. 6,CPC, I, 1899, 1903,19S6.
between the Khan and the English. If this was the intention, the scheme
failed for Vansittart very correctly refused the suggested offer of Samdwip
and so disarmed the possible criticism in Mir Jafar* s court and also assured
2
the Khan that his enemies could not do him any harm. If the Khan had feared
that Nandkumar had been seeking to discredit him with the English , he must
have been still further reassured by Vansittart* s action in complaining of
the appointment of Lahori Mai as Diwan of Hugli and the continuance ef Jagat
Chand as the Nawab* s agent at Calcutta , for both were associates ef Nand-
kumar s the complaints against them were therefore complaints against his
3
enemy , Nandkumar*
Any worries which the Khan may have experienced about hie standing with 
the Nawab or with Vansittart did not prevent him from setting vigorously 
about his task of restoring the Dacca administration* His first task was te 
organise his secretariat, and by all possible methods of persuatien, mild 
or severe, to set his writers and public officers to work# Records had to 
be built up by collecting every loose paper available and by connecting and 
methodizing them# The ivufass&l officers were encouraged by circular letters
A
assuring encouragement and protectionjCnce the machine was functioning he 
set out te collect as much money as possible for the prosecution of the 
war# This was no easy task while the issue of the war was still undecided* 
for * no one. paid hi a revenue with alacrity or yielded due obedience", and 
when the full amount urgently required could not be collected he did not 
hesitate to borrow money from the bankers and shroffs on his own respensibi* 
lity#^
His efforts in the beginning were mainly directed to collecting money# 
But when the war against Mir Qasim developed into war against his allies , 
the Emperor ana Shuja ud daulah,his service extended to other fields# The 
increased dimensions of the war rendered the existing strength of the
7
English troops upcountry inadequate to meet the challenge# All available
1#The letters were reports rather than complaints#CFC,1,1957 and 1956«The 
Khan alleged that he received’*thro the intrigues of Raja Nundconar orders 
for the confiscatipn^of goods and imprisonment of severe! individuals, 
dependents of the factory#(TF,I, 195)*
2.Governor’s letters 5 Oct, 24 Nov 1763. 010,1,1893, 1950o 
3•Governor to Iiir Jafar29 Oct 1763 (CPC, I. 1919).4o TP,I.194# 5# ibid#
6# One lakh so borrow2d(CTC,I,1892)fTom Bulaqidas renamea ion r^ unadjusted#
7 •Total i^ njlish strength on 30 ;;«c 1763 was 1,080 Europeans,5»600 sepoys 
(BSC 30 J c 1Y63i.Mir Jaf.:r*s troops in July 1764 numbered 33,000 men
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troops had to bo rushed to the front with the result that Chittagong,
idler® three battalions of 600 sepoys each wore maintained for the
defence of both Dacca and Chittagong* was ordered in Karch 1764 to
forward two thirds of its strength , keeping only eight companies of 60
2men each at Chittagong and two at Dacca, The move created an immediate
3
problem for the Khan 9 for he had to arrange the transport. But the
large-®cale denuding of East Bengal of troops was also fraught with
danger, for a " few idle reports'* might create disturbances in the
neighbourhood of Dacca? The Khan, prompted by Vansittart but without
orders from the Nawab , set about the raising ©f a large defence force,
working in close liaison with Cartier? This effort only ceased when the
battle of Buxnr en 23 October made it no longer necessary. The bungling
of Nandkumar also added to the Khan’s war work at Dacca, Supplying
provisions for the army in Bihar was Nandkumar* s responsibility, but he
failed in his task, though to a large extent this was due to much ef
Bihar having lain uncultivated during the prolonged war0 The result was
that troop movement was restricted by lack of supplies and Caraac was
obliged to return to the Scanc river in the Spring of 1764© Vansittart
turned again te Dacca for assistance. The Khan assisted in j^ rain
procurement and in the continuous despatch of supplies to Patna from
May 1764 until September, when the operation was stepped M on account of
the price being greatly enhanced and the distance rendering it very
7
tedious to be transported,,,,M
By April 1764 the stock of the Khan had risen very high with the 
English, perhaps by way of contrast with the sharp decline from toler­
ance to hostility in their attitude towards Nandkumar, Nandkumar had 
been accepted as Kir Jafar* s principal minister in the hour of crisis, 
but had never been trusted. As the war progressed he was te seem less and 
less desirable.
1,33SC 13 Jan 1764. 2, BSC 29 Kar 1?64©
3, Vansittart to Reza Khan 28 Kar 1764* CPC, 1,2128 A,
4* Vansittart to Kir Jafar, 25 Apr 1764© CPC, I, 2186,
5# Reza Khan to Vansittart, 24 Apr 1764 (reed) j Vansittart to Reza Khan 
25 Apr and 10 Kay 1764, (C££, 1,2175, 2185,2223)
6, Letter ^0 Kir Jafar, BSC 16 Apr 1764o 
7« Vansittart to Reza Khan 7 hay 17b4(CP£,1,2211) and also 
BSC 7 June, 8 Aug and 17 3ep 1764,
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The English would have very much wished Rai Durlabh to replace 
Nandkumar, and that is v»hy he was made a member of the Nawab*s camp,almost 
against the Nawab* s wishes. He was left without any employment until 
December , and Was then given the Diwani of the Nizamat, a position of 
little power while the entire revenue administration conducted through the 
Khalsa remained under Nandkumar*s control. The appointment must be seen 
a® the Nawab* s way of expressing his annoyance at Nandkumar* s failure to - 
collect more than a fraction of the revenues, rather than any serious wish 
to favour Rai Jhirlabh,^
j'ir Jafar was pressing Nandkumar about the revenue collections because
the Emperor had agreed to grant a sanad for Bengal as soon as the Nawab
paid fifty per cent of the annual tribute of twenty eight lakhs with an
additional five lakhs as Nazar ana. The news of this agreement, sent by
Rai Durlabh reached Vansittart on 10 January 1764? Nandkumar may have been
implicated in the negotiations for the agreement. He secured his title of
3
Maharaja from the Emperor about this time. Earlier in December Vansittart 
had been apprised of Shftja ud daulah commending Nandkumar to Iiir Jafar both 
on his own behalf and that of the Emperor urging him te make the Raja " the 
sole manager of all the affairs ef the three provinces" ,^0n hearing the news 
of the agreement, the Council became even more anxious to establish their 
control at the Durbar, They had their own claims on Iiir Jafar, for the 
undefined losses to private trade caused by Kir Q&sia*s abolition of inland 
duties on trade , and by the war, and for the cost ef the war against Kir 
Qasim, though this had been declared by the Company and not by Kir Jiifar , 
While these claims were unmet they had no wish to see any money go te the
emperor, and on 19 January they directed Major Knox to prevent any c
5
remittance to the emperor.
The extension of the war, when Shuja ud daulah gave protection to Mir
•«©
Qasim after he had been driven from Bihar, added active fear to the English 
dislike of Nandkumar, On 3 April 1764 the Calcutta Council advised Camac te 
bring about the dismissal of N&ndkunar^ They recalled the past experience of
1,Rai Durlabh to Vansittart, reeds 10 Jan, 1764oCPC,I,2Q14&also DSC 16 Jan 
1764o
2, ibid, 3* Hasan Ali Beg to Adams,reeds 7 Dec 1763, CPC, 1,1966,
4* SMuja to Iiir Jafar, reeds 7 Dec 1763 .CrC, 1,1970. ---
5. BSC 16 an4 19 Jan 1764. 6, BSC 16 Apr 1754.
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the man*s intriguing dispositions, pointed out his shameful neglect in 
collecting grain for the arcy , and voiced their apprehensions that he had 
"many connections at so critical a juncture as this, against our government^ 
This last was the real trouble, for they knew Nandkumar had wide contact 
with the North Indian chiefs and with the Emperor*The English were afraid 
ef Nandkumar , and afraid of exciting him ” to fora worse designs" 0 Cam&e 
was directed to have him dismissed , if it could be dene immediately; 
otherwise he was not te divulge the Council9 s suspicions , which would 
antagonise both the Nawab and Nandkumar?
On the same day as the Council were sending their directions to Carnac
regarding Nandkumar, Cam&o at P&tna was discussing his suspicions about
Nandkumar with the Nawab* Carnac* s suspicions were roused by one iiir Ashraf
4
who accused the Raja ef being engaged in anti—English activities* The 
Council on hearing from Carnac decided that now that public notice of their 
suspicions had already been taken Carnac was to press the Nawab for the 
dismissal of the Raja* As it had been always his custom , they said, "te 
endeavour to make himself ef consequence with all parties",they became far 
mere apprehensive now teat the Raja would take " every measure for strength­
ening his interest with our enemies in order to secure for himself an 
asylum"* In the circumstances the Council decided that they would abandon 
Rai Durlabh , for whom they had so long pleaded, if Nandkumar could be 
dismissed*. Carnac was told te accept the sending back te Calcutta of Rai 
Durlabh if this would induce Kir Jafar to send Nandkumar tooo Carnac found 
the task impossible without use of force and he would not use force " at 
this critical juncture"* The Nawab was " put so much out of temper by this 
affair*? that it had rendered him incapable of entering into any public 
business for a number of days*Carnac also came to change his tone about him
after Captain 5 win ten and Dr* Fullerton had failed to make the Raja’s
7
principal accuser Haji Abdullah te produce any proof of treachery* The
1*B3C 3 Apr 1764* 2*ibid* 3*Camac9s letter 17 Apr*B3C 26 Apr 1764
4*&ir Asnraf’s complaint was that Nandkumar was in secret link with Mir 
Rasim and also that he was secretly advising Balwant Singh ef Benares not 
"to revolt from his master" Shuja while it was the policy of the English 
to detach him to the side of Iiir Jafar and the English*BSC 11 Oct 1764*
5.BSC 16 Apr 1764o 6* BSC 26 Apr 1764*
7.Carnac93 letter 22 Apr, 16 I:ay 1764* BSC 7*10 and 24 Hay 1764* Haji 
Abdullah,source of i ir Ashraf’s informationjwas in iir R-sin's service 
before joining service under Nandkumar*
70
Council contented themselves, therefore, with installing Batson^aa Resident 
at the Durbar, with specific instructions to watch all correspondence and te 
tell the Nawab that the English would not accede to any treaty he night stake
i
unless it met their conditions of the surrender ef Mir 4asim, Sombre and
2the deserters into the English hands.
It was in this atmosphere of bitterness about Nandkumar that the
Council thought ef Reza Khan for a new service, Bengal was exposed to an
enemy thrust across Sarkar Saran, Ballia, Pumea and Rangpur and the Council
decided that Reza Khan was the only man they knew who could be trusted to
3
act in conjunction with the English troops north of the Ganges; Their choice 
was testimony of their appreciation of the Khanvs activities as Naib of 
Dacca, Private and individual regard for the Khan* s merit received the 
official recognition of the entire Council.They hesitated to recommend him 
to the Nawab , however, "lest it should increase his jealousy and uneasiness 
from what has already pass'd concerning Nundcomar",^
Their doubts were well founded for, as will be seen , the Nawab was 
already at odds with Reza Khan, A certain amount of misunderstanding was 
inevitable in the circumstances in which both the Nawab and Reza Khan 
were placed. The Nawab needed money and more money which the Khan found it 
difficult to supply thou^i, as ha says ,ha did not "slacken in my assiduity 
but remitted whatever I was able to realize"On his appointment at Dacca 
the Khan had found everything in disorder , and since then the economy 
of the region had received a further blow in January 1764 from an excessive 
inundation, particularly in the areas around Lakshmipur which evidently 
destroyed the standing crops besides preventing further cultivation, 
Nandkumar, the Khan later alleged, set out to widen the misunderstanding 
and estrange the Nawab*s affections from him. The orders which the Khan 
was receiving from the Nawab for confiscating goods and properties of indivi 
-duals , though designed by‘Nandkumar to embitter the Khan* s relations with 
the English, resulted actually in greater dosertion at a time when he
1,The Nawab had particularly complained against ^atson in Jan and Feb 1764* 
(CPC,1,203% 2041,2058, 2061),
2,BSC 29 Nay ?764oThe English demand led te continued hostility with
Shuja,who suffered himself to be driven out of his country than to give 
up iir 4asim who was however tendered otherwise ineffective,
3, BSC 16 Apr 1764 (letter to Carnac), 4 ibi•.. 5* I* 194«
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was busy in allaying the " consternation of the zemindars and the people ef
the town*'0 The Khan made strong representations to the Nawab against these
proceedings , urging the impropriety of the practice. Thereupon Nandkumar
maliciously propagated the idea that the Khan was disregarding the Nawab*s
commands in order to ingratiate himself with the English with a view tt even
to the nizamat% ^or *hich the Khan was further alleged to have applied to
the Council.^ The insinuation worked on the Nawab*s mind partly because
Nandkumar was supposed to know the English since he had long lived and worked 
2
with them and had his son-in-law Jagat Chand continuously posted at 
Calcutta# partly because the attitude of the English towards the Nawab was 
still unintelligible to him.^
Heza Khan was well informed of developments, in the Nawab*s caiap ,
possibly through his agent Riza luli Khan* When' in, April or Uay he received
an order from the Nawab to repair to Murshidabad with all his officers and
4
accounts, not even leaving even a deputy at Dacca# he was naturally alarmed©
The Khan sought Vansittart*s advice# but was told not to fail to wait on the
5Nawab at Purshidab&d.
The Khan was to have moved as soon as he heard that Kir Jafar had set oui 
from Patna, but when the latter reached Murnhidabad on 24 August 1764 Reza
Khan was not there. He had been delayed# he said, "by the violence cf the
weather". But his absence was interpreted by NuneUu j.r as a prooof of his 
thesis that Reza Khan "had projects in his head**© The Kaharaja*s comment*# 
nude in the presence of Riza }uli,reached the Khan who hurried to liurshidabad 
and almost immediately saw the Nawab. The Nawab received him with the 
sarcastic remark th^t he imagined the interview would take place at Calcutta, 
but Nandkumar commented that the Khan must surely have brought fifteen or 
twenty lakhs of rupees with him for the Nawab. The Khan was silent against 
the Nawab*s remarks ,but he protested against the taunting demand of the Raja 
and offered to place the accounts under scrutiny.Nothing further of
1* Ti , 1*1 • fcofhe Raja*s connection with Calcutta may be dated frpm the
time of Alivardi Khan, when he took asyluB* there.BPP#XIII#102 
3o Lir Jafar*s uncertainty ;hout Englisn intentions Xs seen in a lelter which 
Vansittart received on 17 1764.(summary in CPC,I,2025)•H* complained
that the servants of the Company H... do everything that is conducive to 
the ruin of his affairs* R® adds "Kir fc^ sii: was an enemy of the English
* and yet they conciliated him; while His Excellency who is a true friend ©f 
the Company is treated in this manner."
4*TP# I# 195* 5* CPC, 1.2369# 2372.
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importance happened, however, during the Nawab*s brief stay at Murshid&bad, 
and on the third day after their meeting the Nawab eskod the Khan te wait 
at Kurshidabad until his return and left for Calcutta, The Khan accompanied 
the Nawab to Kankura, the first stage of the Nawab* 8 journey down to 
Calcutta,^
The Nawab* s departure for Calcutta without settling anything with him
worried Heza Khan and his anxiety was increased by the Nawab* s inordinate
delay at Calcutta0 By October anxiety had developed into a real panic. He
had not left any responsible deputy at Dacca, for he had neither had
instructions to do so nor had he anticipated the delay that was occurring
Tfcere were only a few persons te look after the fort during his absence,but
no one to take charge of revenue administration. The season for collection
was passing, and he was apprehensive lest with further delay there should
be irreparable loss of revenue, for which he would be held responsible,The
Khan therefore wrote to Vansittart asking to be called to Calcutta to
settle his business with the Nawab, or for some other way out of his
2
difficulties to be suggested. The Khan did not write to the Nawab,perhaps 
because be feared that he was too much under the influence ef the hostile 
Nandkumar,
Heza Khan*s letter to Vansittart secured the Nawab*s permission for the 
despatch of his officers to Dacca, but none for the Khan to go either te*
Calcutta or to Dacca, though he was assured t^t the Nawab was well disposed
3 4towards hintf Reza Khan accordingly arranged to send Ismail Khan and Ram
Sanjtknr Roy, the Khan* a Diwan, to Dacca to start the work of collection,But 
by the time they had got away October was almost ever, and the Khan repeated
5
his request to be called to Calcutta, There was now an additional reason for 
a visit ; he wished te bid farewell te Vansittart; and to be personally 
introduced by him te John Spencer who had come from Bombay te succeed him,^
1,IP, I, 195-97* 2* Reza Khan t© Vansittart, reedi 17 Oct 1764*CPC,I,2439*
3# Vansittart to Heza Khan, 18 Oct 17^4• CPC, I, 2440,
4, We do not know,but nay be this Ismail was Reza Khan*s youngest brother,
5o Vide Governor*s letters te Reza Khan, 1 ( Nov 1764o(CPC«I«2449«2454)
6, Speneer joined as Second in Calcutta Council en 24 Kay ( letter te Court 
27 3 pt,17&4), succeeded Vansittart in November 1764, an; was replaced by 
Clive on the l^ tteife arrival in Kay 1765,
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The request was refused, possibly because neither Vansittart nor 
Spencer wanted further t© complicate matters between themselves and Kir 
Jafar* The Nawab, who had always entertained a fear of V -nsitt&rt|deferred 
meeting him to settle financial terns as long as he could, though Spencer, 
through Nabakrishna Had aasure4 him that everything would be settled to his 
satisfaction.1 The Nawab on his arrival at Calcutta on 3 September, however, 
found himself in a situation he had perhaps never anticipated© Ke was 
presented with a heavy demand for money » forty lakhs for the gratuity to 
the Company and twenty-five lakhs for the troops ef the Company and the
p
British King • The Nawab had first been asked for ten lakhs as restitution 
money for the sufferers, but two or three days after his arrival in Calcutta 
the demand was enhanced to forty lakhs0 it times the Nawab even wondered 
whether Vansittart was planning to take the government out of his hand, for 
it was made clear to him that he could not go back to Kurshidabad until he 
had agreed to the Knglish demand© Nandkumar was also used to put pressure on 
the Nawab, being promised a five per* cent commission for persuading the 
Nawab to agree0 Further insults were added to injury by the Knglish, for 
when the N?,wab agreed to pay forty lakhs for the "sufferers", another eight 
lakhs was promptly d jnanded, this time by Spencer* Vansittart also persis­
ted in protecting his own creature Ahsan ullah Khan, the Anil of Jessore
2
whom Kir Jafar accused of misappropriating Rs 1,80,000©
In the circumstances the coming of Reza Khan was deemed undesirable*
The Khan was assured that the friendship between them w-s net so weakly 
founded so as to need personal interview, and that the Nawab would shortly 
send him back to Dacca*^However, the Nawab9 s return from Calcutta was 
further delayed aa reports of Clive9s reposting to Bengal had reached 
Calcutta and the Nawab anxiously waited for bin* Kir Jafar at last returned 
to Kurshid&b&d sometime in December 1764#
His return brought no comfort for Reza Khan* On arrival at Kurshidab&d, 
M r  Jafar formally installed Nandkumar as head the administration
ef the country and its revenues* (Rai Durlabh had stayed back in Calcutta)©
1, Nabakrishna1s evidence, BSC 26 Aug 17660 Quoted* N.N.Ghose, Mabar&J& 
Nuhkissen Bahadur, pp 33-34o 
2* Evidence of Nabakrishna and Nandkumar, BSC 19,26,27,28,29 Aug 1766$
Kir Jafar9s letter(summary in CPC,1,2435*reed 10 Nov 1764);A.C*Roy, Kir 
Jafar, pp 276-92* Nandkumar did not receive his coramis3ion(BSC 26 Aug 9 66]
3* Governor to Reza Khan 9 9 Nov 1764. CPC ,1, 2454*
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And if Mir Jafar had formerly been insistent'in his demand for money, he ima 
even more so now that he owei vast suras to t^ ie English® Reza Khan was asked
i
to pay in the revenues according to Nandkumar*s calculations, which were
evidently based on Mir Qasim*s exceptional agreement with Muhammad Ali
for 1170 B.5®0763-64) from Deeca, nfcich was for Rs 38,86,242, Of this sum
Rs 29*63*181 had already bean accounted for , presumably including the
collections before and after the Khan* s appointment in 1170 which ended in 
2
April 1784. Reza Khan denied responsibility for the remainder as he had not
entered into an agreement for any stipulated sum,For the current year ef
1171 (1764^ -65) of which he had already spent several months idly and
against his wish at Murshidabad he did not agree te pay more than Rs26* 19*178
which was nearly thirteen lakhs less than Mir QaaintfiMdeaand, Nandkumar wa*
trying te impose the same sum as current demand from Dacca*^ The Khan
only tendered Rs 3* 82,103 proceeds ef the collection for the current
4
year, an obviously inadequate sua0
A few days later the Khan found himself a prisoner, A Chubdar summoned 
the Khan to see the Nawab and on his arrival at the Durbar, Muzaffar Ali 
Khan, the D&regha or superintendent of the Diwan Kh&na asked the Khan te 
wait in his office when he apparently went to inform the Nawab, As soon as 
Uuzaffar Ali left, the Khan found himself surrounded by three companies ef 
sepoys under the command of Qaim Beg, the commandant of the Nawab*s troops. 
While the Khan was thus surrounded, the Nawab sent for the Khan*3 Vakil,
Riza Quli and through him sent a draft paper for the Khan to sign. The draft 
declared that the Khan admitted his indebtedness for a sura of sixteen lakhs 
of rupees and sought permission to resign his appointment at Dacca on the 
ground of his proved inability to discharge his duties. The Khan refused te 
sign and protested that the post was not of his seeking and that ho had not 
contracted for any fixed sun. The Nawab when he heard of the Khan* s objection 
is said to have exclaimed that he did not understand books and accounts s all 
that he needed was money. The situation of the Khan seemed so desperate that 
his /akil advised him not to raake any further reply, Nuzaffar Ali then came 
from the Nawab*s presence and communicated the Nawab's orders that the Khan
1, TP, I, 197* 2, Iiir Jafar to Spencer , reed® 30 Dec 1764o CPC, 1,2322,
8* ibid® 40 ibid.
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was to stay where he was until the matter was settled and that he must be
unattended except by an Abyssinian slave and by Riza ^uli* The Khan's
servants were all sent away and he was forced to pass tife night at the
Diwan Khana while guards were placed around the Khan's house in the city*
.y
Next day liuzaffar All was sent to the Khan with an agreement for a further 
sum of twenty-two lakhs for the current year for the Khan's signature and 
sealing* The Khan refused to sign it , but he sent his seal to N;uidkumar 
through Riza luli for the Kaharaja to seal the document if he so likedo 
Nandkumar refused to seal the document, demanding that this should be done 
in the Khan's house* The Khan thereupon went personally to Nandkumar and the 
document was sealed and kept by the Kaharaja0^
10 TP,I, 197-99*
ivy Reza Khan's own account® an verified At i the enquiry held at Dacca 
early in 1774 the Khan had, during the period of 21 months from 11 Bhadra
1170 (August 1763) to the end of Chaitra 1171 (April 1765)cellected a 
a tital sum of R». 35*19,520-1V4-2 and had in addition received a*cash 
sum of Rs. 18,722-15-0 from his predecessor, Agha Saleh who administered 
for and on behalf of the Company* The collections and expenditures were 
both made under two heads, Kuzury or King's estates and departments and 
Nizamat or the Nazim's estates and departments*
Under head Iiuzury the total collections stood at Rs 27,91,753-7-7-3*
Expenditures under head Huzury were t
Irsala or cavalry of Husain Ali Khan Rs0 2,18,235-
Luhanmai Husain Khan 76,871- 0-0
;'albo^ KS i f i BM 1ig i  £ K fc{ * r k S 8 S S 8 1’T 43,505-14-0
Salary of Reza Khan *1 7,5^0 p*n* i 1,57,000- 9-0
Cutcheri servants 53,163-12-5
Nowara (boats) 1,360-11-0
Topkhana (artillery) 21,259- 8-0',
Contingent charges ( paper, oil etc) 4,453- 8-17
Belghaur Khana ( Alms to the poor) 5,700- 0-0
Darul Shafa (hospital at Kurshidabad) 3f037- 4-0
Rozindaran (Alms to objects of charity) 891- 0-0
Nazar (presents)at Punyah(&t Murshid&bad ?) 9,614- 8-0 
Resum ( customary payments) to
officers of the Khalsa(at Kurshidabad) 6,124- 5-5 
Hundian (©r premium on remittance) 32,013- 0-0
Khilats at Punyah of 1171 (at Dacca r: ) 41,579-12-3
Allowance to sepoys(of Capt Grant) for 25,719- 0-0
suppessing Rajendra,Zemindar of Babupur 
Allowance to Nazir of cutcherries 3,591- 4-0
Loss of batta(discount) on Arcot rupees 5,859- 3-15 
Charges ma :ing a road to Tesgong(Tejgaon) 2,580- 4-0
(Continued on the next page footnote )
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The transactions were no happy experience for the Khan who at one 
time was even apprehensive for his life* That the matter did not go that 
far was due, Reza Khan told Governor Spencer*, to the arrival of Samuel 
iiiddletcn as tne Company1 s nor, Resident at tie llawab#s Durbar*^In his 
official instructions for guidance as Resident , Middleton had been 
directed by the Council to regard it as his duty to protect Reza Khan, 
since the Council believed that some person or persona about the Kawab 
were endeavouring to bring about his ruin0 The instructions rant
”o*o you will if necessary remind His Excellency of this 
©ur interposition in his behalf, confirming it in the 
strongest terms*o**"2
Continued from the previous page
Total Collections in the Nizamat estates stood at Rs<>7,27f767- 3-16"3 
Expenditures under the Head Nizamat were s 
State Prisoners (Families of Sarfaraz Khan,Alivardi 
Khan, Shaukat Jang etc)
Writers of the Cutcheri
Jawan Ali Khan.Hushrif or^Accountant of the 'Em a, rat or Bullting deptt*
Officers of Topkhana (Artillery)
Officers of Nawara
Charges building boats
materials for ornamenting boats
Allowances to boatmen posted at Rangamati
l)cst Muhammad and boatmen of fKaus haur*
Repairs to Rangamati fort*
Repairs to Dacca fcrt
Pilkhana ( elephants)
Magazine of Arms and ammunition
Making charges for guns
Raja Jugal Kish©re, Accountant of the Nawara 
Contingency charges ( paper, oil etc)
Nazar at Punyah ( perhaps at Murshidabad) 
peat hire
Cost of cheese sent to MUrshid&bad 
Batta ( discount) on Arcot rupees 
Langhar Khana (charity kitchen),Rozinadar(daily
charity) Husaini Dalan, huharram expenses 8,856- 4-15-0
Paid to Shukur ullah , Jamadar at the English factory 3,045- 9- 0-0
Allowances to Kanuraa Hark&rm, (spy) 1,946- 9-13-0
Allowances to Nil Chand and his officers 360- 0- 0-0
During the period of these 21 months
remittances to liurshidabad amounted to Rs 22,34,648-6-5*
Credit balance in Reza Khan*s hands stood &t Rs 1,812-12-8-30
(Vide Dacca Factory Records * India Office Vol 6 ff 31-32)
^•Reza.Khan to Spencer, reeds 10 Jan 17^5® CPCpI, 2534*
20 BSC 13 Deo 1764*
65,054- 4-15-0 
42,739- 1- 9-1
70S— 0— 0—0 
40,396-10- 6-2 
113,654- 9- 8-0 
168,730-10- 2-3 
26,380- 2-12-2 
6,239-12- 9-2
1,319- 0- 0-0
4,800- 0- 0-0 
7,511- 2-15-0 
61,482-14- 0-2 
5,038- 9- 0-0 
40- 1- 0-0  
5,566— 6—10—0 
10,691- 0-18-3 
738- 1-10-0
5,061- 3- 5-1
2,432- 0- 3-2 
931- 1-11-1
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Middleton had intervened according to his instructions* One day he called 
both Kandkumar and Reza Khan to the Residency at J.uradbagh and it was 
agreed in his presence that Reza Khan would pay Rs 26,86,000 as the current 
year’s revenue and anotner Rs 1,30,000 the past year* Nandkuuar
assured Kiddleton that he would speak te the Nawab on the matter and 
draw up papers accordingly*
Since Middleton' s arrival the Khan felt secure even if Nandkvriar
played a further game by preventing the Khan’s departure for Dacca though
a major part of the current year was already over0 The Khan was in a
difficult position again* Nandkumar did nothing to revise the agreement
as agreed in the presence of Middleton* Perhaps his intention was to cause
such arrears in the Dacca collections as would eventually discredit him
with his protectors, the English , whose interest, like the Nawab’s was
2
in the maximization of revenue* The Nawab, at Iiandkunar’s prompting or 
from Irritation at his ill usage in Calcutta was sometimes "urgent” with 
the Khan 9 but ha evidently had no T/ish seriously to persecute the Khan,
3
"an old friend" of his* Reza Khan for his part bided his time, for he 
understood the Nawab’s character# In mid-January 1765 he took tne opportu­
nity of the Nawab being in a jovial mood after returning from a hunting 
expedition to Plassey - the Nawab’8 last - to secure permission to leave 
for Dacca with his wife and children 0 He also obtained a favourable 
endorsement of his application for a reduction in the rigour ©f the 
agreement forced from him by Nandkunara On the Khan’s narration of the
circumstances of the Tahood (or agreement) the Nawab wrote in his own hand,
4
"exert your best endeavours and set your mind at ease"* Thus relieved , 
Reza Kh&n left Murshidabad on 24 January 17&5 and reached Dacca six days 
later0 The Khan felt so great a relief by returning to Dacca that he sent 
a second remittance of Rs0 20ft000 as a token of his gratitude to Spencer 
the first remittance of a similar amount having been sent earlier from 
Ihirshidabado The Khan’s stay at Dacca was 9 however, destined to be shorto 
In less than three weeks, on the death of H r  Jaf&r, he received a call te 
return to Murshid&bad, this time for a higher position*
Reza Khan to Spencer, recdt 10 Jan 1765q CPC* I, 2534*
2© Spencer to Reza Khan, 12 Jan 1763# CPC, Ip 2538 
3* H r  Jafar te Spencer, recdt 10 Jan T O ,  CfCoIo2536.
4a TP_, I, 200, 204o
5* Reza Khan’s statement of presents given to Englishmen by him0
BSC 6 Ju./' 1765o Senior,chief #f Kasimbazar* alsh claimed that he had 
protected the Khan fPP.TVHr*d n*m®rt ,1772,p509j
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NAIB SUBAHLAR, 176%
On Mir Jafar’s death Reza Khan became a part of the new political 
settlement between the Company in Bengal and the new Nawabo He was thereby 
drawn alse into the internal polities of rival factions among the Company’s 
servantso This involvement would ultimately prove dangerous, but in 1765 
one party was to raise him to power, another to confira him in what 
Hastings later called ” the sovereignty of this province”,^
Kir Jafar died at about noon on Tuesday , 5 February 1765fbut he had
already had on 29 January seated Najn ud daulah , his eldest surviving sonp
2
on the masnad with all due ceremonies, Shortly before his death, in tne 
forenoon of 5 February, the eld Nawab committed his son Hajm ud daulah, 
the rest of the family and Handkur.iar to the protection of the governor and 
Council in a letter to Spencer, In a postscript, perhaps addej after Mir 
Jafar*s death, Nandku.ar, "your servant” professed his attachment and 
obedience to the Company and asked for such kindness from them as he had 
received from the late i.awabo^The Nawab had also sent for i id ;leton, but 
before the Resident was ready to go to the killah or fort the Nawab was 
reported dead and he then accompanied by George Gray, Capt Stables ana S. 
Droze wont to attend the installation coremAny of the new Nawab, There, as 
the Company’s representative ho offered nazr to the Nawab as did the Jagat
A
£>eth and otherJloading citizens of Murshidabna ♦
Najm ud daulah commenced his rule by publicly assuring the Resident 
that "whatever engagements his father had entered into ♦ •<>he would strictly 
adhere to,,*o”, and by publicly expressing the'hope that th© Company would 
favour him as they had his father,. His inaugural speech also contained an
1.Hastings to Court’s Secret Committee, 1 Sep 1772, Add I ss 29125 P 134»
2,'iddleton’s letters,29 Jan,5 Fab 17&5© 4 and 8 Feb 1765©
3*Mir Jafar ans Manckumar to Spencer, reed* 7 Feb 1765© CMC,I,2549*
4«The Jagaf >eth was a hereditary title of the senioruost member of the
house ,anci Maharaja, of the next senior member.After the murder of 
Mahtab Chand an Swarup Chand by Mir *1uin the titles came to be held by 
Khoshal ChanJ n. IJai Chand respectively.
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an expression of appreciation of the attachment and services of liandkunar
whose confirmation in office he held under M r  Jafar was also announced,.
After the ilurbar ceremony the Nawab was proclaimed through the city and
•rders and notices were sent t© the different parts ©f the country.^ T©
2
Middleton everything seemed to be in perfect tranquillity , but the 
authorities in Calcutta had a different view©
Middleton*s letter ©f 29 January reporting M r  Jafar* s illness reached 
Calcutta en 31 January* Spencer*s comment was that ” prevention at all 
times is better than remedy”t and apparently tc forestall pny possible 
disturbances er attempt by Shuja ud daulah t© exploit the situation* he 
took'varieus measures© Capt Grant was ordered to stay with MiMleton and 
to take coiamand of the Comapny*s sepoys j ether officers were sent to 
Murshidabad on the pretence of sending them to i-onghyr; four companies of 
troops ano a subMtern wore ordered frora Burdwan to Murshidub&d, and 
Mddleton was authorised to detain any officer or detachment ®f troops that 
should pass through Murshidabad, if he so d -sired© The Resident was to keep 
the governor constantly informed of developments in Murshi&abal and to 
await instructions should the Nawab die. M d  die ton was also urged to 
take these measures discreetly, however, so as to cause no umbrage should 
M r  Jafar recover©^
On hearing of the Nawab* s death and Kajsr u£ d&ulaji* s accession Spencer
4and his Council became more active, and John Johnbtcne 'ms recalled from 
Burdwan to help in their deliberations© The Council on 8 Febru. ry rMtcr- 
ated its decision of 31 January to support ” as yet” M r  Jafar*B family © 
They had not decided what the new relations with the Nawab should be , but 
they were determined en big changes, and believed it was of great cens*-* 
quence to reseat Najra ud daulah on the masnad ” in a proper and public 
manner £sq J  that he as well as the whole country may see that he receives 
his government from the Company”0 Middleton was therefor© directed ” te 
discourage to the utmost any application for Sunnuds for the provinces frwvi
1o Najn ud daulah also addressed his brothers,3aifud daul -h or hajabat Ali 
Khan and Mubarak ud daulah , the nominal IM.zims of Bihar and Orissa to 
look upon him as they did upon their father, but it does not appear 
that he had any message for M r  3aidu, his nephew and sen of Mran.
2. Middleton*s letter, 5 ^eb *h3C 8 Feb 17^5»
3© Spencer*3 letter ,31 J^n ana 1 Feb.BSC 8 Feb 17&5*
4* Chief of Burdw&n, member of Council,and later a severe critic of Clive0
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any quarter*' for though sanads without the Company’s backing were not 
effective " yet they might in improper hands be sufficiently so to 
embarrass our affairs”* If any sanad was necessary it should be "procured 
thr© our influence alone”! This was, ©f course, no real problem since Shah 
Alen was already in English camp living under English protection#
Exactly a week after Najm ud daulah had started functioning as Nawab
Nazim at Hurshidabad, the Council at Calcutta reinforced by the arrival
of Johnstone from Burdwan and Major Hector liunro from up ecu*1 "try -took up
the succession question© The majority decided to " permit and confirm” Mir
Jafar's nomination of N&jra ud daulah despite John Burdett's plea for the
succession of Kir Saidu, Mi ran’s minor son • The majority agreed that Mir
Saidu had a prior ri^ fct according to the " order of Succession in Europe”©
2But Najm ud daulah,though born of a slave girl, had, been recognised as
• i
Chhota Nawab during Mir Jafar's lifetime ana as Nawab After Mir Jafar’s 
death. As natters stood, any alteration in favour of Mir Saidu would " run 
the hazard of fresh convulsions and parties in the country" while the 
English were yet engaged in a distant war against Shuja ud daulah. The 
long state of minority of Mir Saidu was also considered as another reason 
against his succession©^
Buriett was not reconciled to the majority view* It would seem that 
in pleading for liran's son he was pushing the private views of Rai 
Durlabh, who w;is desirous of controlling the Murshidabad government from 
which he had been successfully excluded by Nandkunar. he therefore 
characterised the new arrangement at Murshidabad as ” entirely plann'd 
and executed by Nundcowar, a man so much disaffected to us” and he 
countered the argument of Saidu's minority by suggesting the remedy, ” our 
appointing proper ministers to manage the affairs of the government under 
our inspection”*^ Whether in thus suggesting a change ef ministers as well
t
1* BSC ti February, 1765#
2#Burdett even sougnt to deny legitimacy of Najm ud daulah by describing 
him as a sQn of a concubine. The majority called him Mir Jafar's son 
r *”th© not by hi^married wife”0 Najm ud daulah's mother, Munni Begun was 
*& slave girl owned by Mubarak ud daulah's grandmother who nad© a gift ef 
her to Mir Jafar0 .Unlike a free woman, a slave did not need a formal 
marriage to bear'a bhild ef her master. A$ soon as she gave birth to a 
sen, she ceased to be a. slave, and becar.e'an 'unmul walad', A son so bom 
was as much a legitimate;heir as on© bom of^  free woman©
3.BSC 12 Feb 1765. 4. ibid.
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as ©f Kawabs he was merely a spokesiru-n for Rai Durlabh is not clear,but
1
we do know that Rai Durlabh had given a note promising money to Burdett*
Burdett failed to undo Najm ud daulah*s accession tut his denunciation of
Nandkumar could not be so easily set aside0 After Hastings^ departure from
Bengal the opposition to Nandkunar had weakened and Spencer and some of
the members of the Council seemed prepared to overlook the widely voiced
objections to the L&haraja provided he could recommend himself to them by
becoiaing regular in payment of the stipulated money to the Company* The
Resident had therefore been ordered on 31 January to support the
2
ministers of Mir Jafar in case anything happened to the Nawab0 The 
neutral attitude of tolerating Nandkunar in his present position became 
almost impossible after Burdett had denounced him in a public document, the 
more so as the Directors had already declared that ** Mundcomar is a persor 
improper to be trusted with his liberty*• *.", and had asked the Calcutta
3
authorities to keep a watch over all his actions
The adjourned council when it met again ©n 14 February tack up the 
question of new ministers who should bo , as Burdett had put itB M under 
our inspection" o The Council now resolved te appoint Reza Khan as I,'aib 
Subah "who shall have immediately under the Nabob the chief management 
of all affairs"«, Under him the revenue administration shall be divided 
between Rai Durlabh and Kandkumar , so that " their power as near as 
possible shall be equal"* Two other measures to extend the Company*© 
authority over the Nawab*s government were also decided upon i it was 
resolved to vest the Company* 3 government with power to veto the 
appointment of any public servant of the Nawab* s government and that the 
Nawab should have no military force of his own. Th^ llawab was however te 
be allowed to keep only such troops as were " immediately requisite for 
dignity of his person and the business ©f his collections"* For the 
maintenance of the Company’s army as the only defence force of Bengal, 
the Nawab was to continue te pay five lakhs a month as a permanent 
assignment which ,it was agreed with Mir Jafar only four months ago , 
was to be a temporary measure for the duration of the emergency of the
4
war against Shmja ud daulah* The idea of the other two measures was
1a Rai Durlabh*s note to W.D.Sunner, reed. 5 Sep. BBC 16 Sep 17&5©
2* Spencer’s letter to Middleton 31 Jan,reiterated by Council 1 Feb*
BSC. 8 Feb 1765o
3© Court’s letter 22 Feb 1764© 4©B3C 14 FebfSpencer* to Court 14 Mar 17&£
"not also new*
Vansittart had triad thorn both with Kir Jafar* As f: r back as July 
1763 Vansittart had asked the Nawab to infora him whenever the Nawab sent 
any officer into the country so that " knowing wh© are his Excellency’s 
friends and who hi3 enenies " th?i governor could take measures according­
ly 1 Though the then circumstances did not permit assertion ©f the _ j. 
principle as a matter of right* there is at least one instance when
Vansittart had gone beyond ,to appoint an Anil and send his appointment
2
for subsequent approval by the Nawabo tlir Jafar had reacted more sharply 
when in June 17&4 Vansi ttart had asked him to discharge his treops and 
rely ©n the Company’s forces er to place his select troops under Camsb’5 
conn and and again in July to place then under kunro’s comoani^and had 
asserted his independence -in matters of Bakshigari , ©r paymastership an® 
command9 The plea used by Vansittart had been the saving of money then 
spent on useless troops and diverting the same for the maintenance of the 
more effective troops ©f the Company* The Nawab had answered the governor 
by awkwardly raising a question about the revenues earned by the Company 
from the Jagiri districts which were meant to pay for the troops eapleyed 
in his serviceo^Spencer and his Council were determined not to allow any 
such freedom to Najm ud daulah*?
The choice of Reza Khan as Naib Subahdar was an obvious one, given 
that the Council's intention was to break the power of Nandkunar and to 
impose upon the Nawab som^ine more amenable to English control, for the 
mutual hostility of the Khan and the 2iaharaja was well known0 The move 
was necessary also to protect Reza Khan who had repeatedly appealea for 
protection against Nandkumar who was determined w to retain his power ana <a
crush this man”* The Khan’s need for protection was definitely greater new
1.Vansittart to Kir Jafar, 27 July 17^3© C1C, I, 1833*
2* Vansittart to kir Jafar, 12 Aug 17&3* CPC, I, 1842* I ir Jafar confirmed
the appointment of Ahsanullah Khan , but not as Amil ef Nadia* kir Jafar 
posted him te Jessore*(Vansittart to kir Jafar,22 Aug 1763©CPC, 1,1846)
3*Vansittart te Kir Jafar, 12 June, 1764© C1C, I, 2300©
4©Vansittart requests Kir Jafar te look upon the kughal cavalry raisea by
kunro H as his servants'*, te pay their wages through Lunre, and te dis.iis!
some of his own cavalry. (Vansittart’s letter ,3 July 1764©CPC,I, 2321) 
5©kir Jafar*s letter,reed* 10 22ov 1764© CPC, I, 2453®
6. Vansittart did not deny the validity of the Nawab*s claims* The Jagiri 
districts , he said, produced about fifty lakhs, but "the Company’s expen. 
have been doubled in this war-*,(Vansittart’s letter 25 Jul 1764©it>id©2353] 
7*The Majority’s minute ©BSC 20 Feb 1765© 8. ibid
after liir Jafar*s death, for despite Nandkumar'3 enmity Roza Khan could
settle his affairs with Jlir Jafar, as he did twice,to his own advantage!
With greater influence ef Nandkumar on the young Nawab,Iieza Khan was in
greater danger0 Ensuring his security was also a responsibility ef the
Council , though Spencer may as well have been influenced in his favour
2
for private reasons0
Having selected Reza Khan, Spencer had te make sure that the Khan's
joining his new pest as Naib Subahdar did net prove a risky gamble * Rasa
Khan later asserted to Johnstone^ one of the architects ef his new
fortune, that he had never wished for the new post, and there is no
evidence that any move caiae from him, and in view ef the reports already
circulating that Clive was due at any meaeatf he might well have preferred
his safe Dacca pesto In order , therefore, te secure Reza Khan against
any eventuality it was also resolved by the Council that the Nawab was te
stipulate in his treaty with the Company alee that the Khan oould net be
removed from his Naib Subahdarl without the acquiscence ef the Council and
that should it become necessary hereafter te agree to Reza Khan's removal
from llurshidabad, he was te be reposted te Dacca which should be guaranteed
to hira0 The consequential arranagement that the Council agreed on was that
the Khan should continue to hold his Dacca appointment and that any officer
sent there should be told that he held it for the Khan who would have the 
5
reversion*
Seme such guarantee was necessary, for despite the Council's resoliw 
tion strenuous efforts were still being made to retain Nandkunar and the 
existing arrangement* The alarm had been raise* at lurshidaoad by Spencer's 
fallure to reply to Najm ud daulah's letter of 6 February, an<> by absence 
even of any letter ef condolence.^Nan^kunar sent his son-in-law Jagat Chand 
to Calcutta to get the existing arrangement approved by the Nnglish, The 
envoy , who hold-the pest ef the Nawab*s agent at Calcutta, offered eleven
1* The previous chapter©
2. The Khan had paid Rs 20,000 to Spencer in 1764 when he was called te 
kurshidabad by the Nawab and another Rs 20,000 after his safe return te 
Dacca in Jan *65©(Reza Khan*a etatemento BSC 6 June,1765)0 These payment; 
were tokens ef gratefulness for Spencer's protection*
3* Reza Khan to Johnstone,the third letter recdsHay I7650PP 4th Repew*,1775 
4* Clive had sailed from Pertsmounth in June 1764o P 542*
% BSC 14 Feb 1765
6, Najm ud daulah to Spencer recdi 16 Feb*BSC 16 Feb 1765*
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lakhs to Spencer for his support for the maintenance of the status quo 
anal money was also offered to Leycester and other Bombers of the Councill
The offers proved ineffective0 However when George Gray arrived from
2
ilalda to take his seat in the Council , Nandkumar proved to have a
supporter0 Gray dissented froa the Council98 resolution of 14 February
"froa ay heart" * or if Clivo9s later allegtdon that Gray had received
il3 25»000 from Nandkum&r when he attended Najm ud daulah9 s installation,
frou his pocketo Gray maintained that the Nawab Naja ud daulah n has
as little occasion for Mahomed Reza Cawn to help hiis on account of his
5
youth , as his father had for Keer Cossin on account of his age"© To him 
Reza Khan was a man of " aspiring temper* and * is by no means of a suffi­
cient rank to hold a post which commands srfch distinguished I.'utseddies 
as the Roy Royon and the Nizamat Duan"^, Gray also feared that the Khsn 
would turn out ” all the old officers" put in by Nandkumar whom he 
designated as Rai—Rayanj and also that he would retaliate on the Nawab 
for the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of Kir Jafar© Gray was equally 
opposed to the division of power between Nandkunar and Rai Nurlabh as
decided by the Council on the ground that it could not bo done without
7
altering the form of government©
Gray9a opposition only delayed the execution of the Council9s
proposed measures. The majority asked Gray for an alternative to Reza
Khan9s appointment , and when he could suggest nothing better than
Nandkunar’s continuance under the existing arrangement , they brushed his 
8objections aside* The Council then arew up thd now treaty, signed it in
two copies and despatched a delegation to ix^ poso it0 This consisted of
John Johnstone and Ralph Leycester from the Council, to be join-d by Samuel
Middleton, the Resident at the Durbar, and A.tf. Senior, the chief of
Kasimbazar on their arrival at Murshidabado Jonhstone being named leader
of the delegation the controlling power ovor the army at llurshidabad was
9
also given to his©
1.Leycester*s minute in Council ae given in the appendices to the BSC 1765 
1.0. records, Ranee A, Vol 6,
2«3ray ires succeeded by Richard Harwell at ) alda.He Joined Council as 16£W>
3.BSC. 19 Feb 1765. 4» 3PC 26 Jan 1766
5.BSC 19 Fob 1765. 6. ibid. 7. ibid.
8.BSC 19 and 20 Feb. 1765.
9. Instructions to the Jelegstion. BSC 20 Feb 1765.
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With the arrival of Johnstone and Leycester at Kurshidabad in the 
evening of 23 February the scene of activity shifted froa Calcutta to 
Lurshidabad© The Durbar had been much agitated by Spencer*s letter ef 
condolence of 11 February which spoke of measures being decided in 
Calcutta©Agitation became real fear when Spencer* 8 letter of 14 Pebruaray
arrived, with instructions to the Nawab to forward a letter from the
governor to Reza Khan and send along with it one from his own summoning
2
the Khan to Murshidabad * against the arrival of our deputies"© The Kawabb 
reply was to send Spencer*s letter to Reza Khan back to Calcutta with a 
protest* The argument user was thet the revenue year was nearly at an end 
and that if Reza Khan vras called to the capital he would use this as an 
excuse to evade due discharge ef his commitments© Since Reza Khan had 
so far only paid six lakhs, he should not be called to Lurshidabad till the 
year*s end, in two months* t i T h e  Nawab at the same time wrote te Reza 
Khan directing him " to stir from Dacca"©^fhe young Nawab feared that 
Reza Khan wax being brought to Kurshidabad to be raised to the iaaanad, ho 
therefore played for time, in the hope that Clive would soon arrive© It 
was certainly difficult for him to understand the Council*s actions, for 
he had done all he could to please them by publicly and in writing 
binding himself te honour all obligations accepted by his father© With the 
precedent ef Mir Jafar* s supercession by Mir a^sira before him, and his
fears doubtless excited by Nandkunar, his alarm was very understandable.
The delegation met the Nawab on 25 February in a private auiiance, 
gave him the governor*s message and explained te him the new draft treaty© 
The young boy ef 16 or 17 calmly read the terns, compared them with 
those which were executed by his father, and signed both the copies* The 
Nawab had no alternative, but to follow the line ef least resistance and 
hope time would bring a change© When the delegation proposed to defer the 
ceremony of re-installation of the Nawab until the arrival of Reza Khan 
the Nawab readily concurred©
1© This was in reply to the Nawab*s letter of 6 Fob which was received by 
Spencer ©n 7 Feb (BSC 8 Feb 1765).Spencer wrote ©n 11 Feb (CPC,I,2554)
2* Governor and Council to Najm ud daulah* BSC 14 Feb 17&5*
3© Kajia ud daulah t© Spencer, recdx 20 Feb 77 65© CPC, I, 2566*
4. Delegation's letter 25 Feb. DSC 28 Feb 1765.For suaoary ef the liaw .b's
letter to Reap Khan CPC, I, 2567©
5* Delegations let.or 25 Feb * BSC 20 Feb 1765©
8B
The delay was welcome te all, to each for his own purpose# The Nawab
and Nandkumar were fitting to delay a decision until the arrival of Clive
and also that ©f the imperial Sanad, which was t© then most essential to
give sanction to Najm ud daulah* s access3ion0 Kandkumar had a private
object , for he had to attend the marriage ceremony of his son with Raja
Krishna Chandra’s daughter] hut he also used the tii«e gap to try
Leycester again with money if nhe would hut endeavour to keep things in
2
the state they were”,and to tempt Senior with five lakhs of rupees M te 
withhold his favours from Mahomed Reza Cawn"#^ The English delegation*s 
official reason for delay was that Reza Khan had still to arrive. But they 
also wished to find out more ahout the revenues of the province and the 
” people most worthy and capable ef being entrusted with the management
4
ef those branches”# Theugh Cray’s opposition to Reza Khan , ana Burdett*s
preference for Rai Durlabh ( who had followed the delegation to Lurshida—
bad), had been overruled, the delegation were in fact still looking for
possible alternatives te Reza Khan. Before and after their meeting with
the Nawab they w*jre busy reporting te Calcutta on possible candidates*
Kirza Eraj Khan, an old Mughal noble, father-in-law of Siraj ud daulah,
and iir Jafar*s deputy at Kurshidabad from 1763 2 Ismail Ali Khan, another
relative , and guardian of one cf Kir Jafar*s sens**} Asad ullah Khan,
a Mughal chief ©f Shuja*s army and brought to Bengal by Major Kunr©^# All
were eismissed as ”creatures dependent on Nundcenar” nnd ” from age
and weakness utterly unfit for undertaking and conducting so weighty a
7
charge as that of Naib Subah”; Finally even Resa Khan delayed. Spencer 
had written te hi# te proceed te Hurshidabad not only by way ef the Nawab
3
but also directly# But he had also had orders from Najm ud daulah , not to 
otir. He took eight days on the way from Dacca to Murshidabad, a length 
of time which suggests that his delay was purposeful. He could not 
disoblige Spencer, he could not disobey the Nawab, and he would net enter 
1-iurshidabad until at the Delegation’s request, Najm ud daulah wrote ©n 
25 February asking him to hurry te the city# He reached the capital 
©n tiie 28 th o
1, jelegates* letter , 3 • • MC 6 i ar 17'65o
2# Leycester’s minute, BSC. Appendices#I#C«Records* Range A. Vol 6.
3o Senior’s evioence. HP Tnird Report, 1773# p 309*
4« Delegations’ letter 23 Reb. BSC 28 Beb 1763.
5# Thi3 least known son ©f Kir J a f a r ,was Kir Jan 0 6C CPC, 1,2344 ,^432,2426 
%0 Nidegvtionb letter 23 -VT. . BC 28 Bebol?^* BBC 14 Bob 17-0*
it
Even th&n the installation of the Nawab was A clayed for another
three days. When it took place on 3 March , 1765 *it made very plain the
power of the Cempany©Gray and Burdett had already pretested in Calcutta
against the ceremony being held up for Reza Khan’s coming as a measure
which carried " the appearance of tee much respect and consideration for
hjm to the diminution ef the Nabob* s authority" .^ ;:©w the authority ©f the
2
Emperor was also publicly lowered*; Najm ud daulah had applied for the
emperor* s sanction to his succession* and this had been sent through
Shitab Rai and under the emperor’s private seal. Nandkumar therefore came
to the delegates* headquarters at Motijhil te Ask " whether a tent sheu’d
as usual on such occasions* be erected without the city* where the Nawafe
might publickly and with due reverence receive the Perwanna ef the Kin^*0
Since the delegates had come te make the Nawab take his government freia
the Company and not from the emperor * they nature lly resented the
"impropriety ef such a measure" ana hurried te the palace to prevent ito
As they reported* the Nawab was " easily convinced" and he " readily
3acquiesced in receiving the government only from the Company". Buck 
alighting ef the eaperor* s parwana must have ore&ted abherrenoe in the 
Nawab and the nobility at Hurshidabad* including the Khan. It also ereated 
an uproar among the English as wellQ Carnao refused to obey directions te 
proclaim Najm ud daulah in the camp in the circumstances which he 
regarded as " the greatest indignity that ceud be offered te His Majesty* 
being directly ^ opposed^to the constitution of the empire"
Vihatever the private feelings ef either Najm ud daulah or Reza Khan 
may have been* the Nawab was publicly reinvested as the Subahdar ef 
Bengal* Bihar and Orissa on Sunday the 10th Ramzan corresponding te 3 
March 176% On the same day Reza Khan was formally installed in his 
office as Naib Subahdar0 The Nawab conferred* Karan All says* the titles 
•f Kubariz ul Hulk (the Foremost in the Kingdom)P Muin ud daulah ( the 
Eminent in the State)* I uzaffar Jang ( the Victorious or Triumphant in War]
1.BSC 28 Feb 1765<>
2.At the same time the English secured Sanad for five Northern Sarkars 
around Luslipatam.The English interest in being kind to the Emperor was 
te prevent !U Law from securing any advantage from bin,’:no French r/ere 
returning to Bengal after the Treaty ef Marie, 1763.Spencer’s letter te 
Court* 14 ; '<rch 1765©
3oDelegatee* letter 3 Mar© BSC 6 K.-r 1765.
4*Camae*e letter 21 Haro BSC 9 Apr 1765o For Grav’s protest BSC 6 Kar 176* 
%  Delegation's letter 3 M*r© BSC 6 liar. 1765o
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on Reza Khan together with & Khilat of five j.)iec<-8, - jewelled aigrette,
a ncimitar, a sword and a r.ale elephant* Titles and similar gifts were
presented te the English members of the delegation an. further honours and
titles were bestowed on the Nawab* s brothers.and friends] The cepios ef
the treaty between tho Nawab and the English as drawn up bj the Council on
220 > February were formally exchanged*,
Under Clause Two of the new treaty the Nawab undertook as essential 
" for myself, for the welfare of the eeuntry and for the Company*s 1 
business** te have a person " fixed with me with the advice of the Governor 
and Council in the station of Naib Subah who shall accordingly have 
immediately under me the chief management ef all affairs*0 And * as 
Mahomed Reza Cawn the Naib ef Dacca*, the Clause further read, "has in 
every respect my approbation and that of the Governor and Council I do 
further agree that the trust shall be conferred on hin and I will not 
displace hin without the acquiescence of these gentlemen" 0 '^ *he Clause 
furtner provided that in case of the Khan*s removal he would * be reinsta­
ted in the N&ibship of Dacca with the same authority as heretofore"
provided, ©f course, that the Khan had "acquitted himself in his adminis—
3
trationS By Clause Three it was further provided that " the business of 
the collection of tho revenues shall bo under the Naib Subah* and that tho 
English should have the right to object to any mutasaddi or officer and 
that the Nawab should pay due regard to their objection* \ i  citations wore 
thus imposed on the power of the Nawab, but Reza Khan had through the 
same process been raised to tho highest position short of the Nizamat 
itselfo The Khan ackno?;lodgod his gratefulness to Spencer together with a 
remittance of Rs 50,000 two days later, on 5 Marcb i'1765o^
The formal exchange of the copies of the treaty , however, did not 
automatically transfer the control of tho administration to Heza Khan0 In 
Gray*s language » the delegates seemed " to find no difficulty in porsua- 
ding tho Nabob to agree to their proposals" | trouble arose about actual
1* til f 151*Karam Ali appears slightly in^cerrect©The first of the throe 
titles was a subsequent acquisition perhaps through Clivo and from the 
emperor*( The Nawab*b letter,6 I-ar0CPC,I,2599 and Seir,lll, 4)
2, Delegates* letter 3 far* BSC 6 Nar 17^5* 3oB3C 20 Feb 1765® 4o ibid 
5# Reza Khan’s statement, BSC 6 June 1765®
6* BSC 6 Ear 1765,
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Meting authority in the Khan' 3 handsp It became necessary for the 
delegates again to intervene since neither NanaLkumar nor the Zemindars 
and other officers ef the Cutcheri who worked under Nandkunar H made the 
usual acknowledgements ef the Naib Subah”.The Nawab did not consult the 
Khan and as Nandkunar still appeared as the Nawab'3 principal adviser 
the delegates found it again necessary te intervene, and this time in 
the presence ef the Nawab, te make beth Nandkunar. and the Nunshi or 
secretary understand the limits ef Nandkumar'a authority.^
Parallel te the eppesitien te Reza Khan went resistance to the 
delegates* attempts te find out the details ef the revenue administration. 
This was essential if there was to be an equal division of powers and
functions between Nandkunar and Rai Durlabh as planned, but though
2
Johnstone was an acknowledged expert en revenue, they ceuld make ne
progress.First the Nawab was hostile to the enquiries,“this slighting treat
3
-sent 11, until he was made te see that Johnstone was n promoting His
4
Excellency's interests". After R^za Khan had been installed as Naib Subah,
Nandkunar and his creatures began te throw obstacles in their way0 The
Relegation found thoro were n© proper accounts since the commencement of
the war against Mir -lasia in 17&3t and when Nandkumar was asked for
information they got none. Thus when he was asked about the Bihar revenue*
he replied that he did net knew what was settled and what was collected,
and he declared that there were no Bihar papers with him at I. urshidabad.
The i aharaja shelved his own responsibility arrtf directed then to Raja 
’ 5Dhiraj Narain , who managed the Bihar revenues at Patna<• Nor could they 
get any information on the Rajshahi Zemindari which was being supervised 
by Nandkunar*a brother. The central office ef the Zemindari which was 
situated at Murshidab&d was set en fire en 20 Parch and all the records 
wore destrey&do^The delegate*, with Reza Khan's help , were able to make a 
rough survey, but obstruction caused such delay that they had not completed 
the division of revenue work between Nandkumar and Rai Durlabh , 
when * sudden new development threw the whole plan out of gear.
T. iy«logati*rfe letter, 7 Ear." BSC 16 Nar 1765o
2o Johnstone's first experience in revenue matters was gathered in Nidnapur, 
He was posted there in 1760 because ef his knowledge of the *j ©ers* lan­
guage (BBC 8 Ncv 1760)o]!e was later posted te_ Burdwan another * ceded’are* 
3o The Nawab*s letter recc0 5 ■'ar»CPC,1,25960
4© The Nawab*s letter to Spencer, reedi 19 Ear 17^5o Cl’C, 1,2608.
5© Ram Harain's brother rewarded by J'ir Jafar.(Jeir.II.556)
6. Relegation's letter,22 Ear. BSC 25 Her 1765.
The development was tne production ef damaging proof ef Nandkumar*8 
enmity towards the English by George Vansittart© It will be recalled that 
there had been twe earlier enquiries abeut Nandkumar in 1764* ence early 
in the year when he was exonerated by Camac ] another time in October 
when the Council decided that any public enquiry would foment distrust 
and jealousy in Mir Jafar which, as Leycester pointed eut9 "in eur
dependence en his government for supplies ef money te carry en the war at
2
this juncture may be productive ef very dangerous consequences". The 
Council did then order private reports from Camac, Batson, Swinten, 
Stables and Fullerton en the matter f ana another leek at Camac* s 
earlier enquiry* Henry Vansittart, before he left Bengal in November, 
tried te persuade Mir Jafar again te disniss Nandkumar, but when Mir Jafar 
refused the matter was dropped. New George Vansittart returning from 
up country , following his chief Major Munre's relinquishing the cemmana 
te CamacJ brought new and telling evidence ef the Maharaja*s questionable 
conduct euring the war.
The issue had been re-opened by Mir Ashraf, an English protege in
Bihar, who had been the original complainant against the Maharaja, Tho Mir
had requested Gderge Vansittart te enquire afresh into his allegation that
the Maharaja had been secretly thwarting the English attempt te detach
Balwant Singh from the side ef Shuja ud daulah and the Emperor, then with
Mir ^asin at war with tho English and Mir Jafar© Mir Ashraf had also
alleged that Camac was prejudiced in favour ef the Maharaja,^ Vansittart
accordingly enquired further and learnt from Balwant Singn that Nandkumar
had written to him two or three tines , and to Shuja sojjo fifty tines© Tni*
was confirmed by Randolph Marriet on 25 February© Their testimony nado nor«
credible an alleged letter from Nandkumar te Balwant Singh, furnished by
Mir Ashraf, which read t
"I have had the pleasure te receive yeur letter by hands of
1, "That Nundceaar*s late behaviour has been such as te remove almost 
$n.ti?ely the susnicqon of hip, being engaged in treachery, however 
faulty he nay have been in other particulars", Camac * s letter 16 jay
BSC 24 May 1764©
2, BSC 11 Oct 17^4© 3* G ,Vansittart was Persian Secretary te Munre,
4, G♦Vansittart*s report, BSC 16 Mar 1763* The enquiry was revived in Oct 
1764 also by Mir Ashraf and at tnat time through H©Billers, The Mir then 
nad alleged that Carnac had even forced a paper from him stating that 
Nandkumar was guiltless© BSC 11 Oct 1764,
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Deendyaul Missir. A treaty is new sent from hence under the care el 
the said Missir. I wae an sincerely yeur well wisker and leek upen 
yeur presperity as ay own, write yeu eut ef friendship that yeur 
revolting frea yeur master and forgetting yeur duty is centrary te 
tke rules ef keneur and justice. Here, these gentlemen are every 
ainute changing their ceunsels and pursue nothing with steadfast­
ness, yeu should net place any cenfidence in their writings and 
agreements”. 1
This evidence was given te the Delegatien at Murshidabad by George 
Vansittart en his way te Calcutta. They decided that tke facts " as 
attested nust for the present destroy all confidence between us and 
Nundcemar”,and they postponed the allocation ef revenue duties between 
the Maharaja and Rai Ourlakh pending further advice fren Calcutta. There 
the Council reacted sharply te Vansittart*s report, supported by new 
documents, and en 16 March they directed the Delegation te deprive 
Nandkunar and his agents ef any share in the collections and te send him
te Calcutta for an enquiry. Spencer wrote te the Nanab also, conveying
2
these wishes ef the Council.
The Council’s directions brought about a small scale revolution at 
Murshidabad.On the morning ef 20 March, when the delegates were preparing 
te carry Spencer's letter te the Nawab, Nandkumar called en them. He was 
promptly detained in the Residency in the custody ef oaptain Stables, who 
had orders te keep him engaged in conversation till their retum0 At the 
fort the Nawab opposed the delegates' proposal te detain the Maharaja, an* 
insisted en his release while he wrote te Spencer en the matter. They 
considered the Nawab was merely wasting time, and they left the fort 
determined te held the Maharaja until Spencer's reply should arrive. At 
the Residency they had had three apartments cleared for the detenue.^
The Nawab regarded the action as an affront t«? his prestige and 
dignity and sent Reza Khan in the evening te urge the Raja's release and 
his despatch te the palace. The Khan returned unsuccessful b u t  c a r r y i n g  
a letter for the Nawab wherein the delegates premised te see the Nawab 
the next 21 March. Before the delegates were ready to move,heWever,
the Nawab was himself at the Residency insisting en the immediate release
1. This letter was net new. It was already en the Company's rec<rd by
11 Oct 1764 (BSC 11 Oct 1764) but the Mir would net shew it te Camac
as he thought he was prejudiced in the Raja's favour. Mir Ashraf was
however willing te shew it te Camac in the presence ef Batson and
and Billers,, but Camac would net agree te sit en an enquiry en this 
in concert With them.(Vansittart's repert.BSC 16 Mar 17b5.)
2.BSC 16 Mar 1765. 3.Delegation's letter,21 Mar.BSC 25 Mar 1765.
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ef tke Maharaja. As the delegates reported, "ke scarce kept within tke
hounds ef decency**« Net knowing kew te act in tke circumstances, and being
without orders to use force, the delegates were obliged to allow Nandkumar
te leave tke residency along with tke Nawab, In this tke delegates were to
a large extent influenced by tke fact that Nandkunar kad nuch influence
net only ever tke Nawab, but also ever ** all tke sepoys and their
1
commandant H Qain Beg,
Najm ud daulah9s insistence upon tke release ef Nandkunar was te a 
large extent influenced by his desire te naintain tke prestige of tke
Nisanat in his own city for ke gave an undertaking te tke delegates that
2ke would send Nandkumar te Calcutta if tke governor insisted, Tke Nawab 
possibly kad sone hopes that Spencer would not further drag the public 
imago of the Nizamat through tke mire, for ke looked upon the whole affair 
as originating from tke enmity of Mir Ashraf an old **liar and child of 
selfishness'*• The Mir9s enmity ke believed to have sprung from Nandkumar9 s 
refusal to grant a jagir to his sister Bibi Raushan and that of Balwant 
Singh from a dispute over certain territories which Nandkumar kad el&imed 
for tho Bengal government - a matter which formed tke subject of a recent 
memorial to Camae0 Tke Nawab could not understand how else a matter which 
kad boon enquired into during Mir Jafar9 a last visit to Calcutta and 
finally settled by Governor Vansittart could be revived,^ With these 
explanations tke Nawab asked Spencer to drop tke whole matter, declaring 
that if Nandkumar wore sent to Calcutta ke himself, with his household and 
servants would g© there too,He complained bitterly against tke conduct of 
tke delegation , which kad brought his government to contempt, imprisoned
tke Maharaja "regardless of his rank and station*9, and obliged him to beg
4and entreat ** in tke most suppliant manner*9*
Tke case against Nandkumar may well have kad very little merit - 
Clive was later to ignore it - but i was mixed up with tke internal
1, Delegation** letter, 21 Mar • BSC 23 Mar 17^5o There appears some 
discrepancy regarding Reza Khan9s role0 Tke Nawab9s letter mentions 
Muzaffar Ali as kis envoy to tke Delegation,(CPC.1.2616. dt 21 Mar )
2, ibid.
3, Though unknown to tke Nawab, tke reason why tke case was dropped 
then was that "tke hopes that Major Camac9 s seeming conviction of 
kis innocenoe kad removed also tke Board9* suspicions,•.might be some 
inducement to forward tke supplies£”ef noney_7wkich depend so muck 
upon kin" (BSC.11 Oct 1764q Leycester*s minute)
Najm ud daulah to Spencer, 21 Mar 1765# CMC, 1,2616.
dispute between Camac and Vansittart,new extended te th% latter1! 
successor Spencer* Vansittart kad secured tke disnissal ef Caraae] and 
Spencer’s government refused te let slip tke eocasien for a further blow 
against kis policies. They therefore paid little keed to tke Nawab*s
plea and by a letter of 23 March asked for Nandkumar to be sent down to
Calcutta in order to "increase tke friendship between kin and tke 
English'*. Spencer, however, nade this concession that tke Maharaja was 
to be escorted both by tke Company’s troops and those of the Nizamato
At tke same time tke delegates wore directed to use all means short of
2force to secure tke Maharaja*
Tke Nawab felt humiliated but submitted to the necessity. On 29 
March the delegates net tke Nawab and tke latter gave kis leave to 
Nandkumar. However, as a concession to tke Nawab*s prestige, it was
arranged that tke Nawab*s sepoys would escort tke Maharaja froa Murskida-
3
bad to Calcutta, joined on the way by the English troops from K&siabasar0 
Nandkumar reached Calcutta on 4 April, tke guards were taken off, and the 
governor personally net tke Maharaja and advised kin not to pay or 
receive visits froa anyone or otherwise correspond with anyone without 
kis prior consent. To ensure that Nandkumar complied, watchers wore set 
around kim.^
Nandkumar*s exit , if it damaged all Mughal government in Bengal, 
immediately freed 8eza Khan from apprehended obstructions fren tke 
Maharaja0 Events wore developing simultaneously to free him from Rai 
Durlabh alse<> Rai Durlabh kad come to Murskidabad with high hopes to 
be put in power in tens of equality with Nandkumar. Since December 1763 
ke already held tke Diwani of the Nizamat , with management of estates 
producing a revenue of six lakhs a yoar^ Mir Jafar did not dismiss kirn, 
but in December 1764 , when Mir Jafar returned to Murskidabad, tke Raja 
kad stayed back muck to Nawab*s annoyance.Mir Jafar having had asked 
Spencer to send Rai Durlabh to Murskidabad, tke Raja sent kis brother 
Brindaban with other servants to manage Rai Durlabh*s office at
1. Like Coote,Camac was also a critic of Vansittart and Mir ^asin.
Vansittart kad secured Camac*s dismissal (Court's letter 8 Feb 1764) 
along with that of kis other crities,Amyatt,Ellis,Hay and Joknstono0 
Events in England,however, resulted in Camac* a reinstatement by Court 
in April 1764(Court*s letter 10 Apr 1764)*
2.BSC 25 Mar 176^;CPC,I,2617. 3.Delegatien*s letter.BSC 1 Apr 1765.
4.BSC 4 Aor 1765.  -- 5.Deloration*s letter.22 Mar.BSC 25 Mar 1?65.
Murskidabad in January 1765*^As tke delegates understeed, Hal Durlakk 
was t# ke given a skare in the Kkalsa daftar in additien te wkat ke 
already possessed as Nizamat Diwan* But wken tke treuhle with Nandkunar 
began tke delegates kad warned Calcutta that " if Nunaoenar ke tetally
laid aside, the Nakek skeuld ke strenuous in kis objection99 te Rai
2
Durlakk^ and se it new turned out* Tke Nawak had inherited kis father9s 
hatred fer Rai Durlakk^ and new if correspondence with tke enemy powers 
was a crime fer Nandkumar , the Nawak accused Rai Durlabh alse with simi­
lar crime* delegates, wke ceuld ketter feel the pulse ef tke Nawak 
at Murskidabad f kad recommended that Rai Durlakk ought net te ke fereed 
en tke Nawak*^May ke they were influenced ky tke gifts ef tke Nawak
and Reza Khan met te ke insistent en this particular pelnt , which must
in any case have appeared as a miner cencessiem te tke Nawak whe had 
already keen ferced te yield en issues ef greater importance* The 
autherities at Calcutta kad a different view and they insisted upen 
rewarding tke man wke has keen 99 ene ef the mest ferward in shewing an
attachment te us** and kad earlier received 99 particular premises ef
keing well rewarded19 ^ perhaps frem Spencer and Burdett* kis main 
supperters in Calcutta* Tke Nawak was net eppesed te Rai Durlakk9 s 
centinuing in tke skare ef tke administratien which ke held under Mir 
Jafar*kut ke was net prepared te grant any additienal pewer te kirn* Tke 
Nawak9s attitude kad hardened after what had happened with regard te 
Nandkumar* At Murskidakad, the delegates* their number new reduced ky
departure ef Leycester fer Calcutta late in March* declined "urging
7
further a subject that seemed disagreeable"* and tke geverner alse
ultimately agreed net te insist further in the matter* theugfa net hefere
0
ke had made a last effert te persuade tke Nawak threugh Reza Khan*
While these disputes were geing en regarding Nandkumar ami Rai 
Durlakk*tke reerganisatien ef the Murskidakad secretariat kad centinued
1* Mir Jafar9s letter te Spencer, recdt Deo 1764 (CPC,I>2510)>
Spencer te Mir Jafar,12 Jan 1765 (CiC, I* 2539)*
2* Delegation* s letter* 22 M&r*BSC 25 Mar 1765* 3* CPC,I* 2625©
4» Tke Nawak cemplained that ke kad a letter frem Shuja te Rai Durlakk
(letter ef 5 Apr* BSC 9 Apr 1765) and then handed it te Jeknstene(CPC
1*2625) ^ Delegates suggested an enquiry 99 fer eur credit"(letter 19 -yr
BSC 22Apr1765)•Council rejects Rai Durlakk9s criminality( Ahid)
5#*Delegation9 a letter 22 Mar* BSC 25 Mar 17o5© 6* BSC 26 Mar 1765©
7o Delegation9* letter 2 Apr* BSC 9 Apr 1765o
6* BSC 22 Apr 17651 Reza Khan te Spencer* reeds 21 Apr 1765©(CPC*1,2626)
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as a jeint effert ef Reza Khan and the delegates© The entire Khalea daftar1
was divided up se that each part Bight he given ta a separate nutasaddi©
The divisian effected, it was daiaed, withaut causing any incanvenience ar
canfusian, was deened the safest system since it was designed ta make it
inpessible for any superintendent ta acquire any iapreper influence in the
ceuntry. Anather advantage clained was that at need any nutasaddi cauld he
displaced withaut disturbance ta the whale, iapassihle if the whale
department were under ane ar twa nen<> (It was alsa passible , under this
seheae ta aocennadate Nandkunar shauld he be cleared af the oharges against
kin©) A central affice called the Kktay Sharifah was created te:ce-erdinate
the wark af these different nutasaddis and ane Kamnarain Mustaufi, an
experienced nan and a feraer assistant af the £anunge; was placed at its
head© The reerganisatien in nany ways fallawed the administrative plans
ef Mir Qasin wha had ahalished the exarbitant pewers af the Rai-Rayan and
had placed land revenue in the hands af a number af afficers, each respem-
sible far territeries paying free five ta ferty lakhs per annum© Mir ^asin
was fallawed net anly in separating the different accounts, but alsa in
the appeintaent af Anils and Faujdars far smaller areas, theugfa this inevi-
tably increased the cast af cellectien and executive adninistratien© While
the previsiem far an Anil was thus nade far almast every snail territerial
divisian the plan envisaged that it shauld be left ta the Nawab ta decide
if the revenues af a district shauld be the respensibility af a I^ eaindar 
2
ar an Anilo
Reza Khan*a duties and abligatians as Naib Subah were else defined in 
the plan which received the appreval af the Ceuncil an 26 April 1765*^He 
was ta be censulted in H adjusting the Bundebust" and in settling the 
celleetian sa that , when necessary, he night sake praper represantatian 
ta the Nawab© As Naib Subah he cauld alsa call an the nutasaddis far 
explanatian when there was any deficiency and in general kis task was Mte 
superintend the whale that he may be able ta give the Nabab a tharaugh 
insight inta the affirs af the geverament and paint aut any aaendnent 
which can be made '*• *The Nawab was still the head af gavernment as well as 
af the stateo Reza Khan was his chief executive ef.icer with his duties and
1© Cerreetly,the Khalisah Sharifah, but Khalsa daftar was in cemmen use©
2© Delegatian*s latter, 22 March, 1765© BSC 25 Mar 176%
3© Ceuncil*s letter© BSC 26 Mar 1765© 4oDelegates*letter 22 Mar0BSC
functions mere formally defined than were these ef either Haji Ahead in 
Shuja Khan and Alivardi Khan's tiae er ef Nawazish Muhammad Khan under 
Aliv&rdi* Functionally,the Khan's effice ceahined that ef the Rai-Rayan 
which was ahelished hy l ir Qasim , hut was sought te he revived hy 
Nandkunar in himself*
The reorganisation included a few political adjustments as well? nere
perhaps in the interest ef Reza Khan than ef the Company. The Ceuncil did
net agree te all the prepesals that went fre&. the delegates0 The delegates
had prepesed reneval ef Ruh uddin Husain Khan fren Pumea te sene ether
district and te put in Jasarat Khan there* Ruh uddin had a pewerful
influence in Pumea, his father Saif Khan having heen pested te the
district early in the century hy the Enperer Aurangzeh, Jasarat Khan en
the ether hand had leng asseciatien with Dacea as naih ef Nawazish
Muhammad Khan, Rajhallahh , Sirajud daulah and Mir Jafar until Lir ^asim
had disnissed him* The Ceuncil veteed the prepesal ef the delegates Hin
censideratien ef the circumstances they mention regarding "Ruhuddin's
family, hut recemmended a previsien fer Jasarat Khan fer his knewn
" attachment te us The Nawah assented te the appeintnent ef Jasarat
2
Khan as naih ef Dacca under Reza Khan. The Ceuncil did net seemingly
take much interest in the delegates' prepesal te replace Muzaffar Ali
hy Haji Mehdi an Aliv&rdian efficer, as the Nawah's Arzhegi whe as the
Nawah's private adviser helped in the fermatien ef "his epiiden ef persens
and things"; hut they were net as unrespensive te the prepesal ef sending
3
eut ef Mirza Baud with a ziladari te Bhagalpur*
By new the delegates and the Calcutta Ceuncil were in a hurry te 
eenelude the reerganisatien ef the Murshidahad government* On 22 April 
the Ceuncil directed the delegates te transfer immediately the alletment 
prepesed fer Rai Durlahh te such nutasaddis as enjeyed the Nawah's 
cenfidence* The Ceuncil however urged them te request the Nawah te allot 
ene share te Gepal Krishna, the sen ef Rajhallahh whe died at the hands
A
ef Mir Casino The Nawah readily consented^ Reza Khan expressed himself as 
well satisfied with these arrangements, and happy that the nutasaddis had
5
it net in their power te he in the least dishonest*
1.Delegates' letter,22 Mar and Council's reply 26 Mar.BSC 25,26 Mar 1765* 
2*Delegates' letter 19 Apr. BSC 22 Apr 1765*
^•Delegates' letter,22 Mar and Council's reply,26 Mar*BSC 25,26 Mar 1765* 
4*Council's letter,22 Apr.BSC 22 Apr 1765. > 5•£?£,!,2638©
Only frem ene quarter did there seen any threat te the Ceuncil*s 
plans* It was feared that the discentented peeple at Murskidabad were 
planning te create disturbances in cenjunctien with the seldiers ef ^aim 
Beg, the cemnandant ef the Nawah*s treeps.lt was suspected that they would 
start the usual claneur fer arrears ef pay and then try te cut eff Reza 
Khan and Rai Durlabh* The Khan, hewever, teek the precautien ef issuing tb 
strictest erders te the nutasaddis ef the arned ftrces te pay eff the 
arrears* Spencer alse seught te ninimise the danger by prepesing te the
Nawab a reduetien ef treeps at Murskidabad and the placing ef seme ef thei
2
under English cennand at Patna* The Nawab did net readily agree* He deniei 
having nere treeps at Murskidabad than were needed fer the service ef the 
varieus effices and a few whe were necessary fer the dignity ef the 
gevemnent, and he refused te send treeps te Patna en the plea that they 
were net disciplined eneugh te be ef any use under English cemmando 
Hewever, he agreed te spare a theusand herse and feet if required* 3 it 
was perhaps this refusal that led the Calcutta Ceuncil te erder Captain 
Mcphersen te remain at Murskidabad under the directlen ef the Resident and 
te " ceuntenance affairs there"*^
The Punyah, attended by the delegatien , was held en 25 April and
with it the new adninistratien cane inte regular functiening even theugh
final adjustments in administrative arrangements were still pending in 
5
seme cases* Te the gevemer*s letter ef assurance that the Nawab weuld 
find his repesing cenfidenee in the Khan worthwhile, the Nawab replied 
with a diplematio assurance, seemingly net unteuched by nalioe, that he 
had " greater cenfidenee in him than the English have"0^ The Nawab had enly 
te bide his time, until Clive reached Calcutta en 5 May 1765, te have the 
truth ef his cemment made manifest*
With Clive*s arrival in Bengal, Reza Khan , already caught up in the 
greup oenflicts at Calcutta, feund himself invelved in the India Heuse
1* Rai Durlabh te Spencer, reedi 21 Mar 1765* CPC,I,26i1.
2* Spencer te Rai Durlabh 24 Apr 1765* CPC, I, 2&9*
5* The Nawab te Spencer, 2 May. CPC, 1,2^4) Reza Khan te Spencer,reedt 5 
May# 1765# CPC, 1,2636*
4* BSC 22 Apr 17?5© 5© Delegates* letter 26 Apr*BSC 29 Apr* 1765*
6o Spencer te the Nawab,24 Apr and the Nawab*s reply recd*5 May 1765®
CPC, I, 2630, 2636*
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politics as extended te Fert William. The English debacle had activieed 
politics at the Inria Heus<i, Clive* s successes in 1757 had extended their 
scope. Unfortunately the early heyes ef yrefit te the Cemyany free the new 
acquisitien were falsified hy the cests ef war and administration, while 
these who did gain hy the revolution, individual servants ef the Company, 
embarrassed the Company hy their demand fer payment in London ef the bilJs 
through which they remitted their yrivate fortunes. The embarrassment ef 
the Company, aggravated hy the general financial crisis in England,ferced 
it te seek gevemment aid. A second yreblen, allied to the first, was te 
maintain diseiyline and contrel ever distant servants whe had acquired 
new yewer , even against the Cemyany through their wealth and had lost any 
fear of the Indian ruling yewers. In the defence of their Indian gains 
returning Cemyany servants struggled te contrel the India Heuse, a 
struggle which eventually centred reund Laurence Sulivan and Clive when 
the latter returened te England in 17€0*Til® struggle between the twe 
develeyed inte an eyen war in 1763» Clive trying unsuccessfully te eust 
Sulivan from the Direction and Sulivan retaliating hy ordering Vansittart 
and his Council in Ayril 1763 to stey further yaynent Of Clive*s jagir, 
drawn frem the revenues ef Twenty Four Parganas. Though mauled in the 
first reund , Clive became mere determined than ever te eust his enemy fres 
yewer. His eyyertunity came when news began trickling te London ef growirg 
trouble between Vansittart and members of his Council and between the 
English and the Nawab, and finally , in February 1764, ef the outbreak ef 
war between Mir Qasim and the English. The news alarmed the yreyrietors 
ef the Cemyany in England whe new intervened te send Clive te restore the 
situation in Bengal. Clive took the eyyertunity to dictate his own terms.
He secured extra-ordinary powers for himself and a Select Committee 
consisting ef W*B.Sumner and Francis Sykes, going with him, and Harry 
Verelst and John Camac already in India, The yewors included the right 
te overrule the Calcutta Council , te send Syencer back te Bombay ,whence 
Sulivan had transferred him, and te regulate the internal trade ef Bengal. 
Sulivan was ousted from his controlling yewer at the India House, though 
net from the Court ef Directors* and Clive was granted a further period 
ef enjoyment ef his jagir. Clive*s earlier services had earned him an 
Irish peerage and a place in the Cemyany and national politics. He new set
1. Court*s letter, 27 Ayril 1763*
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•ut fer India again in high spirits and with a lively amhitien t# achieve 
further greatness in the service ef the Cempany and the natien*
Clive had left England en 4 June 1764 hut a d^Layed passage deprived 
him much ef the credit which he seught fer himself* Munr© at Buxar had 
finally defeated the ccnhinatien ef Mir Qasim, Shuja ud daulah and Shah 
Alan en 23 Octeher 1764* and victery had heen fellewed hy further 
successes against Shuja whese capitalt Lucknew was taken in the nane ef 
Shah Alam^ whe was taken under the English pretecticn seen after Shuja* a 
defeat at Buxar* Nevertheless , news ef Mir Jafar*s death received in
April 1763 en his arrival at Madras still gave Clive hepes " te heceme the
2
Nawah eurselves in fact, if net in name", hy raising Mir Saidu, Miran* s 
miner sen , te the masnad* But en landing at Calcutta en 3 May 1765 *Clive 
feund that Spencer had already stelen a aarch ever him hy making the new 
settleaent with Najm ud daulah*
Clive was a disappeinted nan, cheated ef the eppertunity te play a 
striking rele , ready te leek with displeasure upen the arrangements ef his 
predecesser. He was critical ef Spencer and his Ceuncil fer "geing te the 
lengths they have dene " in reducing the pewer ef the Nawah - theugh Clive 
was later te ge still further - and critical ef the raising ef Reza Khan 
te the heights ef the Naih Suhahdari, Recalling perhaps Yansittart*s 
experience with the raising ef Mir Qasim te a similar statien, Clive wrete 
pungently te Caraae : *• Never trust the amhitiens ef any Mussulman after 
whatever has happened" •** The first meeting ef the Ceuncil en 3 May turned 
anneyance hern ef frustratien te anger, fer Jehnstline and Leycester 
challenged the extra-erdinary pewers ef the new Select Cemmittee , granted 
enly until tranquility sheuld he restered in Bengal * Clive everhere the 
ehjectien, deoalared the Cemmittee sele judges ef their ewn pewer, and 
entered upen a persenal vendetta* In that vendetta Reza Khan was seen 
invelvedo
In 1764 the heme autherities had decided upen a fern ef cevenant , 
which their servants everseas were te sign binding themselves net te accept 
presents mere than a very small ameunt witheut the prier censent ef the 
Directerso This had heen reselved en hy the Court ef Preprieters en 2 May 
1764* despatched hy the Direoters en 1 June and received in Calcutta in
1 •Caraae*»better 26 Mar* BSC 9 Apr 1765*
2*Clive te Reuse, Quetedi Perrest,Clive,II,256-57© 3»Perre3t,Clive,II,261 *
January 1765. The Ceuncil had taken ne steps t# ensure their execution. 
Instead there were rumeurs that the aocessien ef Najm ud daulah was te 
used te secure new presents fer the Ceuncil, as Verelst in distant 
Chittagong noted in a letter ef 7 Kerch 1765*^Te these rumours , ef a 
"combination between the blacks and whites, te divide all the revenues ef 
the Company"^ in which Reza Khan was allegedly invelved, Clive turned 
as the aeans ef destroying Spencer and his supporters. In their dewnfall 
Reza Khan seeaed likely te be dragged dewn, fer Clive made it clear te 
Carnac that he objected te his remaining Naib Subah, " his being a 
Mussulman, acute and clever are reasens ef themselves if there were ne 
ether, against trusting that man with tee much power".
With Clive*s coming the atmesphere at Murshidabad had alse become 
tense. Even though Nandkumar had been eusted frem Murshidabad in Match,
the Khan was kept in censtant alarm by his enemies, allies of Nandkumar, 
whe claimed that as Mir Jafar had adapted Clive as his sen they were 
expecting great faveurs frem him0*Their behavieur en Clive's arrival made 
it clear that they believed what they had said. Middleton , the Resident, 
had urged Najm ud daulah net te ge te Calcutta " witheut the apprebatiem 
ef the gentlemen ef the Council". Nevertheless, by 8 May the Nawab had 
left fer Calcutta fer the pleasure ef seeing his Lerdship, when he leaked 
upen "as his brether and strength ef his arm".^3hah Khanum , 1 iran's 
mother, whe called Clive her sen»sent a letter recesmending Mir Saidu 
and Mirza Daud (Miran's sen and sen->in*law respectively)te Clive’s faveur 
"as they are in a manner his ewn children". She alse asked far an early 
meeting at Murshidabad, and cautioned Clive "net te let the Nawab Najm 
ud daulah see this letter er receive infermatien ef it".*^ Reza Khan , 
pretesting that his appeintment as Naib was " witheut my desiring** , new 
appealed te Johnstene te preserve his heneur t net enly wps the Nawab 
going te Calcutta , the Khan cemplained , but " all my enemies are with 
him, and they will, deubtless, net be dilatery in deing me all the
1.Verelst speke ef the current rumeur in his letter te Middleton and 
heped there was ne truth in it,"fer it must entail, en every ene con- 
cemed the world*s severest censure". Middleton in his reply ef 18 Mar 
1765 confirmed the ruaeur and said that " in accepting ef it} custem, 
the cenduct ef ene ef eur werthiest men justifies it"«Verelst,View,51
2. Clive te Carnac. Kalcelm, Clive.II,560-61. 5. ibid, 359. 4« KN f
5* Reza Khan te Johnstone,Kay 1765. PI Fourth Report,1773,p542.
6. The Nawab te Clive, recdi 12,14 ray 1765. CMC,I,2645,2646,
7. Shah Khanum te Clive.reedr18 Urv 176S«CPC,T7?6S^.
101
-I
prejudice thay can"* Te Motiram, Johnstone's Banian whe had recently lieeii 
given the title ef Maharaja and the Faujdari ef Hugli, the Khan observed:
H The friends ef Nundceiaar rejoice at Sabut Jung's ^Clive's_7 ^ arrival and 
say # that Mharaja will obtain Kellaat ^^hilat^and return te Moorshedabad 
in feur er five days'** Againv theugn the Khan was anxious himself te ge te
Calcutta, the Nawab had refused permission en the plea that if he went
3
" the business ef the Nizamut weuld he interrupted",
Unaware ef the develepaents in Calcutta , Reza Khan first wrete te 
Spencer asking fer pretectien^and then te Clive,In his letter te Clive 
received en 12 May , the Khan explained his appointment and the circumstan­
ces which prevented his persenally paying his respects te him in Calcutta, 
With his letter he sent a Nazarana er effering ef eleven geld mehurs, and 
an agent, Mirza ] uhammad Kazim Khan, " a man ef understanding , and a 
relatien and a faithful friend ", whe had been known te Clive in the DeccaS* 
The Khan sought Clive's permissien te ceae te Calcutta, writing five er six 
times. When ne reply caae the Khan sent anether agent 9 Mahasingh, an eld 
officer ef Alivardi and Siraj ud daulah te safeguard his interest at 
Calcutta, After a long week ef suspense the Khan at last received a call 
from Clive te ge te Calcutta, enineusly coupled with a censure for failing 
te accompany the Nawab, The Khan se long anxious te ge te Calcutta new 
became apprehensive when the call came. Though en the way he met Senior at 
Kasimbazar en 14 er 15 May and was assured that nothing untoward weuld 
happen te him, he reached Calcutta sometime before 20 May with the 
"terror and apprehension ef a man going to be delivered upte his enemies".
At Calcutta the situation terrified him still further. He found that 
his protectors ,members ef the previous government, were themselves under 
censure. He found Nandkumar released, his trial stopped, the witnesses 
whe had been called all the way from Patna turned back. Moreover , the Nawab
1, Reza Khan te Johnstone, May 1765* PP Fourth report, 1773# f 542,
2, Clive was always known te the Indians,except perhaps to a f*"» os Nawab
Sabut Jang, (Seir, II, 306 fn.170),
3* Reza Khan te Meiiram, May 1765* PP Fourth Report, 1773» P 542©
4, Reza Khan te Johnstone, May 176%  ibid,
5* ibid,| Reza Khan te Clive, reedt12, 18 May 1765(CPC,I,2644-45t2650)|Seir, 
III, d0 The Mirza, a Persian was a son-in-law ef Husain Reza Khan,Haji 
Ahaao's grandson( ibid,)
6, Reza Khan te Clive, reed: 18 May,(CPC,1,2651); MN f 152$ Senior's evidenc­
es (PP,Third Report,1772,p 309)$ Barwell's letter,15 Sep*65(BPP,VIII,191)
had admitted Nandkumar again te the highest confidence. The Khan somehow
i
felt that ail business of the moment had been taken out of his nand. Worse
still, though the Khan had known that he was unwelcome to the Nawab, he
now found that he had been denounced by him, jointly with Johnstone and
Leycester, to the all powerful Select Committee. Najm ud daulah had
complained that w since the death of the late Nabob ^ "*the KhanJ  had
distributed among certain persons nearly twenty lakhs of rupees’*, and Reza
»
Khan could only wait in suspense, terrified of the power of retribution of 
the Committee. Before the Nawab*s complaint was formally presented before 
the Select Committee the Khan asked to be examined. He was accordingly 
examined and afterwards he submitted a written statement, drawn up by a 
"blackman”.^  It was probably not until the arrival of Verelst from 
Chittagong on 29 May that the Khan felt any relief.
The Nawab*s complaint was mainly against the treatment he had received
from the members of the delegation, who had forced him to sign the new
treaty under throat of losing his Subahdarl, and had imposed Reza Khan
upon him as Naib Subahdar, though he '* had long ago had evil intentions ei}
the Nizamat " and had been regarded by Mir Jafar as an enemy. Najm uhiaulah
was intent on the restoration of his power and the re-instatement of
Nandkumar, ** my intimate well wisher** • But to Clive and the Select Coamitt«
it was the complaint that the Khan had paid twenty lakhs from the N*wab*s
1
treasury to ” such people as he thought proper1* which was important, for 
this was an instrument with which they were to beat down the members of 
the Council who had challenged their authority0Clivo had no intention of 
reinstating Nandkumar . He remembered his unhappy experience of him as 
Company*s Tahsildar in 175®» and he told Carnao plainly that ” although 
Nundcomar may not prove guilty of the crimes laid to his charge, yet, 
believe me, my dear General he will do no honour either to the Nabob or 
to the Company, in any great or eminent post, which he was never formed or 
designed for $ and I can give you unanswerable reasons against his being 
the principal person about the Nabeb0o*It is really shocking to see what a 
set of misorable *nd mean wretches Nundcomar has plaeed about him ; men
1. PP Fourth Report, 1773 PP JTik-37 :  ^ ”
2© The Nawab*s complaint. BSC 1 June 17&5*
3. PP Third Report, 1773# PP 3 2 0 * 2 1 Roza Khan's statement.BSC 6 June 1765. 
4« The Nawab*s complaint. BSC 1 June 1765*
that tha other day ware harsa keepers”2 Clive likewise had ne interest in 
restoring power ta the Nawab - as has heen seen he wauld have preferred ta 
see the miner Mir Saidu bn the masnad, Nar in the end was he anxious ta 
remove Reza Khan, Najm ud daulah's complaint that the Khan had had claims 
upon the masnad made him seen palitically valuable, Verelst aay have 
speken far him, and the Khan's timidity and intelligence, a cantrast ta 
the general haughtiness af the Muslin nobility, nade him seen a useful 
instrument, Even aare , Reza Khan's replies ta the Nawab's accusatiens 
drave the allegatians against the aid Ceuncil further hane9 far the Khan 
in his statement laid the whale blame an Jahnstane and his Banian Matiram, 
he declared that after Najm ud daulah was seated an the masnad the gentle­
men af the delegatian had sent a prepesal ta him, Reza Khanf thraugh 
Metiram9 later repeated by the gentlemen themselves9 that the Khan sheuld 
prapase ta the Nawab that naw that they had seated him an the masnad they 
weuld expect same reward from him as an the past eccasien. The Khanf in 
arder net ta affend the gentlemen, had put this ta the Nawab whe readily 
censented. The Nawab had asked him ta prepare a list af presents which he 
declined ta de9 but subsequently a list was prepared * befare the Nabab's 
face and given under his hand and seal ta Mr, Johnstene in the presence af 
all the four gentlamen"0 Three ar four days later9 the Khan added,johnstene 
had taken the list af prapased presents ta the Nawab and declined ta accept 
it if it was given unwillingly and contrary ta his inclination. The Nawab 
assured Jahnstane that the gifts were according ta his " awn pleasure" • 
Befare the payment was actually made between 12 April and 1 I ay, the Khan 
had taken the Nawab's written orders an the "Ferd sovaul ^~sawal_7" ar 
office memo asking far orders. After the Nawab had given his orders in
writing, the Khan paid out Rs 8,75,000, Rs 6,25,000 in cash from the
2
treasury and Rs 2,25*000 by bills an the house af the Seths, The Khan thus 
disproved the Nawab*s statement that he had disbursed money without his 
orders) at the same time he convicted Johnstone,
It was also revealed that presents wore also taken from Reza Kh^n 
himself, Jahnstane, he said, sent message thraugh Matiram that as the Khan 
had been appointed His Excellency's Naib, it was proper that he too should 
make same presents. Ultimately a sum af Rs 4,75*000 had been agreed upen,ef 
which he paid Rs 2,25*000 mostly in bills, while the remaining Rs 2,50,000
1 .Clive te Camac, 20 K,ay 1765.1'aloela.Clive.il.358-9. 2. BSC 6 June 1765.
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remained eutstanding. A further accusation was heaped on Johnstone hy the 
Jagat Seth who had. also cose down to Calcutta on Clive9 s arrival. Five 
lakhs had heen denanded fros his , hut the Seths agreed to pay Rs 1,25,OOol 
(Enquiry revealed that sany of the hills were still unpaid and with Metiramc 
There were attespts to hand thes hack to Reza Khan through Motiras’s 
servant Basant Royf hut the Khan had refused to accept then.) The result 
of the enquiry led the Select Cessittee to conclude that Johnstone was 
the principal agent and manager in obtaining and distributing the presents 
and that it was Motiran who had used menaces in his naster98 nase in 
extorting soney fros both Reza Khan and the Jagat Seth. C.S. Playdell,
J. Burdett, G. Gray , they maintainedf had received Rs 50,000 each fros the 
Nawab " in the fu.< 1 persuation that these were free gifts to the gentlemen 
who then cosposed the Beard% and that J. Cartier was an absolute stranger 
to the arrangement and that he had not received any soney. Of the delegation 
only Senior besides Johnstone had received soney from Roza Khan as well as 
fros the Nawab and the Jagat Seth. Middleton had received presents fros the 
Nawab and the Jagat Seth but had intended to refuse any present fros Reza 
Khan and the same was true of Leycester.^(The Committee refrained to 
comment anything about the money which Spencer had received.)
1. The Jagat Seth’s statement. BSC 6 June 1765*
2. Basant Rey9s statemento BSC 7 June 1765® 3» BSC 21 June 1765o.
4* The distribution of the promised amount and amount outstanding were t 
Name of the I By whom promised jTetal sum | Amount to be
gentlemen | The Nawab (Reza Khan {Jagat Seth (promised | paid0 
Spencer 2,00,000 90,000 2,90,000 1,00,000
Playdell 1,00,000 1,00,000 50,000
Burdett 1,00,000 1,00,000 50,000
Gray 1,00,000 1,00,000 50,000
Jehnstene 2,37,000 1,50,000 3*97,000 50,000
Senier 1,12,500 1,00,000 2,12,500 50,000
Leycester 1,12,500 1,00,000 2,12,500 50,000
Middleten 1,12,500 1,00,000 2,12,500 1,00,000
G.Jehnstene 
younger brother
ef J,Jehnstene 50,000 25,000 10,000 85,000 nil
Messrs Jehnstene,Senier
Leycester and Middleton 1,15,000 1,15,000 75#000
J. Cartier 1,#§,000 1,00,000 1,00,000.
( vide BSC 6 June,1765)
The Directers having erdered refund ef the seney, (net te these whe paid,) 
the Select Cenmittee issued netice en Middleten and Playdell whe were in 
India te pay the sum te the Cempany. Others were netified threugh their 
attemeys in India. (BSC 21 Pec 1766). Ultimately , fer pelitical reasens 
the cases were withdrawn by the Cempany.(L.S.Sutherland. The East India 
Cempany in 18th century pelitics, p 171)
The outcome ef the whole enquiry was "that the Select Committee 
declared that the Khan had " so openly and candidly*' accounted for "every 
rupee disbursed from the treasury, they cannot without injury to hi3 
character and injustice to his conduct during his short administration 
refuse continuing him in a share of the government"# They decided, however, 
to retrench his authority partly, as they said, in order te "remove the 
Nabob's jealousies" and partly " to prevent the necessity ef future 
revolutions" by removing the possibility ef a great danger "that may arise 
to the stability ef the present establishment fro* suffering the whole 
power and absolute management of the three provinces to rest in a single 
person"o They,therefore , brought in Rai Durlabh again# The Nawab had 
prevented Spencer from imposing Rai Durlabh on him, but he could net do 
so against Clive# Reza Khan was advised to relinquish his title ef the 
Naib Subah and to accept the simpler designation of a Naib in a new 
administrative arrangement which was formally minuted in the proceedings 
of the Committee dated 21 June 1765* It stood thus*
The Nawab Najm ud daulah Mir Najm uddin Ali Khan Bahadur •Nazim0 
The Nawab Muin ud daulah Saiyid Muhammad Reza Khan Bahadur^Naib 
Maharaja Durlabh ram Bahadur «Diwan
The Jagat Seth Khushal Chand and Maharaja Udai Chand •Chiefs of
Trade#
The Committee then adopted a number of regulations which further reduced 
the power of the Nawab who was rendered a real cypher, besides making Reza 
Khan perhaps no more powerful and responsible than the other two ministers, 
The new regulation also laid down that the Nawab*s treasury should have 
three keys, one with each of the three executive officers, further extended 
the Company's authority by arranging that a servant of the Company, of the 
Councillor's rank, posted at Murshidabad and maintained at thf expense +? 
the Nawab's government , should keep a check on the accounts of the Nawab's 
government# The ministers would be required to subnit their accounts to 
him each month# These regulations were designed to be embodied in yet
2
another treaty which was eventually executed by the Nawab in July 1765#
The sum total of transactions at Calcutta during the first five or 
six weeks of Clive's government had tremendous effect on the future course 
not only of the life of Clive and Reza Khan but also of the history of
1# BSC 21 June 17&5* The proceedings of the day were not the transactions 
of that particular date# The decisions were taken much earlier though 
recorded on that day#
2<; Clive's letter 9 July# BSC 10 Aug 176%
108
Bengal# Clive made an enemy of Johnstone, whose supporters at home had been
i
of some help to him in defeating Sulivan at the India House# Sulivan and 
Johnstones later created a hell for Clive in the years after his return 
to England in 1767# and particularly in 1773 when Clive was hauled up for 
impeachment# Reza Khan, in the dark about new developments until he arrived 
at Calcutta , had very soon determined the course he was to adopt for his 
future conduct# He cane out firmly in favour of Clive , who alone could 
preserve him against the combined enmity of the Nawao and Nandkumar# But 
in the process, Reza Khan had made a very powerful enemy of Johnstone#
Reza Khan in his first statement had not given the whole story of 
Johnstone's transactions# When the latter challenged his facts, and 1. 
declared them "extorted" by the Committee, Reza Khan replied by coming out 
with the story of yet another secret transaction#^ Over and above the 
Rs 1,37*000 which Johnstone claimed from the Nawab as a joint member and 
senior servant on the deputation he had further stipulated that rupees
one lakh for himself and Rs 30,000 for his brother should be paid
2
seeretly and unknown to the others. Johnstone,infuriated with the Khan> 
described the Khan's narrative as false and forced from him "by hope of 
favour or fear of disgrace"^, but the Committee described his statement
4
as related with great "candor and precision"# The Khan evidently become a
5
matter of controversy#^ Johnstone was never to forgive Reza Khan for his 
revelations# He maintained his grudge until as late as 1773 f zn* in his 
attacks in England upon the Clive faction, Reza Khan was to suffer#
In contrast to the Nawab , who evidently returned to Murshidabad 
dejected and in fear of Clive, to whom he had looked in vain for support, 
the Khan returned well satisfied# On his way back the Khan received the
1#Reza Khan to Clive, 23 June 1765# CP2,T,2667# 2# BSC 4 July 1/65.
3#Johnstone's letter ,1 Oct 176% PP Fourth Report, 1773# PP 536*370 
4# BSC 4 July 1763.
3#About ihe Nawab's complaint , Leycester first held the view that it was 
a "shameful insinuation" in order to injure Reza Khan and added that "the 
opinion , 1 entertain of Mahomed Reza Cawn'3 understanding and integrity 
inclines me to believe this a groundless assertion"#(BPC 7 June,1763)#Ho 
later described Reza Khan's statement as " mistaken in part of his detail 
(BiC 11 June 1763)# Sykes , it is said , was told by Reza Khan in 1766 
that the Khan made the presents to the gentlemen at his own will*(Verelst 
said so in his evidence in 1773* PP# Third report,p 321)# Verelst who 
knew the Khan very well howver maintained the view that Reza Khan was not 
a man to make Iny present at his own will, unless it was for some service 
wished for#(ibid0)
6*Sykes to Eastings 16 Feb 1775* *** Ma8 29136 t 57o ..
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Dutch and the French chiefs at Hugli " with becoming civility"^and on 24 
Juhe he entered Murshidabad, finally confinied in his Naibat, though 
without the foraal designation of Naib Subahdar. He also returned with the
confidence of Clive* He had not only survived the machinations of his
2enemies 9 he stood on the threshold of greatness*
Clive left Calcutta en 25 June on his way up country for a new
settlement with Shuja ud daulah and the Emperor* When he reached Agradwip
a dayfs journey ahead of Murshidabad he was accorded a grand reception
*y Reza Khan , who looked to his comfort in the city and made all arrange*
went for his Lordship's further journey* He also engaged Mirza Muha/ratad
x
Kazim Khan as Clive’s chamberlain , but more correctly as his agent in 
Clive’s camp* Taese personal attention*doubtless had their effect on Clive, 
but there were other factors predisposing him in Reza Khan’s favour0There 
is some evidence to suggest that the Khan had helped Clive with a sum of 
six lakhs of rupees during his stay at Calcuttaf But there were public
t
grounds , as well as possible private ones for Clive’s support of the 
Khan* It was clear that the Khan was likely to be an admirable instrument* 
He had not grasped at personal power, rather Clive at this point had to 
prevent Rai Durlabh encroaching upon the Khan’s sphere of authority* 
Convinced of the Khan’s " honor and moderation", Clive called Sykes to
5
Murshidabad to support him and preserve tranquility. More he seems to 
have aided Clive to improve upon what Spencer had achieved. On 9 July
Clive sent the treaty, embodying the arrangements of 21 June and signed
6by the Nawab* Only two days later, however, he was writing to the Select
Ccjrjnittee to negotiate through Sykes an agreement on those terms , in
7
the fora of a limitation of the Nawab's expenses* No such idea seems to 
T.Reza Khan to Clive, recdi 19 June 17^5* CFC,I, 2^6%
2*Nandkuiaar appears to have made a last effort to be reinstated in power by 
an offer of 25 lakhs to Sykes for the President and Council.PP Third 
Report, 1773, ? 322.
5*121  ^T54* 4o Reza Khan’s note, HP, 3 Jan 1771 •
5* " It is with pleasure I can acquaint you that the more I see of Mahomed 
Reza Cawn the stronger is my conviction of his honor and moderation;... 
Roy Dullub, however, has already attempted to destroy this ballance of 
power, and Mahomed Reza Cawn rather approves than resists it." Clive to 
Select Corj,rittee, 3 July 1765* P-‘>C 7 July 17 5^*
6*Clive's letter,9 July.HSC 10 Aug 1765* Clive had added "our business at 
the yurbar is finished."
7&Clive’s letter 11 July. BSC 10 Aug 17^5«
t© have been conceived ©r broached by the English beforo, and it seems 
probable that this was Reza Khan's contribution* The genesis of the new 
deal is not clear, but Karan Ali tells us that it was after a secret 
consultation with the Khan that Clive net the Nawab and teld him that the 
Khan had conplained of his lavish personal expenditure* Such a complaint 
would have been natural, for the Khan was under constant pressure te neet 
the financial obligations of the Nawab's governnent. When the Company had 
demanded immediate payment of six lakhs on account of the Nawab's debts, 
Najm ud daulah denied any responsibility, saying that he was unacquainted
with the collections of the country and that he did not know if there was
2
any money in the treasury* It was the Khan therefore upon whom the respon­
sibility fell* He may have wished to curb the Nawab's personal expenditure 
merely to safeguard his own position - but the* suggestion could not but be 
attractive to Clive. The Khan had put it in Clive's power to perform a 
signal service to the Company* Before Clive left tfurshidabad he had obtained 
Najm ud daulah's consent to the limitations of his expenses to some fifty 
lakhs of rupees a year, the balance of the revenues being appropriated to 
the maintenance of the army, tribute to the emperor, and payment of all 
outstanding debts* In addition , Reza Khan " feeing 4 disposition extreme 
ly timorous" it was agreed that "the payment of the cavalry and sepoys , 
pass through his hands, though included in the said fifty laaks"*^
Sykes, who was asked by Clivo to nemo to Murshidabad to restore 
the balance of power between Reza Khan and Rai Durlabh, reached Kasimbazar 
on 22 July* His rission was meant to be temporary, but iSt came to be an 
extended one, particularly as Sykes had to negotiate a new agreement on the 
lines of Clive's preliminary understanding with the Nawabo The negotiation 
took a long time , for even though the Nawab could not resist Clive he was 
not as yielding to Sykes. Clive had privately advised Sykes to reducO the
1* IIN f 154* 20Najni ud daulah to Clive, reeds 9 June 1765* Cl C,1,2660 
3* riven witnout the Diwani this arrangement would have given the control of 
Nawab*s purse to the English.The grant of the Diwani further converted 
the control into a right over the Nawab's revenues.Clive felt so jubilant 
over this matter that he wrote to the Select Committee on 11 July saying 
that " We have often lamented that the gentlemen of ^ ppencer*s7c©uncil,by 
precipitating the late treaty had lost the mo3t glorious opportunity that 
could ever happen.•.which I have now the pleasure to inform you, are in 
a fair way of being perfectly removed"(BSC 10 Aug 17^5)•Clive had the 
satisfaction of having scored his first victory over Spencer*
4* jpid.Clivc also safeguarded the Khan by departing Qaia Beg to Calcutta. 
The Nawab was not consulted.(Cliv©'sletter 7 10 17**>
m
t
Nawab's expenses to. forty lakhs if possible,^but this proved inpossible©On 
14 August, Sykes sent to Calcutta the draft of* a new agreement which was 
to cone into force after the Diwani sanad from the Emperor Shah Alan had 
keen receivea hy the Company©According to the new agreement the Nawah 
undertook to " accept the aaount of Sicca Rupees 53»&6,131-9-0 as an 
adequate allowance for the support of the Nizaaut which is to lie regularly 
paid as follows, vizt, the sun of Sicca Rupees 17t78#$54-1-0 for all my 
household expences, servants &c and the remaining sum of 36,07,277-^-0 
for the maintenance of such horse, seapoys, peons, Bergundasses &c as may 
be thought necessary for ay Sewarry and the support of my dignity only,
should such an expence hereafter he found necessary to lie kept up, hut on
2
no account ever to exceed that amount** © In the same document the Nawah 
decalred that having a perfect "relyance” on ?/uin ud daulah £~Rezi KhanJ7 
the Nawah desired that M he may have the disbursing of the ahove sun of 
Rs 36,07,277-^-0 for the purposes before mentioned” The balance of power 
had again tilted in favour of Reza Khan© The new arrangement was to take 
effect after Clive's return from Allahabad where on 12 August, 17&5 
Emperor Shah Alam had granted to the Company the Diwani of the provinces 
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.^With Clive*5 return Reza Khan was to enter 
upon the most important phase of his career©
10 Clive to -ykes ,3 Aug 17^5• quoted* Forrest, Olive,11,282©
2© Draft enclosed with Sykes' letter to Select Commix tee <>3SC 7 Sep 1765*
3. ioid©
4© At Allahabad Clive acted as the representative of the Nawab of Bengal 
in concluding peace with 3huja ud daulah© The Diwani was granted to 
Company on condition of their guaranteeing the payment by the Nawab of 
Bengal of the annual tribute of twentysix lakhs of rupees and as an 
altamgha (grant in perpetuity)*”Thus a business of such a magnitude ” 
commented Ghulam Husain ”..0was done and finished in less time than 
would have been taken up for the sale of a j&ck-ass, or of a beast of 
burden, or of a head of cattle” (Seir,III,9)• But even then, it appears 
from Ghulam Husain's report, that as usual the formalities were all 
observed, "the Company's acknowledgement and bond for the same, which 
are the owner's voucher , were drawn up under their seal, and entered in 
the Imperial registers”©(ibid)0 We do not know what these obligations 
were, but Holwell reported to the Fuller Committee in 1767 that in 1732 
"the East India Company were told they forfeited their lands by the 
Constitution of the Empire if they raised their rents"(AddMss I8469 f 16j
I l l )
CHAPTER SIX
BE7-A khan at the zenith op his career, 1765-1767*
1
Before the acquisition of the Diwani, Reza Khan had been merely 
politically useful to the Company; after it, he became the chief instrument 
of their administrative control of the country,3hah Alaa had granted the 
Diwani sanad on 12 August 1765* when somewhat over a fortnight later 
Clive returned from Allahabad to lurshidabad he had to take the practical 
steps needed to implement the agreement which had been concluded, in his 
absence, by Sykes ^ rith the Nawab Najm ud daulaho The measures adopted during 
his brief stay served to raise Reza Khan to the zenith of his power, for, 
as Reza Khan put it later, "Lord Clive found it necessary to restore the 
ancient form of government and set one person at the head of the administra­
tion of public affairs” « That person was i uhammad Reza r.han.
To Reza Khan, who was to act for the Nawab Najm ud daul&h and so to 
control the public office of the Kizamat, was transferred charge of the 
Nizamat finances, fixed at Sicca rupees 36,07*277-3-0, He was also given 
charge of the annual pension alloted to Jlir Saidu, ; iran's son, Clive, while^ 
at I'urshidabadf fixed the amount of the pensions and allowances to tne family 
and dependents of M r  Jafar, These were included in the household expenses 
of Najm ud daulah , but because of his known jealousy towards Iir Saidu,
nominated as his successor by Mir Jafar in 1760 in preference to Najm ud
2daulah , the pension of Mir Saidu was placed in Reza Khan's hands. Since 
Shah Khanum, mother of l iran and half sister of Alivardi, who had been 
Kir Saidu*s guardian was now dead, Reza Khan was the natural guardian of 
the interests of Alivardi*s family. Nevertheless,the charge added to his 
importance* As the Nawab's deputy, with authority to discharge the public 
functions of the Nizamat and control over the public funds, and of lir 
Saidu's pension, the Khan virtually enjoyed a sovereign's dignity. When, 
therefore, Clive and the Select Committee told the ijirectors that " the 
Nabob ^ Najm ud daulah^ holds in his hands as he always did, the whole civil _
1,Reza Khan's note on the past and present state of Bengal as given to 
Goring in feh 177^*Nhilip Francis sent this note to Lord North on 23 J ar 
1775* Francis I ss. • Kur E 28 f 352,
2,Vide Clive to Rir Saidu's mother,and to Reza Khan 11 Oct 1765(CPC,I,2723-24 
AND iir Saidu to Verelst,reeds 10 Feb 1768.(Ci-)C,II,786),
Ill
administration* the distribution of offices*.and all those sovereign rights
which constitute the essence of his dignity*J they were untrue to practice
however constitutionally correct# Only when necessary to give extra weight
to letters and parwanas to other foreign powers and settlements was it
2
thought fit to affix the Nawab*s own seal#
N# attempt was made to separate the Diwani administration which 
continued as part of the Nawab9s administration as before^nor was it deemed 
necessary to formally amend the administrative arrangement recorded in the 
Select Committee9 s proceedings of 21 June. The formal transactions of the 
Nawab9a government* such as the revenue settlement with the Zemindars were 
continued to be made out in the joint nar^ ea ef Resa Khan* Rai Durlabh and 
the Jagat Seth#^ Though even under the formal arrangement*of 21 June,Reza 
Khan had a distinctive status as Naib ; in actual practice he gradually
5
became " the centre of business* public and private* i Only on ceremonial 
occasions* such as the annual Punyah did the Nawab preside# At other times 
it was Resa Khan who acted* as " regent**as the Directors called him* as 
" minister* or "Prime minister"* as the Select Committee called him* or 
as Naib or Naib Nazim as he Btyled himselifrhe Khan was never formally
installed as Naib Diwan, but Clive did all he could to secure for him
honours and dignity befitting his real practical authority#
While Clive was securing the Diwani and other sanads for the Company 
from the Emperor Shah Alam he also procured for Reza Khan the various titles* 
Ghulam Husain says* of Bahadur or Valiant* iiuzaffar Jang or the Victorious 
in War* Nluin ud daulah or the Eminent ef the State* ttubarixnl Hulk or the 
Foremost of the Kingdom* Khan i Khanan or the Lord of Lords# To these was 
added the privilege of riding in a Naleky...a distinction reserved to .
1# Letter to Court * 24 Jan 17^7* •
2# It was a custom in dealings with all European nations in Bengal before 
Plassey* and with all other nations except the English after Plassey that 
"they were never allowed a personal interview with the Nabob but as a 
special favor nor even with his ministers*but transacted all affairs* by 
the Vakeels* with the mutsuddies ef the Durbar*0CCP*Kasimbazar,11 Jul 1772
3# The separate identity of the office of the Diwan had ceased to exist since
the emergence of the 9 independent9 Nawabs early in the century0 The office 
of Padshahi(imperial) Diwan existed as a matter of form and it was held 
formally by someone who was held next in rank to the Nawab who nominated 
the holder*though formally appointed by the emperor0Under Mir Jafar, the 
office went to Miran and after his death to his son Mir Saidu#The Coiapany 
in fact, substituted Mir Saidu#
4# Reed9s letter 17 DacQMP 20 Dec 1770# 5#Seir*III*4#
6# Court9s letter 24 Dec 1765{Letter to Court 24 Mar 1766;BSC 31 Doc1766.
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Sovereigns "^*Karasi Ali says that the titles , which Reza Khan certainly
enjoyedy were conferred upon him , when installed as Naib Subah9 in March
2
1765f by Najm ud daulah* But that Clive obtained for him at least the title
Khan i Khanan or Lord of Lords, and the distinction of the Sovereign's
privilege to ride in a Nalekyand use the Mahi I.aratib or Fish Standard is
certain* Procuring titles for the Nawab, his brother Saif ud daulah, Rasa
Khan, Rai Durlabh and for the Jagat Seth and others had been a part of
4Clive's mission to the Emperor* The Emperor might be militarily impotent 
and politically ineffective but Clive knew very well that he was still - 
looked up to as the souroe of all honour and distinction in Indian society* 
Ennobled with imperial titles Reza Khan would be a more effective w 
counterpoise to the Nawab 0 ~~
The strengthening of the dignity and power of Reza Khan was very 
necessary , for Clive could only exploit the Diwani grant by working the 
established form of government* Some nineteen Company civilians^had been 
killed during the struggle with Mir ^asim9 others fell victim to Clive 
in his ruthless war against those members of the old Council who questioned 
the dictatorial powers he claimed for himself and the Select Committee*^ By
■7
January 1766 one councillor had been suspended, four had chosen te resign*
Clive's attempt to restore the situation by calling in men selected from the
Madras establishment threatened in its turn to cause a revolt of the Bengal
servants, fearful of their prospects, and his high-handedness cracked the
solidarity of the Select Committee too* Sumner who had cone out with Clive
as hiB second, with the prospect of succeeding him, refused te support Clive
further, and he tendered his resignation and sailed for hime at the close of
1766* So many losses left too few men even to run the commercial offices
properly, especially as those remaining were often junior and inexperienced,
0
heavily dependent on their Banians* To seek to manage the revenues of the 
province by European agency was plainly impossible*
1 * 3eir, 111,4 2. MN f 1§1*
3* Naleky is described as " the shell of a Palenkin"but it has neither "the 
arching nor the tent" of it and is instead like "an European chair,with 
two bamboos that rest upon the shoulders of eight men"0Seir,IIl,4 fh 5*
4o Clive's letter 9 July*BSC 10 Aug 1765*
?* They were Amyatt,Ellis,Hay,Chambers,Howitt,Lyon,Oaks,Smith^AEiphlett,Bennet 
'Vollaston, Culston,Kylon,Hutchinson,Lake,Round,Collings and Croke*
6* The powers were given by the Directors to meet the emergency caused by war 
~ith . ir v^asim*Clive retained the power for other purposes*
7* Letter to Court 31 J&& 1766* 8* Letter to Court 24 Mar 1766*
Maintenance of the existing administrative arrangement was also a
part of the grand strategy of Clive* s diplomacy in India, the comer stone
of which was laid in his settlements at Allanabad* While Spencer had
tried unsuccessfully to "convince the Empire ^ "that_7 are not determined
to destroy the Mussulman power" and to repudiate an established belief
" that our real views were to wrest the Empire from their hands" ^ , Clive
sought te achieve success by positively integrating the Company within the
framework of the empire both in the interest of the Company’s security
2
and that of his jagir, an institution of the eoplrt* With a sudden change 
in the subah administration , the camouflage would not have worked*
Personal considerations also drove Clive to rely upon the established 
Indian &dministration0 He had returned to Bengal intending to stay only 
long enough to fulfil his obligations to the Proprietors by restoring order 
and to ensure the future security of his jagiri J-te had felt cheated when 
he found the war over and a settlement with the Kurshidabad government 
already precipitately concluded by Spemcer* Eut then he pulled off the 
coup of securing the Diwani, serving the Company’s interests beyond all 
their expectations by securing to them the revenues of the three provinces*
Naturally, Clive expected a further reward for this extraordinary 
service*He hoped for an extension of the ten-year grant of the Jagir, and 
he soon set his agents to werk - Scrafton within the Company and Walsh in 
political circles outside it* hut if they were to win him his prise it was 
essential that he support their efforts by immediate material gains from 
the Diwani grant* Clive thus needed a spectacular and early success - such 
as only Reza Khan could provide* Clive himself recognised his own inade­
quacy in " civil matters In revenue affairs he had reason to feel even 
more out of his depth* He could scarcely have forgotten the unhappy experi­
ence of the revenue administration of the assigned districts in 175$ &ud 
1759© The regular aimed action needed to establish the Company’s authority 
in Burdwan and Liidnapur, despite Kir Rasim’s support of Vansittart and 
grant of a jagiri sanad, was also fresh in mind*
1* Governor Spencer’s letter to Directors, 14 Kar 17&5o ~
2* iir Jafar had granted 24 Parganas to the Company in 1757 03 their _• 
Zemindarl and its revenues amounting to Rs £,22,95$ P03^ aunum to Clive 
as Jagir in 1759oWhen the Company stopped payment to him in 1765 he 
 ^claimed his ri^it to the payment under Kughal law*In 1764, the Proprie­
tors required him to come to India again and agreed to restore payment of
jagir money to him for ten years from 5 J'ay 17§4»At Allahabad Clive had 
his jagir also confirmed by Shah Alrm.fjVIKO, IV,pp xxvi-xxviii)
Hi
Only in Reza Khan’s district of Chittagong had the Company’s possession 
been peaceful* Maintenance of the established form of government, with the 
Nawab nominally head of all affairs and Reza Khan as the real manager thus 
seemed the best solution for the problem of making the Diwani pay* Reza Khan 
was therefore installed and supported, with instructions to avoid " trouble 
and disturbances " in matters of confirmation of jagirs and altamghas, se 
that no clash with their holders mighlT foil Clive’s hopes of early profits*
In pursuing this policy Clive also believed that he had chosen the
most economical system* In his personal letter to the Directors justifying
his use of the existing revenue administration Clive emphasised the point*
"The power of supervising the Provinces, though lodged in us, should not,
however, in my opinion be exerted*** Three times the present number of civil
servants, he argued "would be insufficient. *♦; whereas , if we leave the
management to the old officers of the Government, the Company need not be
at the expense of any additional servant, yet we shall be able to detect
2
and punish any great offenders"*
Clive made one demand upon Reza khan : that in return for power and
position he should secure the largest possible net gain for the Company from
the revenues of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa? Reza Khan accepted the unspoken
bargain* He saw little difficulty in securing a satisfactory revenue surplus
•in time ef peace, given sound administration0 He maintained a view that
"Cossim Ally increased the Bundibust , but without judgement; lieer Jaffier
reduced it from indolence and mismanagement" * ^He hoped to do better than
either* Meanwhile , since Clive's stay was to be short, and his interests
were in immediate action , the Khan suggested te Clive, during his short
stay en rente for Calcutta, that a new tax, to be called the Company’s
4
Nazarana, might easily be taken* For such a step he had the example of 
Alivardi, to which he later referred as guide i "Mahomed Ally Verdy Cawn 
in his time, in order to defray the expenses of the Mharattoes demanded 
huzzeranah... and giving the expenses to the i.harattoes, the nomination of
1.Clive to Reza Khan ,10 Sep 1765* CPC,I,2700.
2.Clive to the Directors, 30 Sep 1765*
3*Reza Khan’s note (no datejhanaed to Goring in fob 177$* Francis Iss*
I*C. Eur S 28, p 346*
4* Clive to Reza Khan, 10 Sep 1765. CPC,1*2700*
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Chouth,or fourth,collected it in the Bundibust from the Zemindars, which
custom from that time to the present ^ 1769.J7is still continued,"^ Clive
agreed , on condition that the tax might not be " an occasion of any
2
oppression on the country** , and Reza Khan accordingly prepared an estimate 
and sent it to Clive for approval?
Reza Khan to satisfy his great supporter was ready to have recourse 
to such expedients, but his paramount aim was to restore the stability and 
moderation which he associated with Alivardi1 s regine0 His ideas of govern­
ment were based on what he had seen and learnt before disorganisation £ad
set in after Alivardi*s death in 1756# *nd to that golden age he wished to
,y
return,Clive realising the importance of Reza Khan to his own plans was
ready to permit some tenderness to the old order, and to build up the power
of the Khan* But unhappily for the Khan, Clive had come to depend much upon
Sykes, his staunchest supporter in the Select Committee, and all the more
valuable after Sumner's defection0It was Sykes whom Clive, despite much
controversy , installed in the post of Resident at the Durbar, where he
. 4
permanently replaced Uiddleton on 21 August, 1765*
Sykes was not well qualified for the post : he was ignorant of the 
language and perhaps also of the manners and custones of the Court, for
5
Karen Ali suggests he was not well received there. His only diplomatio 
experience had been gained when he was third a,t Kasimbazar factory, Hastings 
the second there, had acted as Resident, and Sykes had substituted for 
Hastings during his temporary absence from Uurshidabad during the first 
phase of Mir Jafar*s nizamat ( 1757-60)* Clive’s need of his support led, 
however, to his appointment both as Resident, and on Senior*s departure 
for England, as chief of Kasimbazar,
Sykes was the watchdog at Ilurshidabad over Reza Khan's administration. 
He was determined to make the most of his position there, and to reap
1,Reza Khan's note as enclosure to Becher' s letter, BSC 25 Sep 17^9*
2.Clive to Reza Khan, 10 Sep 1765# CPC,I,2700©
3*Reza Khan to Clive, recdt 20 Sep 17651 Clive's reply 22 Sep 1765*
cpc, i, 2705 , 2707*
4*BPC 26 Aug 1765*'>ykes said later(BPC 28 Dec 176Q)that the post was first
offered to Sumner but he refused to accepto But after the acquisition of
the Diwani Sumner asked for the post which had then grown in importance 
and this time he was ref\ised0
5* IH ff 153# 156.
l i f t
material advantage for himself under cover of active efforts to maximise the 
profits of the Company. Sykes was determined to win the good opinion of the 
Directors, and in so doing was ready to disregard both the old regime under 
the Khan and the ultimate good of the province, Becher in 1769 na3 to write
revenue during the time of their being in station without sufficiently 
attending to what future consequences might be expected from such a measure**, 
Verelst, a member of Clive's Select Committee and his successor as Governor, 
criticised even more broadly, speaking of "immediate advantage" having been 
"the object of every attention at home and here, in preference to every
may be taken as examples ef wh&t Becher and Verelst were criticizing,
Sykes measures to cut down expenses and to push up the revenue demand 
could not but be distasteful, but their relations got off to a bad start 
thanks to an aot of apparent double dealing. In July and August 1765 Sykes 
had negotiated with the Nawab a limitation of the latter's expenses , and had 
received much assistance from the Khan in this delicate task0 fho arrangement 
concluded was for the Nawab to have Sicca rupees 17,78,854-1-0 for household 
expenses , to pass through the hands of the Nawab and his Nizaraat Diwan0 
Control of the much larger public funds of the Kizamat, Sicca rupees 
36,07,277-8-0 was given, however, to Reza Khan0 Sykes reported the Nawab* s 
agreement to these measures on 14 August^ Five days later he sent another 
report to the Select Committee, saying that the Nawab had agreed to a further 
reduction of eighteen lakhs "from the 36 laaks of the Nabob's stipend that 
was to pass thro' !.',R,Caim's hands - and that the Nabob consents to the
proposal from a conviction that it will tend to promote his ease, the peace
4
of the country,..,"
Sykes had used the Nawab's hatred of the Khan to obtain his consent to 
a proposal calculated to injure the Khan's power, patronage and influence,
1. Becher's letter,24 I-ay® BSC 8 July 1769o 
20 Verelst*a minute, BSC 11 August 1769q 
3o Sykes' letter 14 u^g. use 7 Sep 1765®
4o Sykes' letter 19 Aug? BSC 7 Sep 1765®
* the endeavours of all concerned ^ werey^ to gain credit by an increase of
measure which might tend to its future
The Nawab thus rebelled against beiiig treated as a cypher - indeed Karam Ali
relates that even at his last meeting with Clive at S'Adiqbagh, he continued
to plead for control of the people of the Kizajnat^  and readily rebelled
against augmentation of Reza Khan*s influence© The Select Committee, by
2
letter of 25 August 1765 approved of the reduction Sykes had secured0 But it 
was never put in operation, probably being vetoed by Clive on his way back 
from Allahabad# Clive doubtless realized that the whole-hearted support of 
Reza Khan was needed, both to make the Nawab truly innocuous and to secure
the fruits of the Diwani grant# He wanted no hitch to mar his achievement,
news of which he had chartered a special ship to convey to the Directors 
in London#
Sykes also touched very closely on Reza Khan* s power when he proposed 
that the administration of Dacca should come under the inspection and control 
of Kurshidabad. On Reza Khan1 s elevation to the Naib Subahdari after Kir 
Jafar1 s death , Spencer* s government had allowed the Khan to retain direct, 
personal control of the Naibat of Dacca# The Company officials recognised 
that this government was the source of Reza Khan* s private means j he drew
an annual salary of Rs 90*000 as Nawab of Dacca^ the same Bun as he had
drawn as Kir Jafar* s deputy in the province^ Since his salary as acting
ITawab was not fixed until early in 17619 his Dacca income was very necessary^
Moreover in Dacca,Reza Khan was able to restore and maintain the form of 
the old Mughal provincial administration# Immediately after his appointment 
at Kurshidabad in March 1765,the Khan had sent J&sarat Khan as his Naib to 
Dacca; and in June 1765* on confirmation in his post by Clive , the Khan 
promptly sent Uahasingh, a veteran of Alivardi* s regime 9 to Dacca as Diwan^
conferring on him at the same time the title of haharajaf Mahasingh replaced
Rama&nkar , the personal Diwan of Reza Khan, who had been acting for the
1. KM . . f 157. 2. BSC 7 Sep 1765.
3. Sykes* report on Dacca0 BSC 18 Apr 1767.
4. Reza Khan*s salary for 21 months as Dacca Naib under Kir Jafar
is shown as Rs 1,57*000 Rs 7*500 per month. Dacca Factory Record.
India Office Vol 6 f 31.
5. Clive to Reza Khan, 25 Jan 1767. CPC,I,2811#
6# ih1 f 154 ; Reza Khan to Verelst, 17 Mar 1767* CPC,II, 178#
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Khan at Dacca! Jasrat Khan and hahasingh thus recreated the Kughal division
of provincial authority between Subahdar and Diwaii. The two officers wore
independent in their authority, though both were individually responsible to
the Khan. They were also made to act as check upon one another* the expenses
of Jasarat Khan and his department were paid by Kahasingh, those of Kahasingh 
2by J&sarat Khan* Sykes9 proposal would thus have imperilled both Reza Khanfs 
personal finances and the structure he had recreated* It was turned down , 
however, by Clive as an "impolitic*' affront to Reza Khan " at a time when he 
was of such consequence to and so principally instrumental in reducing to 
order and retrenching the immoderate expeaces of the Zemindars and other 
officers of the Government which without his assistance would have been 
effected with the greatest difficulty*"•
Sykes also achieved only a partial success in his efforts to cut down 
government expenses, one of the main tasks he had set himself " as collector 
of the King9s revenue, under the inspection and control of the Select
4
Committee"• By 31 October he could report considerable economies in the
5
Patna administration9 s expenses* Under the Naibat of Ram Harain and then of
liir Kazim, these had run about twenty-one and a half lakhs* With the .. l
assistance of Reza Khan, Sykes reduced this figure to some seven and a half 
7
lakhs; Even this he thought *' great and heavy"* but as he reported he could 
not cut it further as the ministers " declare to me that there is no
a
superfluous expence in that sua%
One of the measures he had proposed to effect economies was the removal 
of Nawab Ihteraa ud daulah, Kir Jafar9 s brother, and Dhiraj Narain, Ram 
Narain9s brother, from the posts of Naib and Diwan respectively on grounds of 
incompetence. Reza Khan did not deny the allegations of their incompetence,but
td him as well as pethaps to Rai Durlabh this was no reason to dismiss them 
without any alternative provision for their maintenance. The Khan did not
1. ^  f 154* 2* Sykes9 report on Dacca, BSC 18 Apr 1767 o
3* Sykes was quoting Clive in his report to Select Committee* BSC 18 Apr 1767* 
4* In these words the Select Committee descibed Sykes9 functions as Resident 
at the Durbar* Letter to Court 24 Jan 1767*
5* Ram Narain, son-of Rajigalalp was bred in Alivardi9 s family, was secretary to 
Seraj ud daulah9 s father, lie succeded J&nakiram& Rai Durlabh9 s father as 
Naib at Patna ih the time of Alivardi and continued in the post until 
he was dismissed by H r  vlasim in 1761 *As he was killed in 1763 by Kir i^ asim 
liir Jafar on his restoration appointed his brother as Diwan at Patna*
6*He was Kir Jafar9s brother and known also as Nawab Ihteram ud daulah.
7*The sum was reduced^  to Rs 750,920 tXca Rs 21,53i934 —2-10 
Sykes9 letter 31 Oct*BSC 5 Nov 1765* 8* Ibid*
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it appears, oppose Sykes openly in this matter. But he was about this time
very much frequent in direct communication with Clive in Calcutta both
through letters and messengers so frequent that on one occasion, 19
November 17&5 » Clive v/rote to the Khan acknowledging receipt of his thirteen
letters] By the end of September his relation and envoy liirza i uhammad Kazim
Khan had set out from kurshidabad to see Clive and N to explain some affairs
2
relative to the country,etc., to His Lordship in private". Again early in 
October he warned Clive that "an answer te any letter respecting the
3
regulations of the Subah may be deferred until the papers are perused". It 
may well be that as a result of this correspondence that on the 25th October 
the Select Committee 9 replying to Sykes' proposals of the 21st , laid down 
that Ihteram ud daulah and Dhiraj Narain should be continued in the dignity 
of their stations while the ministers selected two naibs to act for than in 
the actual discharge of their duties^ The Select Committee, ignoring Sykes* 
attempt to cut expenses, went on to award an annual allowance of Rs 72,000 
to Ihteram ud daulah and another Rs 50,000 to Ruh ud din Husain Khan, the 
Faujd&r of Pumea* The grant to Ruh ud din Husain was made "out of regard to 
his family connections" rather than in recognition of ability for in his case 
too the Khan had recommended arrangements to ensure "that the revenues of
5
Sarkar may not be lost or neglected , but be managed in the best manner",
Sykes replied on 31 October with angry complaints of "fraud and villainy" 
in every department of the Government and of his "struggle with every 
difficulty that can be thrown in my way by the ministers, I utseddees,Congoes 
^~^anungoes_7and their dependents0"^He accepted the need to retain Ihteram ud 
daulah and Dhiraj Narain since "our connections" with M r  Jafar and Raa 
Narain "made it necessary to give them our countenance, and a proper influence 
in the country"^ and forwarded the proposal of Reza Khan and Rai Durlabh 
recommending retention in office of the two incumbents with appointment of 
three more officers, two on the part of the Company and one on the part of 
the government , " to remain not only as checks on their actions, but to
mmm— i m m r n m _ _ _ ----------------------------------   , ,  , , , ____ _________________________________________________________
1, Clive to Reza Khan , 19 Nov 1?65. CPC.I, 2752,
2, Reza Khan to Clive,recds2 Oct 1765.CPC,I,2?14«Mrza Kaaem,son-in-law of 
Husain Reza Khan.Haji Ahmad's grandson wr.s tne Khan's envoy to Clive in 
V.ay and his agent in Clive's camp in mission to Alla-iabad.
3, Reza Khan to Clive, recd:4 Oct 176%  C1£,I, 2717. 4.33C 25 Oct 1765.
5* i£id.| ?xQ'^  to Clive,26 Sep 1765(CPC,1,2710).Ruh ud din was a son
of Saif rhan wnp was posted to Pumea early in the century,The family was 
oust ed Alivardi and restored by Mir Jafar in 1763e 
6. BSC 5 ov 1765. J
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enable them to proceed in the collections with greater alacrity." £ykes had 
bowed to Clive's known regard for Liir Jafar and Ram Narain, and to the wish 
of Reza Khan to maintain the old order„But he did so reluctantly, declaring 
himself "entirely for having a new class of people of less consequence to 
manage the affairs of that province j* osho he expected would^be more obedient to 
"any orders they, might receive from hence*" Though he had reluctantly given in
he was as determined as ever for a "total change" but "by degrees" and without
5
causing "great disturbance and murmuring all over the country".
In the matter of Bihar jagirs and grants in altamgha, to which the Khan 
had taken the first opportunity to draw Clive's attention on his return to 
Calcuttaf Sykes was not so much opposed as altogether ignored by the Khan and 
Cliveo Reza Khan persuaded Clive to restore these grants, resumed by I.ir viasim 
and so to restore and preserve the older arlstocracy*Clive, determined to 
avoid "much trouble and disturbance" at the moment , deliberately excluded 
Sykes from discussion of the question. Sykes complained that had it been in 
his power "to enquire into that article we would find the greater part 
misapplied^ (The first reaction of the Directors was one of approval."Altho 
the Jagheer land form a considerable deduction of our revenues in Bahar", 
they wrote to the Select Committee on 21 November 1766, "yet we would not have 
then resumed, which may have been alloted for the support or dignity of the 
great families or faithful servants of the Lioguls or former Subahjfat the same 
time you are not to admit any new Jagheer either from the Kogul or the Nabob", 
Within the next two years the view of the Directors had9 however, changed, 
considerablf o)
In November the struggle between the Khan and Sykes turned from Patna to 
Kurshidabad, Sykes began by disallowing the settlement which Reza Khan had 
made at the beginning of the year, at the Punyah held on 25 April 1765<> He
1, Sykes' letter 51 Ccto BSC 5 Nov 1765* 2. Ibid, 3<> ibid,
Reza Khan to Clive, reeds 9 Sep 1765* CPC,I,2^97© further correspondence on
the subject, also in Sept may be seen in CPC,I,2700,2705,2707,271Qo
5, Sykes' letter 31 Oct, IBC 5 Nov 1765o
6, The Directors wrote on 11 Nov 1768 that "after Cossim Ally Cawn had gone 
through the odious task of resuming the Jaghirs, it seems to us an error
to have restored them, but being restored it will appear very ungracious te 
resume them" and they asked to know about the "Rank, Station and Character" 
of the holders. They Y/ere obviously making observation on Rumbold's report 
dated 6 July 1767 in BSC 21 July 1767,
121
found Reza Khan* 3 assessments often short of what they had produced in the
days of Alivardi, Sira;} ud daulah or Mir Jafar and in the interests of "the
welfare of the Nabob and our employers" he revised them to arrive at what he
considered "the just revenues due to the government" and pushed up the demand
to a gross sun of Rs 1,60,29*016-10-2 and a net sum of Rs 1,50,04*687-2-5o
Ke was not satisfied even with this, and expressed the hope that further
increases could be made " without the least oppression to the farmers or
tenants", though he thought "some degree of rigour" was necessary te rouse
1
the Zemindars and collectors end stop general malpractices*
Murshidabad*s expenses next came under Sykes* axe, but here Reza Khan
was able to save more than at Patna* While expenses at Patna had been
retrenched by nearly two thirds, those of kurshidabad were only cut by little
over half, to Rs 10,24*129-7*17* The ministers intervened to prevent any
further reduction and declared what was left to be "indispensably necessary"
2
for the office staff, roads, charity and other contingent expenses* The 
Kurshidabad Secretariat had been reorganised by the Khan soon after his 
first appointment as Naib Subahdar in March, and the employees were regarded 
as his dependents. Rai iXirlabh had likewise added to their number by appoint­
ment of his dependents* Both ministers held it to be not only uncharitable 
but also very undignified and dishonourable to throw such humble people out 
of employment or to grudge them the indulgences they enjoyed* Sykes claimed 
later to have had encountered difficulties in his continuous process of 
retrenchment because these people "had long enjoyed tho benefits arising 
from the profusion of a disxracted and indolent administration and been 
accustomed to advantages which exceed all proportions, when compared te these
w
under European governments, but at the same time he further claimed te have 
had effected it "with all possible tenderness"* In fact* however, he had 
not only thrown many eut ef employment, but had caused them further distress 
by not paying them their arrears of salary for over a year, and by calling 
upon them to render accounts for the past years, on the ground that much 
government money had been embezzled* The Khan* 3 attitude is not known, but 
it is likely that he shared the attitude of bib protege Karaa Ali who
1* Sykes* letter 17 Nov 17*>5o juotedi Bolts* Considerations* App* pp 143-4* 
The earlier demand is not stated,but the Select Committee in letter to 
Court on 8 Sep 1766 gave Rs 1,61,00,708 a still higher sum as net receipt* 
2* Sykes* letter* BSC 25 Nov 1765*
3* Sykes* letter 2 Jan* BSC 4 Jan 1769*
1?,?.
commented acidly in the i uzaffamamah "at this time the practice began in 
Bengal of recovering money from dismissed people and despoiling them1*.
That there had been irregularities was certainly tnie, but to dig up tk$- 
past of the retrenched servants was distasteful, particularly after the 
recent changes, and specially after the new government of the Company had 
chosen to deny responsibility for most of the liabilities of the previous 
government. Reza Khan therefore kept out cf the scrutiny of the past accounts 
undertaken by Sykes0 He deputed All Ibrahim Khan to act as Amin checking the 
accounts with Sykes* Their strictness, the I’uzaffamamah declares  ^caused 
suffering to many, sufferings enhanced by the failure to pay arrears of
salary for over a year and then only at a deduction of three-eigths of the
p
sum due0 Where the deduction went to is not clear*
Such action contrasted strongly with the Company1s attitude when others 
sought to secure what was owing to them0 After Clive* s appointment of the 
Seth brothers to the lurshidabad government, they sought to recover the old 
debts due to their house from the Zemindars and Taluqdars* This was resented 
by Sykes, the Select Committee and Clive alike0 Soon after the acquisition of 
the Diwani,Clive, with a fine air of moral indignation warned the Seths that
"His Lordship greatly fears that the tendency they seem to have to 
avarice, will not only turn greatly to their disadvantage, but will 
at tne same time destroy that opinion he had of their inclination 
and disposition to promote the public good0" 3
The Seths could not disregard such a wamingo They had to forget about 
the debts due from the Zemindars, or at least to abandon hope of even the 
long standing and customary governmental assistance^ in their recovery* They 
had likewise to forget about the money they had lent to Mir Jafar*s Janadars 
(army leaders) during the war with Mir lasim and Shuja ud daulah, at a time 
when the Nawab could not regularly pay them. After the Diwani grant came 
into operation the Seths asked Clive, Camac and Sykes for the thirty lakhs 
they had lent to these Jaaadars. But since the Nawab* s revenues had now 
become the Company* 3, and the Nawab* s income had been limited, the Company
1* : h f b 6 *haran Ali wanted to write a book detailing these events, 
but we do not know the existence of any such work,,
2. MS f.156 3, Clive to the Seths, 4 Nov 1765. CP£,I, 2736.
4. "Formerly, when the Zemindars and Talookdars owed money to the bankers, 
the government enforced the payment of itoBut now in the Company*s time 
the bankers have been plainly told that their debts could not be 
recovered for them***Re2a Khan’s note0(no date) .Add Mss 2 9 1 f 98o
officials refused to recognise the Seths1 claims. The only liability they 
admitted was for the twenty-one lakhs that the house of Jagat Seth had lent 
to lir Jafar. This they agreed to pay by instalments over a period of terf 
years, half from their own revenues , half from the Nawab1
Reza Khan could have been no more than a helpless observer of the Seths1
losses, fer the denial of their dues came from Clive, the Select Committee,
and Sykes. But in another injury to the Seths he played a more positive
though very minor role. In 1773 Sykes recalled to Bastings
11 On my arrival at the city ^TurshidabadJ  I found the provision of
Kellauts in the hanos of Jagut Seat and indeed it had ever been with 
him, but a year after our taking the charge of the Itewanee I did 
propose to ItRC £ kUhaanad Reza CawnJ^ ih© provision of the Kellauts &c 
on easier terms than he gave them to govt, which was accepted of, and
accordingly I yearly sent money to Bonarass, for the provision of such
articles, as he, KRC, thought could best answer for the Pooneah
3
In abetting Sykes in this r.ove, Reza Khan damaged the Seths more in their 
privilege or prestige than in their pocket. Nevertheless the expenditure fen 
this item in 1766-67 was over two lakhs^, and Sykes recorded that he made 
" 25 to 30 P cent profit'* by the trade after paying commission and other 
expenses. The business was not conducted in Sykes1 name of course, but in 
that of Kantu BrRnror some similar agent,
Reza Khan1s readiness to assist Sykes in the profitable business of the 
Khilats was perhaps prompted by Clive1s efforts to clear up the misunderstan­
dings between the Resident and the Knan. Sykes had been to Calcutta in 
September and early October (1765)$ and Clive nay have addressed him to 
make up his quarrel with the Khan. Significantly Clive9writing on 8 October 
1765t reassured the Khan th^t "with Hr. Sykes1 assistance the addressee 
will be able to carry on the business of the government in a proper manner
and without interruption*1^  and the reassurance was repeated in another
7
letter of 19 November;'The Khan replied, assuring Clive that he would work in
Q
concert with Sykes. Undoubtedly Reza Khan never had a favourable opinion of 
Sykes, but thenceforth he allowed no criticism to reach either Sykes1 ears
1, fourth Report of the Committee of Secrecy,1773* P 102.
20 Khilats or dresses of honour ( given on ceremonial occasions. It also 
used to indicate an appointment or conferment of any title).
3, Francis Syk-r: to V/arren Hastings, 28 Jf-n 1773?Add Kss 29133 PP 347-54o
4, Actually Its 2,16,870-10-10. ]v5C 28 Apr 1770.
5 • >:?4533 ?J,'Qian of Sykes and Hastings and was founder of the
i-aj feailly.
6. CK;,l, 2722. 7. Qgc,l, 2152* 8, H«cd, 8 and 24 0ct.CPC,I,2720,2729.
m
or those of Clive0 On the contrary , he showed extraordinary concern to enlist 
Sykes' approval in all matters, and to secure his goodwill by further aid in 
his business transactions0
In matters of internal appointments the Khan had been given absolute 
discretion - a liberty re-iterated in writing by Clive on 19 November 1765*^ 
Sykes, unacquainted until his appointment as Resident with anything but the 
trade possibilities of Kasimbazar, had neither authority nor competence 
therefore to intervene in the appointment of officials. Nevertheless the Khan 
wag at pains to consult Sykes about his appointments - and Sykes, to return 
the compliment, made very little criticism of his choices, The Khan could 
proceed therefore, Sykes concurring, with his policy of conciliating and 
strengthening the eld order,
2
He had already secured the position and honour of Ihteram ud daulah , 
Dhiraj Narain and Ruh ud din Husain at Patna and Pumea, and he sought 
further to conciliate Ruh ud din for his loss of power by appointing his 
Pirzada ( spiritual guide's son) and manager Asghar Ali as collector of 
Dinajpur^Mrza Nazim , a fellow Persian, and a relation by marriage into 
Haji Ahmad's family was rewarded with the Faujdari of Hugli which obviously 
was taken away from Potilal, Johnstone's Banian0 The Diwani of Pumea was
A
given to Suchit Rai., possibly a former dependent of Shi tab Rai though the
latter was always a staunch supporter of Nandkumar, jmd therefore not much
of a friend to him. In Dacca Jasarat Khan and liahasingh were already his
Naib and Diwani now Reza Khan made i'ahasingh's son, Amrit Singh, a boy of 14
his own personal Diwan0 Iluhammad Aman and Kirza Amanullah, two of Siraj ud
5daulah's officers were re-appointed to government serviced The Khan's keenness 
to make friends even with the bitterest enemies of the past is perhaps best 
instanced by his treatment of Ali Ibrahim Khan, at one time a great noble 
at the court of ! ir Qasim, After M r  Rasim's defeat he had lived a wandnrer's 
life. Now coming to Durshidabad under Pirza Nazim's protection he was "received 
amongst the favourites and friends " of Reza Khan0^ Reza Khan thus sought to
1,"»Vith regard to the different appointments the addressee ^  \eza Khan/has""been 
making, he is himself the best judge of the propriety of them",CPC,I,2751*
2, Though he retained his rank as Naib of Patna he came to live at Rajaahal. 
The Naib's seat, the fort»was ordered to be cleared for English use,3SC
3,Vide CPC,I,2738;Seir,111,11-12, 25 Oct 17b>.
4#0ne Suchit Rai is noticed as Shitab Rai's agent at Penares in 1764££1C«I...
2456iShitab Rai,bred in Khan-i-Dauran's family in Delhi, was for long an 
intermediary between the English,the Emperor and Shuja.He played a leading 
role at Allahabad,and was made Dhiraj K&rain's peshkar a t Patna-v in  1Vo5• 
5* f 154 69 Seir,m,11-.,
conciliate and consolidate the leading figures of the old regime. He was
careful,however,to post his own men as checks at vital points. Thus in the
Khalsa Cutchery1 where Rai Durlabh was Diwan* despite his known laxity, with
his son Rajballabh in practical charge, Resa Khan put in Rai Hiralal as
peshkar to Rajballabh. For further ckeck and control the Khan put in his
2
brother-in-law Path ullah Khan as his own bTaib.
Sykes had raised no objections to these appointments perhaps because of
Clive* s admonitions about good relations with the Khan, perhaps because the
latter could now assist him in his business ventures* Reza Khan had already
assisted Cartier and other gentlemen of the Dacca factory to pursue their
private trade in tobacco without the Company’s knowledge.^The Khan now agreed
to bring Sykes into the ring. Details of the transactions are scanty, but
it is known that Reza Khan had agreed to distribute the tobacco to the paikarc
(petty wholesalers) of Dacca through his Haib and Diwan. Sykes used the syste*
not only for iimself, but for his friends and business partners, Warren
3
Hastings being among then.
Sykes also tried to break into the profitaole timber trade of Pumea,
which was already a monopoly of Richard Harwell, tnen commercial Resident
at Halda* Soon after he. made the proposal to Barwell,in November 1765 9 Sykes
sent his Gomastah,Krishna Kinitar,to make purchases in iurnaa, The Gomastah
found that Harwell had already "pre-arranged the proper people"^ Sykes
thereupon reported to the Select Committee that he had receiv'd complaints
from Saiyid i.uh&mmad Khari , the Faujdar and from Suchit Rai, the Diwan of
Fumea against Liyrtle, Harwell's agent in purchasing timber. He alleged that
Harwell y.ras charging the Company more than either private merchants- *r the
mii isters would do* The case was considered by the Select Committee on 10
February 1766, &nd on 19 February it was decided that since Europeans were
making exorbitant profitsy the trade should be entrusted to the Ministers of
the Murshidabad government* On the same day the Select Committee also decided
to place the chunam or lime trade and the saltpetre trade in the hands of the
5ministers, to the exclusion of all Europeans and Company servants®
1. The office which dealt with the revenues of the Rmperor was called Khalsa 
Sharifa,Khalsa Jaftar or iJaalsa Cutchery0Tne un-assigned revenue paying 
areas were called Huzury Kafels.Normally the provincial Diwan, and in Bengal 
since Shuja Khan’s time, the Rai Rayan,headed the office.>ir Qasin abolish­
ed the post of Rai-Ray&n and it was restored in 1772 by Hastings*
2. LIT f l55;Trial Papers,II,f200. to Hancock,HApr *70,Add Ksa-29125
4* Harwell’s letter 21 Jan ’66*211,IX,80. 5oB5C,10 and 19 Feb,1766® 31-32
128
The way was thus opened for Reza Khan to lend the cover of government 
to Syke^ private trade in different commodities! Sykes fully utilised the 
opportunity,30 much so that Barwoll in one of his letters home* written on 
28 February 1768, complained that
"the exclusive right he has to the trade in Saltpetre, wood and silk 
is besides a fixed and certain advantage. The saltpetre gives him 
Rs and for which he does not advance one rupeej the wood in
the same manner; but the silk he does advance on* The two former he 
deals in through the influence of the government, the last through his 
influence as Chief of Cossimbazar factory"* 2
Meanwhile, public expression of the new harmony between Reza Khan and 
Sykes was given in April 1766, when Clive, accompanied by Camac , came to 
Murshidabad for the first Punyah held ;inc • the Company1s accession to the 
Diwani* For the first time the Company, in the person of its governor Clive, 
took its seat at the public Durbar in the capacity of Diwan, second in 
rank to the Nawab, in the foughal subah of Bengal0Clive was not ignorant of 
the value of such ceremonies - if he had be^n^Camac with his long . c
experience of Indian courts could have assured him that even "the princes 
in the midst of distress keep up all the face of royalty"* The Punyah was 
held with full pomp and ceremony, at a cost ef Rs 2,16,870-10-10*^ The Khan 
rejoiced at the restoration of the dignity of his government, Sykes at the 
profit on the provision of Khilatsi and Clive, C^mac and Sykes assured the 
Select Committee that the whole proceeding had beon worthwhile* " We thought 
it by no means advisable to deviate, upon slight occasion, from the estab­
lished forms and customs of this anniversary*'* In their same letter of 30 
April 1766, they added, that "the expence hath formerly been charged to the 
government; it must therefore, now of coerce , be brought to the Company’s 
account; but the amount was so inconsiderable it was scarce worthwhile to 
introduce any innovation that might lessen their dignity in the eyes of the 
people.^tn fact, howevor, the cost^tf the Punyah Khilats were covered by 
a new tax, the BhA_Khilat, but neither costs of the ceremony, nor receipts 
from the new tax , kept by the ministers in a separate aocount, were showa 
in the Company’s books0 Sykes explained xtha dttpoe&lment to Be char in 1769
1* Barwell, affected in timber trade put it thust " They^Sel* ComJ7had come 
t* the resolution ef indulging ^Sykes With exclusive right to trade * • 0 by 
decreeing it an exclusive right of the Nabob’s"iletter 1 ,IX*9C c
2. BPP, X , 50*
3e Carnae’s letter 6 Feb* BSC 17 Feb 1761*
4* 3SC, 28 Apr 1770. . .
5* Ruotedi Ban^ arji, DoN* Barly L?nd Revenue System in Bengal’and Bihar.21 ft1
' St I jLa. 0 6  * ft to . f LA 1 1 I J'BLw   ' "  ■
mon the grounds that the Home authorities would not approve it.^
The visit of Clive and C a m e  to i urshiiabad in April and May of 1766 
had more than a ceremonial importance* The end of the revenue year was the 
right time to review achievements and plan adjustments, for Clive would not 
be in Bengal at the next Punyah. He could view with satisfaction his 
acquisition of the Diwani - as he wrote to the Directors, "the revenues of 
the three provinces being now entirely under our direction, we no longer 
depend for the support of our military establishment on the bounty of the 
Subah"©^Ke was also well pleased with the arrangement for operating the 
grant* By the Select Committee’s estimates the net collection for the 
year (1172 B.S* or 1765-66) was Rs 1,61,00,708 from Bengal and Rs 61,80,276 
from Bihar, an increase of Rs 11,31t978 fcJid Rs 562,261 respectively*^ He 
could confidently advise his correspondents in England that the Company’s 
net gain would be over £2,000,000 a year0^ For this splendid result Clive 
and the Select Committee recognised that they were indebted to Mthe 
diligence and abilities" of Muhammad Reza Khan .They acknowledged SykesV 
"assiduity", but placed the main stress upon the Khan’s "profound knowledge 
in finances"for , as they said, " without the diligence and skill in the 
executive officers, all the attention of the Committee to support the 
influence of government, to enforce the obedience of the Zemindars, and
to prevent fraud, embezzlement and depredations committed on the revenue,
£
would fail to produce the required effect"0
Clive had two more major demands to make of Reza Khan before he left 
for England : a curtailment of the Niz&mat expenses which would provide 
the money for an enlargement of the Company’s sepoy army, and the re-orga­
nisation of the Bihar revenue administration* Botn were initiated after 
the Punyah in 1766*
The idea of cutting the Nizamat expenditure was not new* Nine days 
before Shah Alam had formally granted the Diwani sanad Clive had written
to Sykes saying :
"I do not see the least necessity for the young Nabob’s keeping se
many se&poya and if a part of them be reduced a part of his
i* Sykes’ letter to Becher 16 Jan 1769* BSC 28 Apr 1770*
2* Select Comnittee to Court, 8 Sep 176o*
3* ibid. ybe^increase appears te have been made on the anticipated net 
recefpts" after Sykes’ revision of demands in 1765, and not on the 
previous year’s collection*
4* Clive to Marquess of Rockingham,6 Sep 1766.iuoted* Sutherland*,
Hast India Company in the 18th century Politics*138*
5* Sel* Com to Court 8 Sep 1766* 6.'^el.Can to Court 9 ttsc,
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allowances may be taken off, for so large a sum of money as 50 laaks 
will I fear distress the Company and if he can be brought to do this 
and accept 40 we can the better pay the King his 26o" 1
When he came to administer the Diwani grant, however, Clive realized that
any such assault on the old order would be untimely and would antagonize
Reza Khan0 But by April 1766, Clive was ready to raise the issue himself
with Reza Khan - not with the Nawab, it might be noted, whom Clive ignored*
In due course, on 19 April 1766 Clive reported privately to Verelst that
Reza Khan had agreed to cut the public funds by twelve lakhs, so long spent
on "useless horses, elephants,buffalos, camels etc0w,and that he, Clive,
2had resolved to raise tweenty-six new battalions of sepoys*
The two issues were inter-related.Clive and the Select Committee 
explained to the Directors that the raising of the new battalions had been 
made necessary by the dismissal of the Nawab*s "useless military rabble" 
and of the troops maintained by the various Faujdars and Rajas* Nobody knew 
better than Reza Khan that the Nawab*s troops were a useless rabole. He had 
constantly te ask Clive fer sepoys te maintain order ^  because the Nawab9 s 
forces were ill trained* inefficient, and indeed, at t^ne3, a source of 
danger to him0 Clive had removed 4&ia Beg in July 1765t but Sher Ali, the 
Darogah of the /Airshidabad Topkhana (or superintendent of the Artillery) 
had proved scarcely less of a trouble-maker* Some of the officers Reza Khan
z
managed to pacify, but others, as Karam Ali writes, "lost their livelihood""
The dismissal of many of these troops thus suited Reza Khan as well as Cliv^
while the money saved provided for the new sepey battalions0 A further
advantage was also hoped for, as Clive made clear to Verelst s "the frequent
complaints made by Kahsned Reza Cawn of the power which sffloers assumed
commanding Seapoys, and who are sent only for the purpose of collecting
%
revenues hath made me resolve to new model the army"o The complaints .
1*Clive to Sykes,dated Benares 3 Aug 17-5* quoted: Forrest, Clive, II, 282* 
20 Clive to Verelst, 19 Apr 1766. _H: 3,739* p 2 8*
3. Letter to Court, 9 Dec 17660
4* Reza Khan to Clivei Reed: 2 Oct 1765 (GPC,I„2713, 2714) recdj 6 Nov 1765 
(C1C, I, 2739)l Clive’s replies 8 Oct 1765 (CPC,I,2721)19 Nov(QPC,I,2752) 
5* Clive to Najmuddaulah, 6 July 1765* CPC,I,2671*
6, 32L f 153
7* Clive to Verelst, 19 Apr 1766, HM>,739» p 29*
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referred to evidently sprang from a clash of authority between the Khan and
Damodar Singh of Pachete or Krishna Manikya of Tipperah were suoauea© 'me
creation of the new sepoy force could be made an occasion for reshaping the
Company’s army also0 As it turned out# Clive soon became involved in reforming
the Company’s army in Bengal consequent upon manifestations of Indiscipline
2
among the European officers in out-station brigades0
The dissolving of a large part of the Nawab’a forces might have been
expected to cause discontent in one so. concerned with the dignity and honour
of the old order as Heza Khan0 But many of the old class of army officers had
been des t  royed by I dr -lasim^  and others had disappeared during the convulsions
of the late war between the English and Mir Jafar on one side and Kir ^asim,
and Shuja ud daulah on the other*Those who survived were in the main the
dependents and relations of Mir Jafar and his family and of Reza Khan and
Alivardi’s family*For then government service both in the Nizamat and revenue
departments were still open* These were the people who now manned the higher
4
services, and they were thus provided for*
There remained the troopers* the Biharis* Bhojpuris and Rajputs, and the 
smaller number of Pathans, Rohillas and J&ts, who during the troublesome days 
of Alivardi and the yearly Karatha incursions into Bengal, and again during 
Mir Jafar*s wars with Shuja ud daulah , had flocked to Kurshidabad to sell 
their services. The reduction of the public funds of the Mizamat to twenty-four 
lakhs in 1766 obviously led to many of than being discharged0 But the raising 
of twenty-six sepoy battalions by the Company provided, far better than the 
Nawab had done, for the wandering class of North Indian mercenaries*
Fifteen of the new battalions were to belong exclusively to the brigades, 
not to be removed from them * or employed upon any other business than fighting 
Two battalions were to go to Calcutta, commanded by Town Major and Barrack 
Master, and one battalion each to the ’ceded* districts of Burdwan, Kidnapur 
and Chittagong. The other battalions were intended for Diwani duties, three
1. Both the Rajas were hereditary chiefs of centuties old ruling houses and 
their territories were situated on two extremities of the province,west and 
east, Pachete covered the area around modem Raniganj in Burdwan* They
were subdued in Nov 1765 1766 respectively(CFC,I,2752 & BSC 7 Cct176(J
2.This led Clive to visit Monghyr and Patna directly from iurshidabad.
3* tastings to Coote, 14 j ay 17b2.Add Mss* 29097 f 52o
4* ubarak ud daulah to Cartier,Reza Khan to Cartier,re e ds8 Nov 1771(CM£tIIIt975
the Company’s officers sent to reduce Zemindars to obedience
. 1
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1
to be posted at i./urshidabad and three at Patna* Two features about these
2six, later known as "Pargana battalions**, were important for Reza Khan* The
first was the provision in the scheme that they shall have 11 but one
commissioned officer each at their head who shall always reside at the city
and whenever detachments are made no European above the rank of a Serjeant
shall command ^ "so^that t^ere may be no disputed about receiving and
obeying orders of the officers of the government"*^ The second was that the
battalions at lurshidabad was to be regared as a 'taurs&^ y.ef recruiting amy*
from where, as Sykes had directions from the Select Committee, draughts were
to be sent to the brigades on requisition, filling up the vacancies in
4
Kurshidabad battalions by new recruitment* Hitherto most of the fighting the 
Company had done in Bengal and Northern India had been primarily with sepoys
M  II
brought from Madras and even Bombay - hence their name Tilangas from the
first Telegu speaking troops brought by Clive in 1756-57 Madras,*** The
new policy,confirmed by the Directors , opened the possibilities of the
£
mercenaries in Bengal to join the Company’s sepoy army* Clive’s proposal
7
that each brigade should consist of equal number of "Gentoos and Mussalmans"
•
was certainly generous to the ITualimSe l .,
v/hen these Military changes had been set in motion, Clivo turned to Reza 
Khan for aid in Bihar0 He had been mugh impressed by the Khan during his stay 
at Kurshidabad,and by September 1766 the Khan was committed te the delicate, 
though not very difficult or unwelcome task of going to Patna and setting the 
administration in order. The Patna administration had been very slack* Samuel
1* Clive to Verelst, 19 Apr 1766, HI3.729* f 29*
2o These Pargana battalions were later dissolved by Hastings who created an
integrated Anglo-Indian army©
3* Clive to Verelst,19 Apr 1766* HMS,739» f 29o 4. BSC 3 i ar 1767#
5* They were known by this name in Bengal and Oudh even after the North
Indian mercenaries constituted the Company's sepoy army* Elsewhere in Indi 
they were contemporaneously known as Gardis (corrupted from Gharbis or 
westerners) (Seir0 11,334 fh.175)®In fact the name came to be applied te 
all troops raised and trained on European model.’ir join’s army remodelled 
by Gregore was also known as ’Telingas’4s the name was very much feared
in those days0 (Hastings to Vansittart,23 May 1762.Add Mss 29098»p57)*
60 The Directors had urged the restriction to recruit fi'ora the Company's 
territories of 3ihar and Orissa. (Court’s letter11 Nov 1763)*In any case 
Clive had created his ’Lalpaltan’ in 1757 with milti-racial mercenaries, 
the same class ©f people who composed the Nawab* s army(Brooa^ Bengal Army,9fl) 
Forrest, Clive,I,384)and soon after a battalion of Bhojpuris(Barat^A- The 
Bengal Native Infantry,6)©
7o The ConLiittee of Secrecy approved ito Bar&t, op. cit, 27♦
8* Reza Khan went to Patna in Sept,but Clive had asked him in July0ESCl 2/Aug
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Eiddleton, Sykesfe predecessor at Kurshidabad, who had gone to Patna as its 
chie^ fef the English factory, did not enjoy Clive* 3 confidence •While Dhiraj 
Harain's incapacity was well known; disorganisation v.as only increased by 
the struggle for power between hip and his more powerful Peshkar8 Shi tab Hal, 
and from Liurshidabad neither Sykes nor Reza Khan could exercise effective 
control 0. When Clive was at Patna 9 in the course of his visits to army 
establishments for suppressing the attempted m&tiny of European officers, 
Shitab Rai, Ghulam Husain suggests, saw him to apprise of the anomalies in 
Patna accounts and to ask for an enquiry by Reza Khan0 Clive found it useful 
and convenient for he did not certainly wish to appear harsh towards the 
brother of Ram Karain, his eld protege killed by Kir ilasim for being loyal 
to the English*
.y
In September ,1766 Reza Khan arrived at Patna armed with wide discre-
3
tionary powers , "the terrors ef power and punishment marching before him”*
He examined the accounts, found them very deficient,removed Dhiraj Karain and 
put his officers in prison* Shitab Rai was installed as liaib of Patna in 
his place* Reza Khan had been under no illusions about hhiraj l.arain’s 
abilities nor had he failed to take due notice of Shitab Rai's appointment 
from Calcutta as Dhiraj IJarain's peshkar* nevertheless Reza Khan now mini­
mized the unpleasantness of his exito He might well have followed the common 
practice , as even Kir ^asim followed with Ran Narain, of imprisoning the
late Naib and forcing payment of the deficit* Instead the Khan wrote off all
4
outstanding balances of the pre-Diwani periodjand in order to make the Raja 
pay for the short credits since the Company's accession to the Diwani a year
earlier^the receipts from his jagir were made over to the Company* The Raja,
now deprived of his Jagir,was not left te starve; he was granted an allowance 
for his subsistance*^
Reza Khan next settled , as far as he could, the question of Jagirs, 
Altamgfcas and U&dad Maash, again with much consideration for their holders*
1* Heir, III, 17-21 oShitab Rai had accompanied Clive from Allahabad to 
Calcutta in 1765 o Already a great favourite of Carnac, he soon rose in 
Clive's favour too<j His appointment as Peshkafc at Patna , it could be 
l?otea{Jag the beginning of something bigger*
2<j Seir,III,21 3* Seir,III, 22
4* Rumbold's letter 31 Aug0 BSC 6 Oct 1768*1110 writing eff was perhaps of
gckeral application to landholders also*
~jn oeir, III,22
In September 176^ » on Clive's return from Allahabad with the Diwani aan&d, 
the Khan had asked Dhiraj Karain to keep all collections from the jagiri 
lands separate pending final determination about them* To Clive he had 
proposed that Dhiraj Nar&in should leave the grants untouched until the
holders' sanads could be examined.Khere grantees had died or run away or
2
were unable to produce sanads9 the lands should be resumed* To this Clive
agreed 9 adding that he would not touch the jagirs of those who were alive,
3
"as it might be the occasion of much trouble and disturbance”*
Ghulam Husain, the author of the Seir, spoke of this respect for grant-
holders rights as "one of the tokens of Divine goodness, and one mark of
English Munificence" t commenting that but for this lenience " all was over
with the ancient nobility and gentry of this land”*^Uad he been less hostile
to Reza Khan he might properly have given his due appreciation to the Khan's
efforts in this respect, for it was he who now minimised the difficulties
of the older nobility by restoring many of the grants which Mir a^siin had
called in, and by making new grants, particularly of Altamghas and Madad-i-
5
Maash which were more permanent in character*
Rum bold* s^repert of 6 July 1767 raakes it clear that he thought Reza 
Khan had been over generous in acting " inti rely as he thought proper". 
Rumbold found many of the jagirdars absentees and others incapable ©f produ­
cing their "Phinnaund3" (Faraan) or title deeas.He believed that if the 
J&giid&rs were asked to prove that they held imperial grants many of the 
estates would revert to the government* But in demanding proofs appropriate 
to the days of Akbar or Aurangzeb he was asking for more than the English 
themselves could offer t neither Clive's jagir , nor the Company's jagirs 
of Burdwan, Uidnapur and Chittagong had been gifts from the Emperor, and
they were only confirmed in 176^0 Rumbold did not press the point, however,
1* Reza Khan to Clive, recdi 9 Sep 1765* £P£,I,2697o
2* Reza Khan to Clive, recd*20 Sep 176jo £L£,I,2705*
3* Clive to Reza Khan, 10 Sep 1765* CPC,1,2700. 4. Seir,III, 12
List of Bihar Jagirs etc* enclosed with Ruikbold's report.BSC 21 July 1767*
Runbold..defined„the^Altamghas as a gift which descended "...to the heirs 
•f the person possessing it,whereas a Jagheer at death of the Jagheerdan 
rouums xo xhe King*1* lie , at the sane tii?e, defined the Kadad-i-Kaash as
"a grant of the same kind as Altangha, but generally given in less sum to
...persons of lower renk". (Ruiibold's report. B3C, 21 July 1767).
60 Thomas Rumbold, one of Verelsi Council in Chittagong in 1761 joined as 
Chief of Patna and "Collector General of Bahar"(3SC 19 Bov 1767) on 
19 Bov 1766,a month after iezn Khan's visit (BSC 9 Feb 1769)
for though anxious like Sykes to increase the Company's revenues,he wa3f
days Ghulao Husain in 1783» Mlike his other countrymen, .. in those beginnings
©f their dominion jaore careful and more inclined to conciliate the hearts
of the natives©.•"! Ke had only one proposal to canvass - that the jagir
lands should be resumed, and the jagirdars paid in cash from the treasury©
His plea was that the lands would ” produce a much larger yearly revenue
than ^ "they werej^ valued at" - implying once again that the Khan had been 
2
over- generous©
Whether Reza Khan had been over generous cannot now be ascertained0tfhat 
is clear that by the end of 1766 he had dene much to restore the old 
institutions which he valued© At Kurshidab&d the Punyah had been celebrated 
in traditional style. At Patna he had restored many grantees to their 
estates, and had been given a great entertainment in his honour* and had 
reviewed the Company’s forces on parade,^The army reforms instituted earlier 
in the year had provided for many of the soldiery of the Nawab ; and in his 
Daeca administration , built up from the ruins, he provided for a tremendous 
number of people, both aristocracy and co. on oners. In 1775 was paint 
a picture of the ideal past when "the ryots the not rich , were content" and
4
when ” the Zemindars and Talookdars were father and friend of the people"©
5
Ey imposing easy assessments in Dacca^ he made possible a return to those
happier times© In addition he had encouraged the main industries of Dacca,
boat building and the weaving of fine muslins* In November 1765 he ordered
7
455 pieces of cloth for the imperial wardrobe and boats for the use of the
Q
Hmperor, appointing a special officer in the Dacca establishment to 
supervise their supply?
1©Seir, III, 27 2. Ruiubold's letter 6 July, B3C 21 July 1767o
3#*-N f 1600 4* Roza Khan’s note© Erancis less© 1,0.Hur E 28,p345<>
5© Vide next chapter. 6, East Bengal was long reputed for boat building
industry. In mid iTfth century ,It is saida "the 
Sultan of Constantinople found it cheaper to have 
vessels built there”©Bernier,E- travels in the 
iogul Bapire(1656-1668), (Hd0 Constable and Smith)
p 170. n 2©
Reza Khan’s expenses under head ’charges boats’ 
at Daoca as found in 'arch 1767 was Rs1,14*^43o 
(Sykes report© BSC 18 Apr 1767)
f? Reza nhan to Clive 17 Bee 1765 reed: 22 Dec 176^0 CPC,1,2762, 2762 A©
8. Annually three or four large boats used to be sent to the Emperor.
(Sykesi report. .*£>0 18 Apr 1767)
9. Tho salary of the Darogah was Rs 100 per month© Sykess report,B3C IBApr
1767.
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The Khan had perhaps one regret that he could net conciliate Najm ud
daulah, though his policy of reconciliation with others had more or less
succeeded* One reason for Kajr^ id daul&h’s continued hostility was perhaps
the influence of Nandkumar, who had kept up his regular correspondence with
the.Nawab*; The Nawab sincerely believed that Kandkumar was ** much better
acquainted *•* with the situation and circumstances of persons in Calcutta,^
Mabakrishna offered his help to the Nawab, but he was disregarded only
because Reza Khan was friendly with him. The sudden death of Mjm ud daulah
had cast a shadow of suspicion on Reza Khan at l.’urshidabad, as it had done
2
on Clive in Calcutta and London*
Until Najm ud daulah*s death on 8 Kay 1766,'Reza Khan wa9 just holding 
his own position against the Nawab*s hostility; on Saif ud daulah*s accession 
to the masnad on 19 Kay the Khan further consolidated his position* Kir 
Umid Ali and Lahori Beg , who had great influence with the former Nawab were 
removed from their posts* M r  Abdul Ali and other trusted persons were 
appointed as Saif ud daulah*s t4tor3. Niamat, who was Najm ud daulah*s 
DarogWof the Pilkhana was reconciled through the mediation of one Hur uz 
Zaman* Though Vftnni Begum was not Saif ud daulah* s mother and as sucri could 
not claim the control of the Nawab*s household the Khan did not, it appears, 
object to her continuance in her earlier status* This continued his good 
relation with Kunni Begum0
In defending the interests of the old Alivardian order the Khan 
continued also to serve the interests of Clive, by furnishing him with 
evidence that the Diwani grant could be worked smoothly and profitably* To 
make sure that Clive would have a spectacular achievement to show when he 
returned to England to press for an extension to the period of his jagir, 
the Khan had pushed up the revenue demand0 Yet, it appears, he had generally 
received the support of tie Zemindars and T&luqdars - he had made their 
interests seem consonant with his own*
1. N&jm ud daulah to Nandkumar, 8 Apr 1766* PP Fifth report, 1773 P 555?
2, Najm ud daulah accompanied by Reza Kh&n went to see Jlive at Sadiqbagh 
just before his Lordship was to set out for Patna*ThdJ stayed with Clive 
upto 10 or 11 R.h* when the Nawab complained of indisposition* The Nawab, 
Sykes told a Parliamentary committee, nad taken some ice water* After 
this the Nawab returned sick and died in 3 or 4 days* The news of the 
Nawab*s death gave rise to a strong rumour , as Verelst informed Sykes,
foVOil^n£,ciive* Third Report, 1773, p325)*The rumour echoed in London 
Court's latter ,16 ;:ar 1768}. Haji Sus^apha says that at Jurshiuabad 
people pointed to Resa Khan as "tfa supposed authorM(8eir,III,13 ftl 9)
Two things seen to have made this possible ♦The increased demand possibly
could be more easily met because there uad been a vast Immigration of
agricultural labour from the west* Warren Hastings stated to the house of
Commons in 1767 that the troubles of 1757-64 had driven the manufacturers from
Bihar, an open country to Bengal, "intersected by rivers" where "from its
natural situation /"they were 7 free from dangers of war"* " The troubles",
1 . .
Hastings added?"have caused no scarcity of food or rice"*! KcGuire, giving 
evidence to the same committee of the House, argued that the movement nad 
begun with the I.aratha invasions of Alivardi’s time, which had resulted in the 
improvement of the areas south of Calcutta^
If the zemindars were thus more able to pay, they were also more willing 
to agree with Reza Khan*s proposals because he stood between them and more 
direct attack from the Company. Thsir knowledge of the Company1s earlier
revenue activities were sufficient to alarm them* The Calcutta parganas had 
been the first to come under the Company*s administration , and there, the 
Directors observed, "we immediately turned out all those men who stood between 
the government and the cultivator" with consequent ruination of many families© 
The Company’s administration in Burdwan, Jidnapur and Chittagong, though not 
as alarming, had scarcely been more encouraging* It was therefore in their 
interest to co-operate with the Khan who was unwilling to interfere in their 
internal administration, and had fixed notions about their rights,privileges 
and duties, based on Alivardian traditions© These notion® wjiich formed the 
basis of his policy throughout were, as reiterated in brief in 1775, that "the 
w land is the inherited property of the zemindar1* and that "the rent of it is the 
right of government". ‘.Vhen therefore the I  uslim emperors, who had "obtained 
possession of the country by war", the Khan adued, granted" any Jaghier or 
Altamgha (Royal immunitiesjthoy have ••* bestowed the rent of th«a"©^ The 
landholders in Bengal hod no better supporter against attack on their property©
1* Hastings1 evidence to the Fuller Com, it tee of the :,ouse of Commons on 31
I  er 1767* M i  Kss 18469 f 21©
2* W© KcGuire (Verelst*s successor as chief of Lakshmipur and Ellis* predecessa 
as chief of Patna)evidence to Puller Committee on 1 Apr 1767 ©^di Isa 18469 
f 33* (hciuire left Bengal in Oct 1764 after 20 years* stay in the country)0 
3# Court* s letter , 17 i ay 17660 Ilolwell said the same thing.to Puller Committo 
" '/hat we did at Calcutta was relieving the people from their own Zemindars" 0 
Add Kss 18469 f 19,(Iiolwell was in Bengal from 1731 to 1760)
4© Reza Khan*s opinions as sent by Philip Francis to Lord Ijorth on 25 Nov 1775© 
Francis hss. I.C .Bur B 13 PP 475-77©
The Khan had difTiculties , however, in areas where “the Zemindars of the
Bengal type did not exist, that is in much of 3ihar and in Pumea0These areas
had recently been battlegrounds, and both contained more Jagir lands© Thus
Rumbold had reported of Bihar that "on Cossim Ally Cawn’s accession to the
Subahdarry he found this province of no value to him, as it then stood,
distributed in Jagheers" ,^and Ducarel of Pumea that having ** no hereditarry
Zemindarry was long appropriated to men of family or relations or favourites
of the Nabobs of Bengali, who held it as a kind of Jagheer, paying little or 
2
no rent'*© Neither therefore had contributed much to the Nawab*s treasury© On 
the contrary during the whole of Shuja’s nizanat (1727-39) the expenses for 
the province of Bihar had to be paid out of kurshid&bad revenues© During 
Alivardi’a nizajn&t (1740-56), Janakiraa (Rai Durlabh’s father)as IJaib paid 
three lakhs per year for three years and another nine lakhs from his own 
emoluments* Ram Narain paid fifteen lakhs in five years© iir Jafar received 
six lakhs from Bihar during his first Mizai.at (1757-60),and some twenty-five 
lakhs after his restoration (1763-65)© Pumea, brought under the Bengal 
Nawabs by Alivardi Khan , never yielded him more than four lakhs a year0^  
Neither area therefore had paid much, and neither had an organisation 
capable of absorbing the impact of sudden new demands*
Nevertheless on the Company’s accession to the Diwani, under Sykes*
pressure, Reza Khan agreed to a great increase in the demand © When Suchit
Rai was appointed Diwan,or Anil of Pumea he paid twenty-five lakhs to the
government in two years, and in 1766-67 actually raised the demand to twenty-
five lakhs for the yearj? Suchit Ram^ was an outsider, ignorant of the country
and he was quite unable to collect the heavy revenue demanded© He borrowed
from merchants to pay the government and ultimately found himself in prison,
7
whence only death released hiia0 Ducarel blamed Suchit Ram* a failure on the 
excessive expenses incurred on account of the officials, who collected
1 ©Rumbold*VHlettercT Jul^, BSC 21 July 1767©
2©Ducarel*s letter 3 Dec , U ‘ 13 Dec 1770o 3*Hea&a. Khan’s note,BSC 6 far 1769
4©Reza Khan*s note as enclosed with Becher’s letter,BSC 25 Sep 1769 
5oibid and also Ducarel*s letter 3 Dec,HP 13 Dec 1770*
6* The name is variously given, and also as ’Sujaut Rai*in II*, f 157o 
7©Reza Khan’s note as enclosed with Becher’s letter, BSC 25 Sep 1769®
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the revenues at three levels, in the village, at the Pargana Cutchsrry s-ud
-i ^
at the Sadar cutcherrj, but that was to ignore the special nature of the area*
In Bihar the outcome was similar* The heavy demand in the first year of the
Diwani led to the dismissal of Dhiraj Narain from the Naibat or Diwani of
Patna^and of Mirza Daud from the Faujd&rl ©f Bhagalpur^* Then the Khan himself
fixed the revenue of the province for the second year at Rs 68,53»776*inducing
4
Anils, mostly his own men to fara the revenues* This too was a very high 
figure , though much less than the crore of rupees which Sykes had assured 
Clive could be collected from 3ihar*In the event, as Rumbeld reported, many
5
of the Anils, particularly Muhammad Ali, Klir Khalil, Mir Abdul Shukur and
Sukhlal, failed to collect what the Company demanded, and became the poorer
6by parting with their money*
Did Reza Khan make a mistake about areas with which he was not conversant?
It would seem not, for Rumbold tells us that Reza Khan informed him " he
7
never expected the whole could be collected** o It appears rather that in areas
which in effect were paying revenues for the first time, he pitched the demand
experimentally high, intending to write off balances as necessary* The eld
0
practice had always been to write off legitimate outstanding balances - a
practice which he liimself followed in adjusting the Bihar accounts in September
17&6q lu this tray Clive would be able to impress the Directors with a high
estimate - and he was not going to stay to see if it was realised* So while
Reza Khan was still in Bihar, Clive and the Select Committee reported to the
Directors that the Khan was busy " in regulating the collections of that
province; whence we hone revenues will be reduced to more order, and raised
o
to a greater amount1** In a loter despatch the Committee not only reported 
large increases in the current revenues, but encouraged expectations of more
1* Ducarel*s letter 3 Dec, Mi 13 Dec 1770*
2. dhitab Rai*s statement* (Trial papers relating to Shitab Rai*s trial as 
preserved in India Rational Archives, f 20)
3* i irza Daud, I .iran,s son-in-law was given the Fawjdari of Shagalpur(the only 
Bihar district which was administered directly f ’ca i .urshidabad)in April 
1765 by Reza Khan* The l-irza refused "to give a single dan more" when the 
demand was revised by Mykes in llov 17o5,and left the collection without 
notice.The Khan then with Sykes* concurrence,posted one Mir Waris Ali who 
agreed to pay the higher demand0(Reza Khan*s letter,reed 12I?oY*65«CliC,I,2745 
4*Rmbold*s letter, BSC 9 17^9 o 5*Perhaps ha was the author of Til
6•Rumbold*s letter, BSC 9 Feb^1769o 7. ibid*
9* Balances,said Reza Khan in^  note on the past state of Bongal in 1774f”"were 
formerly wary uncoiimoni whenever they arose, inquiry was made into their
causes*If th .y appeared reasonable the rent was lowered and the deficiency 
was remitted*’ I.e.Bur £ 28, p 347*
9 .Letter+o f!nnr+ ft Sen 1766. f.
with statements of anticipated revenues for 1766-67o**vftiat the Khan had not 
realised was that the Company would rigorously exact fulfillment of 
contracts from the unfortunate Amils, without the enquiries and the 
abater*ents customary in former times 0
When Reza Khan reached Calcutta in October 1766 he was accorded a vote
2
of thanks by the Fort William Council* Row that he had done what was humanly 
possible to fulfill Clive*s expectations, it was Clive*s turn to fulfill 
the Khan’s expectations*
By ILarch 1766 Clive had become convinced of the usefulness of Reza Khan, 
and had written to the Directors through the Select Committee asking them to 
send a present as a distinguishing nark of the Company’s favour to "spur" 
the Khan to further endeavours^ But the Directors’ first comment on Reza 
Khan’s appointment as Naib Subah which arrived soon after the Committee’s 
request for a present, was far from favourable te the Khan* Their letter, 
which was in reply to the letters from the Council and from Governor Spencer 
of 11 and 14 Karch 1765, approved the succession ©f Raja ud daulah and the 
appointment of a regent* But on the choice of Reza Khan for that office 
they cemnented, ■ we think you passed too slightly over the charges urged 
against him, of being so very deficient in accounting for the revenues of 
the province of which he has been Governor** The Directors doubtless based 
their comments on the letter of Kir Jafar received by the Calcutta Council 
on >0 December, 1764* But it is also clear that they were unable to 
comprehend the political moves of Spencer's government, and that the Khan’s 
appointment was included in the general disapproval of things done by Spencer, 
the great favourite of Laurence Sulivan, which *?as voiced by Directors who 
had ousted the Sulivan party* - 1  ^ -
C *
On 30 September 1765 Clive had written t© the Directors detailing his 
achievements, and explaining the governmental arrangements at Rurshidabad
1* Letter to Court 9 Dec 1766o 2, BPC 13 Oct 1766
3* They suggested that another of greater value should also be sent to the 
Nawab * to prevent his regarding that useful minister with an eye of 
jealousy*. Letter to Court, 24 Mar 1766,
4* Court*s letter 19 Feb 1766*
upon which the Select Committee expended so much time and energy* This letter 
reached London on 20 April 1766; but the Directors* reply despatched on 17 Lay 
still had no favourable comment to make on the Khan*s appointment* We know 
in fact that in a first draft they had declared " we differ from you in our 
ideas of the administration of government*• They had objected to the June 21 
arrangement of four men sharing the government* a plan likely to produce 
discord and had recommended the appointment of one man to conduct the affairs 
•f the government* They had accepted Reza Khan as .a proper person to take 
charge in that case - but >ad added toe rider "not that we wish to see a 
l.usselnan 4n the office but rather a Gcmtoe"* Then on second thoughts they 
emitted all tnese critical comments from their letter to Bengal* conscious 
perhaps of their dependence on Clive*a voting power* But Clive was not 
without a listening post in the Direction* The silence, no less than earlier 
criticism , must have worried Clive0
'.Then Clive set about rehabilitating the Khan in the eyes of the Directors
he did not do so by explaining the political significance of fir Jafar* s and
later of Najm ud daulah* a allegations of deficiencies in the Dacca revenues,
which as Verelst said had been laid " solely with a view to prevent him from
2
being appointed to the management of the affairs of the government"* Instead 
he decided te ensure the Company’s protection and support of the Khan by an 
extraordinary measure, a vote of thanks from the Council on behalf of the 
Company, which should foroe the Directors* hands* Accordingly on 13 October 
1766 Clive proposed to the Council "that the thanks of the Board in behalf 
of the Honble Company be given him" 0The motion was unanimously adopted 
following which Reza Khan was introduced and the "acknowledgement of the 
Board" made to him* Reza Khan in his reply of thanks promised his utmost 
endeavours to continue to enjoy the "good opinion" of the Board, and for 
the past success diplomatically gave the credit "in a great measure to the 
assistance given him by Lir0 Sykes" *^Dl±ve followed this up on 16 January 17671 
in his parting minute of instructions to the successor government with a 
strong plea for support for the Khan and a statement of the Khan's services 
given in the most glaring terms; "Justice to U0R*C&wa t toe Kalb Devan calls
upon me to recommend him in the strongest terns, to the protection of the
1* Despatches to Bengal, Original Draft , Vol 3 page 375*
2* Verelst’s minute, BSC 20 June 1769*
3* BTC 13 October 1766*
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Committee. His diligence ,disinterestedness, and abilities exceed those of 
any other Mussulman I have yet seen"#^
All that Clive could do by commendation , he had done# But the Khan was
not ignorant of the fact that Clive was g-ing and Sykes remaining , and he
was naturally anxious about his own security, continuance in power.He had
received a pledge in the Company's name from the Council, but knowing how
the decisions of the Council changed from time to time he was not fully
assured# Clive had assured him of his support in England, reiterated in his
2parting letter to the Khan , but if the Khan knew of the Directors* comments 
he must have f ;lt insecure# He now raised the question of his salary# Until 
he had won the confidence of Clive by his work Reza Khan had not, cleverly 
enough, mentioned it©Now that Clive was due to leave shortly the Khan became 
anxious to have it settled#
He must have been made the more anxious by the actions of Sykes# During 
the two months that the Khan was away from Kurshidabad, Sykes assisted by 
Ali Ibrahim Khan had been busy making further economies# The Clive-Reza Khan 
understanding of April 1766 regarding the reduction of the public expenditure 
of the Nizamat by twelve lakhs was incorporated in the treaty of 18 *. ay 1766 
which Saif ud daulah had signed before being formally installed as Nawab the 
next day! According to this treaty the public funds at the Khan's disposal 
had been settled at Ha 24,07,277-0-0, but before the treaty was signed again 
on behalf of the Company on 28 November 1766 also by Clive and Camac who 
were absent in May , the actual amount had been further reduced, first te 
nineteen lakhs before November and then again to sixteen lakhs in November 
1766.4 Sykes himself seems to have felt that he had gone too far, for in Kerch 
1767 he wrote flhat advantage was lost to K.R.Cawn by this reduction I will 
not venture to pronounce) but am certain that the present sum cannot be less­
ened without lessening in a great degree the dignity and consequence of the _ 
Nabob, which we , as well as himself, de profess ourselves desirous te maintain
Clive's minute , BSC 16 Jan 1767*
2# Clive to Reza Khan 25 1767t CPC, I,28110 (Clive left Calcutta next day)0
3# It appears that the treaty was signed twice, first on 18 Nay by all members 
of the Council except Clive, Camao and Sykes who were absent from Calcutta 
and again on 28 I-ov 1766 by the Governor and Councilo By this treaty the 
Nawab agreed that the 'king' was to be paid Ra 2,16,666-10-9 monthly and 
that he v7ould accept Rs 41,86,131-9-0 in all per year#tut of the latter sum 
Rs 17*76,854-1-0 was as before 'for my house' etc and the rest to bo spent 
by Reza Khan©(pp Eirst Report, 1772, p 208)*Saif ud daulah was seated on 19:.aj 
4® 3ykes*f letter of 6 i.'ar, 33C 10 ar 1767. 5. ibid
The Directors accepted tne situation but with disapproval and *«nt stringent
orders to Calcutta ; n'tfe direct you never to reduce the stipend lower
being desirous that he the Nawab^should have sufficient to support his
public character1*« Reza Khan must have been shocked by this underhand
2dealing, which Sykes said later was done at Clive*s direction* In any 
event the Khan became further alarmed at futuro prospects and became more 
insistent that his own salary should be fixeti0
Until December Y(66 Reza Khan*s official sources of incone had been
3
his salary from Dacca and his jagiroThe only advantage he had personally 
derived had been , as authorised by Clive, the cost of maintenance of 
his bodyguard of one hundred, horseman and three hundred "Coss-Burdar* or 
musketeers* Whereas with Mir Jafar he had insisted that terns be settled 
before he took office, with Clive he left a monetary settlement to the 
last, though from a letter from the Khan to Verelst it seems that Clive 
may have promised him a salary of ten lakhs a year*^IIow at last Clive 
proposed to redeem his promise and settle the question*
By November Clive had in fact provided for the Khan*® salary by making 
Sykes unofficially deduct eight lakhs from the i;&wab*s public funds* The 
difficulty was to make sure that the Directors would #groe to the payment 
of a big sun despite their expressed dislike of the Khan0Cnce again Clive 
sought to tic their hands by action in Ir*dia0Cn 31 December 1766 the Select 
Committee took up the question of the Ministers* salaries, as a matter 
arising from the repeated representation of the Khan* In a sldlllfully 
worded minute twelve lakhs was recommended for the Khan, Rai Durlabh and 
Shitab Rai, "as shall bo settled by the Right Hon*ble the President ^ Clive^ 
their payment to coiuaence on the last day of January next gl7<S7_/! The 
distribution ©f the sum, which remained unspecifi jd in the resolution of 
the Committee was later communicated to t:;e recipients as 9 lakhs for 
the Khan, 2 lakhs for Rai Durlabh and 1 lakh ( actually 4 rupees less) 
for Shitab Rai*^
1* Court*8 letter , 16 Mar 1768*
2<> Sykes*$ letter 6 Mar, BSC 10 i ar 1767# The Khan perhaps was not aware of
Clive* s hand behind this deduction which made the agreement meaningless
even before it was finally signedgKaram Ali puts the blame on Ali
Ibrahim Khan* a eagerness to court Sykes*s favour* (MN f 161)
3* The Khan enjoyed his j&gir as a Mughal mansabdar and as a gift from
the emperor, liis Dacca salary was Rs 90,000 per year,
4* y 1772 the strength had risen to 550 sepoys. Trial Papers.11,128. 
cm r’Pf* ^filive's letters 2b Jan 17o7. CPC. 1*2811,281%
The matter was communicated to London in the last letter from the 
Select Committee to the Directors signed by Clive as governor, dated 24 
January 1767* w^o ^ays before he set sail for home#In this letter three para­
graphs were devot d to the question of salary of the ministers, particularly 
of Reza Khan, admirably building up a case for the sanction of twelve lakhs 
as salary for the three - without specifying the amount fixed for each# It 
was observed that Reza Khanfs present emoluments were eight lakhs from 
perquisites ; and therefore , the letter added ," we thought it proper in 
the distribution of salaries, to consider Mahomed Reza Cawn in a light 
superior to the other ministers"# The letter continued, "this we have 
recommended to the President, who will adjust, with their approbation, the 
several proportion to be drawn from the above appointment"# Finally, there
was a strong recommendation for the sanction of that " great and enormous "
*
sum of twelve lakhs which had been set apart for the ministers on the ground 
" that it is necessary and reasonable^ and will appear so on consideration 
of the power which men employed on those important services have either 
to obstruct or promote the public good, unless their integrity be confirmed 
by ties of gratitude and interest"© The Directors were not told how the 
twelve lakhs were to be distributed, though Reza Khan and Rai Durlabh were 
told of their respective salaries by letters from Clive dated 25 January©
The slow exchange about the Khan continued with a letter from the 
Directors written on 21 November 1766 in reply to toe Committee*s letter 
of 24 I arch 1766# The Directors still cautioned Calcutta against showing 
favour to Reza Khan and referred again te Mir Jafar*s allegations# Not until 
16 :arch 1768, after the news of the vote of thanks by the Calcutta Council 
and Clive*3 recommendations had been reinforced by Clive*s arrival in 
England ( in July 1767) did the Directors authorise the Fort William 
government to " assure him ^the KhanJ[ of our approbation and protection 
and of the sense we entertain of his services"# By the same letter the 
Directors accorded their sanction to the setting apart of twelve lakhs 
for the ministers#
When they gave their overall sanction the Directors were still unaware 
of the way in which the sum was allotted, and when they did finally know 
they could do nothing but comment that nine lakhs was too high a salary 
for Reza Khan* Clive*s manoeuvres had thus succeeded, for the Company
1# Court*s letter 17 - March 1769*
mhad at last to confirm what Clive left as an accomplished fact in India*
In Bengal the Khan had been definitely established in his new position
by Clive. Clive's protection had saved him from all his enemies,notably from
Kandkur.ar whom Clive would have banished to Chittagong had not Nabakrishna's
pleas on behalf of the Raja's family and caste dissuaded h±m\ Clive had
also shielded Reza Khan's administration from some though not all of
SykesS measures of economy* The Khan had been honoured with titles from the
Bmperor, and with the thanks of the Company delivered by the Council* He
had been assured by Clive's manoeuvre of a handsome salary. The Khan had
also in his own way helped Clive to work the diwani and particularly te
secure extension to the terms of the grant of the Jagir by a further period
2
of ten years beyond 1 ay 1774.
To post-Clive Bengal and te the people concerned with the Company in 
England Reza Khan appeared, and rightly so , as the symbol of the Clive 
system* Reza Khan and Clive's system had become inseparable. The danger 
was that any reaction against Clive or against the political and adminis­
trative arrangements he had made for Bengal was likely to become a reaction 
against Reza Khan too*
1. Harwell's note on Nandkumar (no date) BPP, XIII, 108*
2, Prior to Clive's return to Bengal , the Proprietors had sanctioned 
Clive the enjoyment of his jagir of the revenues of 24 Bargnnas 
amounting to Rs 2,22,95^ year for a period of ten y. ars from
5 Lay 1764* ifter the acquisition of the hiwani and Clive's achievement in 
Bengal the period was further extended by ten je&rs at the General Court 
held on 23 September 17^7• Court's letter 20 lev 1767*
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FI 1ST ENGLISH ENCROACHMENTS ON REZA KHAN'S AUTHORITY,1767-176®®
When Clive left Bengal fer the last tine on 26 January 1767* Heza Khan 
was at the zenith of his power, the essential key to the system Clive had 
created.The basis of Clive's system, as he explained in the minute of 
instructions written for his successor, was that the Company's servants 
should always remember * that there is a Subah ^ Subahdar^. • .and that th• 
the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial jurisdiction must 
still vest in the Chief of the Country acting under his and this - 
Presidency in con junction" o
By the phrase, ” the Chief of the Country1*, Clive meant Reza Khan,whom
he saw as the indispensable link between the Nawab and the Company, Sykes,
the co-author of the scheme and a principal executant of it, equally held
Reza Khan's to be the vital role, saying two years later, ** I Bhould be
really at a loss to point out where wo could find a man who would fill his
2
station with equal dignity and propriety** o The Khan and the political 
system were therefore inseparable. If the system failed and the Calcutta 
government ceased to be united behind it, Clive*s towering personality being 
withdrawn, Reza Khan must fall too.
Initially the system worked wellj under Verelst and Cartier the 
Company's foreign relations both with the Indian rulers and with the other 
Burepeam nations trading in Bengal were conducted through the Khan and in 
tne name of tho Nawab, The cloak was successful in making the Indian chiefs 
look upon the English as the staunchest allies of the Nawab's government, 
thereby publicising the virtue of English friendship. So Kamdat Singh, the 
Raja of Morang^,applied te the Faujdar ef Pumea and to the Nawab for
1, Clive's minute, BSC 16 January 1767,
2, Sykes' letter 2 January, BSC 4 January 1769,
3, The name 'foerang* then applied te the areas roughly comprising the
northernmost parts of Rangpur,Dinajpur and Pumea districts, and werhaws 
miliguri sub—di vial am ___________
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assistance and support] as though power still lay in his hands, and the
Jat chief, Jawahir Singh wrote to Reza Khan, when seeking friendship and
2
alliance with the gentlemen of Calcutta* Verelst played his part too by 
deferring the decision on Kandat Singh’s affairs until the governor had 
net the Khan and taken his advice* In the negotiations with the Marathas 
Verelst had gone even further than Clive in emphasising the independent 
identity of the Nawab9 s government^ The deception proved no less useful 
when practiced upon the government of His Most Christian Majesty of France 
for when the disputes which arose between the two nations in Bengal were 
later carried to Europe for determination , the English were able to 
justify their motions as allies of the Nawab, and quoted extensively from
5
the orders of Reza Khan,
Reza Khan , for his part, had reason to welcome the governorship of 
Verelst, for, since their first meeting at Sitakund in January 1761 they 
had remained personal friends* It was Verelst9s testimony to the Khan*s 
abilities as an administrator and also to his integrity in financial 
natters which, more than anything else, had drawn Vansittart9 s attention 
to the Khan* Verelst9s Influence was most probably an important factor in 
neutralising Clive9g initial prejudice against the Khan in May 17&5*Indeed 
thoir long-standing personal relationship seems to have ripened into 
something more s when Verelst visited Murshidabad as governor he stayed 
at the Khan’s palace, Nishat Bagh ,while Verelst9s descendants in Ireland
1* Reza Khan, however, sought Verelst9s advice in the matter since the Raja 
of that “obscure country44 had never before sought refuge in B^n^al.The 
Khan who had already sent some troops to the border suggested that he 
should be reinstated and helped against his enemies who were assisted 
by the Rajas of Bhutan and Amarkot*His country was very large and it 
extended as far as Nopal*The Raja sho\Lld be, he sxnggested,made to psty sjc 
annual tribute and agree to allow export of timber*(Roza Khan’s letter 
reed* 12 Peb 1767)# ££0,11,434*
2o Jawahir Singh’s letter to Reza Khan,reods12 Apr 1767* CPC,11*296*
3, Verelst to Reza Khan,30 Mar 1767,(CPC,II,241),
4, Alivardl Khan had put a stop to Maratha invasions of Bengal by agreeing 
to pay a sum as Chauth( literally, a fourth)to the Nagpur court besides
putting Orissa(minus Midnapur)under a Maratha-Nawab condominium* During
war against Mir Qasim the Calcutta government had offered to stand sur^ 
ty for the Bengal Chauth and urged the Marathas not to offer help to Mir
Qasin0 Clive had sent M r  Zain ul Abidin, a relation of Reza Khan as 
envoy to Nagpur*Verelst did not directly deal with the Maratha envoy,but 
took him to Murshidabad and there held a conference on the matter along
with the Nawab, Reza Khan,Zain ul Abidino(CPC0I I , 7 7 t 9 4 , 1 4 1 ,416)
5*For detail, HNS 102* 6*For example letter to Smith 21 I ay*BSC
14.)
possessed a letter in the handwriting of Reza Khan's eldest son, which
read "Hausin Ally Khaun presents his compliments with his first essay 
of English writing to his good friend Mr* Verelst in wishing him 
a happy new year", 1
Moreover, the good relations between the two men does not seem to have
been based upon any corrupt bargains botween then* Verelst, after he had
purchased the private business of Sumner^ did ask the Khan to get his
offioers to help him in realising the balances due at various Arangs or 
2
trade centres, and on another occasion the Khan lent money to friends of 
Verelst, Verelst standing as surety and joint signatory to the debts* The 
Khan also bought the Khairati Bagh in Calcutta from Verelst* But these 
were minor acts of friendship , not the exploitation of claims such as 
the Khan's dependence on Verelst might have made possible* The real value 
of the good relationship between them was that it prevented the growth of 
any mutual misunderstandings when circumstances became increasingly 
difficult for Reza Khan and Verelst alike0
At the bottom of many of the difficulties of both the Khan and 
Verelst was Francis Sykes, the man who had taken a large part in renderinf 
the position of the Khan secure, and who as one of the two survivors,with 
himself , of Clive's Select Committee , should have provided useful support 
for ¥orolflt*Hi* pursuit of private trade and of enhanced Company revenues 
was to embarrass and entangle both*
The Court of Directors, it will be remembered, had on 8 February 1764 
positively forbidden to their servants in Bengal all trade in salt,betel- 
nut and tobaoco, and in June 1764 and February 1763 had reiterated the 
ban* However in August 1765 Clive and the Select Committee had proceeded
1* The original was in Ireland until 1908, but a transcript has beem 
preserved in the archives of the India Office, London* HFS,739, ! 1e
2, Verelst's agents were Huzurimul's goaastahs ,Surdas Sinfch at Rangpur, 
Maina Ram at Raj ganj, Raghunath Jugal at J agannathpur, and Sukhdev 
Majumdar at Handial*(Verelst to Reza Khan 27 Apr 1767«CPC*II*364)
3, The details of the transactions are mot oloar*A letter from Reza Khan 
to Nabakrlshna(CPC,II,783B) in Jan 1768 speaks of Verelst having asked 
the Khpn to help M* Chevalier with a loan of Rs 1,20,000 which Chevali­
er had asked from Verdst*Reza Khan found it "impossible*te procure the 
sum*But Harwell, Verelst'a attorney at Dacca in 1774,spehks of "joint 
bond" and assures Verelst (letter of 30 Nov 1774) that he would adjust 
the engagement ^between you and Mahomed Reza KhanNte the satisfaction 
ef"the Nabob without involving yourself"(HPP,XII, 190)*0ne John Knott's 
l«tter(frM Lenden «n 2? Mar 1774)says that tha Khan hai lent Jhree 
lakhs «f Sicca rupees te a ieint eenoerm(N.M.Rhe8a.es oit* 11 26-29)
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te organise a society of trade with a nonopoly of those three commedi- 
ties. The capital stock of the society was then divided into 5&i shares 
distributed among the sixty-one most senior members of the Calcutta 
government, Clive himself receiving five shares , Sumner and Camae three, 
the ten Councillors and two Colonels two each*^ Rosa Khan was made to issue 
one hundred and six parwanas facilitating the trade* The more junior 
servants of the Company were excluded from membership of the society. They 
and the free merchants were then further provoked when by a regulation 
of 5 October 1765* European servants of the Company mot employed in any 
factory : and all free merchants trading in Bengal under the Company1 s 
protection and license were oalled back to Calcutta* The regulation 
applied to the junior servants, spread out in the different Arangs (trading 
posts) and out*stations9 except suoh as were engaged in providing the 
silk investment for the Company* Moreover no one was allowed to send 
Gumastahs or native agents into the interior of the country without 
authority from the Calcutta government*
The junior Company servants and merchants were incenaedf for they had
been deprived of extensive means of enriching themselves .The instance of
William Bolts may serve to illustrate the extent of the private trade
thus forf&it t Bolts, a Butch adventurer, who had been in the Company,s
2
service since 1760, had made £ 90*000 in six years and in 1767 he had
over eight lakhs of rupees invested in the countryside* The Company1s
investment in Bengal about the same time, as William Kacguire told at a
Parliamentary enquiry in 1?67t was about forty lakhs per year at the rate
3
of eight lakhs per ship and five ships per year* It waB no wonder that
Bolts had found it more profitable to resign from the Company9 s service
a
on 24 November 1766 to concentrate on trade as a private merchant? The 
Company1s service was not as paying as private trade* The salary of a 
Councillor, Clive had observed, is "scarcely three hundred pounds per 
annum s and it is well known that he cannot live in the country ^ sf Bengal^ 
for less than three thousand pounds* The same proportion holds among other 
servants".^
1* Below the Council, the second category of Company servants comprising 
18 men held 12 shares, and the third category of 28 men held the remain­
ing shares.(I.Bolts. Considerations,170*72)*
20 N.l.Hallward, William Bolts, 3
3o Macguire was in Bengal for 20 years until 1764{Oot)*Add Mss 18469, f 32 
4* N.l.Hallward, William Bolta.45. Qjietedi Forrest, Clive0IIP300»
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The orders were the sere falling because though issued in the name ef 
high sounding principles , they did not in fact stop private trade or the 
Monopolization of the inland trade* The measures merely transferred the 
gains of trade to the senior servants of the Company, to the men in 
authority* Thus while the orders of 5 October were being enforced, Clive 
was sending out ten European agents for the Society of Trade* Those 
Europeans who had influence with the members of the Council or the Seleot 
Committee were also able to secure exemptions and repeated extensions of 
the time in which to wind up their affairs* Thus Barwell retained his 
station during the remainder of Clive9 s stay in Bengal , thanks to the 
influence of Verelst exerted in his favour! The regulations about the 
residence outside Calcutta and the movement of Gumastahs thus became an 
instrument of patronage*
Reza Khan found himself involved in the conflict between the different
groups ef the Company9s servants over private trade0He had facilitated the
operation of the Society of Trade, he had provided the occasion for the
regulations of 5 October 17^3* This last he had done by writing at the
very beginning of October, asking Clive and the Select Committee that
"ordersjnay be issued to the gentlemen of the factories of Jahangir- 
nagar^ DaccaJ  and Lakhipur ^ Lakshmipur in Noakhali^to see that none 
ef the dependants of the factories lend money to the zamindara, etc*, 
without the knowledge of the mil* or hold any farms* or interfere in 
the affairs of the country, or send any people into the distriots and 
make a disturbance* Orders may also be issued to the effect that what­
soever demands the dependants of the factories have upon the zaaindars, 
etc*, they must lay the aocount thereof before Jaearat Khan, the Naib 
at Jahangirnagar* that he may oblige the zamindara to pay whatever is 
just** *1*
It is clear that the Khan in so writing was* seeking to strengthen the
country government ( and particularly his own administration in Dacca) and,y
to make it really effective, and that he wanted restrictions to bo placed
upon the native agents of the factories and not upon their English masters*
Indeed* though wo do not know how his relations wore with the English at
Lakshmipur, it is certain that he was on cordial terms with those at Dacca.
and especially with Cartier* the chief of Dacca* His complaint* however*
was made the occasion for the recall of junior servants and free merchants
1*Richard Barwell to his father, 1 Sep 1766* BPP* IX,89-9f>*
2*Roza Khan9s letter,recdsd Oct 17^5* Th® quotation is from the summary in 
CPC. I, 2715© Alee BSC 5 Oct 1765*
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te Calcutta,The odium of that move was thus cast upon the Khan, the mere
so, as another provision of the regulations, the Committee laid down
that if any one overstayed the period of grace to 21 Ootober allowed,
the Khan and his officers would he free to " take what measures he thinks
proper to send them down to Calcutta", The Khan was also supplied with
2
lists of those authorised to stay in the interior of the country. The 
Khan seems very prudently to have avoided any exercise of these powers, 
hut he could net avoid the unpopolarity of seeming to he author of the 
regulations
The effect of this can he seen in the complaints which Barwell 
hegan to voice with increasing bitterness from February 1766 onwards, la 
a letter of 18 February , Barwell complained to the Select Committee of 
the "pernicious influence tending to prejudice the Company9• 
trade and that of their servants, ^which^ had been exerted by His 
Excellency ^ Reza KhanJ^  and endangered the concerns immediately under my 
management",^Before Barwell9s complaint had reached the Select Committee, 
they were already seized with a complaint from Reza Khan, in terns 
reminiscent of those of Mir ^asim or the restored Mir Jafar*, of contizmdl 
English interference with the free trade of the country0 Ho wrote s
"The Zamindars of the pergunnahs ef Radshy ^ Rajshahi^ Ruecuapoor,an* 
other districts in the Subah of Bengali complain that the factories 
of the English gentlemen in the pergunnahs are many and their 
Gumastahs are in all places and in every village almost throughout 
the province of Bengali| that they trade in Linnen,Chunaj^Tis^r, 
Mustard seed, Tobacco,Turmerick, Oil, Rice, Hemp, Gunnies, Wheat &e 
in short in all kinds of grain, Linnen, and whatever other cemmedi~ 
ties are produced in the countryi that in order to purchase these 
articles, they force the money on the Ryots, and having by these 
oppressive means bought their goods at a low price, they oblige the 
inhabitants and shopkeepers to take them at an high price,exceeding 
what is paid in the marked Gut they do tot pay the customs
1, Clive to Reza Khan, 8<>ct 1765® CPC,I,27220
2, Initially the two incomplete lists contained names of the Company9s 
servants at different factories(CPC,I,2722&0 and of the free merchants 
(CPC,1, 2722 B),
5, Barwell*s letter, 18 Feb* ESC 26 Feb 1766,
4, Vansitt&rt, it may be recalled, had written to the Seoret Committee of 
the Directors on 24 Deo 1765 that ",,,the present system is such that
it is with great difficulty a friendship can be maintained with any
Nabeb,Our connections in the country are so extended by the pursuit of
private trade through a number of new channels in distant parts of the
country. . ,^thatj7already many such ^ complaints/have cone from Meor Jaf-
fier in terms just the same as were...used by lieer Cossim",
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due ta the Si roar ^ j^vernment_7but are guilty af all manner #f 
seditions and injurious acta, far instanca, when at any tine the 
malguzzarrea ^ payment af revenue^is denanded af the Taalucdars,Royt 
&oa subjeots af the Sircar, the afareaaid Gamaetabs under the 
pretence af dabts due, ar aooaunta ta he settled da nat let then fa, 
er suffer the revenue ta he taken from then and upon complaints at 
the instance af lying informers and hase nan, they place their peans 
avar the Ryats and invalve then in variety af troublesj that 
pressing people violently into their service and imposing n&ny and 
diverse cannands an the officers af the favemnent, the inhabitants, 
the tradesmen and ethers, they ruin everybody and reduce the villafei 
Gunges ^trade centres^te a state af deselatien0
It is by this iniquitous practice that the people af the 
country, have been ruined and driven ta flight and that the revenues 
af the Sircar have been injoredf there is new scarce anything af 
worth left in the country*© 1
After stating the circumstances , the Khan went an ta appeal t
"If justice be nat done in this case, haw will it be passible in 
future ta collect the duties af the government ar its revenues ? All 
the Zemindars make the above complaint and what I have herein writtea 
is only an abridgement af the accounts given in at large by them af 
violence and oppressions. As it is requisite far the prosperity af 
the country and the well-being af its inhabitants as al&e far the 
obtaining the full revenue and duties, that the pear eta have 
justice done them and that disturbances be put an end ta, I have 
therefore represented these natters ta you gentlemen of the 
Committee", 2
The Khan had been driven , in his defence af the aid order, and of 
zemindars with wham he can perhaps be seen ta be identifying himself, 
into an attack upon the Gumastahs and their interests, and mare danger*- 
eusly upon the English gentlemen behind then who had virtually monopoli­
sed the trade "in grain, linnen and whatever ether commodities are 
produced in the country"0
Once again a complaint by the Khan was used by the Select Committee
as occasion far measures which, while seeming fair and harmless on paper,
in practice served the interests af their awn members. They plaoed the
chun&m or lime trade and the trade in timber at the disposal ef the
Murshidabad government while they opened the opium trade ta all,"subject
to such restrictions only as the ministers and officers af Government
3
may think proper" ©The effect af this was in fact ta enable Sykes at 
Murshidabad ta establish his personal monopoly aver most of these artolea.
1, Reza Khan's letter, BSC 19 February 17 20 ibidp
3o BSC 19 February 1766,
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to the exclusion of others previously interested in the*.The process can lie 
traced in Barwell’s private correspondence0 A nonth before this regulation 
Richard Barwell, commercial resident at Malda, wrote to his family f "Bhen
I was at Mootajeel ^Jotijheei^ with Mr. Sykes in November 0 0 * he acquaint
2ted me of his desire to be concerned in the timber trade" © Barwell had
inherited a monopoly in Pumea and Dinajpur including the timber trade of
Pumea# from his predecessor Gray, now promoted to Council. Barwell had
found the trade profitable enough to engage European agents, a Mr. Myrtle
and two others? to work for him at the Purnea supply point, and he was
unwilling to let Sykes participate. Sykes was no less determined to secure a
share, and from his vantage point at Murshidabad he proceeded to make use of
the machinery of the government against Barwell0 By February Barwell was
already under pressure from Calcutta government to recall his three
European agents in Purnea and so to comply with the regulations of 5 October
1763. The next stage Barwell related to his father as followst
"At this tine Kishen Kinker, Mr0 Sykes Gemastah was in Pumea| and soon 
after preoeeded up for the purchase of wood. Being disappointed by my 
having pre-engaged the proper people, he wrote, as is evident, to his 
master, and his master to Souchetroy the Diwan or Amil of Pumea and 
Souchetroy to the Resident at the Durbar, a very pretty farce, and which 
I confess makes my blood boil not a little..©Kishen Kinker in Scuchetrp/s 
address, you will observe, is mentioned as an agent of the Nabob*s though 
in reality Mr Sykes Gemastah". 4
This complaint by Sykes^Guaastah to the Nawab*s officials and so to Sykes
himself was followed, as has been seen, by the Select Committee, of which
Sykes was a member, putting the timber trade at the disposal of the
Murshidabad government. In other words, Heza Khan’s name was made the cover
for Sykessneat manoeuvre to oust Barwell from the timber trade. At this date
Barwell was well aware that his opponent was Sykes, not Reza Khan, but by
January 1767 when Clive* s dual system was folly established, Barwell had
come to see the system as the enemy and to direct his attack against the
existence of the "Moorish government" under Reza Khan. In a letter to
Beaumont in England he observed on 1 January 17671
"I will venture then to affirm our present government excellently
1. Richard’s father,William Barwell was in Bengal from 1722 to 1750 was 
governor of Fort William in 1748-49* BPP.XXVII,35o
2. Barwell* s letter, 21 Jan 1766. BPP.IX.80° 3* BSC 10 Feb 1766.
4o Barwell*s letter,21 Jan 1766. BPP,IX,80.
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calculated te fix the yoke of slavish dependence, for let me ask, who 
is there that will dare te breathe a wish or utter a thought that may 
render him obnoxious to a man or set of men who have it in their power 
to ruin all his future prospeots**. and yet this is a very natural 
consequence whenever this settlement shall be cursed with a villain 
who shall act behind or hide behind such a skreen as is this Moorish 
government"o 1
He added t
MIn such case where then is the poor sufferer to seek redress*..Is he to 
look for it from the Boardf Yes* And the Board possibly shall so far 
heed his representations so as to sacrifice a worthless Phousdar or a 
Zemindar"* 2
Barwell was voicing a personal anger, but the frustating situation created 
by Clive's measures affected all the junior Company servants and free 
merchants* A general resentment was thus growing against the system on which 
Reza Khan's power and position was built*
Verelst was obliged , as a close associate of Clive, to adopt and
continue the policy he had inherited, and in consequence he also inherited 
the hostility of Clive*b orltios* Barwell observed in a letter he sent 
home on 9 December 1767s
"Since l/.r* Verelst's accession to the government the system has been 
regarded which his Lordship thought proper to adopt, and, as the Direc­
tors themselves by their silence on some points and acquiescence on
others have encouraged, if not entirely approved, the extortion of any
arbitrary power the Governor, whoever he may be must prove dead indeed
te ambition not te seize the opportunity that is offered him te render
his will and pleasure alone the principle of governing"* 3*
But Verelst had to pursue Clive’s policy without Clive's strength* Clive 
had come armed with extraordinary emergency powmrs conferred on him by the 
Proprietors* Verelst succeeded to the government when the emergency was ever0
Clive could count on unquestioned support of the Directors at home, Verelst
could not* Clive had had a free hand te adopt any measure that he deemed 
necessary, while Verelst had a line of conduct predetermined for him without 
the necessary means of executing it* All that he could hope for as a Clive 
man was support from a pro-Clive direction which by this time was under very 
severe attack*
Verelst not only lacked solid support from England, his hand was also 
weakened in India, mainly by the changes in the power of the Select Committee*
1. Barwell'a letter t* Beauaont, 1 Jan 1767, BPP. IX,111. . . 2. laid.
3. lichari to WtiU-OloBarwell, 9 Dee 1767. BPP,X,9.
Of the original Committee of 1765 *Clive, Sumner and Camac had gone, while 
Sykes, more of an embarrassment than an aid, was at Murshidabad* Richard 
Becher, it is true was sent out by the Directors to strengthen Verelst, and 
Cartier, the second in Council generally supported Verelst, though he was 
no politician and so rather a lightweight* Colonel Smith, later made Briga- 
dier-General,did not long continue a supporter] while in January 1769 Sykes 
left for England* Moreover the Directors, by mistake or deliberate policy, 
further weakened the Committee by their conflicting orders about its 
functions* Clive had vested it with extra-ordinary authority and made it 
politically superior to the Ceunoil*But the Direoters , in a letter of 12 
January 1768;plaoed the political activities of the Committee and the 
expenditure of the Diwani revenues under the direction of the Council0 A 
further letter of 16 March 1768 from the Directors confirmed the change 
and extinguished the extraordinary powers of the Select Committee* Thereafter- 
the Council took charge of many of the subjects previously the Select 
Committee's exclusive cenoem, and from 22 August 1768 the Council began to 
sit also as a Secret Committee* Reza Khan who had so long to deal with the 
Select Committee alone thereafter came increasingly under the Council's 
control*
Verelst had had to face some interested opposition within the Select 
Committee, but now he had xo deal with a larger Council, composed of 
comparatively junior servants of the Company* How this reacted upon his 
authority can be seen in the question of a successor for Sykes at Murshida­
bad* Sykes had given notice of his intended resignation on 14 October 1768, 
and the question was raised in the Council on 18 November whether the pest 
of Resident at the Durbar, because of its importance, should automatically 
go to the second in Comncil , in this case Cartier* No unanimity could be 
reached and the question was deferred while the members of the Council were 
circulated for their opinions as te whether the second should be stationed 
permanently in Calcutta or not, and whether if the second were posted out of
1*Smith had a dispute with Verelst ever his designation0CliTe was President 
and Cemmanderwin-Chief* After Clive's departure Verelst claimed the supre­
me command over the Company's troops as President, while Smith claimed , 
to be recognised: as the Commandei^in-chief* The Colonel had ultimately to 
accept the position of Ceamander-iiw chief under the Presidency*
(Barwell's letter of 9 Deo 1767* BPP* X, 11)*The Directors ordered on 30 
June 1769 saying that "our Governor irf to all Intents and Purposes the 
Commander in Chief of our Forces" but Verelst was "not himself to held*** 
a Warrant for appointing General Court's Martial" exoept in Ceuncilo
Calcutta, Cartier should lie offered' Murshidabad* The question seemed ene ef 
principle but it was evidently linked with that ef the aotive support en 
which Verelst could depend in his transaotiens In Council0 Verelst,Barwell 
hinted, was interested in having Cartier eut ef Calcutta se as te give kin 
a sure wgrking majority en the Seloot Committee] and the reoerd ef voting in
the question would sees te confirm Barwell* Verelst, Becher and Sykes voted
2for Cartier*s posting te Murshidabad, Colonel Smith, Charles Floyer , James 
Alexander, Claud Russell, Francis Charlton voted against* Cartier, though 
not very enthusiastic about going te Murshidabad, had asked that he should 
be nominated Resident, if there were no ether reason than his being the 
Second in Council te make it inadmiss&ble * but the Council chose Beoher, 
thus removing another aotive supporter ef Verelst from the Ceunoil*^
Reza Khan was te find that Verelst, as his governorship continued, 
became less and leas able te suppert and protect him against the pressure ef 
private interests* Immediately however, his position was more directly 
threatened by his Indian rivals* Soon after Clive left repeated attempts were 
made against the life of Nabakrishnaf who had been appointed the Company* s 
political Banian by Clive's government* The method aaopted was te vise English 
law as then administered in Calcutta by the Mayor's court, and behind the 
move was Nandkuaar, backed by ether Europeans and Indians* The attempt was 
frustrated and Nandkumar was officially censured and threatened with 
withdrawal of English protection and handing over te Resa Khan* But almost 
simultaneously with the attaoks on Nabakrishna, came others upon Reza Khan, 
first against his continuance in power and then against his life* Whether
1. In a letter dated 6 Sep 1766 sent heme, Barwell said that Verelst and 
Becher expected te be majority after the departure upcountry of Cartier an« 
Russell on a deputation to Shuja ud daulah (BPP,X,34)•Russell, who happen* 
ed te be acting member ef the Select Committee in the vacancy ef its two 
members, Sykes and Smith,being permanently posted eut of-Calcutta had 
incurred Sykes* displeasure by enquiring when he would resign the chiefship 
ef Kasimbazar which had been ordered by the Directors0He hag also offended 
Verelst somehow(Barwell' s letter 9 Deo 1767»BPP,X,11-12) oAldersey got the 
Kasimbazar post and Russell was disappointed*But in the appointments made 
in 1768, Verelst was beaten when he failed te get the Second's post at 
Kasimbazar for Maddison and Reid,one of the sufferers under Clivefi got the 
acting chiefship at Chittagong* As Barwell says,both Becher and Verelst had 
promised Chittagong to Barwell (BPP,X, 54) *Cartier was not always helpful*
2. Charles Fleyergd oritie ef Reza Khan.kad keen superseded ky Ruaheld, a 
x It w *  Clive* • delng. (Ceurt’s letter 16 liar 1768)
6. BSC 18 Apr 1767* ** Verel8t’ 5. N.L.Hallward.Williaa Beltsr.d8-9.
there was any connection between the conspiracies against the two very 
powerful native instruments ef Verelst*s government is anybody's guess, for 
no clues have been found to discover the hands which acted against Reza Khan,
In September 1767* Colonel Smith sent from Allahabad two letters bearini 
what were apparently Reza Khan's sealso These were found in a bamboo case 
near the body of a dead man, one of the two messengers said to bo attacked by 
robbers in the province of Kora^ The letters Supposedly bearing Reza Khan's 
seals were addressed, one to Jawahlr Singh, the Jat chief, and another to a 
Govindram, an inhabitant of Akbarabad or Agra,^If they had been genuine they 
would oertainly have destroyed all trust in the Khan*
The alleged letter te Jawahir Singh, the Jat chief, began with a 
reference te earlier letters about the "situation in this country, the 
superiority of the Nazarenes /"the Christians or English^, the designs laid 
for the expulsion of the evil minded tribe, the league formed with the
Afghan raiders for the ohastisement and dispersion of those who are in your
2
quarter"o It also spoke ef the earlier messages sent through representatives,
The preamble which followed the above introduction read i
"Seeing that the ordering and regulating the affairs of the /"kughalJ  
Empire and the extermination of the traitors of this realm are points 
which it becomes and behoves all the Grandees of the Throne and every 
noble of consequence in Kindest an to pursue as his particular cause, I 
am well persuaded that in consequence of your well-wisher's overtures 
you will think seriously of this cause and the means of destroying this 
enormous evils",3
The letter went on g
"The your well-wisher has by a course of long services made this tribe 
/the English^as it were his own and procured the administration of 
everything in these Subahs to himself | yet there i c
is no dependence to be placed on the words and professions of these 
insidious word-breaking and rapacious people i In so much that I who 
have expended immense sums, what from my own house and patrimony and 
from the revenues of the country, merely for the gratification and use
ef their principals and agents, I who have consumed my time in attaching
affections and seething the heart ef each individual, I who have 
labored with all ay abilities and still continue to labor for them, net 
withstanding all that I have dene I have net found one of them sincere
nor have I confidence in my mind, no not the smallest for they to this
hour keep up ay enemy in hope among themselves" ,4
TT^nsnn i^iiisTrTittMr^ rsqrrfSTr^ cnrrTariw^
Allege* letter ef Reza Khan t# Jawahlr Singh. BSC 1} Oot 1767.
}. 1H*. 4o ikl*.
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It further read i
"Every year brings fresh numbers sf their countrymen te the management 
ef their affairs and just as their interest and ^ Tllegible^ suggest they 
make changes and dispositions in their gevemmento Hence it is, that 
frem my attachment and devotion te them I have reduced myself te straits 
and new with both hands and with censtant prayer I call eut in the 
temple ef Ged fer the utter perdition ef these base and evil men and in 
this werk I am the ce-adjuter and friend ef yeu all** 1
Explaining the opportunity then available the letter addedi
"Seeing that at this time several English Sardars are become without 
heart and discontented frem the removal ef Sabut Jung ^ Clive^( ef which 
your excellency has probably been informed) 9the season is as favorable 
as we could wish it****" 2
The alleged letter te Govindraa appears te be in reply te a petition, 
and states that its auther had also written te Najib ud daulah, the Rehilla 
jthlef and an unnamed " Mehah Rajah "* There is also an order te deliver the
3
letter and " en receiving the answer te commit it te the same Cossid"*
As Colonel Smith observed in his forwarding letter ef 25 September 1767 
"' the arguments made use ef in his letter te the Jaut te encourage an inv&dLmt 
are specious and well calculated te produce effect* At Agra it would net have 
been known whether the letter was real er fictitious and possibly might have 
obtained certain degree ef creditibility*0^
The Colonel, an irritable man and recently in dispute with Verelst ever
his status as Commander in Chief, was by no means favourable te the policy
ef showing particular regard te Reza Rhany though his bitter criticism ef the
Khan was net publicly stated until October 17&9* However, none of the effect*
expected materialised, fer the Colonel at once declared the letters te be
forgerieto Forwarding the letters he cemmentedi
"that if Mahomed Reza Cawn did actually write it he is deserving ef the 
severest treatment fer his perfidy* Fer ay part I have no dependence en 
the gratitude ef Mussulman; but as Mahomed Reza Cawn dees net want 
common sense, I am inclined te believe that this is rather an artifice 
ef his enemies, te ruin him, than any ambitious project ef his own t fer 
it is by no means usual fer a man ef his rank te express his sentiments 
in writing, te a stranger with so little reserve* It is net many months 
since iJewhar Sing informed me "that so far frem writing te Mahomed Reza 
Ckwn:. , ho did net even, knew there was sueh a man in Bengal"0We may frem 
hence suppose that Mahomed Reza Cawn would net hazard his fortune, nay 
his life, by a treacherous correspondence ef this nature"*5
« 1
1* Alleged letter of Reza Khan te Jawahir Singh* BSC 13 Oct 17<>7» 2o ibid 
3o Alleged letter ef Reza Khan te Govindram ef Akbarabad0 BSC 13 Oct 1767* 
do Cel* Smith1 s letter ef 25 Sep. BSC 13 Oot 1767* 5* ibid*
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We do net know why tho Celdael bo readily exonerated the Khan* It nay he
that he did not wish to clash again with Verelst whilst he was applying to
tho Directors for permission to keep two lakhs of rupees given hin hy the
Emperor*^ But it may well he that he took the commonsenso view as the Seleet
Committee that these wore deliberate forgeries designed hy an eneay of the
Khan* The Select Committee, or Verelst at least,knew that the Jat Chief was
acquainted with Heza Khan , hut they still did not hesitate to hrand the
letters as * spurious and forged*1 and to order Sykes '* to have the strictest 
3enquiry made** Only a few months earlier a man had heen arrested and blown 
from tho mouth of a gum for having forged seals in his house and delivering 
to the Khan a forged letter purporting te have heen written hy Jawahir Singj^ > 
There was no recorded outcome of Sykes9 enquiry f and no proof of forgery 
nor clue as to its author* It nay he pointed out, however, that in 1762 when 
in almost identical ease Rancharan, VansittarVs Banian, was accused of 
treasonable correspondence, authorship was traced hy Eastings to Nandkumar*^ 
In this case,too , Nandkumar must he suspeot* He is known to have been in 
very friendly correspondence with the Emperor and Shuja ud daulah, even when 
his master Mir Jafar was at war with them* Nandkunar* s letter to B&lwant 
Singh, given in chapter V , wherein he urged the latter not * to plaee any 
confidence in their ^ "English^ writings or agreements*^is paralleled in 
in this letter to Jawahir Singh, with the phrase " there is no dependence 
to he placed on the words and professions of these insidious, word-breaking 
and rapacious people1** The supposed letter frem the Khan was evidently 
the work ef a well informed man, and a man with wide contacts - andagaim 
Nandkun&r fills tho hill* After Nandkumar was convicted of forgery and 
exoouted, in Hastings9 day, so Ghulam Husain tells us, "Amongst other strange 
things found in his house, there came out a small casket containing the 
forged seals of a number of persons of distinction**^
In November, 1767, when it was dear that the business of letters had 
not shaken Heza Khaa9s position, there was another plot or "dark design",this
time against his life* Ve have no details of any sort about the conspiracy
- - —  - -      - ■ ■ -  -  - - —  ■
1* The Emperor had paid two lakhs to Caraao who was very respectful to kin*
It is doubtful if the Emperor paid Smith also out of his own will despite 
Smith9 s insulting treatment with Shah Alam(vide Seir ,111,101IV , 56) * Verelst 
did not approve of it and the Directors concurred (in letter of 11 Nov 1766
2* BSC 13 Oct 1767* 3o CPC.IIo 464* 4? For detail,Range 160 vol 17*
5 see supra. 6c Seir, III, 79
7. T e w h f t t  Reza Khaa, 26 Nev 1767. CPC.II,£757
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so that we can neither connectnor dissociate the two attempts hgainst him0 
Both, however, seem t o  have heen externally inspired, since there was no one 
at Murshidabad to gain from the Khan9s going, and in both cases he received 
staunch support from Verelst and the Seleot Committee©^
The Khan had escaped the direct attacks upon his position and life made.* 
it would seem hy Nandkuaar or other Indian rivals, Ee was not so fortunate 
in defending his own interests and those of his order from the assaults of 
Sykes, It will he remembered that while Clive was still in Bengal, Sykes had 
proposed to carry his campaign of retrenching espenses and raising the reve~ 
nue demands from Patna and Murshidabad into Dacca, hut that Clivo had 
prevented any such move against Reza Khan's home ground. In his last minute 
of instructions Clive had again warned his suooessor against any extension 
of direct English interference in the district administration t "To appoint 
the Company's servants to the offices of Collectors, or indeed to do any act, 
hy an exertion of English power, which can equally he done hy the Nabob at
our instance, would he throwing off the mask, would he doolarlng tho
2
Company Subah of the provinces**© Nevertheless jfithin a month and a half of 
Clive's departure , Sykes was at Dacca, He defended this abrupt break with 
past policy hy saying " From a Just regard to the Honor of Mahomed Reza Cawm 
lest it should seem strange to you, Gentlemen, that in the course of our gene 
•ral regulation and reduction of improper expenses throughout the provinces, 
Dacca should have heen so long neglected} I think it necessary to ebaervo, 
that he never was backward or seemingly averse to this measure, that it was 
not carried into execution before owing to Lord Clive and other gentlemen who 
Judged it impolitic , to aim at depriving Mahomed Reza Cawn of his private 
emoluments,,o The appointment of an allowance to him was probably reserved 
as the last step, and since it has been resolved on he has forwarded my 
enquiries with the utmost disinterestedness and shown not the least reserve"©
How little truth there was in Sykesi argument that Reza Khan was not 
"seemingly averse to this measure" can be seen from the apprehensive letter 
the Khan immediately wrote to Verelst, The letter, of which Verelst chose to 
take no notice in public, was an appeal to an old friend and by one who still 
regarded himself as principal in Daoca matters? In abstract the letter
1, On Clive's departure, Cartier Joined the Council as Second, Cartier was an 
old friend ex the Khan at Dacca where xhe Khan helped him in tobaoco trade*
2. BSC 16 Jan 1767. 3. Sykes' letter 15 Ayr, BSC 18 Ayr 1767.
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read thus j
"Ur* Sykes has proceeded tswards Daccat and the writer is at present 
wholly engaged in the necessary business ef the Sarkar *** A statement 
ef the annual sums received from Dacca * was seme tine age transmitted 
t© Lerd Clivef and it EU3t have keen seen hy Mr. Verelsto When the 
writer returned te Murshidabad from Calcutta ^"in June 1765,7 invest 
ed Raja Maha Singh with autherity te retrench several unnecessary 
expenses which were incurred at Dacca0 The Raja accerdingly struck
eff about seventy er eighty thousand rupees* by which means there will 
be se much saving te the Sarkar fer the present and#*still further 
advantages will be obtained next year0 The accounts are still unsettled 
and have net been examined by the writer* The Raja has been directed te 
furnish Mr. Sykes with a full account ef these and ether particulars 
as also ef the band-o-baat /"*settlement 7and after that te allow him te 
raise  ^ the rents in such places as admit ef an inorease* The 
expedieus settlement ef Dacca is highly proper and advisable* By the 
favour ef God 9 all abuses will be entirely eradicated* Since the 
writer*s allewanoe has finally been fixed by the Committee* he dees 
net covet a single kauri £~a small shell used as money 7 ef the 
revenue ef the country0 The Raja will net fail te abolish such expenses 
as may be struck eff with consistency* The sum ef 2 lakhs ef rupees has 
been set apart fer seme particular disbursements* These inolude the 
expenses ef beats which belong te the Subahdar* Formerly the annual 
expense of beats was J lakhs* but now by these regulations* it has 
been reduced to one lakh* The writer has already represented this matter 
to the Governor and spoke of it te lir0 Sykes* Whatever the Governor 
directs will be put in feroe* When Mr* Sykes returns 'frem Dacca aad 
brings the accounts properly arranged* these will be forwarded to the 
Governor* The writer formerly sent Lerd Clive the accounts of the 
balanoes relating to Dacca and other districts* Whatever increase has 
been made in the rent of Nuralipur £ Kurul 1 ahpur_7 has been entered in 
the accounts which are sent for tho Governor* s inspection* Mr Sykes 
has already bean supplied with paper ef increase in the rents and 
»azars"o^
Reza Khan* it is clear* was prepared to break the isolation of Dacca 
and to bring it nominally into line with other distriots by some increase in 
revenues " in such places as admit of an increase** and by decreasing the 
expenses Mas may be struck off with consistency49* Under his directions tho 
Dacca Diwan Mahasingh had already cut expenses by some seventy or eighty 
thousand rupees and more might be expected next year* As for himself * now 
that Clive had fixed his salary* he did not want a single Kauri from its 
revenueso But the whole letter betrays the awkwardness of a helpless man 
who apprehends an ugly situation and does not know how* unaided* to avoid it0
The Khan* s fears wore well founded* fer where he had spoken of savings
1* Reza Khan to Verelst* recdi 17 Mar 17^7o CPC* 1I*17&7
Ill I)
of Rs 70-80,000 Sykes had proceeded to effect a " real increase " of 
Rs 8,53,709-13-17* This he had achieved by reducing the expenses of Jasarat 
Khan and Mahasingh, between then amounting te Rs 4t37?878 a y®ar te a mere 
Rs 65»000c He had retrenched the expenditure under the heading "0harges 
Boats" hy dismissing Abdullah and his men, hy cutting the Kh&lsa secretariat 
establishment of 196 "lioories", Peshkars, Soristadars and i'unshis te 73t and 
by abolishing entirely the charges fer artillery " attending the forces 
at different places and belonging te His Majesty". One obvious item ef 
savings was of course Reza Khan's salary of Rs 90,000 a year which had been 
a charge on Dacca revenues since 1763o The remaining gain te the revenues 
ef ever four and a half lakhs ef rupees was secured by pushing up the 
revenue demand from about twenty one lakhs te a total sum ef Rs 25t81«438o 
Reza Khan's assessment had been lower than under All vardi.Sykes,however,
M had Recourse _te the accounts made out in the time ef Aliverdi Cawn and 
also under Meer Cossim's government** though, as he said, he did not fellow
1 ■ t
them implicitly. "In the former I found them rated at 30 laak'a'and in the 
latter at something more, but by the best lights I have been able to procure^ 
it is evident that such sums were never celleoted tho measures were used 
for that purpose nest cruel and inhuman such as we should abhor the thought! 
of "o It is clear that the increase must have affected tho peasantry and 
servants and dependent* of Zemindars and Taluqdars, while the retrenchments 
hit large numbers of military officers, soldiers, civil servants, boatmen, 
beatmakers and the thousand and one sorts of people who had found maintenance 
under Reza Khan'b administration*
Reza,Khan, and perhaps Rai Durlabh also , had exerted their utmost 
influence te save what they could from Sykes' "regard for the interest of 
the Company". Neverthelessjthe expenditure of Rs 3t320-13-0 en the Imamb&ra 
or Husaini Dalan was swept away* The giving ef Khilats at Eid was rigidly 
restricted to Rs 94-7*10. The charity to beggars fixed at Rs 4,045-8-0 was 
cut to R* 455-8-0» though a new grant for the blind and lame , amounting to 
Rs 3,600 was introduced. Two other charitable items were allowed to stand t 
Rs 2,823-14-0 for a Langhar Khana or soup kitchen, and Rs 1,518-10-0 for 
hospital charges of "Black doctors" and medicines for the sick poor. The one 
increase was under the head of Justioe. Where previously there had been one
10 The statements and figures in this and the following paragraph are based 
on Sykes' report on Dnc*a dt 15 Apr 1767. BSC 18 Apr 1767.
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Shahr Amin drawing Rs 150 per month and a Daregha ef Adalat drawing Rs 10(% 
there were new to lie six Shahr Amins te settle disputes " among the lower 
sort of inhabitants residing in the city** 1 However, as the new Amins only 
received Rs 50 a month , the cost to the Company was not particularly greatc
The other item which made up the total ef Rs 65,000 which Sykes allows*
for expenses, was the Rs 34*755 meant for the surviving dependants ef
ex-rulers of Bengal, the wives and children ef Sarfaraz Khan, Sirajud dauleh
and Shaukat Jang ef Pumea, There was an apparent increase under this head,
ef Rs 960, for the two widows of Shaukat Jang, who had not been originally
included in the list ef pensioners0 But ift fact Reza Khan had been paying
this sum to them , probably from the Nizamat department of Dacca, Whether
the Khan could have saved all these allowances had they not formed a
subject of great controversy in England between Hoi well and Clive must also
be doubted, Holwell ,incorreotly informed as he was, had used the
exaggerated reports of the Dacca murders of June 1760 at Mirant orders^ to
justify the deposition of M r  Jafar. This had angered Clivo, who felt
himself indebted to Mir Jafar, and on his return to Bengal in 1765 he took
the earliest opportunity to look into the matter and to free the royal
prisoners. They had replied with an address of thanks te Clive in which they
did not fail to mention that until the coming of Reza Khan to Dacca (in
1763) they 19 did not receive regularly even the slender sustenance which
4
was allowed them"0 Sykes not only retained their allowances hut made it a 
point to meet them at Daoca where " they appeared very happy at having 
obtained their liberty**
Under Sykes9 axe had gone not only the livelihood of thousands and the 
contentment of many more, but no less tragic for the Khan, the museum piece 
of an old regime administration which he had gradually rebuilt from the 
ruins of 1763* Sykes himself made this clear, "The province of DaccaH he 
reported, **has at all times been a heavy charge to the government, by reason 
of many and various expences, arising not from the natural and necessary 
disbursements attending the collections but from articles of a very differ­
ent nature kept up in conformity to the mode of government which has 
hitherto prevailed. In consequence of our regard for the Company, which must
1, Sykes's reporto BSC 18 Apr 1767* 2, ibid, —
3, Holwell9s source of information was a Dacca letter which he received on 
on 12 June 1760(India Tract,37&tP 54)•Actually Alivardi9s two daughters, 
Ghaseti Begun and Amina Begum were murdered by drowning,
4. CPC,I, 2761| BPP,VII,216-17# 5,Sykes9 report, BSC 18 Apr 1767#
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suffer greatly should the present form be continued, the ministers 
together with myself have thought it expedient to confine within a 
narrower circle and reduce to a more reasonable degree these super­
abundant and inconsistent expences**© A few personal favours to the Khan 
done by Sykes m&ft little consolation to the Khan© Indeed, the one 
redeeming feature of the whole episode must have been the retention in 
his servioe of the old Alivardian officials, Mahasingh and J&sarat Khan0 
Mahasingh , the Diwan of Dacca,was recommended to be vested wholly with 
the business of revenues, and Jasarat Khan to be retained as Naib Nazim* 
Of the latter Sykes wrote, "Jessarat Cawn who has long acted under 
Mahomed Reza Cawn and has still some share in the management, is without 
deubt by reason of his advanced age and other infirmities, not equal to 
the task of a collector, nor would I recommend him to that office; yet 
justice to his character obliges me to declare it my wish as well as
opinion, that a genteel allowance should be appointed him, and that he
2
should remain in his present position*© The foundation was thus laid 
of an hereditary Naib Nizamat of Dacca which was abolished after the 
death of Nasrat Jang in 1822, the family becoming extinct after the 
death of the last deputy in 1843o Reza Khan thus saw his own influenoe 
in the district continued almost unabated through his old officers — an 
outcome not without advantage to Sykes tee©
That advantage was to be found in private trade, this time in 
tobacco* Under Reza Khan’s instructions llaha Singh and Jasarat Khan 
had helped with the distribution of the tobacco owned by Cartier and 
ether gentlemen of the Daooa factory* It was probably to steal a march 
upon possible rivals that Sykes paid his visit to Dacca soon after 
Cartier*s departure for Calcutta and it is possible that Mahasingh and 
Jasarat Khap. owed their continuance in office to their usefulness in the
tobacco trade* It seems certain that Sykes moved so fast so as to
forestall Barwell* s appointment to Dacca as chief of the feotery in 
succession to Cartier0 Just before he left for Dacca, Sykes had induced
1* Sykesk report* BSC 18 Apr 1767* The Khan had to agree to Sykesfc plan 
but at the earliest opportunity he made out a case that a number of 
boats M may be built on the Company*s aocount"(CPC,11,534),proposed it
to Verelst and obtained the Committee*s sanction(B3C 8 Aug 1767)©
2* Sykesk report0^ S18 Apr 1767*Jasarat Khan* a salary was not included in 
the sum of Rs 65,000 allowed as Dacca expenses©
3* *,ff*Hunter,Statistlcal Account of Bengali vol Y, Dacca, p 58©
mthe Khan to write to Verelst protesting against the prospective posting of 
Barwell to DaccaJ In his letter to Verelst which reached the Governor on 17 
March 1767 the Khan had added a postscript saying that he had been informed 
’that Mr. Barwell is going to be appointed to the chiefship of Dacca© The 
behaviour of that gentelcman to the inhabitants of Malda is as manifest as 
the sun0 So violent were his proceedings that it was impossible te check 
then. The restrictions that were placed on his affairs of timber, saltpetre 
etc* irritated hin to the most violent remonstrances. Now that he is going 
to Dacca he will take to his old ways again, so that much confusion and 
disorder will take place throughout those parts© Jasarat Khan and Raja Maha 
Singh, who are stationed in authority there on the writer’s part, will 
experience the same treatment from him as the writer himself formerly did in 
the transactions of timber and saltpetre; and any trouble the said persons
2
may be involved in on that account will be equally felt by the writer*©
He added, by way of contrast, '• fir. Cartier, while he was Chief of Dacca, 
aoted with so much moderation and equity towards the 1 anils th?~t the writer 
reoeived constant satisfaction and the affairs of the Sarkar were administeimd 
with success and justice”©^
The Khan’s letter to Verelst was supposed to be private and Verelst in
1 © Barwell was to have gone to Dacca as compensation for his enforced
withdrawal from Malda . Clive had allowed him to remain there to wind up 
his affairs. The commercial residency at Malda being an independent out- 
station, ana not either a factory or a residency subordinate to Kasimbazar 
(like Bo alia or Kumarkhali) which had the primary charge of providing the 
Company’s silk investment became subject to tho regulation of 5 Ootober 
1765 and was ordered to be closed down©(The Directors wrote on 17 Mar 1769 
that the Fort William authorities had their permission to re-open the Malda 
residency if they deemed it necessary)©The closing down of Malda residency 
and the special recommendation of the Directors in Barwell’B-favour made 
Clive appoint him " in the Select Committee of the 7th January* 1767 to the 
chiefship of Daoca©Sarwell thanked Clive in his letter of 13 Jan. Yerelst 
also had assured Barwell that he would get Dacca and Barwell had according­
ly mad<> no application for the three important posts ef resident at kidna- 
pur, at Burdwan and Second at Dacca which on 20 Jan 1767 &11 went to men 
junior to himself- George Vansittart, John Graham and James Harris.When the 
minutes of the Council proceedings of 20 Jan were subsequently made fair, 
the nomination of Barwell was found ’erased and emitted**(Barwell’o letters 
to Anselm Beaumont,3 Apr, ,0 Hardwicke, 20 Sep 1767»BPP©Il,153t X,3-5)•The 
Dacca post went te Thomas Kelsall, one of those brought from Madras.It 
would seem that Reza Khan’s letter was designed to ensure that there was no 
second re-arrangement in Barwell’s favour of which there was some chance 
still(vide Verelst*s letter to Reza Khan, 17 Mar 1767© CPC,II,179)©
29 Reza Khan to Verelst, reodt 17 Mar 1767o CPC,II.178© - 3« ibid0
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fact took no public notice of it* Nevertheless by 4 April Barwell had heard
from Nabakrishna about the attack upon hinselfo He recognised the Khan’s
action for what it was, however, and bore him no grudge* In a letter to
Leycester written on 4 April Barwell explained » "From ay l*»t you would
suppose ne by this time at Dacca; but so far aa I from it that it is great
favor, for as I am told, to be permitted to return to adjust my affairs at
Maulda. In short I pcrcieve I have been most ingeniously amused to my
utter confusion and my friend Sykes' great satisfaction© You must understand
that that genius, on his return to the city £"of Murshidabadlast month
prevailed on Mahomed Reza Cawn to write to Ur# Verelst..0 No public notice
is taken of this letter, as it was wrote in a private capacity , nor should
1
have become acquainted with it, if it had not been fer Mjt. Nabookissen"• 
Verelst’s complicity in the manoeuvre he attributed to his need to keep 
Sykes’^ support for himselfo In a letter to his family dated 9 December 
1767 , Barwell observed "To account for the latent cause of such behaviour 
from I/r0 Verelst towards me I roust remark that he seems long to have 
considered me the object of Mr# Sykes' resentment and consequently any 
circumstance that tend3 to my mortification is as a cement to his cenneo-
p
tion with that gentleman** Reza Khan*3 part had once again been to provide 
cover to 3ykes£ moves. But Sykes was also to make a concession to Reza Khan*
The concession was to provide for the very necessary expenses of the- 
government for which there was no fund available after Sykes had appropria­
ted all collection to the Company's revenues, including tho customary 
receipts of cutcheri servants, oalled the fesums* These resums were reco^al^ 
sod sources of income of the cutohery servants , often in addition to their 
official salaries© The Khan needed some such fund , though-not of a very big 
amount but sufficient to moot sundry demands , such as for providing Sykes!s 
public table , "charges of bearers of English gentlemen and others travel­
ling backwards and forwards on business", allowances and presents to 
nutasaddis and clerks and for contingency charges* Two events particularly 
made the creation of such a fund all the more urgent* First, the drastic cut 
in the D«cca expenses had rendered maintenance of some of the essential
1. BPP, IX, 155 2* BPP, X, 13
3. For example the Dacca accounts of 1763-64 and 1764-65 show: such
payments to Murshidabad staff as legitimate expenses.( vide Dacca Factory 
Record. I.O.vol 6. ff 31-32)
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staff at Murshidabad, such as tho sepoys guarding the treasury and the 
Chubdars attending the Khalsa outcheri, whose anuual salary amounting to 
seme Rs 2590 used so long to he paid from Dacca*,difficttltoSe was perhaps 
in need of providing for some of those who were suddenly retrenched from 
Dacca0 The second event was the severe flood causing " great distresses 
every hody • The floods , the like of which had not “taken place within 
living memory”^had endangered the safety of the city if Murshidabad 
and putting up of embankment had become urgently necessary# The Khan had 
proposed to Sykes that instead of providing in kind for his table, Sykes 
would be paid a sum of Rs 2,000 per month • Sykes concurred and authorised 
the imposition of a few petty cesses, re sum Kezarat. rgam 10 Annas per 
cent, and Pushtabandy which came to be known later as Mathote, the accounts 
of which like those of the Bha Khilat were kept separate and unknown to
2
the Company until SykesJj successor,Becher made full report on them in 1770, 
The Khan thus brought the expenses to a public account which had perhaps 
been so long a matter of secret and private arrangement liable to
abuses# May be the matter was known to Verelst as well for he had attended 
the Funyah of 1767* In any case the creation of the fund was a minor 
concession as compared to what Sykes was planning to do next#
Reza Khan , and indirectly Verelst too, were to suffer further from 
Sykesh pursuit of private trade# After Barwell*s recall from Malda, Sykes 
as Resident at Murshidabad and Chief of Kasimbazar factory was without any 
competitor in the districts of Purnea and Dinajpur and also in that part of 
Rajshahi which lay to the east of the Padma river# There was no other 
residency or factory in the area , and his control of the Boalia out-station 
for the silk investment ensured his dominance of that part of Rajshahi# 
However, early in 1767 orders came out from England separating the Residency
3
at the Durbar from the chiefship of Kasimbazar 0 Under these circumstances 
it was essential to Sykesi interests that his personal agents should be 
established in Pumea and Dinajpur# The necessary excuse for despatching 
them into the districts were found in their failure to answer the high 
demands for revenue by the end of the second year of the Diwani#
1* Reza Khan to Verelst, reeds 22 Sep 1767* CPC# II, 580, 580A#
2# BSC 28 Apr 1770# Kathute and Bha Khilat later created much uproar in 
England# For aetail, KMS,68,pp 487*5®1#
3# Court's letter 21 Nov 1766# ______
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The failure was due to the mischievous attempt of Sykes and Clive to
serve their immediate interest by exerliitant demands for revenue* As early
as 1 January 1767 Barwell had diagnosed the trouble in a private letter t
“The enhancing the revenue of the country which appears the great aim 
of Lord Clive will he found, I believe, in a year more the cause ©f its 
being diminished, for the country has absolutely heen plundered hy 
those whe have heen appointed to make the collections* I mean 
particularly the provinces of Pumea and Dinagepore1**^
Sykes, however, threw the blame on the native collectors, and on 12 March
Verelst i“rote t© the Khan that " It has frequently heen reported to the
writer that the amiIs who were sent from Murshidabad to Dinajpur, took over
from the zamindar charge of the collections, part of which they placed to
2the Government*s account, and put the rest in their pecket*o The source of
Verelst*s information was obviously Sykes who returned to Murshidabad from
Calcutta early in March 1767o Reza Khan indignantly denied the allegation,
and he wrote to Verelst a full defence0 He said s
"tfith regard to the collections at Dinajpur, and the money said to have 
heen embezzled there hy a certain aail from Murshidabad, the writer 
^~Reza KhanJ^  says that the ?miil was sent froa Murshidabad not to 
oollect the revenues hut to order the zamindar to deliver in the 
stipulated rents* The zamindar hisself has never mentioned to the 
writer a syllable about his being dispossessed of hie authority hy 
the a-dl or about the embezzlement of the revenues by the latter or 
about the country being ruined, and by ne means believe that the 
mischief has been done by the amilo Were the writer*c own brother 
guilty , the writer would puiii3h him* Accordingly the zamindar and the 
peshkar were summoned to Murshidabad&* * if, Sykes began an examination 
of them which lasted for nearly four days* The zamindar pleaded that 
he had not yet oollected all the revenues, and was therefore unable 
te speak with certainty^** At the end he applied for leave to return 
to his districto.o which was granted"0 3
There was here a complete disagreement in the views of Reza Khan and 
Sykes in regard to land revenue policy* Reza Khan was working to preserve 
the older social groups who were all dependant on income from land and its 
management* If the revenues failed this was because too much had been deman 
ded0 In 1769 he was to complain that whereas in Alivardi Kh&^s day Purnea 
had never paid more than four lakhs, in 1766*67 the demand had been pushed 
up to twenty-five lakhsf In the name way demand had been screwed up from 
twelve lakhs or less to seventeen lakhs, even in a season of widespread
1* 3PP,IXf% 120 20 Verelst to Reza Khan,12 Mar 1767* CPC,II,172
3* Reza Khan to Verelst, reedi 21 Mar 1767o CPC, II, 186*
4* Reza Khan*s nete0 BSC 25 Sep 1769*
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crop failure in Dinajpur] Tho ministers, that is Reza Khan and Rai Durlabh9
o
had not failed , as tho Directors alleged, to make "some severe example" of 
the officials who had failed to keep upte the Company1s expectations. Suchil 
Ram of Pumea had paid twenty-five lakhs to government (though he had only 
done so hy ruthless exaotions and hy borrowing froa merchants and hankers)0 
Even so he had heen placed in custody from which " he never escaped • •• till 
death released him”. The same fate was likewise inflioted on Muhammad Zaman, 
the Amil of Dinajpur who, when the Khan was writing in September 1769, was 
"yet in prison environed with misery and distress"^ There is no mistaking 
the Khan*s inner emotion in the way he writes about their fate, oareful 
though he was in his language©If in 1769 the Khan1® language , despite his 
caution,betrayed his inner emotion,in 1767 it betrayed, as the Directors 
pointed out,in the case of his defence of the old class of bankers and 
shroffs, " the awkwardness of a man who is maintaining an argument against 
the conviction of his own mind"© Punishment to Suchit Ran and Muhammad Zara an 
were such acts of the Khan , where he had to act in the manner he did, not 
because they were gulity, but because punishment to them was necessary 
to prove Sykes's thesisp which obviously received the support not only of
the Calcutta government but also of the Directors©
Sykes for his part was determined to destroy the old order, to crush
out everybody between the Company on the one hand and the "poor inhabitants"
on the other© He had, in his own words, made it his " business to see that
the Company as Dewan to the King have full and just amount of their revenues
and that the poor inhabitants in general be not exposed to suffer as they
have heretofore done, by the avarice and rapacity of their governors and
collectors'*© With regard to wh&t did not belong to the Company's troasury
he was guided by answer to a simple question as he bluntly put it, ” It was
7
this, whether it should go into a blackman's pocket or my own"© By the term 
" blacknan " Sykes did not mean Kantu Baku , his Banian or others of his kind
1. Reza Khan's note© BSC 25 Sep 17^9* ■
2© Commenting on the outstanding balances on the expected revenues the 
Directors observed in a latter to Select Committee on 11 Nov 1768 that
"we cannot suffer such a depredation of the revenues and shall not think
the ministers do their duty if the ^allanoes ...are not all recovered,$nd 
we are astonished in not having mode seme severe examples these 
great offenders?
3© Reza Khan's not^© BvSC 25 S -P 4© ibid©
5. Court'* letter 11 Nov 1768; Res* Kkaa to Y«rol*t,25 JCov 176T0CPC.H.676o
6. Sykes!; resort otf DinaJour *»i Purnosa BSC 10 Fek 176d«
V AJJ Umm OQi** ________
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The deficiencies in Dinajpur and Pumea had been discussed at the April
Punyah when Wrelst was at Murshidabad, and at his suggestion the management
of Dinajpur had heen taken out of the handB of the Raja, and that of Pumea
from Suchit Ram , who was dismissed and cast into prison* A nominee of
1
Reza Khan, Saiyid Huhamm&d Khan was thereupon sent to Dinajpur , and 
without any fixed coiunitaent was given a free hand to collect whatever sums 
wore possible and credit them to the government, Sykes, however, angrily 
declared that for the next five months the Saiyid did nothing hut " write 
the usual and ordinary excuses and complaints with representation of the 
poverty of the country, distress of the tenants and oppression of the 
former collector"! and in the autirm of *1767 he himself went to Dinajpur*
He stayed there for five weeks, and reported the district te he "in a 
plentuous ^ "sig^ and flourishing situation",^ He dismissed the Raja's 
Nazir, Muhammad Z&man and the Raja's Diwan,Harieh Chandra, and marked them 
out with all their agents and dependants for further resentment, " as
4
people so long hardened in the paths of corruption"? He left one cf his
assistants, Redfeam to continue his researches. He then went to Pumea,
where in the town "the people ho re evident marks ef beggary and distress",
and there too he left another young servant of the Company, Rooke te
complete enquiries* In February 1768 Sykes submitted a report on both
5
districts to Calcutta*
The deficiency at Dinajpur and the misery in Pumea were the results 
of Sykes£ having overridden the moderate revenue policy of the Khan. Sykes 
however used them as an argument for posting of Knglish supervisors in the 
districts - an arriiment later used hy the critics of the Khan and of Clive's 
system and hy the Court of Directors* He also made then the occasion for 
posting his own men - his assistants at Murshidabad,in Dinajpur and Pumea, 
in positions which enabled him to capture the whole looal private trade,
i*He was^new immigrant from Persia and was appointed Mir Rasim's naib at 
Hurshidabadoln April 1762,Hastings described him us one who" speaks 
the Indostan language but imperfectly" and was "an elderly,plain and 
sensible man and hitherto much liked at the city"(Add Mss 29097»?16)0It 
must have been partly due to him that the Khan could live in safety at 
Murshidabad during Mir Rasim's rule0 The Khan paid back the favour and 
kindness by making him Faujdar of Pumea, while Suchet Ram was Diwan in 
1765(vide BSC 10 Feb 1766)0 He remained a great favourite of Reza Khan*
20 SykesH report* BSC 10 Feb 1766* 5* ibid0
4* ibid, 5* ibid*
6*Sykes'sletter of 17 Nov 1765, g^otedi Bolts, Considerations»App0 pp143-4*
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Barwell "being new removed and the Malda residency itself closed down* He
and his assistants proceeded to exploit the situation to the full0 Early
in 1768 Reza Khan was forced to complain to Verelst against Sykes* On 28
February, 1768 Barwell wrote to his family ” It has been currently reported
that Sykes*s inordinate desire to be rich has made him transgress decency
in his acquisitionso His Excellency Mahomed Reza Cawn has in private manner
intimated to the Governor that from 12 to 13 lacks of rupees in Salamees
/"offerings as tokens of respect^ and farms, have been reaped by Mr0 Sykes
or his banian Contoo /KantuJ7* This intimation, however, was suppressed, and
1
His Exoellency discouraged from making it publick.*..* Verelst also received 
denunciation of Sykes from various senior servants of the CenpanyfAlexander,
Russell, Kelsall and Alderaey, " in consequence of repeated letters of
2
complaint to those gentlemen from their Gemastah** Evidently there had been 
serious dashes of private trading Interests0 Indeed we know that at least 
once the Board had to rescind oertain restrictive trade regulations which 
Sykes had got Reza Khan’s government to issue*^
The complaints , however, were hushed up* Verelst already had toe many 
critics and was too dependent on Sykes to wish to air them* Reza Khan was toe 
busy trying to have his brother-in-law, Path ullah Khan , the son of At null ah 
Khan installed officially am his deputy and presumptive successor to wish to 
antagonise Sykes0 The Khan had been broken in health hy the physical and 
mental strain of office, and on 9 February 1768 the Seleot Cei&mlttee had 
written about a deputy for him to the Directors* "T^ 'ahemed Reza Cawn, who 
frequently complained to the Presidency of the declining state of his health 
occasioned by the continual application to the business of the government has 
lately requested our permission for the nomination of some person to assist 
him, as he may be frequently rendered incapable of attending himself to the 
business of the cutcherry, or any accident should befall him) and recommended 
Fatey Ally Cawn^, who hari for some time past been assisting, and whom he 
should as fully as in his power instruct in the business* Ve deemed his 
request but reasonable t and Mr0 Sykes informing us that the person recommended 
was of integrity,attention and abilities, we readily consented to his 
appointment”; Sykes , who had been asked to suggest a salary, proposed
1. Bp.rwall*a latter. 26 Pell 17&. BPP. X. 30 2, lhid,
3, Vide -SC 29 Nov and 29 ho« 1767.
4, The nano was Path ullah Khan though called hanarifioally Path All Khan*
5, Letter te Court, 9 F«h 1768.
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Rs 7,000 per month fer the Deputy , but the Directors while regretting the 
ill health ef the Khan and approving the appointment of the Deputy f
refused te accord sanction te the Deputy* s salary te fee paid out ef the
2
Government* s funds and suggested its payments frem the Khan* s salary#
But though Sykes was net hostile te Reza Khan, and was prepared te
give full suppert te suoh personal demands ef the Khan, he refused te
abandon his policies even when they necessarily undermined the Khan*s
authority# So he would not fee satisfied with the oasual visits ef himself
and his assistants te Pumea and Dinajpur feut fey July 1763 he was planning
permanently te pest Reeke at Dinajpur# The proposal was made to the
Calcutta government jointly fey Sykes and Cartier in a letter dated 1 July#
Cartier had gene te Murshidabad te represent the governor Verelst at the
annual Punyah# It does not appear that Cartier had any definite views afeeut
the matter # He was prefeafely made merely te endorse the suggestion which
was Sykesk and which directly concerned the latter alone, perhaps feecause
Cartier* s private trade in silk required Sykes1* assistance# In August
1768, Cartier and Sykes sent Duc&rel, another assistant ef Sykes te Pumea
though his stay was only fer a short period ef five or six waeks#^ Verelst
and his government, however, refused te accept the suggestion or the
4principle underlying# After he had resigned from his post ef the Resident
Sykes tried again , in a letter of 2 January 1769* to push his scheme fer
the appointment of*gentlemen ef character* in every district as checks 
upon the collectors# He argued that this would fee ef * great feeneflt te 
the inhafeitants, and future advantage te the revenues fey affording a full
security te the property, and consequently a further encouragement te
5
industry*# Onoe again, however, his proposals received no support either 
frem Verelst or frem the ether senior servants ef the Company in Bengal0
It may fee asked hew far Sykes feelieved that a system ef English 
supervisership in the district level would fee ef pufelio benefit and hew far 
he saw in it possibilities ef private gain# Prefeafely his motives were 
mixed, and it is new impossible te disentangle them# It is evident,however, 
that te his contemporaries it was clear that holding ef governmental
1.BSC ^ Feb and 25 July 17&o 2# Court’s letter 17 har 1769*
3# Ducarel* s letter 3 1770f KP 20 Deo 1770
4# Sykes^ letter 25 Aug .BSC 31 Aug 1768#
5# Sykes’s letter 2 Jan# BSC 4 Jan 1769#
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authority in any area was the surest means ef effectively monopolising the
entire trade ef that distriobj Poets conferring governmental powers were*
therefore well worth investing in* Writing t© his sister ,probably late in
1768, Barwell had proposed t HI can only say I would spend five thousand
pounds to secure te myself the chiefship of Dacca , and to supervise the
collection of the revenues of that province and which is not at present
annexed to the chiefship* I would spend the same sum to procure to myself
2
the Patna chiefship and collection of revenues'9* It is not the commercial 
appointment as chief of factory that made the posts worth investing five 
thousand pounds, hut the supervisorship of the collection along with the 
chiefship that made the posts so very lucrative* On Sykesk motives and 
actions Barwell may he thought biased, though Verelst90 steady refusal to 
approve his plans would suggest otherwise* But a letter which Sykes wrote 
in 1773, long after he had left Bengal9 suggests that his appointment of 
assistants in the districts had not heen purely disinterested* Sykes 
wrote to Hastings, for whoa he was then rcting as an attorney in England, 
at a time when he feared Company reform: was threatening his private 
interests* He said, * 1 heg you will immediately get my stocks or cash in 
the Company9 a treasury in yours or in the name of Messrs Redfe&rn or Duoarel 
till such time as I see the storm blown over* This my friend, I expect you 
will comply with, as everything say he apprehended hy such a sett of
3
Direoters and, therefore, I would he beforehand with them if possible1*
Sykes choice of Redfeam and Ducarel as defenders of his business interests 
cannot hut suggest that in Murshidabad an official relationship had grown 
into a much deeper private identity of interests*His renewed attempt in 
January 1769* to make the appointment of Englishmen to the districts 
government policy and his commendation in glowing terms of the services 
ef his three assistants, Redfeam, Ducarel and Reoke,^each one of whom had 
heen given some district experience,may thus he seen as an effort to keep 
his.business partners in positions there their mutual private interests
1* Complaining against Sykes, Barwell wrote home on 28 Feb 1768 ef the 
"impossibility of purchasing one single article of merchandise in those 
districts over which his authority more immediately extends19 *(BPP,X,30)
2. BPP, X, 233o
3. ayfe# t* Hastings, 28 Jan 1773. A W  Mss 29133 f 349.
4« Sykes* letter 2 Jan, BSC 4 Jan 1769#
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oouli be best served. His moves may even be seen as the resuit of yressure 
from his assistants, if they were aware as Barwell of the profits to he made 
in district administration. Three assistants could not he provided in two 
distriots, Pumea and Dinajpur where only the revenue had failed, and hence 
possibly the recommendation to send out Enelish*en to all districts, not to 
supplant the Khan’s officers hut merely to he okeck open them.
One other question arises about this episode - why were Verelst and the 
Council so opposed to Sykesiplea for English supervisors ? Here too private 
and public interests may both have been at work* It was not perhaps in the 
interests of the senior servants to send their juniors into the distriots 
as revenue officers* Those with interests on the commercial side may have 
had no wish to appoint competitors after their experience of the way in 
which Sykes had exploited his position to their disadvantage,, The complaints 
of Alexander, Russell, Kelsall and Aldersey strengthened the hands of 
Verelst to say ’no1 to Sykes!s proposals. Moreover , at this time f besides 
their normal profits from the inland trade and the country trade, tho 
members of the Council had established a monopoly of the supply of Bombay 
and Surat cotton to the Bengal weaving interest which they must have been 
particularly unwilling to share0 A stock of Rs 25,00,000 had been created, 
the shares being divided among most of the members of the Calcutta Council, 
and used to engross much of the west coast cotton.^ The price of cotton 
had risen from Rs 16-18 to Rs 28 - 30 9 &nd when as a result a tremendous 
increase in the production of Kapas, a local cotton and a large Influx of 
supplies froa northern India by the Juana and Ganges had followed, the 
Council had used Reza Khan to protect their monopoly,. He was induced to 
distribute large quantities of their Bombay and Surat cotton through the 
Zemindars, while a prohibitive duty of 30 per cent was imposed on 
imports across the Bihar borders. The appointment of English officials 
to the districts would obviously threaten the smooth working of so 
profitable a systea0
Verelst*:'. objections to SykesV proposals were perhaps as much grounded 
on principle as on personal considerations. Verelst was an heir to Clive1 s 
policies and he, more than anyone else, was committed to uphold them0Moreovez
1. Bolts, Considerations,196-7♦
2. ibid. The Directors , when they heard of this, adversely commented on
thq monopoly, in their letter of 11 Nov 1768 and described it as 11 so
injurious to our government1*.
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he had no authority te exceed the limitation on him hy the Directors which, 
as Verelst later reminded the Council, was that the Company should retain
1
the * primitive charaoter as merchants with the most scrupulous delicacy**# 
For the Khan, Verelst had all sympathy, and though he could not support 
the Khan against the powerful interest of Sykes until there were complaints 
against the latter from other senior servants ef the Company, when they 
came he firmly ignored SykesV proposals#
Reza Khan had resisted Sykes^ changes in Dacca and had voiced
vigorous objection to his revenue arrangements# Nevertheless^when Sykes
reacted to his loss of the Kasimbazar chiefship and to the Select Commit**
toe1 s loss of extraordinary powers by preparing to leave for England, the
Khan betrayed some dismay at the prospect of change# He had worked with
Sykes for more than three years, and at a personal level they had achieved
an understanding of each other# In December 176&v therefore, the Khan
did a last service to Sykes and sought the favour of the Calcutta
government hy writing about the impending change# The letter, accompanied
by one in similar terms froa Nawab Saif ud daulah, gave testimony to the
good conduct of Sykes i Mr Sykes who has resided for these three years
past at Murshidabad on the part of the Company, has in every transaction
conducted himself with an unblemished character and with the greatest
equity and prudence so that both rich and peer acknowledge their obligations
2
to him and no ©no has ever talked to his dispraise"• More specifically the 
letter declared , " no act of oppression has ever been committed and the 
Company* s affairs have been transacted in a proper manndi during his 
residence**o^One cannot but suspect that Sykes had a hand in the letter, 
for he was busy trying to secure the authorization of the Calcutta 
authorities for his acceptance of sundry presentsf and was doubtless anxious 
to keep his official record clean in view of the changing mood of people in 
England#The Khan also sought to safeguard his future, by expressing the 
hope that the Calcutta authorities would **appoint a gentleman to suoceed 
him /Syk-s 7/who would b ^  possessed of his virtuous disposition and who 
will make it his study to promote the Company*s interest and the welfare of 
tho mankind", so that his "mind may be at ease, the affairs of the country
1# Verelst*s letter# 3PC 16 Dec 1769*
2# Reza Khan*s letter, BPC 27 Doo 1768* 3o ibid#
4# The presents were, a diamond, a gold gulabpash(sprinkler of rose water)
a gold betel box, a gold flower pot, the last three with appartenanceso
BFC.27 Doc 1768.
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be properly transacted and the prosperity of the Nizamut and its subjects
may be conspicuous**^ He ended with praise . for the Governor and the
gentlemen of the Council * for their judicious and uprifjat management of
the affairs of the Empire and their paying due regard to everything that
concerns the welfare of its inhabitants*f and no less praise for H the
wise regulations established in these seubahs* which were the bffwcta of
2
their just eounselso
Hi? real feelings may have been better expressed in a comment, in 
March* upon Sykes selfjustifying boast that Mir Jafar had seldom received 
more than half * the revenues which we now get*! Reza Khan* a reply was 
that M revenues are extorted rather than collected* o'Sie ended with the 
warning that the country was * subjected to a variety ef evils distinctive 
^sic^ to good order and population* The consequences which have already
ensued are alarming and worse may reasonably be apprehended if a remedy be
5
longer deferred**
1* Reza Khan*s letter# BPC 27 Deo 1768 2# ibid*
3o 3ykes*s letter 2 Jan# BSC 4 Jan 1769*
4* Reza Khan*s •propositions* 0 BPC 28 Mar 1769* 5* ibidp
175
CHAPTER EIGHT,
REZA KHAN OPPOSES TRADE MONOPOLIES t
PROPOSAL FOR THE APPOINTMENT OP SUPERVISORS 9 1769.
The changes which were sparked off by the replacement of Francis Sykes 
by Richard Becher as Resident at the Durbar ultimately made Reza Khan 
redundant and the system which perpetuated him9 obsolete 9 though neither 
Verelst nor Becher anticipated this turn of events*
When Sykes resigned his post in January 1769# Verelst had already 
appointed Becher to fill the vacancy* In a Council bedevilled by "interested 
opposition"* Becher would seem* like Verelst* to have had fewer vested 
interests to defend than most* And besides* being a man of moderation*Becher 
was also a man of vast experience* Having joined the Company9 s service in 
Bengal in 1743 he had been a witness to the rule of Alivardl* During the 
troubles which ended in Siraj ud daulah* s capture of Calcutta in 1756 he was 
the chief of the Dacca factory* When the news of the recapture of Calcutta 
reached the Direotors* he was chosen* as one of the three to be governor of 
Calcutta by rotation* In the interest of the greater good of the Company and 
his nation* Becher gave up his rights* and jointly with Watts and Manningham* 
offered the post to Clive* Soon after*he left for home*When the news of the 
acquisition of the Diwani reached London*the Direotors sent Becher again to 
Bengal with a seat in the Select Committee and so also in the Council*which 
he joined in 1767#For some eighteen months after his appointment he kept 
aloof from the current craze for quick acquisition of wealth* He presumably 
sent his gumashtas into the countryside to conduct a private trade on his 
behalf^as did all gentlemen then resident in Calcutta* But he did not 
use his authority to secure a lucrative upcountry post for himself* though 
as Richard Barwell had by January 1769 noted* "The Presidency is not a 
f* BPC 2i June 175&* ' :T,
2 * One such "man of business'* employed by Becher was Charles Grant* a future 
Director of the East India Company* Grant had arrived in Bengal in 1769 
as a cadet in the Company's service* (A.T*Embree* Charles Grant and 
British Rule in India* 30J*
3* T.Rumbold9s letter of 31 Jan# BPC 2 Peb 1769#
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place te make a fortune at; any ef the subordinate facteriea are te lie
i
preferred te the most lucrative employments at Calcutta** Instead he
remained content with the appointment ef Aoceuntant, at an allowance ef
Rs 1,000 a year only. However, as Collector-General, he was responsible to
the President and Council for the supervision of the revenue administration
of the Twenty-Pour Parganas, Burdwan, Kidnapur and Chittagong, a task
o
previously undertaken by the Committee of Lands, When , therefore, on 11 
January 1769, Becher assumed charge at Murshidabad as Resident he was free 
from the entanglements ef private trading interests and already well 
acquainted with the problems of revenue administratien0
Between Becher and Muhammad Reza Khan there was a quick growth ef 
understanding and an identity of views, if not ef ultimate interests♦Since 
Becher was net personally involved , Reza Khan felt free to raise the 
question of the manner in which the Company made its investments, the evils
of trade restrictions and monopolies, and the tyranny of th<r gunashtas .The
3
Murshidabad government had complained repeatedly of the mode of investment
and of the distress occasioned by the gumashtas in the countryside. But
even when attention was paid te the complaints,which was rarely, and
remedial regulations were promulgated, little good could follow while Sykes
was both Resident and Chief of Kasimbazar, for he was the author ef many ef
the worst features of the trade restrictions and monopolies. Nor did his
less of the chiefship end the evil, for his successor , William Aldersey,
upheld Sykes9s system, either to satisfy private interests or to keep up
the Investment, and Sykes as Resident could scarooly denounce what he had
established as Chief of Kasimbazar, With Sykes gone, Reza Khan could make
another attempt te remedy the evils ef the Company9s methods. Within three
weeks of Becher9s arrival at Murshidabad , the Khan had the satisfaction
ef finding himself supported in his complaints. On 30 January Becher wrote
to Verelst that he was convinced that the existing mode of *providing goods
for the Company at Cessimbazar and ether places will prove destructive not
only to the revenues but to the trade of the country*^. Within a fortnight
5
he had repeated his wamingo'
1, Harwell to Hardwicke, 9 Jan 1769# BPP, X,251«
2, The actual administration ef revenue collection in these four districts 
was undertaken by the Zemindar, or English Collector, of the 24 Parg&nas, 
the Residents ef Burdwan and Midnapur,and the Chief and Council of
3« Aldersiy^*letter of 5 I‘ayiy69#BPC 19 June 1769*
A. BPC 19 June 1769. 5. Becher9* letter 11 Feb 1769.BPC 19 June 1769.
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Sykes had bullied the Khan into aotiens he disliked, but in Becher he 
feund an apparently sympathetic appreciation ef his pelicieSo The Khan was 
encouraged by the war* support he reoeived from the new Resident te visit 
Calcutta in liaroh. and te sake a number ef representatiens te Verelst*He 
alse asked Verelst te use the eccasien ef the approaching Punyah te come te 
Murshidabad fer a fuller discussion*
Verelst and the Ceuncil were perhaps fer the first time in a mood te 
listen te Reza Khan, and the Khan was encouraged te speak his mind with
less reserve than before* He preceeded te submit a leng memorandum upon 
the whole question ef the trade ef Bengal. He began his "prepositions" by 
stating, as self-evident, that " whatever contributes te the population 
ef the country and the general welfare ef the inhabitants naturally 
augments the rule ef government* The attention and authority ef the 
Governor and gentleman of the Council are necessary te establish salutary 
regulations for those purposes" \  He then entered into an account of the 
past affluence of Bengal and the contribution ef trade te its eld 
prosperity t
"Formerly this country was the principal resort ef foreign merchants 
who brought hither considerable sums to purchase its ceraiaedities* I am 
well informed that in the time of Aly Verdy Cawn the merchants of 
Akbarabad ^ AgraJ^, Lahore, Multan, Gegerat /GujratZ Ferkabad,Hyderabad 
and the port ef Surat reckoning the Mabenent3 ^ 3ic^ and Hindews only, 
exclusive ef Europeans, purchased cloth and silks te the amount of 
Seventy Lacks ^Takhs_7 ®f rupees and from this source the Ryetts were 
maintained, the native merchants enriched and the revenues supplied0 
Now every branch ef foreign commerce is ruined* Men of credit and 
large capital _ are retired and the merchants who still retain
a connection with these provinces scarcely purchase te the amount of 
Seven Lacks in the year* This sudden failure of the usual supplies of 
specie is already felt te such a degree that business is almost te a 
total stand the revenues are extorted rather than oollected and the 
country thereby subjeoted te a variety ef evils distructive ^ aic J  to 
good order and population* The consequences which have already ensued 
are alarming and worse may reasonably be apprehended if a remedy be 
longer deferred"0 2
Reza Khan was passing a judgement on what was supposed te be his own
administration , and he accused nobody* But he made it plain that he saw
the gumashtas of the Company as mainly responsible fer the decline ef the
trade, and fer the injury te the revenues ef the province* He could net
1* Reza Khan*s "preposition"* BPC 28 Mar 1769*
2. ibid*
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repeat the language ef Mir Qasim, and he was careful not to mention his
political objections to the power of the gumashtaso Nevertheless, though
speaking out of regard for the Company9 0 revenues, he asked, as Mir '4asim
had dene, that in disputes between the gumashtas and tho subjects of the
government authority should vest first in his officers, the anils, and
finally in himself* In his representation he made this clear t
"The Departments of Trade and Revenue are chiefly connected,, It is my 
duty to point out by a fair statement of facts such evils as have tended 
to the decay and diminution of the latter and which may by neglect be 
productive of more dangerous and pernicious effects.
In the first place I would propose for the good order of the country 
that all Gomastahs who have Balances due fer advances made on account of 
their Investment make known the case to the aurail of the District where 
they are employed that the aumil may enforce their just demands
with his authority and in case of any neglect or connivance in the 
auiail that the complaint be referred te the Chief ef Cossimbazar if the 
dispute arises within the district of Huxadabad ^ "Murshidabad^and te 
the Chief of Dacca if within the district of Dacca; these gentlemen will 
communicate the particulars to the Resident at the Durbar to me in order 
to ^ nake^ the final decision*.
Secondly the true spirit of trade is mutual satisfaction of the buyer 
and seller. There are nevertheless divers people who take upon themselves 
the name of Gomastahs and under the sanction of that name carry on an 
illegal and oppressive trade which in its effect depopulate the country 
by creating general distress and dispair £"sic7 amongst the Ryetts and 
occasion considerable less and interruptions in the department of the 
Revenue,, Was these set of men restrained from trading on this oppressive 
plan the country would be preserved from these mischiefs, Balances would be _ 
never or rarely incurred and all complaints about outstanding debts ^be 
at an end0
Thirdly, it is an usual practice amongst the Gomastahs to grant protec­
tion to the Dellols ^commission agents^ Pyoars ^ etty wholesalers^ etc 
who are all Ryotts and pay revenue to the Sircar and under pretence of 
trade hinders the aumil from collecting the legal dues of the govern­
ment. Could these Gomastahs be obliged to withdraw their protection from 
them and measures taken to put them on a footing with all other Ryotts 
[i\J would be highly beneficial to the Revenue" 0 1
The Khan9 8 second suggested remedy was that the gumashta system should 
be abolished, and that tho Investment should be made as it had been before 
1752 *y contracts with indopendenot Dadni merchants, that is with Indian 
merchants working on advanoes, Dadni, from the Company. "To alleviate the 
general distress in some degree", the Khan wrote, " your servant would 
recommend tho reestablishment ef the former mode of providing the Company9s 
silk investment by Dadney" o And still avoiding any reference to the political
10 Reza Khan9* "propositions". BPC 28 Mar 1769* 2. Ibid.
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issues , arguing the case solely in terms ef the interests ef the 
Company9s trade and revenues, he pressed the case fer freeing trade as 
follows;
"The merchants weuld then find an advantage as formerly, in importing 
specie and renewing the commerce with these provinces, The Comparer 
will receive large Investment; Multitudes whem necessity have c/ 
obliged te seek fer employment elsewhere will again apply themselves 
te the silk manufacture with cheerfulness and assiduity because 
with ^sic f  certain prespects ef reaping the fruits ef labor" .1
In his next prepesitien Reza Khan deliberately exeroised an economy
ef werds , perhaps te aveid drawing the fire ef the private trade interests
ef the Cempany,s servants and their friends upen himself i
"Your servant weuld secendly recommend that all ether branches ef 
cemmeroe in like manner be subject te such regulations as will both 
secure a considerable Investment fer the Company and leave an opening 
te the industry ef the individuals. By these means manufactures ef 
all kinds will be increased cultivation become the care as it
is the interest ef the Ryot • . ^ w h w i l l  be enabled te live 
comfortably £jJ a spirit af improvement weuld prevail throughout the 
country and the revenues [^weuld^  be collected with ease and without 
having recourse te rigorous methods"® 2
The last point discussed by Reza Khan was linked both with the problems 
ef declining production and commerce and with the difficulty in collecting 
the revenues fer which he was responsible.This was the difficulty caused by 
the shortage ef precious metals, particularly silver, in Bengal® Before 
1757 the European companies, including the English, had paid fer the goods 
they purchased with imported silver , which, circulating through Bengal, 
provided the means ef paying the government9 s revenues»After Plassey,however 
net only had great demands been made on Mir Jaf&r and his successors, as 
reward for their elevation te the masnad and the sums se exacted sent out 
ef the country in cash or in kind , but the import ef silver had declined. 
Further, the acquisition ef the 24 Parganas, of Burdwan, Midnapur and 
Chittagong and finally ef the Diwani ef the entire province , enabled the 
Company te pay fer its Investment out of the revenues ©f Bengal, without
1. Reza Khan9s "propositions"0 BPC 28 Mar 1769* 2. ibid0
3. According te the calculation ef a parliamentary committee( vide>P P ,Third 
Report, pp?31V12), the total ef these exactions amounted te £5,940,493 
including the amounts, received in cash by, the Company, their servants, 
and a small amount shared by native and Armenian dependents ef the 
latter,from the Indian chiefs, Balwant Singh, Shuja ud daulah and mostly 
from the Bengal Rawabs, from 1757 to 17^5* Retable payments, by Jke Nawabs 
were; Te the Company by Mir Jafar £1,575,000 and by Mir Qasisi £ 62,500.
TO the Company*s servants"and their dependents £3,588,200 (£ 3*#246f,74 by
1(4 * Ctmm4*. liv rJ. in ah 1
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importing money er bullien inte the country. Since the Dutch and French1 
could als# tap the wealth #f the Company9 s servants by resitting their 
illicit fortunes against hills ef exchange paid in Europe, they tee ceased 
te import bullien into Bengal.The tipert ef hullien inte Bengal which in 
ten years previous te 1767 averaged 90 te 100 lakhs a year,including 36 te 
40 lakhs by the Dutch* "the greatest iaperters ef silver*1, seme 12 te 14 
lakhs hy the English and seiie small amount each hy the Danes, Austrians 
and Prussians,had practically all stepped.^Imports hy the Asian merchants 
from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf parts which befere Pl&ssey amounted 
annually te 18 er 20 lakhs^h&d, fellewing the establishment ef the supre­
macy ef the Company9 s servants?in the ceastal trade , alse drepped 
censiderablyi though this still remained perhaps the enly seurce ef import 
ef bullien, abeut five lakhs a year, er as the Select Committee estimated 
in 1767, abeut fifteen lakhs in feur years©^ Mereever, by the treaty ef 
1763, the Company had agreed te remit an annual sum ef 26 lakhs ef rupees
te the Emperer.Fin&lly, since 1757,Fort William had been sending silver
5
needed fer the English trade frith China0 The difficulty caused by the 
shertage ef silver was sought te be remeved, unsuccessfully though, by 
intreductien ef geld ceins , simultaneously with the currency ef silver 
rupees but Clive9s geld rupees, first minted in 1766 which feund acceptance 
"rather as bullien than coin" had failed te selve the problem. Only the 
native shreffs and bankers , if helped te reestablish, their credit and 
business as in Alllvardi's time,could be of help in the oircuiri3tances*Te make 
things worse the shertage ef silver had been accompanied by circulation 
ef debased ccius<, which being forced by the gumashtas on the ifyets were
paid back te the government in the form ef revenue. The debased ceins had
?
enly increased the problem ef collecting the revenue which was already
1, The French did net trade in Bengal from 1757 &n* until the revival ef
their trade in terms ef the treaty ef Paris (1765)o The French factories
were reopened in 1765«Eapleyees ef the French, M, Chevalier in particular^ 
stayed in Bengal and acted as agents ef the Company9 s servants in their 
private trade,
2, Sfeleot Committee9s letter te Court, 26 Sep 1767*
3© Verelst, View, p 86 fn, Verelst gives the pre-Plassey annual import ef
bullien by Europeans as s £300,000 by Dutch( alse for Batavia),£250,000
by English, £200,000 by French and £ 30,000 by Danes,(ibid)
4, Seleot Committee9s letter te Court, 26 Sep 1767o
5* Verelst, View, p 85. According te hiia remittance te China "continued
without remission te the year 1770",
A. a-f \Mm t  -» 1^1 -On.
m
a serious cause ef worry te the government en acceunt ef the peculiar 
growth ef trade pattern in Bengal which had created a tr&ditienal demand 
fer particular typea ef ceins in different parts ef Bengal and again f*r 
transactions in different commodities  ^ <1 while the government*s
demands were assessed and revenues were preferred te he collected enly in 
Sicca rupees* The shroffs in the past came in between the government 
and the revenue paying Zemindars and faluqdars* received the payment in the 
currency ef the area and paid inte the government treasury in Siccas enly0 
Trade in currency had gradually extended te receinage ef eld Siccas every 
third year9 a measure which earned prefit fer the shreffs and the mint 
besides acting as a check against debasing the metallic centent ef the 
rupee* As money lenders te Zemindars and bankers te government* and 
finally as suppliers ef bullien * the shreffs and particularly their chief*
the heuse ef Jagat Seth*came te enjoy a very pewerful position* pelitically 
as well as secially* abselute central which the shreffs exercised 
ever bullien prices9 currency and internal credit ran ceunter te the 
interests ef the English* As ene ef the principal imperters ef bullien 
they eften resented the prefits made by the shreffs merely by minting the 
silver they had brought in* The English tried te remedy the situ&tien by 
ebtaining the right te mint ceins at Calcutta in their treaty with the 
Nawab Si raj ud daulah which was further cenfiraed by Mir Jafar after 
Plassey* The clash ef interests further increased after Flassey whan the 
shreffs began undervaluing the Calcutta ceins and the English were equally 
deteruined te utilise their newly acquired influence in ceunter&cting 
these efferts ef the shreffs* The clash had further intensified with the 
Cempany decerning crediter te the Nawab and the Company’s servants and their 
gumashtas becoming meney lenders te the Zeminders and farmers*The almost
1*. Seme idea may be had frem the following information extracted from a
report bf 1770 (vide BPC 12 Apr 1770).
Dinajpuri Sanat(eld Siccas) ••.•for rice and ether grains
English Arcet rupee fer Gheev oil
French Arcet rupee fer Ghme* oilfhemp9 gunnies etc*
Sanat(eli Siccas) fer cloth ( with batta fer buyer)
Nadia, HuglfcSiocas*
Malda and j Murshidabad Sanat (eld Sicca)
Birbhum |
Pachet (Raniganj) iViziry er Benares rupees0 
Dacca city*Dacoa Sicca
Dacca district and Tipperas English and French Arcets*
Purnea t Azimabad (Patna) Sanats (eld siccas). x
hangpur tFrench Arcet* Sicoas* sanat*ana Naraini(fer revenue)
Jessere t Siccas* sanats. s'reneh Arcet.
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unequal figfct . had ruined the shreffs1and had affected the traditienal 
pattern ef revenue collection* the Company9s monetary reforms,aimed partly 
as they were against the entrenched pesitien ef the shreffs, Reza Khan 
oeuld net he very leud in hie support fer thee* When Verelst* e government 
in 1767 had asked the Khan9 a epinien en prepesed currency reforms « a 
feature ef which feeing the prepeaal ef abolition ef featta er disceunt en 
aanats ( er eld Siccaa) and their acoeptanoe aa ef aaae value aa Sicca 
rupees fer the purpese ef revenue, the Khan echoed the sentiment ef the 
geveraaent at the unaatiafaetery state ef affairs censequent upen the 
"unsteadiness ef the currency in these subahs" as, he further declared , 
'•there is ne fixed value ef oeins anywhere19* His recommendations, hewever9
-n
were in defenee ef the featta er disoeut and fer the preservatien ef the
2"trade ef the sarrafs, whe gain a liveliheed fey it19* The Khan98 tene was
almeat inaudible then* With pesitive recommendations fer afeelitien ef
the gumashta system and freeing ef trade the Khan new returned te his third
peint with nere vigour* Recemnending the resteratien ef the eld banking
and shreff system as his third prepesitien the Khan maintained that s
"It was the ancient practice fer the aumils and Zemindars te negeciate 
the greas revenues with the merchants and bankers and they paid Siccaa 
inte the treasury at a certain rate ef exchange* This established the 
credit ef the bankers and their business fleurished* They imparted vast 
quantity ef specie into this country from Akbarabad ^~Agra_7,Shahjehai>- 
afead ^ D e l h i y  and Benares te carxy en their extensive concerns 0 From 
the present mode ef permitting ^ remittinjj7 the gross revenue inte the 
treasury, the Government derive ne considerable advantage* On the ether 
hand the business ef the bankers and merchants suffers thereby a total 
stagnations the currency ef the province decreases daily te the distress 
ef all ranks and the revenues are oellected with extreme difficulty* If 
the ancient custom ef negeciating the revenues at a certain rate ef 
exchange was revived the business ef the hankers and merchants weuld be 
restored te credit , the scarcity ef specie less severely felt and the 
revenues collected with ease"© 3
The Council proceeded te discuss the Khan*3 memoranda en 28 larch 17&9» 
and at last were spurred inte aotien0 They accepted the validity ef his
1. Vide Warren Hastings te Clive, 2 August 1759o(Add 29096 f 160)*
Warren Hastings te Clive,18 August 1759. (Add Mss* 29096 f 169)j
Warren Hastings te Clive, 9 August 1759*(Add Mss* 29O96 f 164)*
2* Reza Khan te Verelst ( recdi 25 Nov 1767)* CPC, II, 676,
5* Reza Khan9s "prepesitien"* BPC 28 Mar 1769*
complaints, declaring, M The Beard have hut tee much reason te apprehend 
that the trade is greatly obstructed, that private merchants suffer many 
impediments and that an impreper autherity is exerted hy the Residents at 
the eut Factories"1They decided as a first measure te withdraw the 
Residents frem the eut-statlens ef the Kasimbazar factory, and in the 
secend place te withdraw their parwanas frem the Ceapanygumashtas *By se 
doing they intended te put the gumashtas en the same footing as ether 
merchants, accepting the Khan's argument, that their gumashtas* "frem these 
purwannahs derive an autherity te the prejudice ef native merchants and te 
the great eppressien ef the Pycara and Dellels ^"balals^ "^Further 
consideration ef Reza Khan's memorials, which included many ether matters, 
they postponed until after Verelst's return frem attending the Punyah 
ceremony at Murshidabad©
5
In April Verelst attended the Punyah , as Reza Khan had asked him te, 
and for seme weeks oensulted with the Khan, with Becher the Resident , and 
with Aldersey, the Chief at Kasimhazar* The latter cenfirmed that there had 
heen repeated cenplaints hy the 'country government9 about the prejudice 
arising te the general trade ef the country , "hy the mode at present
A
adopted" fer making the Company's purchases , while Becher observed that
the withdrawal ef the parwanas ef itself weuld achieve nothing unless
5
followed up hy further regulations* By mid May Verelst had completed his 
enquiries and consultations, and without waiting until his return te 
Calcutta he acted te re-establish control ever the commercial branch ef 
the Company* Frem Be&lia, modem Rajshahi, en 1d M ay , he framed and 
despatched a seventeen point set ef regulations, te Aldersey at Kasimbazar* 
He wrote, "having new finished my enquiries and investigated clearly the 
causes ef the general deoline ef the silk trade in these districts it 
appears te me that under the sanction ef the Company's name force has heen 
exerted te oblige the assanies^~debters in any way er defendants^te the 
disposal ef their Putney at an under rate and ever weight /TndJ/ that /711k/ 
winders have been compelled te work fer wages inadequate te their labour
1* BPC 28 Mar 1769 2* ibid*
In this ceremony the Nawab Nazim presided* Since 1766 the governor and 
in his absence , the Secend in Council, represented the Company in its 
capacity as Diwaa*
4* Aldersey*s letter ef 5 May 1769* BPC 19 June 1769*
5# Becher's letter ef  ^May 1769* BPC 19 June 1769*
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a monopoly having hy these Bethels heen established which has heen destruc­
tive te the trade ef the foreigners and has annihilated that ef the native* 
The autherity ef the Government has heen trampled upeni its revenue 
diminished and the basis ef its support* its commerce* undermined**• Verelst 
was making a very nederate statement» fer the situatien was really much 
werse than indicated* He feund the situatien se desperate that he urged
2
Aldersey te promulgate the regulatiens immediately as an interim measure0
One group ef regulatiens was designed te re-establish the autherity 
ef the Nawab* s gevernaent ever the commercial agents ef the Company* thus 
satisfying the demands made by Reza Khan in his prepesitiens* Thus it was 
declared that if any manufacturer er trader had any grievance abeut the 
price paid te his by the Centpany*s agents, he might appeal* All such appeals 
were te be accemp&nied by a certificate frem the gevernment officer ef the 
market er locality* stating the market price ef the cemmedity en the day 
in questien* If any deduction had been made beyend 15 per cent interest a 
year upen any advance made te the manufacturer er tr&der9 the payment should 
be held te be illegal* Again any attempt te force gecds instead ef cash 
upen a manufacturer, as his advance from the Company was declared illegal* 
Goods se imposed were made liable te confiscation by the government* Another 
clause laid down that "ne force whstever is te be used to oblige the assaaiet 
te the disposal ef their Putney te the Company er any ether individuals in 
their service | who fer the recovery ef their just ballances • • • are te 
make application te the officers ef the government" who weuld do such justice 
" as the circumstances nay require"* Most comprehensively* it was ordered 
that the " Gunges" er markets 9 established near the Company*s factories 
and out factories were te return te the jurisdiction ef the Nawab* s officials 
They were te judge disputes among the peeple9 and net the Residents9 who 
hitherto dealt with oases in their cutcheries* If a Resident were net 
satisfied with the official's decisions, then he must move his superior, 
the Chief ef Kasimbazar fer further redress*^
Other olauses ef the regulatiens were designed te prevent the monopoly 
and abusive practices carried en in the name9 though net always in the 
interests ef the Cenpany© The gevernment officers were directed immediately
T. Verelst te Aldersey* 18 I!ay* BPC 19 June 17^9*
2# Verelst*s regulations enclosed with his letter te Aldersey.BPC 19 June17£ j
3. ibid*
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te make it known throughout tho districts that tho seer was established
at 76 Sicca weight, with an addition of half a Chhatak ( 1/32 of a seer)
for "turn of tho scale", and that tho current oppressive practice of taking
200 Sicca weight for a seer, with an additional allowance of 20 to 23 seers
was abolished* It was also ordered that all advances were to be paid in
sanat or other rupees en which batta er discount was to be allowed at the
bazar rate, and that the current practice of forcing the base coins at
an unjust batta was to cease* By another clause the praotice of obliging
private merchants to bring their goods to the local factory to verify
whether they were the varieties required for the "Company' 8 assortment"
was prohibited* This harassing practice had usually resulted in the
merchant having to dispose of his goods to the factory officials9 who
appropriated them on the pretext that they were needed by the Company* It
was also provided that all deliveries to the factory or receiving centres
were to bo sealed, and that they might not be opened except in the presence
of the supplier or his agent, the weighman and at least three other
witnesses* The weighman had to be acceptable to both parties* No servant
of the Company or dependants were to receive Nazarana or presents from
manufacturers, Pycars or others on pain of dismissal and such other
punishment as the nature of the offence required* Artisans were no longer
to be made, as hitherto, to pay one rupee a day on account of the peon
set over them to prevent their selling contract goods to other purchasers
at a bettor price* Sardars1 wore also prohibited from forcing winders from
their houses to work at the Company's factories* If the Company's winders
deserted their names and addresses were to be given to the officers of the
Nawab's government for action* The regulations ordered that M these poor
people receive the reward ©f their labours in proportion to their work",
prohibited the infliction of corporal punishment and torture upon them, and
provided that if they were proved idle ” which can easily be ascertained
by the overseer at tho close of the day by bringing the work and the
workmen to the Resident they may if example is necessary be punished by
2
his direction, but by no other order whatever"*
Verelst had taken note of the fact that the weavers and silk winders
1* Literally headman - here overseer or labour contractor*
20 Verelst' 9 regulations enclosed with his letter to Aldersey on 18 Mdv 
BPC 19 June 1769.
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were rarely paid were than a third ef what was due te then for their 
Seeds and their labour, and that very large suns were in dispute between 
such manufacturers and the Pycars, winders and Sardars* Besides legislating 
te prevent abuses in future, he set up twe boards of arbitrators! ene te 
deal with disputes between the manufacturers and Pyoars9 and the ether te 
arbitrate between the silk winders and the Sardars*^
In formulating his regulatiensf while yet at Bealia and cut off frem 
all outside influences, Verelst had been moved both by his conferences 
with Rosa Khan and Becher and by his experience ef the realities ef the 
situatien in the distriots0 He was seen reminded ef the eppeeitien9 his 
reform was likely te meet from vested interests9 fer Aldersey objected te 
an immediate promulgation of the regulations, suggesting that they should
be deferred until the next season, and that the prior approval of the
2President and Council should be secured* Aldersey*s objections were based, 
officially, en the difficulties that weuld ensue in realising the huge 
amounts outstanding with tho Pycars, which at Bealia alone amounted te 
ever twe lakhs, besides ether big sums at Kumarkh&li and Jangipur, if the 
Pycars lost their control ever the manufacturers, te whom they in turn had 
made advances, by the promulgation of the new regulations^ Verelst was 
aware, however, that these were not the only reasons for Aldersey1 s 
objections* The Resident and his staff at Bealia out-factory alone had 
made some Rs 60,000 a year frem Nazaran&s, the Resident taking frem twe 
to six rupees from each client, the B&nian and the Account Keeper consi­
derably mere* Such charges upon the petty traders and manufacturer!
would be threatened by the regulations* Again though Verelst put it on 
reoerd that he did net regard Aldersey as author ef the abuses against 
which he was legislating, he had taken serious notice ef the malpractices 
ef Goring and to a lesser degree of Forbes, his successor as Resident at 
Bealia, as well as ef Kantee Biswas*^ The grip of the Company,s servants 
was in fact very strong both at Bealia and at Kasimbazar* When he had sent 
his own men to buy silk and silk piecegeods as a test they had returned 
failures* Even Reza Khan and the Nawab had found it necessary te seek his 
aid in procuring silks for their own households©**
1. Verelst*s regulations. BPC 19 June 1769. Arbitrators chosen were 
Ramsundar(Pycars),Ratan(canufacturers),Rawji(winders),Ghesal(Sardars)*
2. Aldersey te Verelst,30 Kay.BPC 19 June 1769o
3* Verelst*s letter^ BSC 19 June 1769. 4. ibid* 5* ibid* 6* ibid.
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Aldersey*s letter was a warning ef the trouble he might faoe ever the 
issue, and te strengthen his position Verelst from hi shat Bagh sent a 
detailed report to the Company in a letter dated 5 June 17^9* before his 
return to Calcutta,In this report many ef the points made by Reza Khan 
and Becher, who was his warmest supporter in the matter, reappear, Gn the 
basis ef his twe months of enquiries in Murshidabad and Bealia he objected 
to the "mistaken authority the commercial department has assumed in the 
country**, commenting that "...net content with taking villages at will 
for the Company* s and private investment it has even gene so far as to 
prescribe the very districts where tho. little trade left to the native or
foreign merchants shall be carried en**0 He took up the Khan*s complaints
2
about the drain of silver declaring that whereas commerce had once 
sustained the opulence ef Bengal, now under the Company had become the 
cause of w its principal loss and drain" 0 He illustrated the decline in 
silk trade from figures in the Pachotra (Murshidabad Custom House)accounts© 
Despite the Maratha invasions which affected the silk producing areas, the 
Murshidabad production of silk had never fallen below 12,000 maunds a year 
in Alivardi Khan*& day,.Between 1730 and 1737 the average exports, on 
which duty had been levied, had been as high as 23,000 maunds a year* Prom 
1737 however production had begun te fall, and since the acquisition of the 
Diwani in 1763 it had fallen to below 7000 maunds© Even with the additions 
of the silk manufactured in the Company*s filatures, this represented a 
great falling off in production, many workers having taken to "raising of 
other crops".^ Verelst summed up his analysis of the evils affecting 
Bengal thus i
"An authority totally independent of and highly prejudicial to the 
government has been assumed.••.Orders have been issued to the 
government* s officers enjoining them with severe threats not to permit 
any other person than those employed in the Company* s name to purchase 
silk | These agents have exerted the most unbounded tyranny in an 
indiscriminating eiesure of every one*s property j and when by chance 
any of it escaped their vigilant rapacity, fines, imprisonments and 
corporal punishments have boon the lot of tho distressed industrious 
ryots| while the intimidated landholder has silently bemoaned tho fate 
of his oppressed tenahts incapable of administering relief or of 
preventing the daily increasing ruin of his lands" 0 4
1© Verelst* 8 letter of 3 Juno, BPC 19 June 1769*
2. In his Yiew(p81) ho was later to calculate the drain upon Bengal in the 
first five years after tho acquisition of the Diwani at £4,941,611,and 
this on the Company* o account only©
3* Verelst* s letter of 5 Juno. BPC 19 June 1769.
4o ibid.
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On 19 June 1769 Verelst placet the whole issue of the Company* s
method of investment, together with his proposed regulations,copies of his
correspondence with Becher and Aldersey and extracts from his letter to
the Company, before his Ceuncil0 He reported Aldersey*s objections that
there .should bo no alteration in the mode of provision of the Investment
"untill it could be changed under the sanction of the president and
Council19 - and concluded , **A sanction, Gentlemen, I earnestly recommend. .1"
His request was heeded. The Council resolved to adopt the Dadni systea
and instructed tho Kasimbazar factory accordingly. They also pinned
reponsibility for disorders in the eut-stations firmly upon the factory
administration itself, commenting, * we are astonished such enormous
o
proceedings have remained so long unnoticed**. Verelst had carefully 
absolved Aldersey from personal responsibility for the abuses) the Council, 
more blunt, directed the chief and members of the Kasimbazar Council to 
set an " example of integrity and assiduity** in their own cenducto
On 19 Juno tho Council adopted Verelst*s regulations. On the 20th, 
Verelst wrote to Reza Khan that " the scheme which the writer ^ VerelstJ  
devised for the transaction of the Company* 8 business in consultation 
with the Khan and Hr. Becher Bah ram Jang Bahadur, has been approved by the 
members of tho council. Accordingly the systea of Dadni will continue • • 
and the gmaashtahs who were the cause of oppression will be dismissed. As 
the proper transaction of the Company’s business depends on honest and 
truthful persons, it is desired ^ b y  the w r i t t h a t  whenever llr.Aldersey 
inquires of the Khan about tho conduct of any person, the said gentleman
4
nay be infomed of the fact**. He concluded with the hope that this would 
lead to the prosperity and increase of population in the mufassil.
Over the question of gumashtas and of abuses in the Investment, Reza 
Khan had apparently won his peinto Many of the points in his propositions 
had been agreed to, and some of the authority over trade , lost after 
Mir Qasia’s downfall, had been restored to the Nawab* s government. In the 
larger question of revenue administration, also taken up at the time of 
the Punyah, he was less successful. He did persuade Verelst and Becher to
1. 3PC 19 June 1769. 2. ibid. 3. ibid.
4. Verelst to Reza Khan, 20 June 1769* CPC,11,1437•
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agree to seme reduction in the revenue deia&nd upon the zemindars, in 
amounts varying from Rs 93»602 in Rajshahi, Rs 86,879 in Birbhum, Ra20,000, 
Rs 12,140 and Rs 5#000 for Edrakpur (Gevindaganj in R&ngpur), R&jmahal 
and the 4 anna Zemindari of Jessore^respectively, to a mere Rs 3#500 in 
Katwa0In Muhamoadshahi and Lashkarpur, the silk producing districts, which 
were expeoted to benefit from the reforms in Investment methods, nothing 
at all was remitted. But with Rs 4,75#511 outstanding for the year 1768-69# 
the reductions could not be considered as particularly generous j they 
represented not so much a change in policy as a bowing to the inevitable0
The Khan, however, secured some satisfaction for his brother, Syed 
2
Muhammad Ali Khan0 He had been Faujdar of Hugli, and in February 1768 
Reza Khan had proposed tnat he should receive a fixed salary of Rs 60,000
3
a year, in lieu of all perquisites; This had been supported by Sykes and the
4
Ceuncil had raised no objection© However the perquisites surrendered to 
the Company yielded only Rs 39»000 in 1768-69, since there was very little 
income from custom duties, and by March 1769 the Council was obviously 
repenting of its bargain/ When at the Punyah a deputation from Purnea 
asked fer a good administrator to be posted to their district, the 
difficulty was resolved by appointing the Khan's brother, who was known 
for his integrity and moderation , to Purnea and by making new arrangements 
for Huglio
Reza Khan was also able to secure the postponement of the farming 
systea which both Verelst and Becher championed and Reza Khan detested, his
1, This later became tho ostate of Haji Muhammad 1'. oh sin, a contemporary of 
Reza Khan who constituted the property into an educational endowment 
known as the Pohsin Fum<« see Hunter, The Indian Kusalmans,pp 184-861 
4*R«Ualllek, Tho British Policy .and the Mug lime in Bengalfyp~2^6f26Vi6Sft
r,
2. Ho wae an older brother of Rosa Khan by a different ••thex\>-Though he is 
salt xe have been an aaainistrator ef Chittagong (deir,lli,0/)tne eis- 
trict did never have any Faujdar or Thanad&r of his name. Perhaps he was 
an officer at Chittagong during Reza Khan's Faujdari(1760-61) as he 
became Faujdar of Sylhet when Reza Khan held the Naibat of Dacca which 
controlled also the administration of Sylhet, Muhammad Ali held the 
Faujdari of Sylhet at least from 1765(CPC,I,2738)if not from 1763 and 
until 1767 when he was posted to Hugli after the dismissal of Kirza Kazim 
After serving at Purnea from 1769 to 1771 he was reposted to Hugli in 
1771• In 1772 he was dismissed by Hastings when Reza Khan was arrested© 
Muhammad Ali retired to Purnea where he lived until his death, his family 
perhaps finally settling there,Reza Khan had married his widowS5eir,III^7
3* BSC 16 Feb 1768, 4o Sykes's letter 15 Hay, BSC 23 July 176# ^
J Joint letter of Verelst and Becher 30 June, BSC 8 July 1769,
R»CA fcTVtnmt m J  Ann OO
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dislike being more grounded against the new class ef farmers,the freeing
merchant and Banian class whs were taking te revenue farming as an
extension ef commercial activity, than against the system aa such, 1 It
may have given him some satisfaction te find that Pran Bess and *3uji*
Mohan Mitra, probably nominees ef Sykes, were discredited and removed
from Rajshahi and Dinajpur respectively and that Rani Bhawani was restered
2
te the administration ef her zemindari0 Buji Mohan was replacet in
5
Dinajpur hy Ram Chandra Sen , Becher*s nominee, who had heen recommended 
hy the Resident* s Banian,^ The gain in Rajshahi hy restoring authority 
of the Zemindar was lest in Nadia ^its Zemindar,haharaja Krishna Chandra 
having had • unjustly* defaulted in paying Rs 1,17*000 en an annual 
settlement ef Rs 7»75»000 fer 1768—69# Hither because ef the almost 
continuous black record ef the Raja se far as payment ef the stipulated
5
revenues was concerned or en account ef the Raja*s relationship with 
Nandkumar,the Khan did net apparently defend the continuance ef the Raj&*s 
administration in the district and readily gave in te Verelst and Becher*s 
plan ef farming ef revenues* Hia farm ef the district went to the 
Company*s Political Banian, Maharaja N&bakrishna and to fourteen others, 
Calcutta merchants and oreatures of the new power# ® The Nadia arranageaent 
did not have his hearty approval and at the earliest opportunity he was te 
work for its annulment#
1, Reza Khan very seldom gave vent to hia inner feeling* In Dec 1774 he 
gave a note on his observation on the past and present state of ^eng&l to 
Coring who had contacted him for and on behalf of Philip Francis* In 
this note (vide.1*0# Mss Eur E 28) he not only described the Zemindars 
and Taluqdars as Hfather and friend of the peopleM(p 345) he strongly 
commented on the farming system which had become universal by then* Ho 
said t "The whole country is now farmed to the best bidders*The effect 
will best shew what advantage is to be expeoted from establishing this 
practice. But the Company must never hope to derive any increase of 
revenue from it* The Renter has neither knowledge of the country nor 
interest in tho improvement"0 (p346)#
2* Buji Mohan’s name was perhaps Braja Mohan. He had been put in Dinajpur 
by replacing the old officials who had incurred Sykes* displeasure* 
Becher found both Bo b o  and Mitra undesirable; Bose had oollected more 
than he was entitled to while Kitra had failed to produce satisfactory 
accounts.( Joint letter of Becher and Verelst 30 June,BSC 8 July 1769)*
3, Harwell*s note on Ram Chandra Sen ( no date). BPP.XIII,99*100# 4# ibid. 
5<> The Maharaja of Nadia has been a source of trouble at least since the 
beginning of Mir Jafar*s rule. Mir Jafar had assigned the revenue of 
the district to the Company to clear his debts but Scrafton, the Resi­
dent was so exasperated that he suggested that the Calcutta Council 
should threaten hia "with the loss of his cast/iic7.• *H(BPC Q Jul 1758).
C .  - - - nnn Tr * J » 7 c  u
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One other issue,in which Beza Khan was much interested as an upholder
of the old order\ was the provision made for the members of the old
ruling fatally of Sarfaraz Khan( 1739-40) • Murshid Quli(1700w27 )had bought
and set aside the Khas Taluq of Assadnagar for his daughter, the mother of
Sarfaraz Khan, and wife of Shuja ud din (1727—39) .Wlien Alivardi Khan
became Nawab after the defeat and death of Sarfaraz Khan, he continued to
appropriate the income frem tho Taluq to the maintenance of Sarfaraz Khan1!
family, held prisoner at Dacca* Siraj ud daulah, on his accession,
appropriated the estate hut sanctioned a monthly allowance of Rs 5,000 for
tho prisoners, now joined hy the dependants of his defeated cousin, Shaw-
kat Jang of Purnea, Mir Jafar added the dependants of Alivardi and Siraj-
ud daulah to the group, hut reduced the allowance to Rs 2,500 which too
was not paid regularly. In March 1769* Reza Khan had raised the question
of a more generous provision in his Propositions, He pointed out that the
Kh&s Taluq was yielding Rs 62,000 a year and appealed te the Council*s
benevolence, M for the relief of such as labour under misfortune and are
deprived of their just rights". Ho had suggested either aa increase of the
allowance or a reversion of the Taluq to the family, "when the reverses
of fortune have humbled and reduced from a situation of affluence to
misery and dejection". Relief to the family in either way, he maintained,
2
would result in "universal praise" for English liberality,Cn 50 June , 
Becher and Verelst, in their joint letter,supported the Khan's plea^ and 
on 11 August,Verelst again urged on the Select Committee a reversion of 
the Taluq to the family. He commented "<>•• we have laid before you the 
nature of the claims together with the miserable indigence ef Serfraz 
Cawn's family and surviving dependants, I must beg leave to add that their 
ol&ims to the lands in question , are allowed by the greatest enemies of 
the family and their condition commiserated by all who are acquainted with 
it. To behold the undoubted heir to this Subah confined to so small a 
pittance , as is insufficient oven to support nature, is in the highest 
degree unworthy of their hi^i rank and give me leave to observe unworthy 
also the reputation which the English government has acquired for acts of
1, Reza Khan had also appealed for a suitable pension for Faharaja Dhiraj 
Narain in his Proposition (BPC 28 Kar 1769) and this was answered by 
sanctioning a monthly allewanoe of Rs 1,200 (ibid),
2, Reza Khan's propositions, BPC 28 Far 1769,
3* This joint letter was presented to the Select Committee on 8 July 1769, 
BSC 8 July 1769.
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generosity to the unfortunate. It has shewn acts of genrosity to many j 
let it not now refuse an act of justice to those who demand it so 
particularly at our hands'**^  However, the appeals of Becher, Verelst and 
Reza Khan were virtually turned down hy the Cemuittee0 They voted on 11 
August for the continued retention of the Taluq by the Company , merely 
adding a further Rs 1,000 to the existing monthly allowance of Rs 2,500 
from which one hundred and fifty members of the ruling families of Bengal 
had to be supported*
The Committee* s action was indeed disappointing to Reza Khan but it 
should also be seen as a sign that Verelst was losing control not only of 
the larger body ef the Council but also the smaller body of the Select 
Committee* Reza Khan*s propositions of 28 March had been in part accepted, 
and Verelst* s Regulations of 18 May had been adopted by the Council on 
19 June, but the interested opposition which had built up against 
Vansittart in Mir Rasim's day , was ready to make itself felt onoe more 
against Verelst and Reza Khan* The weakness of Verelst*s grip over the
Council had been shown as early as September 1768 when he failed to get
2
Maddison appointed as Second at the Kasimbazar factory , and when the post 
of Acting Chief of Chittagong , virtually promisea to Barwell by Verelst 
and Becher, had been taken by Reed* Ho had suffered another defeat at the 
Council when Becher and not Cartier had been nominated to succeed Sykes 
as Resident at Murshidabadf Becher* s posting to Murshidabad was a serious 
loss to Verelsto Sykes*a resignation in January followed by Francis
5
Charlton*s resignation in March' had further weakened him* Runbold’s 
posting to Patna in 1766 became a cause of further weakness to Verelst in 
1769 and when Rumbold resigned late in 1769 his vacancy was filled by James 
Alexander whoso departure for Patna meant a further weakening of Verelst* s 
hold oyer the Council and the CemmitteOo Cartier was not an ambitious man, 
nor was he a dependable party man* Claud Russell was certainly offended 
when Aldersey,and not hef succeeded Sykes at Kasimbazar^ while with 
Brigadier-Cener&l Smith early differences had developed into ugly hostility.
1. Verelst*s minute* BSC 11 Aug 17^9*
2* Having failed to get Robert Maddison the Second’s post Verelst had sougrrt
to favour hia by other scans as well* Robert* s brother John was recom­
mended for a writer’s pest(letter to Court 25 Sep 1768) and later Robert 
was recommended for a now post of Deputy Resident( ibid 2 Feb 1769).
3. Barwell* s letter,6 Sep 1768# BPP,X,33» 4* BPC 18 Lev, 28 Dec 1768.
5. Letter to Court, 2 Mar 1769. £0 Barwell*s letter,9 Dec 1767*BP£,X,11-12
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Moreover Verelst, as inheritor ef Clive* s regime , was exposed to the 
hostility of those servants of the Company whose immediate prospects Clive 
had injured hy importation frem Madras, and hy the end of 1769 these wen, 
John Reed,Francis Hare, Joseph Jekyll and Thonas Lane had all become 
members of the Council, If Verolst could help he would never wish to see 
then in the Council, The governor had deferred filling the vacancies 
caused hy the departure of Sykes amd Charlton hy about eight te ten months 
because ef his serious difference ef opinion with the majority over the 
question of method } Verelst was for selecting and others for seniority. 
Verelst* s failure te induce the Council to approve his suggestion was in 
itself a signal ef his weakness which became further confirmed when Reed 
and Hare were elected to the Council en 17 October1on the basis of senieritj 
te he followed soon hy Jekyll and Lane en the resignation of Smith and 
Rushold,
Verelst*s situation was further complicated hy the steady influx of 
junior servants from England, The Bengal establishment had seen twenty six 
new-comers, in addition to four from Madras , added in 1765* aether 
sixteen in 1766, four more in 1767 and thltyfour in 1766, the last hatch 
arriving in Bengal about June 1769,^Few of these gentlemen had come out 
prepared te live within the nominal salaries and allowances sanctioned hy 
the Company,Sons and nephews of the Direotors and their friends, as they 
were, they had oeae with hopes of quick fortunes such as the post-Plassey 
*Nabobs* had acquired. Like many already in Bengal they were restive under 
a system where most ef the advantages had become the special privileges of 
the seniors, and were therefore anxious for wider openings in the revenue 
administration than those offered hy Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong,
But perhaps the greatest blow to Verolst , and so to Becher and to 
Reza Khan was tho changed mood and tone of the Directors, By 1767 the
1, Verelst*s argument in favour of selecting members for the Council was 
based en Compariyls lettdr of 17 May 1766 (para 33) asking the Governor 
and Council not to admit anyone in the Council unless they were satisfiec 
in every way including character, With a divided Council Verelst could 
not use this power. See, BPC 25 Aug and 17 Oct 1769# Barwell had observe 
in a private letter on 25 Dec 1769 that "The majority being for succession 
by seniority, the governor's system of advancing hy selection has been 
overruled) this has mortified him not a little",BPP,X,244,
2, Bie figures are from 1,0, Personal Records, V©1 14 pp 466-70.
3, One of them was John Shore, the future Lord Teignmouth whose first
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Directorsf under pressure from the enemies ef the Company*s monopoly ,had 
heen forced to compromise with the Government in England and agree to pay 
£400.000 a year to the Government ©^Political pressure had likewise made 
it impossible for the Company to press home its legal proceedings against 
Johnstone and others who had shared in the presents exacted from N&jm ud 
daulah, Rosa Khan and the Jagat Seth in 1765* -The Proprietors for their 
part were clamouring for higher dividends© These pressures had broken the 
cohesion among the Directors themselves , who had become involved in
national politics9 just as tho wolitici&ns became involved, through Clive1!
5
struggle to retain his Jagir 9 in the Company9s affairs0 The Directors,
already soured by domestio conflict, became bitter when they found that
the acquisition of the Diwani had enly added to their problems, extending
the financial commitments while diminishing its internal autonomy* They
were unlikely to be tolerant or objective, therefore, when they heard
frem Sykes of failure in the revenues of Dinajpur and Purnea, or of the
Faujdar of Hugli, Hirza Kazan Khan9s failure to pay that districts
collection in full*Their anger found an echo in their letters, frem that
ef 11 November 1768 onwards, to the Governor and Council and to the Select
Committee* Without the patience to seek out the true causes of the
deficiencies, they condemned the Amil systea, charged the ministers with
negligence, reflected adversely on Reza Khan for aiding the private trade
in Bombay and Surat cotton of the Governor and members of his Council*
There was even a renewed demand that the Calcutta government was to report
on the very old allegation against &eza Khan made by Mir Jafar and Najm
ud daulah regarding the Dacca revenues* The Directors had not even spared
their governor in Bengal from their bitter comments* By the end of 1768
the opposition led by Lawrence Sulivan , now joined by V^nsittart and
Johnstone had gathered great strength, and in April 1769 Sulivan swept
back Into power* The opponents and oritics of Verelst in Bengal , in direct
contaot with developments in London and in many cases with the Sulivan
group, were strengthened by the developments at home*
7* Vide Court'1 a letter of 20 Nov 17^7• In addition the Company was to pay 
about £200,000 a year for compensating the Government9 s loss of revenue 
"for lowering the Duties and allowing a drawback upon the exportation of 
Teas to Ireland and the British Colonies in America** (ibid)
2* Court9 s letters, 21 Nov 1766, 4 Mar 1767* 16 Mar 1768*' ~
3. Clive9 s Jagir of Sicca Rs 222,958 was extended oh 23 Sep 1?67 for a 
further term of ten years frem 5 May 1774 er date of decode if earlier, 
Court9a letter 20 Nov 1767*
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Circumstanced as he was9 Verelst had attempted an almost impassible
task hy his regulatiens ef 18 May. As the First servant ef the Ceapany
in Bengal he was evidently conscious ef the paradox ef the situation
which he described later in these werds t 99 Experience must convince the
most prejudiced that te held vast possessions9 and yet te act en the
level ef mere merchants making immediate gain eur first principle ; te
receive immense revenue9 without possessing any adequate protective
power over the people who pay it f te he really interested in the grand and
generous object9 the good ef the whele9 and yet te pursue a narrow and
partial end | are paradoxes not te he recenciled9 highly injurious to
eur national character9 dangerous te the best defended establishment9and
almost bordering en inhumanity1^  Verelst had lent his weight in favour ef
the 1 good ef the whole1 in preference te 9 narrow and partial end9 which
was Asking ef • immediate gaim9. The Clive system was already under a very
severe strain and the mounting opposition to the system new received a
definite point ef ceimter-atiack and Reza Khan became the eventual
sufferer0 Te effect reforms Verelst needed pointing out the current
irregularities and abuses9 but Barwell9s comment in a private letter
is sufficiently indicative ef the origin ef the counterblast that engulfed
Reza Khan. He wrote t MTha Cessimbazar investment has afforded Verelst
an opportunity te expatiate en the rapacity ef the Cocpany9s servants of
the lower class. I wish fer the sake of the service that the frauds
pointed out at Bauleah had net been neticed9 but measures taken to prevent
2
such mismanagement in future"0 The service had taken the challenge which
found expression first in the pretests ef Aldersey 9 and then in the
measures ef the Seleet Committee. The service again9 it should bo reaem-
beredf was primarily commercial in motive if net always in actual
assignment ef dutiesg and Verelst9s dream ef a Company9s administration
3
"totally free from commercial views and cenneotiens^ was yet tee pre­
mature. While Verelst was yet making hia enquiries and the Council had net 
gene beyond the decision te withdraw their parwanas frem the guaastas, 
Aladersey had, on 5 » addressed a long letter te the governor
observing that 99 However Justly the Company9 s agents and the Gomastahs
1* Verelst9s letter. BPC 16 Dec 1769o
2. Barwell te RoLeycester, 24 Dec 17^9« BPP»X«259.
3. Verelst9s letter* IPC 16 D^o 17&9»
l«g
•f private Merchants may Tie accused ef having ^ madej^ a had use ef their 
autherity in the ceuntry the divesting the* enly will net give the due 
relief to the farmer unless precautien can he effectively taken at the same 
tine te renedy the abuses se universally complained ef having heen committed 
hy cellectors ef revenues dispersed all ever the country* fer where
is the encouragement if after receiving 6f instead ef 5 rupees a seer fer 
his silk he is liable te he deprived ef the whole hy such unlimited 
exactions" This was net se such an attack upon freeing ef. trade which he 
declared "•••is nest certainly te he wished fer«.*"* er a defence ef 
the gumashtas as such, as it was a tactical and diversionary wove hy opening
a new offensive* this time against the instruments ef government© Aldersey* s 
immediate objective was apparently te retain the control ef the Commercial 
branch ever the territory if enly hy sharing in the autherity ef the 
Resident© He was persuaded "ne attention will he wanting en the part ef the 
gentlemen new residing at the Durbar that may induce the ministers ef the 
ceuntry government te take every necessary measure©©, hut these abuses are 
se grafted in the very frame ef the government that te eradicate them 
effectually must probably he a work ef time",^He had duly taken note of 
the current thinking ef the authorities which was te make the success ef the 
investment reliant on officers ef the government " in whose hands the power 
will then wholly rest"|but he was ef the opinion that "the person superin­
tending the silk Investment he vested with such a share ef authority as nay 
he requisite fer its support without injury te the farmer or the private 
merchant" • ^Aldersey* s concrete proposal was that sinoe the revenues end 
the investment were se nearly connected* "they ought te he under the 
direction ef one power"* hut was prepared as an alternative te agree te 
"participate in the Resident's authority"* though in the event ef investment
and revenues remaining in separate hands " each might he naturally inclined
to the support ef his own particular department without sufficiently 
attending te the censequenoes that might ensue te the prejudice ef the
4
ether •••"<> Aldersey* s complaint was an echo ef the eld conflict between
«
the Nawab* s government and the Company* s servants which in a later period took 
serious dimensions between the twe wings ef the Cempany*s administration*
1. AUersey's letter te Verelst, 5 May 1769 .BPC 19 June 1769.
2. ibii, 3. lion. 4, 1>U.
English revenue efflcials and the commercial ef fleers of the Company*1
Verelst's reply en 19 June was a refusal ef the autherity which H Mr*
Aldersey as chief ef Cossiabazar is desirous ef sharing with the Resident
at the Durbar" o Instead* he suggested relianoe en the Nawab's efficials i
"every purpose would be fully answered by the attendance ef an ef fleer
ef the Government en the Chief ef Cossinbazar in his circuit te the
Aurungs* who might immediately redress any grievances pointed out and might
assist him in any enquiry necessary fer his information and the Resident
would, I imagine* be glad of being acquainted with whatever wight tend to
2the ease and encouragement ef the Ryots”* The rebuff was followed by the 
passing ef his Regulatiens by the Council the same day*
Aldersey did net gain his point but he had raised a cry against the
instruments ef government* This cane in handy te Becher and perhaps to a
lesser extent also te Verelst9 who new planned and set up a parallel
executive machinery for the districts and an administrative organisation
for Murshidabad working directly under the Resident and independent ef
Reza Khan's control but acting as a watch-dog on his administration*The
Calcutta government had as early as March 1766 sought the Company's
permission te hold the Punyah St Calcutta estens&ibly te boost up the Bales
of the woollen imports but the Directors had been very much emphatic in
refusing the 'innovation' which weuld mean "in a manner removing the
a
capital ef the province from Muxadabad te Calcutta"* Short of transferring
the revenue capital from Murshidabad te Calcutta expansion ef the
Resident's establishment has been the enly alternative* Again Clive ha*
been emphatio against using Englishmen in the districts without being
countermanded by the Direotors | the alternative being extensive use ef
a new class of native agents0 Just as Aldersey had alse spoken "ef the
undue influence exerted by the Gomastahs and Pycars" as responsible for
introducing " a complicated scene ef oppression which aggravated the
distress ef the oeuntry" in erder te argue his ease for a share in the
1* See ChapterJ0/ and also EmbreotA*T* Charles Grant and British Rule in 
India,pp 87-90*
2* EPC 19 June 1769#
3* Vide Court's letter ef 4 Mar 1767(para 19)0
4* Banian( meaning the new class ef people dependant on the English)
influence had steadily increased at Murshidabad since 1765*M©tiraia was 
introduced by Johnstone* lJabkrishna by Clive, Kantu by Sykes and Gekul 
Ghosal by Verelst.The number of such men who received Khllat at 17&9
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1
Residents authority, so also Becher echoed Aldersey*s attacks on revenue 
collection in order te push forward his plans to establish sere direct 
control over the revenue administration. 0n 24-Mtyt nearly a week after
2
Verelst had already cone to a firm decision on the line of his referas, 
Becher introduced his case in an often quoted letters
"When the English first received the grant of the Dewannee their first 
consideration seens to have heen the raising ef as large suns from 
the country as could he collected.• •0The Zemindars not being willing 
er able to pay the sums required, Aumils have been sent into most of 
the districts. These Aumils on their appointment agree with the 
ministers to pay a fixed sum for tho districts they are to go te ant 
the man that has offered the most has generally been preferr*d. What 
a destructive system is this for the poor inhabitantsQ* 3
Becher added s
"The Aumils have no conneotien or natural interest in the welfare of 
the country where they make the collections, nor have they any 
eertainty of holding their places beyond the yearj the best recoamen- 
- dation they can have is to pay up their Kistbundee punctually, to 
which purpose they fail not to rack the ceuntry <>••• Uncertain of 
their office, and without opportunity of acquiring money after their 
dismission can it be doubted that the future welfare of the country 
is not an object with them ? Nor is it to be expected in human nature0 
These Aumils also have had no check on them during the tire of their 
employment | they appoint those that act under them ) so that during 
the time of the yearls collection their power is ah so lute" ©4
Bocher, less crudely and openly than Sykes, had nevertheless been seeking
to chrb the Khanfs power, in some degree^and hence his solution was neitner
a more reasonable fixation ef revenue nor to attempt a removal of the
deficiencies of the current systea by granting real responsibilities to
tho feemindaro and security ef employment te the anils^ though his own
letter tended to suggest this? Install , his remedy was to post a Naib
selected by the Resident alongside every Anil- appointed by the KkatuAnother
new group ef officials, these Naibs, who werwin ell probability nominees
and dependants of Banians and gumashtas » were thus added to the existing
Set Of officials© These Naibs wore M designed as checks on the Aumils, who
c
were directed not to do anything but with their knowledge". They were to
1. Aldersey* a letter to Verelst of 5 1769© BPC 19 June 1769*
2, Vide Verelst*s Regulations of 18 H a y * ibld0 
3a Becher*s letter of 24 Kay 17&9o ibidp 4. ibid.
5o "I have since my residence at the Durbar £since Jan 176^induced the 
Nabob to concur in measures that tended to lessen his authority" o
Becher** letter *10 Oct. BSC 12 Oct 1769©
60 Joint letter of Becher and Verelst, >0 June 1769©BSC 8 July 1769#
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keep copies ef all accounts and te correspond directly with the Resident.
This move in the field was paralleled by another at the headquarters,
where the Resident duplicated the work of the Khalsa cutchery by
appointing his own staff " to take copies of all papers relative to 
2
revenues". Reza Khan had welcomed this enlargement of stafff and with an
eye to finding alternative employment for mutasaddis and clerks retrench**
hy Sykes9 had offered te help select the new men. The Governor and the
Resident, however, refused his offert apprehending that such men, being
3
the Khan*8 nominees whould prevent the accomplishment of "our plan".
Becher and Verelst had set up the nucleus of a native hut non-Mughal 
administration under direct English control before the governor returned 
to Calcutta to get his Regulations of 18 May approved hy the Council on 
19 Junef They possibly hoped that by these measures they would be able 
to meet Aldersey*s objections to the native government before the 
Regulations conferring wide powers te the government* s officers were
5
enforced*
The Council* s decision on 19 June had been taken when there were
only three ether members, Cartier, Alexander and Floyer, besides Verelst 
£
present. A major decision on policy relating to a very controversial
matter taken by such a -depleted Council , though legally binding , was
7not likely to have hearty response. The arrival, in May {of the nows of the 
development at the India House and partcularly of tho Direotors' letters of 
11 November 1763 containing censures for Roza Khan and Verelst* s 
government further weakened the authority behind the Regulations* It seems 
very probable that Aldersey and others continued to resist Verelst*s 
move in the hope of a change, for after 19 June complaints of the inability 
of tho Company*s agents to procure the Company’s Investment became much
,*«ere frequent® It was alleged that with the transfer of power to the
1. Joint letter of Verelst and Becher, 30 June. BSC 8 July 1769*
2. ibid. 3. ibid.
4* The Joint letter of Verelst and Becher dated 30 June 1769 was a report
on the Punyah and other transactions at Murshidabad in which both 
had participated. Verelst had returned to Calcutta long before 30 June. 
One point which Becher sought to emphasise la his letter of 24 Hay was 
the foreign-nesa or Persian origin of the Mughal officials and his new
measures sought to remedy this, by putting in *n&tives*o These ’natives’ 
were •bviously Calcutta based Banians pnd their dependants.
6. Russell was absent due to illness. Other members were spread out of 
Calcutta as chiefs of factories and as Resident at Murshieabad<j 
7a The General letter was received,in Verelst*s absencet3PC 29 ■ay 1769°
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government* s officers* the Pyc&rs and D&lals had Tieen prevented from
clearing their debts to the Company* as they themselves were said t© be
unable to recover advances from the manufacturers * The merchants dealing
with the Kasimbazar factory regretted their inability to comply with the
new terms ©f business*, The price of silk goods was reported to have gone
up from Rs 5-10-0 to Rs 7-2-2 per piece for the cheapest variety and from
Rs 16-8-0 to Rs 21—1—6 for the most costly* Increases in the prices of
raw silk were likewise reported from all the centres under Kasimbazar,
by over 25 percent at Kasimbazar* rather mere at Paddapar across the
1
Padma* and by over eighty per cent at Kumarkhali,
Two days after these difficulties had been considered at Calcutta* on
16 August* the Select Committee resolved to put English supervisors ana
English assistants in the districts. In proposing this the Committee
accorded their endorsement to the earlier condemnation of the abuses
committed by the gumashtas but took note also of "the numerous train of
dependants and underlings whom the Collectors entertain* whose demands
as well as the avarices of their principals are to be satisfied from the
spoils of the industrious ryetts who thus lose all confidence in the
2
government and seek protection in other places"© They also attacked the 
zemindars* another group of miscreants* whom they described as tools or 
screens or as associates of the Collectors in their illegalities! They 
further went on to attack the morals of the people* the "venality which 
forms part of the genius of the people and which is known or tacitly
allowed by Government without drawing any shame or discredit on the
4
guilty or being thought any peculiar hardship on the injured"0 From the 
people they preoeeded to an attack upon the Mughal aristocracy* who 
generally manned a good number of the higher offices in the province* 
attributing the distress in the country to the want of sufficient checks
1.EPC 14 Aug 1769o The actual Brice increases for raw silk* as reported by
Kasimbsz.rr* wore per seer of 72 Siooa weight* from Rs 7-9-6 to Rs9-1^3
at Kasisbazarp from Rs 7-5-6 to Rs 9-14^ Faddapar* and from Rs 5-5-3
to Rs 9-9-3 *t Kunarkhali* (ibid©)Aldersey had first opposed Yorelst on
the plea that the manufacturers "actually refuse to deliver silk,*©and
offer to return their advances" despite higher prices being offered (vide
letter of 26 Hay,BPC 19 June 1769)$four days later his plea was that the
advances wore irrecoverable(letter of 30 Kay^BPC 19 June 1769)©It is not
perhaps ai^ccidental coincidence that the Kasimbazar merchants else 
offered to work t e new system from the next year(BPC. 14 Aug 1769),
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on the "Instruments ef Government whe are generally adventurers from Persia 
educated in the aanner and principles ef a government whese tyranny, corrup­
tion and anarchy are predominant, whe are strangers te the custeas and 
Indifferent te the welfare ef this oeuntry and whe oannet hy any vigilance 
he restrained er hy any severity he deterred frea practising their native 
oppressions ever a timid, servile and defenceless people", They alse feund 
"want ef persons ef integrity and reputatien among the natives ^ Bengali
A
HindusJ^ t# supply their places)• Finally they expressed their lack ef
confidence , however mild the wording, in Reza Khan himself* They declared
that "..othe degree ef pewer, without centreul, ef knewledge without
partieipatien and ef influence without any effective counter-action is tee
important and replete in censequenoes te he vested in any three ministers,
er rather one single man, whe allewing him the clearest preference for
integrity, ability and attachment amongst his ceuntry-men, cannot he supposed
superior te temptation and at least ought net in good policy te he trusted
so extensively and independently, as has heen necessarily the consequences
3ef the present system"£ The answer then must lie in an extension ef European 
control, hy posting ef Englishmen in every distriot i "While the Company are 
in reality the principals in the revenue ef this country and the most 
interested in the good conduct ef its government every har should he removed
A
that tends te preclude them from a knewledge ef its real state"? Here was 
the direot answer te the restraints imposed on the activities of the 
Company^ servants hy Verelst*s regulations and te his renewal of the 
authority ef the Nawah's government* As Barwell reported, all that Verelst 
could do was to acknowledge the Committee*s resolutions " with the host
5
grace possible",
Verelst certainly could do no better than he did* Ever since the 
Directors had placed the Diw&ni expenditure and political activities ef the 
Select Committee under the direction ef the Council in 1768# the Select 
Committee and the Governor had lest much of their independence ef action 
and the influence ef the commercial branch which dominated the Council 
became increasingly dominant* The chiefs ef factories immediately seized 
the opportunity in obtaining for themselves, and in violation ef the positive 
orders ef the Company, a share ef the commission of two and half per cent 
upon net collections ef revenues which the Company had set apart for
1. ESC 16 Aug 17&o 2* ibido 3o ibido jkid "
5* Barwell te Leyoeater, 4 Oct 1769,3PPtX,256»
6, Court* w Jan end 16 Mar 176AiS*«r*t 0***-co in- *ncs*
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Its civil and military servants when the Society ©f Trade was abolished©
Originally the percentage had been divided inte a hundred shares, frera
which tiie factory chiefs of Kasimbazar, Patna# Dacca and Chittagong were
specifically excluded by the Directors© But Ruabold, who held the double
office of the chief of Patna factory and collector-general of Bihar, bad
argued ~ on behalf ef the chiefa that since the Company had limited the
private trade ef all its servants te the expert and import trades only ,
2
the chiefs should be compensated for this0 Though the restrictions were 
never in practice heeded, the comraercial line got its share in the 
commission on land revenues© Verelst did not oppose the measure which 
directly centradicted the positive orders of the Company in the hope, 
perhaps,of winning the support of the senior servants ef the Company0 But 
whatever gain he might have had in this respect was lost after he had 
get the Regulations ef 16 May through the Council on 19 June ,though with 
only a third ef the Council members present on the occasien0 The iegulation 
had affected not only the chief ef Kasimbazar but also ether senior 
Company servants including Cartier^ who shared in the silk trade ef Bealia 
through the Residentf The Regulation had affected tne private trade of 
all in that it had put an end to the usurped territorial Jurisdiction an* 
judicial powers ef the Company* a servants and their gumashtag, exercise ef 
which alone ensured a high margin ef profit, higher than tnat ef otners wne 
did not enjoy those powers© The demand was for restoring the powers and 
that through its normal channel namely the revenue admini strati on© In tV-ce 
ef a determination te make good the declining profits frea private trade 
and curtailed chanoes ef easy money in the commercial branch by a wider 
English participation in revenue management Verelst was helpless© With
1© Court's letter,20 Nov M & J *  These 100 shares were ordered to be diatri-~ 
buted among the senior servants, some principal sharers b©in& as follows 
The Governor 31 shares; The Second in Council 4b shares; The Commander- 
in-chief (net to share as a member of Council or Connittee)7i shares}
The Resident at Durbar ( not te share as a member ef Council or Committal 
4b shares; Member of Select Committee 3? shares ( if net a factory 
chief); Member ef the Ceuncil(but net a factory chief) 1y share;Cel.2i 
shares; Lt* Col.1? shares; Major i  share, etca (ibid©)
2©Rumbdldts letter, 31 Jan0 B1C 2 Feb 1769oHe also complained ef decline 
in private trade ef factory chiefs on grounds ef large increase of 
Company's investment and competition ef Calcutta gentleiaeno(ibid.)
3o The Factory chiefs were te ;^ t 1? shares each. BPC 2 Feb 17&9o
4. In May 1769*Verelst had allowed one Hr© Pattle te stay at Bealia for 
four te six weeks for "collecting in ef the outstanding advances on
.th.r ,.r«.a«",(Var.lst t. Al.Ur.ajr
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Becher and Rumbeld stationed upceuntry and the commercial branch antago­
nised Verelst ctuld no lender hope te carry the Council with him* Even 
the grip over the Committee was in doubt, for Verelst ceuld count on the 
support of only one nan, Alexander! and he was faced with Cartier whose 
stand was indefinite and with Russell who was disgruntled0 Floyer who 
very often acted fer an absent member was apparently no dependable 
supporter of the governor*To make natters worse fer Verelst, Richard 
Smith had returned to Calcutta early in August to increase Verelst*s 
embarrassments both in the Council and at Vie Committee! Instead,therefore 
ef persisting in his old stands in opposition to what appeared to be 
popular denands, Verelst revised hia own stand and sought to retain the 
initiative in the new measures in his own hands* Five days before the 
Committee adopted the scheme ef supervisorship for the Diwani districts, 
on 11 August,Verelst submitted a lengthy minute to the Committee dilating 
on the oppressive and overgrown powers of the Company*s commercial agents 
particularly that ** •••undue influence which has been in general exerted 
by the agents ef the Europeans | whe joining the power which they 
borrowed from their masters names and ascendancy to their native 
preneness to oppress, became tyrants Instead of merchants &•<>*• In the 
sane minute he also joined the chorus of condemnation of the 1/mghal 
officials, though in this he tended to be moderate and disorLninating*
He had observed t "There cannot be more fatal misfortune befall any 
country, than the destruction of the confidence between the government 
and the Bubjeot, nor can any power have a more pernicious tendency than 
that which is delegated fer an occasional service, to one who is an alien 
to the country by birth, and who besides his indifference or total 
disaffection to it has these additional motives, to a rapacious conduct, 
an insecure appointment, a variety of temptation and the greatest oppor­
tunity to concealment and elusion0 The Avails are cankers te the industry 
of the Ryottf necessity alone has hitherto obliged us to employ them0 The 
transactions of each day are so many instances of infidelity and
1* Smith, on his return from Allahabad, attended Select Cesnittee on 11 
Aug when it met after a long interval since 8 July 1769*Verelstf» 
opposition to his acceptance of a money present of rupees two lakhs 
which was confirmed by the Directors had obliged him to refund the sum 
to the Emperer(The Emperor* s receipt dt 3 July0 BFC 7 Sep 1769)*
2* Another issue on which he gave in ^bput the sane time was the method ef 
filling Council vacancies,, He was obliged to adept the principle ef 
seniority, but sought to make a virtue of it0BPC 25 Aug and 17 Oct 1769b
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unfitness fer suck trusts | and supposing that a few ef then should 
possess seme claims te favour and commendation, the extent ef the 
provinces under their charge 9 is^se censiderahle te expect er even 
hope fer any great services frea the best endeavours"©^
Verelst was te regain the initiative 9 if only te determine the
course ef events whicfc were moving very fast Mid. endeavour te preserve as 
suck unimpaired as peesible9 the system which ke9 jointly with Becker*had
sought te strengthen se very recently* - So oeuld perhaps held out against
the pressure fer a wider English participation in revenue management,
but net when the Directors had 9 perhaps unwittingly* lent support to
that demand© In their letters ef 11 Kevember 1768* the Directors, besites
2
consenting adversely on the Amils* had spoken with considerable praise
ef the administration in Eurdwan^and approvingly ef the direct English
Amanagement ef the Calcutta lands© "Their last letter**, the Select 
Committee observed on 16 August, "has new afforded us the sanction that 
was se essentially necessary, fer the welfare and improvement ef these 
provinces as well as for our own vindication in the pursuit of such plans 
as we may judge advisable te adept© By that letter the Directors sees 
te approve of the distribution and allotment ef the country into Farms 
and ef the appointment ef European gentlemen te supervise the different 
provinces and te contreul the conduct ef the agents ef the country 
government© From this permission we have well grounded expectation ef
5
success te our design of introducing new Regulations"© The truth was, 
as Verelst liter paid*-the Connittee- teok"advantage of an equivocal 
permission"*
Verelst1s minute, BSC li Aug 17^9•
2© The comment was in the letter to the Seleot Committee© fteza Khan 
vigorously pretested against this comment©(Vide his note annexed te 
Becher*s letter© BSC 25 Sep 1769).
5* Burdwan was granted by Mir ^asin te the Company as a jagir in 17^0*
In 1762 farming fer 3 years was introduced in the district,the bidders 
being, "men without fortune or character" as Verelst describes them* 
in 1765 Verelst was appointed supervisor of Burdwan© The Raja*s Khas 
(or directly administered) lands were farmed out te "new farmers", 
with "assurance ef net beinf: dispossessed"©(View* p 71)* The Directors 
had absented l»that we, are perfectly satisfied with the administration 
©*©in which there seems nothing capable of further improvement,but an 
attention te the Chakeran lands and the letting the lands out in long 
leases; which will have a happy effect.*.by attaching the landholders 
more strongly te our interest" •(Court* s letter 11 I:ov 1768)©
A . 1 •++... 11 lv;»w 176ft. VRr. 16 Amr 176Q- 6~ VloW. W 7^
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Verelst sponsored the scheme under pressure, hut he also sought, as 
appears frea the instructions drafted hy him, te restrict the scope ef the 
supervisere* activity, at least fer the tine being , te research. The
"* y i
supervisor weuld be primarily responsible fer collecting information 
about the district te which he was posted. He was te prepare a smeary 
history, net going hack further than Shuja Khan’s day (1727-39)# t ie 
district’s rulers and possessors, their order ef succession, revolutions 
In their farallies,their connections and other relevant natters0 More 
widely he was te record local customs and the privileges enjoyed by 
different classes | the state, produce and capacity ef the lands; the 
revenues paid by the Ryots, and the methods ef collection ; the regulation 
and pattern of commerce! the adainistratien of justice. Such information, 
he maintained, was necessary and a work of time. He therefore wished to 
see the young gentlemen devote thenselves to research, initially taking 
no part in the work of administration. Te soften the blow te their 
aabitien he authorised their indulgence in private trade, adding the 
pious wish that it should not be immoderate. Verelst9s intiative prevented 
an immediate dislocation in Reza Khan’s adainistratien.
The resolution of the Committee taken on 16 August was only too
2
welcome to the Council when it was communicated to thea on 4 September. 
They lost no time in approving the scheme , or in appointing the persons 
who wore to be sent out into the various districts as supervisors and 
assistants .Accordingly Kelsall, the chief of the Dacca factory was made 
supervisor of that district, with J.Sumner,v. Holland and A0 Staples as 
his assistants. George Vansittart was chosen for Dinajpur with John 
Haliberton and W.Pye as assistants. Ducarel in Pumea was given one 
assistant, David Anderson. Per Hajshahi, to the east of the Padna the 
supervisor was W.3.Rouse, accompanied by Francis Gladwin, while the lands 
north-west of Murshidabad and west ef the Padma, including Rajnahal and 
Bhagalpur went to William Hardwood, with William Hooke as assistant0Hugli 
was earmarked for John Graham who was to have Thomas Graham as assistant. 
For Rangpur and Nadia the supervisors designated wore John Grose and Jacob
1. BSC 16 Aug 1769.
20 Secret Cons, 4 Sep 1769«
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Rider with Robertson and John Hojarth as thoir respective assistants. The 
combined charge of Birbhua and Packet went to the Hon’ble Charles Stuart with 
Llathew Dawson as his assistant. The first result of the scheme formulated 
by the Committee and approved by the Council was thus to introduce twenty 
Europeans into the revenue administration^0 Later, on Becher’s recommendation 
Walter Wilkins was chosen for the Tipperah supervlsorship, which he was to
hold in addition to his chiefship of Chittagong which Verelst had secured
2
for him, and Robert Wilraot was chosen for the new district of Jessore0
On 8 September, Verelst undertook the difficult task of announcing the
proposed changes to Reza Khan. He did so with all the delicacy possible,
making it clear that it was the subordinate staff whose failings required ,
this English intervention, not the Khan, Zamindars or Aails. Verelst began
“The Khan perhaps remembers how often he and the writer have discussed 
face to face the question of dishonesty and incompetence of the amiah 
^/subordinate officials^ the zamindars and tahsildars^"coll'ct©rs7, 
who in spite of the repeated warnings that have been issued by the 
Nizamat, have not yet reformed themselves*. 3
The letter went on to refer to the Khan’s expressed wish to see the ryots
of the whole province made ” happier and richer than those of Burdwan”.
A
Reform^ on the lines adopted in Burdwan maptfnot difficult, but in the past 
this could not be effected for “dearth of capable men”. Now, however, that 
difficulty had ended, for this year the Directors had sent out a large 
number of men. Verelst then outlined the plan. The English Amins were to 
correspond with the Resident not the Khan, but, Verelst explained, they 
were not to interfere with the revenue administration. Their function would 
be ” to gather accurate information regarding the state of the Sarkars and 
parganahs ^ "revenue divisions and subdivisionsJ  in Bengal, the resources 
of the land , the present revenue, the increase and decrease of the sane,the 
good and bad qualities of cloth and other goods, the number of Tantis'
/^weavers_J/, in faot all matters, a full knowledge of which is essential
1, Appointees totalled 21 but e£ them Ducarel was already at Pumea. The 
Directors had asked the Select Committee (vide letter of 11 Nov 1768) to 
appoint one ©r more “of our most experienced servants”for investigation in 
Pumea,”such as has been made in Burdwan”.
2. Becher’s letter of 26 Nov and Select Comndttee’s reply .BSC 10 Df>c 17&9*
3. Verelst to Reza Khan, 8 Sep 17^9o CPC, II, 1580.
4, Long term faming without auction which had benefited the Company had
earned praises of the Directors though it was equally ruinous for the old
privileged classes. Burdwan, Verelst claimed,“exhibits the face of a 
garden” and^proof ”ef the propriety of the plan which I introduced” in 
1765*(Verelst*s minute, BSC 11 Aug 1769)•See aise View.pp 70-71 and B.rluq, 
East India Company* s Land Policy and Conferee in Bengal. 1 6 9 8 - 1 7 8 4 . To
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1 2 to the English whe are anxious te promote the prosperity of the country".
(Verelst concealed frea Reza Khan that the non-intervention in administra­
tion would end as soon as the necessary information had "been secured.) If 
the Amils, "high and lew", created difficulties for the supervisors, as was 
likely, the Khan was asked to inflict heavy punishment on them, The letter 
concluded with an appreciation of the Khan’s past services, and with the 
hope that "in the present instance also he will exert himself in a way that
may gain him good opinion of both the English Sardars ^~chiefsJ7 and the
3
people of this country"*
Reza Khan was no fool, and doubtless he realised how much the posting 
of supervisors would undermine his authority, hut he was helpless* All he 
could do was to fight a delaying action. The Khan therefore hastened to 
write hack to the governor welcoming the decision of the Council as 
necessary for the complete eradication of the "abuses which still ren&in", 
for safeguarding the rights and improving the conditions of the ryots 
and for the prosperity of the country. But as " a sincere well-wisher of 
the Company" he ventured to suggest that the scheme might he deferred until 
next April, as half the revenue year was already over"f The Khan’s letter 
which had reached Verelst on 18 September also mentioned that "although the 
English gentlemen may net interfere with the collections, yet the Z&rdn- 
dars and Anils will plead dryness of the season on one hand, and the 
appointment of the English gentlemen on the ether, as an excuse for holding 
back largm balances,the recovery ef which will be difficult if not imposs­
ible to effect.^Ho thus shrewdly struck at the Company’s weak point, its 
want of money and dread of iny interruption in the flow ©f revenue: ? This 
was the most effective argument for counteracting the pressure on Verelst, 
if the move were the Council’s rather them the governor’s own* Three days
T. Verelst had great interest in past history, even if* it was for adjiinis- 
trative reasons. Only five day3 before the Committee adopted the scheme, 
on 11 August»he was dilating on its importance. During his stay at lurshi 
-dabad he was himself making enquiries.He had arranged for taking copies 
of records and had hoped some young gentlemen would learn Persian and in 
4 or 5 yoars would produce a "perfect English cipy"(BSC 11 Aug 1769)*The 
Khan must have been aware of this craze of Verelst*
2* Verelst to Reza Khan, 8 Sep 1769. CPC,11,1580. 3. ibido
4o Reza Khan to Verelst, Rood* 18 Sep 1769* CPC,I1,159^*5« ibid.
6. The almost bankrupt state of the Company’s treasury in Bengal had
induced the Council to withhold the remittance of Rs 24 lakhs to China 
and to curtail the Company’s investment from Bengal to Rs 45 lakhs for
the next 2/3 yearr. (Secret Cons* 7 Aug 1769)#
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later, Reza Khan returned to the point, expressing his regret that Verelst 
had g^ven him no warning ef the Council's plans for sending supervisors 
into the districts© Had he been advised beforehand he would certainly have- 
asked for enforcing the scheme at the commencement ef the year er after 
the closing ef the accounts.He urged again te defer the matter till then 
in 1770 so that "the designs of artful people nay he defeated, and things 
proceed in a proper manner".
The Khan might also hope fer the support of Becher who too had been
caught unawares© The information of the proposed changes reached him in
a comnunicatien from the Select Committee as an accomplished fact, though
he had been asked te give his sentiments "at large on the several points
2
we have already discussed". The measures had been decided upon without
even consulting him despite Verelst*s urgings on 11 August that "no
measure should be taken without his privacy and no resolution formed
5
without consulting his opinion"; The committee's deliberate aot ef ignoring
hi'* Besides some indireot references t* him in the deliberations^vas
offensive enough to make the Resident view the decision with disfavour0 As
Resident it was in Becher's interest te defend the Khan and maintain the
status quop With Verelst'a support he had already resisted Aldersey's
demand fer a share in the powers he enjoyed as Residento Now having just
devised the meanB ef extending his influence throughout the Divrj^ ii areas
of Bengal and Bhagalpur^by appointing his own native agents as Naibs te
the Amils, he was unlikely to welcome the appointment of European
supervisors to those same districts, directly subordinate to the Resident
though these supervisors wero. His opposition to the Committee's plan was
the more probable because he had decided to stay in Bengal for one year
T. Reza Khan to Verelst, Reed, 21 Sep 17^9o CPC,II. 1&10.
20 Select Committee to hecher, 16 Aug. ESC 16 Aug 1769*A copy of the entire 
proceedings was enclosed.
3. Verolst's minute* BSC 11 Aug 1769*
4. The argument that " the delegation of authority to one or to a few 
which require the abilities and activity of many to execute" was an 
indireot reflection on the Resident himself0 See BSC 16 Aug 17&9©
5« Bhagalpur was the chly Bihar district which was administered directly 
from HurshidubadoReza Khan in keeping up with his usual policy of giving 
up the le&at important to save the rest had offered to work the new pl;n
in Bhagalpur(vide his letter to Verelst Reed. 18 Sep 1769,CPC,II,1596). 
Extension of Becher's influence to Bhagalpur brought abouxHT"clash
between Becher and Patna factory over the saltpetre trade of the area
and Verelst supported the Faujdar who was under Becher'3 influence©
(BPC ’I .Tulv 176QK
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more, and though. on Verelst1 s departure he would become Second in Council , 
he hoped to Tie allowed to stay at Murshidabad as Resident, Under such 
circumstances he too had an interest in deferring the posting of the 
supervisors to the districts. When therefore the Council wrote to hi* 
again,confirming the Committee's decision and to have the plan "immediately 
ai#ptai" ani worked1, Becher alee.w#le#a»4 the decision hut declared it 
immediately unworkadle "without i»«inent risk to the present year's 
collections". He requested peraissien te visit Calcutta la erder -te hetter 
oeaprehend the plan and te explain his views and hy the end ef Septesher 
he cane down te Calcutta to{ether with Reza Khan te when Verelst had 
prenised • the secrets ef his heart** when they would neet Shortly 
in Calcutta^
Before ho came to Calcutta, Roza Khan had already written at length 
about various recent measures of the Calcutta government and about the 
series of comments which the Directors had made in their letter of 11
4
November 1768, attracts from which wore made available to the Khan in June© 
He welcomed the Council's and Director’s decision to make it illegal for
5
Europeans to trade in salt, betel-nut and tobacco, but he criticised the 
raising ef the duties on these articles, especially on the last two. About 
the duty on salt which "was formerly fixed at 2jr per cent frem the 
Husselmans and 5 per cent from the Genteos /^and which_7 is ft®* generally 
established at 30 Rs# per 100 Mds^taunds^** he was doubtful of its wisdom. 
Unaware,perhaps,of the Directors* orders to raise between £100,000 and 
£120,000 as salt-duty and- of the eagerness of the Calcutta authorities to 
be on the safe side to assure this pmeunt without any adequate knowledge of 
the amount of salt produced in the ceuntry^he gave his opinion as mouth­
piece of the Company's revenue interest, Katlvo traders, he reminded
1. Council's letter to Becher, Secret Cons 4 Sop' 17^9o
2, Becher's reply to Council,14 Sop, Secret Cons, 5 Oot 1769,
5, Verelst to Reza Khan, 19 Sep 17^9o CPC,II,1600,
4, Vide BSC 20 June1769 and Becher*s letter of 26 June(BSC 8 July 1769)*
5, Reza Khan's note enclosed with Becher's letter, BSC 25 Sep 17^9*
6, From the knowledge they could gather locally in England the Directors
estimated that a salt duty of £100,000 to £120,000 could be collected
but having had no definite information “from any of your Registers" they
advised the Calcutta authorities "to settle how many Sicca Rupees p 100
Buzar Haunds it will amount to", (Court's letter 20 Nov 1767)oFort
Willian authorities fixed Rs 30 per 100 maunds, but without any knowledge
of the salt producedoAbsenoe of any information in Calcutta records 
induced the Directors to remind again in 1771(General letter of 28 Aug)#
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the Calcutta government, were men of small capital an* it might prove that
they could not hear such high duties, and that the revenues might ultimately
suffer. The Khan showed his dislike ef the new farming system which had keen
hailed hy the English and which was introducing a new class ef rich,Calcutta
based Banians as controllers of land, by opposing to the pressure ef London
and Calcutta for the full establishment of the system. He briefly remarked
that " as the districts in Bengal are many, it is impossible to farm them
2
out at once, without foreseeing the disorder it would occasion"0 The Khan 
however, promised to execute the decision of the Company gradually, a 
beginning having been made already in Nadia and Rajshahi0 The Khpn then 
turned to the accusations of the DirectorsJ which he vigorously rejected.
He diagreed with the Directors1 reasonings about the shortfall in revenue 
from Purnea and Dinajpur and denied his over leniency to Souchet Ram,
Muhammad Zaman and Kirza Kazlm, Souchet Ham was in prison "till death 
released him", while Muhammad Zaman who was put in custody in 17&7 was 
"yet in prison environed with misery and distress"• To please the English he 
had been very severe even with the Mirza, a fellow Persian, a friend and 
by marriage into Alivardi’s family a close relation. Neither he nor they wore 
blameworthy - it was the excessive remands which had caused the shortfalls 
in Pumea and Dinajpur and the i;irza had held back a sum of Rs 1,50,000 which
4
he claimed as his emoluments as Faujdar ©f Hugli for two yearn. The failure 
in the revenues of the frontier distrlots of Tipperah and Fachet had their 
obvious explanation in the revolts of their Rajas,
1, Reza Khan’s note enclosed with Becher*s letter, BSC 25 Sep 1769o See also
li.Huq, East India Company’s L*nd Policy and Commerce in Bengal, pp 240-41 o
Reza Khan had withheld his judgement until after two years when the effecte 
of this high* rata of duties would appear. The Company’s income from salt
revenue did in fact fall for more reasons than one, but the Directors held
Reza Khan as responsible for this loss of revenue which formed one of the
charges against the Khan in 1771® (Court’s letter of 28 Aug 1771)®
2, Reza Khan’s note enclosed with Becher*s letter, BSC 25 Sep 1769® The ini­
tial effect of the new farming system in Burdwan has beon as noticed by
Verelst (BSC 14 Sep 1765) that " the old farmers who had possession perhaps 
from father to son for many years past, continued to rise in their offers, 
and probably exceeded the real value of the lands, rather than be turned 
out of what they had esteened as their estate and habitation and insulted 
by the new-comers"0 Ultimately they failed to pay and surrendered,
3, The Directors' comments were based on Sykes’s report on Purnoa and Dinajpur 
(BSC 10 Fob 176?) which is already notioed in the previous chapteib
4* As Verelst reported to the Select Committee on 20 June 1769, llirza Kazim 
had already paid the money due fren him. The Kh^n had put the L irza also 
i"t© ee'nfinement, BSC 20 June 1769o
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Reza Khan also protested strongly against the aspersions cast on the 
»
Mughal judicial system t
"The exacting of fines has heretofore never been a means of exempting 
the guilty from punishment | on the contrary every degree of severity 
and torture has been and is still inflicted on them as enjoined hy 
the Laws of God. Had a thirst for fines caused any deviation in this 
point, the had consequences te which it would have tended in the 
regulations and .institutions of this Empire would have sufficiently 
appeared before this Juncture*© 1
He was equally hold in defending the Amil system© pointing out that it was
not9 and had not been© the practice to appoint them for just a year or two0 
"These Souhahs consist of thousands of districts, and every district 
contains hundreds of Pergunnahs© Talooks© and villages© and the Auails 
who nonage their collections do not receive their appointments on 
condition of one year only i whoever for years together gives proof of 
his diligence in the cultivation of the country© the Ryotts are 
satisfied with his conduct and no complaints made against him© is 
never dismissed". 2
He added t "We lock out for men of capacity© principle and religion© hut 
from amongst thousands we pick out one fer his appearance and good 
character© it iB only a course of business© and they seeing him vested 
with power© that will convince us of his good or had disposition© and 
in whomsoever this latter appears© and the Ryotts complain of his 
oppressions© he is of course necessarily disnissed*© J
Then from this outspoken defence of the quality and efflcieny of 
Mughal system© the Khan turned to a hitter rejection of the accusations 
nade hy the Directors against him personally© He emphatically asserted 
that he had paid into the treasury whatever he had collected,"to the last 
trifle". He then recalled that it was Mir Jafar who© after his restoration©
1o Reza Khan’s neto enclosed with Becher’s letter© 3SC 23 Sep 1769o ^hcre 
was as yet no direct attack from the Directors on the judicial system© 
hut an indireot one© made in paragraph 11 of their letter to the Select 
Connittee on 11 Nov 17&8« Observing that they were happy that the short­
fall in Dinajpur "has not arisen from depopulated or oppressed state of 
the country© but solely from the villainy profusion and folly of the 
Rajah and his ministers".© the Directors had added that "Wo oannot suffor 
suck a depredation of the revenges© and shall not think the ministers do 
their duty if the ball an cos ©00 are not all recovered© andwo are asto­
nished at the lenity of the Nabob and Mahmud ttosa Caen in not having 
made some severe examples of those groat offondors0 Whore has 
always been a most dishonourable practice of fining for crimes which is 
unbecoming all well administered governments. • ."©
2© Heza Khan’s note enclosed with Becher1s letter0 BSC 25 Sep 17^9o Reza 
Khan appears to have had reaoted sharply to the remarks like "an almost 
annual change" and "a succession of rapacious governors" which were made 
in the Directors’ letter of 11 Nov to the Select Connittee© Anils, it 
appears, formed a cadre of service and wore posted to different district* 
as an*/when deemed necessary©
X _ H . k a  KVi a v i I ©  n . i .  © n A l © a © i  -f.k  «  1 R n  1 7 h O
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had insisted on the Khan* s acceptance of the office of Naib l-Iasim as the
Khan enjoyed the confidence of the English* Knowing the distracted state
of the district he had been unwilling to go to Dacca, and had only (;©ne
on being absolved frea any sot contraot© In the second yoar he had been
detained for five months at Kurshidabad and had then had a contract
forced upon him by the N&wab at the instigation of the mutasaddis -
moaning Nandkuaar* Those troubles of 1764 I*1 which Samuel liddieton had
also been involved should have been well known and it must have had
appeared strange to the Khan that they should be raked up now© The Khan
made no complaint against any individual, not even Kandkum&r, but he turned
bitterly upon the Company t
"If with all ny attention to the Company's affairs and attachment to 
their interest, they inspect an agreement which mere force compelled 
me to accept, and bring the balanoe thereof into question, it is 
widely distant from either friendship or equity*© 1
He concluded with a challenge to his accusers t
"The Accounts of my collections are ready, the Country is ready and 
I am ready } make your enquiries"© 2
On arrival in Calcutta Becher asked the Governor and Council to advise 
the Court ef Directors that he would be available for the position of
Second in Council but that he would like to return to England late in
1770 ©? early in 1771« The Council noted and appreved his request© Then, 
on 10 October, before he had said anything about continuing as Resident, 
he wrote to the Select Connittee to urge the deferment of the posting of 
supervisors until the ministers had been induced to work the scheme 
whole-heartedly 1 He was sure he could win Reza Khan's co-operation, given 
time to convince him of the propriety of the plan, and without his
agreement his subordinates would try every art to frustrate it© He also
observed t " 1 think the interest of the Company materially concerned and 
that it is political to shew Mahomed Reza Cawn every mark of respect we 
can, without deviating from our plan of reformation and I think he has a 
claim to this, from the indefatigable pains he takes and the service he 
has rendered the Company"f
1© Reza Khan's note enolosed with Becher's letter© K>C 25 Sep 1769*
2© ibidp The challenge wasdocepted , * by the Company though for other 
reasons ©A lengthy trial in 1772-74 could not disprove the Khan©
3. BPC 3 Oct 1769*
4* lecher's letter 10 Oct© BSC 12 Oct 1769*
Only after making this point did Becher, on 23 October seek the
Council* s permission to continue as Resident at :lurshidabadf arguing that
the station was l,next in importance to that of the Governor”, and that
he thought himself by now " at least as qualified te conduct that branch,
as any member ef the Board that can be oent“^  Becher* s request to stay
as Resident caused no lengthy debate, perhaps because he had already
canvassed his case very thoroughly. Nevertheless, he did net retain the
2post without what Barwell reported as * a pretty hard struggle1* f which
showed in the minutes as a proposal by Floyer that Becher must comply with
the rule of 28 December 1768 that the Second in Council must always stay
in Calcutta, ready to take over the governorship in emergency. Brigadier
Smith naturally supported FI oyer and Rusbold, Becher, Rumbold argued that
as Becher was only staying in Bengal for another year he could not be
regarded as the eventual successor to the governorship, and that the rule
3might therefore be waived in this exceptional case.
On the proposal to defer the posting out of supervisors, however, 
opposition was more open and prolonged^ Though the Council did eventually 
recommend a postponement of the scheme until after February 1770 , except 
in Nadia, Rajshahi, Pumea and Rajmahal , and in any other district which 
the Resident might suggest, Floyer and Smith entered long dissents against 
delay. They opposed Becher*s plea for time to win ever Reza Khan, and they 
objected to the "idea of appointing persons on behalf of the ^ "liawab’sJ  
Government to accompany our Supravisors". Smith maintained that the Khan 
had sense enough to understand that it was his duty "fully to conform to 
whatever is directed by this Board" and that to send persons on behalf ef 
the Country government would be " to send so many spies of the ministers" 
into the districts. To wait for the ministers* approval was useless, he 
argued , for it never could be their wish or interest to " enable us in 
some future time not only to bring in a large surplus of revenue to the 
Company*s treasury but to have ministers as wo have the Nabobs aerely
5
nominal"\
1, 3PC 23 Oct 1769*
2* Barwell to his father, 25 Dec 1769* BPP, X, 244
3. EPC 23 Oct 1769.
4, This subject was taken up by the Council in its secret session*)
Secret Cons, 26 Oct 1769*
5* Smith's minute ef dissent. Secret Cons, 26 Oct 1769*
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Smith then proceeded te attack Reza Khan directly, declaring, MI 
never did subsoride te the very high encomiums which from tine te tine 
have been bestowed upon Mahomed Reza Cawn; fer whether I survey his 
conduct in general or a particular view, I think there is mere cause for 
censure than for applause*• * In a general point of view**, Smith observed,
* 1 presume it will not be contested with me, that this country is by no 
means se flourishing a state at this period, as when he was first invested 
with almost supreme power. It has been urged in his behalf, that the 
country was originally ever rated s supposing that te be the case whom are 
we to blame fer such an Injudicious measure ; a measure which has been 
productive of such very unfavourable consequences to the Company1 s 
affairs, as well in India as in England 9 Fer a particular example ef the 
mismanagement he censured, Smith then turned te Pumea, commenting that
* in the course of three years a fine fertile and extensive province is
reduced one fourth part from the value it was estimated at when Mahomed
Reza Cawn came into power and this toe during a time of the most profound
tranquility*1. Smith held that these were " surely no proofs of our
minister’s extraordinary abilities'*• He ended with another sinister attack,
claiming that when the ministers were making huge reductions in the demand
on Pumea * Aqa Razy who was the humble dependant ef the ministers, and
invested with immediate authority over this unhappy province did accumulate
such a fortune as in so short a space of time could only be accumulated by
rapine and extortion"In similar vein, though Verelst had already given
his findings, on local enquiry, that Mir Jafar’s accusations about Reza
2
Khan’s Dacca collections were politically motivated. Smith declared the 
Khan’s statement te be a lame excuse, and went en to question the size 
ef the salary of the Khan, whose " nest superlative degree ef merit " had 
been M most superlatively rewarded"?
Smith thus proceeded from the implication that Reza Khan was te blame 
for over-rating the country, for employing the severe hand of oppression 
te answer these demands and for introducing the practice ef anticipating 
next year’s revenues te cover deficits in the current collections to
1, Smith’s minute of dissent. Secret Cons0 26 Oct 1769*
2, Verelst’s report te Select Committee, ESC 20 June 1769,
3, Smith’s minute ef dissent. Secret Cons, 2I Oct 17690
the direct imputation of corruption practised through his dependant. The 
Council may have given little weight to the charges ef one who was the 
least informed amongst them about the actual working ef the administration, 
but Smith’s arguments were very useful te these in England who wished te 
condemn the Clivite regime in Bengal, and were seeking a scapegoat. Smith 
either did not know , or he had deliberately ignored the fact that Sykes 
had revised Reza Khan’s assessments for 1765-66 sharply upwards, soon after 
the Company's acquisition of the Diwani, and that it was Souchet Ran not 
Aqa Razy whe had been in charge ef the Pumea revenues. He seemed well 
informed about Pumea only because Ducarel’s report ef 17 August was 
before the Select Committee on 12 October, but Ignored the reporter’s 
observation that " the fault is not wholly to be laid upon the people of 
this country", But for the opposition in London who had re-entered the 
Directorate in April 1769* Smith’s strictures were valuable ammunition, 
whether well founded or not. Significantly every word ef censure of Reza 
Khan in Smith’s minute ef 26 October 1769» &nd of Floyer’s very similar 
attack on 29 March 1770 was underlined in red ink at Leadenhall Streeto
Smith and Floyer were not of course alone in objecting to the
postponement of the supervisor scheme. There were others no less keen in
championing the junior servants of the Company and no less convinced ef the
need to send H cur own countrymen * into the districts, Barwell was one of
these, and his writings to England also served to excite opinion against
the Khan and his administration. As early as 10 September, before the
Council’s decision, he had written to Vansittart, already appointed one
of the three Commissioners to come t© India with exceptional power§, saying
" The present mode of collecting the revenue calls loudly for a reform, ana
unless abilities t© plan and a spirit to execute be equally exerted the
x
golden prospect of the nation will assuredly vanish1*,J After the Khan •»
request for deferment became known, .he wrote to his father still mere
decidedly and alarmingly t
"A system has been proposed for collecting the revenues of these 
provinces and universally approved when proposed. Since that the gentle­
men of the Council seem very indifferent to the carrying ef it into 
execution. His Excellency the Nabob ^ Reza Khan^ has wrote publickly to 
have the scheme postponed, and God knows whether private considerations
1, Duc&rel’8 report to the Resident dt 17 Aug • BSC 12 Oct 1769,
2, The three commissioners appointed were Vansittart (representing Sulivan’s 
party).Sorafton (Clive’s party), and Forde,
3, Barwell to Ho Vansittart, 10 jep 17°9* BPF,X, pp 31-32,
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may not supersede the public good* The Company's possessions whilst the 
present mode ef collecting the revenue is continued, appears te me 
precarious ; all the revenue is anticipated fer the payment ef the army 
and fer the prevision of the Company1s investment* Should then an eneny 
invade the country the Zemindars will naturally withhold the rents, and 
if Mahomed Reza Cawn on whoa the officers of the government are 
entirely dependant carries on any private intrigues, hew easily can he 
influence a total step te the oellections0 What then is te support 
their army ? In such exigency the sending up Europeans will he of 
little censequence‘r0 1
Te sum up the developments ef 17^9* Reza Khan, feeling a little mere 
free after Sykes's departure from Hurshidabad, came out with his suggestions 
for a remedy of the situation in which the country had been left by Sykes*§ 
administration both as Resident and Chief of Kasimbazar* This was possible 
because of the sympathetic response he received from the new Resident 
Becher and also from Verelst, whe were roused from their complacency by the 
decline in revenues and trade* The reforms suggested met opposition from 
the deep rooted vested interests of the commercial branch of the Company's 
service as well as from servants of the Company in general, Verelst acting 
on the Prepositions, then carried through his reforms, designed to reassert 
the control of the Hawab's government and its officers, with just one third 
of the Council's members present* He acted ceuragously but perhaps unwisely* 
As a result the opposition to Clive's system, already growing in strsngtn 
because ef events in London as well as in Bengal, was led to a decisive 
counter-action* Verelst's Regulations of 18 May were answered by the 
scheme of supervisorship which transferred superior power in the districts 
te the European servants of the Company* This rendered Reza Khan and his 
instruments potentially redundant*
Reza Khan could only fight a rearguard action t as Barwell put it,
2
the Khan H not liking the new system, has put off the evil day"0 That he
was able to achieve even this much was perhaps due to the Company's need te
maintain the farce of the Country government se as te resist the British
Government's claims to the territorial revenues ef Bengal and the demand ef
the rival merchant groups within the City of Londen for a free trade te
i* Barwell to his father William Barwell, 4 Oot 17^9* BPP, X,235o William 
Barwell had great influence in the Company's affairs in Lenden*An ex­
servant ef the Bengal establishment 1722-50) ,ex-Govemor of Calcprtta 
(1740-49), he was a Proprietor and also a Director ok many occasions 
0753-57* 175**-65,1766-67),3PP,V I I I 188 nj BPP,XXVII, p 35,
2* Barwell te Leycester, 4 Oct 1769* BPP, X, 23?^
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India and the ending ef the Company’s monopoly. He had also been able te 
use the conflict of interest between the dwindling nunber of senier servant! 
and the ever increasing nunber of junior servants of the Company in Bengal0 
Finally, until December 1?69» Khan could roly upon the support of 
Verelst who saw9 more olearly perhaps than any one elsev how near the 
appointment of supervisors brought the Company to a decisive break with 
all its past in Bengal*
Verelst , who had sponsored the scheme under pressure;supported the 
Khan’s plea that the posting of supervisors to the districts should be 
deferred. Not only that, he also sought, as appears from the instructions 
drafted by him, to restrict the scope of the supervisors* activity to 
research, conceding officially at the same time, their right to private 
trade. Verelst had also taken his vengeance on the commercial branch by 
creating a rival private trade interest to break the hitherto monopoly of 
the commercial branch* Senior servants of the Company,who were in the 
Council and the Committee and who had. earlier forced Verelst to adopt the 
scheme, becoming perhaps suddenly alive to the throat had, as Barwell 
reported,”grown cool" and lent their support to Verelst. With Swith*® 
departure for England in November, Verelst was relieved of his most vocal 
critic though the gain was neutralised by the departure also of Rumbeld
in the same month' .The changed situation enabled Verelst not only to
confirm the deferment of the scheme but also to vest the Resident with 
extended powers On 10 December the Seleot Committee had conferred on 
Becher the powers of recalling any supervisor from his station ~ only 
K el sail of Dacca being excepted - and of making any additions which he and 
the ministers thought necessary to the Letter of Instructions which was to 
be regarded as indicative of general directions, fhe scheme in August was 
seen as a ocmmon threat to the Khan as well as to Beohcr .n: thi interests 
ef the two had coalesced as never before | and with Becher*s posticn thus
1. Barwell*s complaint on this score is made in a letter to Leycester on 4
Oct 1769.he wrote 1 **A plan has been laid down by V—  and approved by the
Board.... The Council are grown cool, and when it will be executed is to m< 
a secret.I hope, however,private considerations will not expldde a 
measure absolutely necessary for the welfare of the country and the 
Company1*(BPP,X,236) .Barwell who was to enter Council on Verelst* s 
departure (and he was called to Council on 2 Jan 1770)had not yet deve­
loped the interest of the Councillors which,as later events proved, 
in violent clash with the private trade interest of supervisors*
2. BSC 10 Deo 1769. . * -
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reinforced on 10 December,Fecher also sought alrost immediately to stabilise
the Khan*s position as near as possible to status quo ante0On 20 December
Becher had instructed one of the earliest supervisors t© be sent out saying
“that it is not tha intention of the President and Council to alter the
present font of government, but that the gentlemen employed by them as
Supravisors are to support the authority of the government1s officers...
and proper respect to be paid to then - at the same time the Supravisors
are to recommend such regulations as appear necessary for the welfare of
the country and the benefit of our Employers - advising me whenever the
officers of the goverment refuse to acquiesoe in what you propose that I
may if I find it expedient apply to the ministers to issue their orders
for enforcing the measure"! The limited controlling power over the district
administration which found a place in Becher*s instruction wag again a
decision of the Committee in order that the supervisors might not be
“ incumbered in their important researches'*, though this, it was declared,
2
should net be “ an immediate active power*• Hie disclaimer, however, did
not decieve Verelst# On 16 December 1769, when Verelst joined the Council
and presented his farewell message for the instruction of his successor
Cartier and ef the Direotora, he drew upon his twenty years of experience
in India -and three as governor to emphasise the revolutionary nature
of the plan to appoint supervisors0 He commended the scheme as a nursery of
able and vigorous administrators for the future. But he warned that
“there is a rock, and a dangerous one which requires the greatest 
circumspection to avoid# We have stepped forth beyond all former 
precedent or example. We have the beat and most laudable arguments te 
justify our conduct# 3ut it should be remembered, that we have reached 
the supreme line, which to pass would be an open avowal of sovereigntyo 
It should be remembered that we cannot be more, without being greater 
than sound policy allows | the interests of our employers at home, no 
less than our national connections abroad, forbid it*# 3
For that reason , he urged t
“If wo were , before the change, cautious of interfering with the native
government..s we ought now to redouble ©ur prudence. The change itself,
supposing the greatest forbearance on ©ur part, has an unavoidable 
tendency to destroy the name of, the Niaanut*. <>"• 4
Such a destruction of the name of the Nizamat and the consequent open avowal
of the Company's authority must injure the Company by becoming the source,
as already had happened in England, “of perplexities and jealousies'*#
1# Becher* s letter to Jacob 'Eyder (Nadia) ,20 Deo 1769. ^uotedi D.'.:-ranerjee, 
Early Land Revenue System in Bengal and Bihar,!, 80-81.
•f nctr* 17<<v ? nvn 1' a
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In history there is no going. hack, and Verelst knew that he could not
return to the old ordering of thing* But ha could and did advise a balanced
compromise between the two systems, the old and the new, a "middle way* where
'•noderation cust guide and continue us; where we nay walk with safety ,
advantage and consistence without danger of too much confinement, or too
much liberty"! As Clive before hin, so Verelst now urged his successors s
"Interiors should be regarded as essentials.Every order should scrupulously
2
wear the sanotion of the native government". There must of necessity be a
show of dependanoe, wherein delicacy to the ministers "should appear meat
3
conspicuous in all transactions, either of business or ceremony1*o Such a 
policy of restraint and regard for ministerial feeling had never been easy, 
and as Verelst foresaw,it was likely te be " more difficult te produce a
4
proper conformity in the supravisors".
Verelst did not fail to record his sense of the difficulties facing his
successor Cartier. " I am not ignorant", he wrote, "hew difficult it is
always to preserve and affect that temperate rule of conduct which I mention,
when the power and direction of all departments so entirely concentrate in
yeur Board". But he also allowed himself to express seme doubt about how far
the scheme of supervisors would be beneficial to the country* He saw that it
was not possible as yet "te form an administration totally free from
commercial views" since every Englishman in the Company*s service in Bengal
derived his "sole advantage from commerce, carried on through black agents,
who again employ a numerous band of retainers". There was a danger therefore
that these "Banians and agents by the spirit with which they aot and the
force of their example" would obstruct the good effects of the administration
7
of the European gentlemeni The remedy Verelst proposed was again the same -
"that the whole weight and vigilance of the Board should be exerted to check
the most trifling variation from the line, and to preserve the idea of native
government, its dignity and superiority over all, as entire and unimpaired as 
0
possible"* Verelst had rendered the last service which he could to the system 
he had inherited and within which Reza Khan worked*
1. Varelst* 8 letter t* Cartier an* Councilo BPC 16 Deo 1769o 2» 1*1*.
3. 4o i*l*» 5. l*l*o 6» 1*1*» 7. 1*1*, 8. 1*1*.
CHAPTER NINE
3HE CONFLICT DEEPENS, 1769-177*?.,
With Verelst*3 departure from Bengal in December 1769* Reza Khan 
had entered a long and bitter struggle for survival0 In this he had 
received much assistance from Richard Becher, whose interest as Resident 
until the close of 1770, had become linked with his. The difficulties 
had been rendered easier te bear by the warmth and sympathy of Johif 
Cartier, an old friend of the Dacca days who had succeeded Verelst as 
governor. But the tines were difficult even for Cartier. Verelst*s 
parting letter of advice , submitted to the Council on 16 December 1769> 
was a catalogue ©f problems bequeathed to his successor. These problems 
did not diminish in 1770, but grew in number and complexity. Bengal was 
in the grip of a still mounting famine and of an epideiaio of smallpox 
which was soon to claim the Nawab Nazim as one ef its many victims. The 
difficult task of introducing the scheme of supervieorships, put off by 
Verelst, had soon to be tackled. In London events were moving towajrd^  a 
revolution in the Directorate and a crisis in the Company’s relations'
1 • #
with the State. Already three Commissioners for India had been appointed 
t© come out with extra-ordinary powers, and the news of their appointment 
weakened Cartier’s authority. In Bengal the group conflicts within'and 
without the Council were still unresolved and still acrimonious. They 
were soon to develop into an open battle between the Committee and the 
Council for control over the revenue administration. And for dealing with 
these problems Cartier was personally ill prepared, for unlike Verelst 
he had no political and administrative experience, his whole career until 
his elevation to the governorship having been in the commercial line. In 
mo9t difficult circumstances all that he could do was to stick to the
t. Both Reza Khan and Cartier were posted to Dacca in 1763, ^ e Khan as 
Naib Nazi© and Cartier as Chief of English Pactory.They co-operated in 
war efforts against ilir Qasim anti remained friends ever sinceo
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course charted for him by his predecessors until he was forced by 
circumstances to change direction# His loyalty to the systen he had 
inherited and inability t© manoeuvre proved costly t© him*
The most pressing problem whioh faced Cartier when he assumed office
2
in December 1769 was still that of the great famine sweeping Bihar and
western Bengal© Reza Khan had officially advised Calcutta of the
3
"dryness of the season" as early as September 1769* Since then the 
drought had continued, destroying the autumn, and ruining the prospects 
of the winter harvest# On 23 October Rumbold told the Council that 
famine conditions had forced him to abolish the duty on food grains 
coming into Patna, where rice was already selling at ten seer3 per
4
rupee, while Becher reported "great dearth and scarcity" at Ivurshidabad# 
The Council ordered 1,20,000 aaimds of rice to be laid in for the 
Company*s army, BO,000 maunds from Dacca and Bakarganj, and 40,000 by 
Reza Khan from Pumea and Dinajpur, supposedly less affected districts©
A supply of rice, premised earlier to Madras, was suspended# Directions 
were given to build storehouses at Patna and liurshidabad, whose 
Supervisor and Resident were told t© exert themselves t© prevent 
monopolization ef food grains and to encourage cultivation ©f "pulse, 
gram, barley and every sort of grain that can be raised in the dry
5
season"# Nevertheless, when Cartier assumed office Barwell was writing
to England, " all the western districts of Bengali and Bahar are in a
terrible condition, and in most places rice sellB at eight and twelve 
„6seers per rupee"0
1# Cartier and Becher were dismissed by the Directors in 1771 for their 
opposition to the junior Qembers of the Council# The Directors dis­
approved "the opposition given by our Select Committee", and ordered 
Russell and Floyer, the other two members, to Madras wherefrom they 
had been brought© (Court*s letter,?1: Apr 1771)* See next chapter#
2# Since Rurabold*s appointment in Nov 1766 at Patna the administration 
of Bihar was made independent ©f Kurshidabad*s control, though patna 
accounts used to be sent to liurshidabad for incorporation in the Diwani 
accounts .Though Shi tab Rai worked directly under Rumbold, he sometimes 
channelled his representations to Fort William also through Reza Khan 
who besides being the acting Nawab for the three subahs was frequently 
consulted by Verelst also about Bihar problems#
Excessive rains in August 1768 had destroyed crops in Bihar and this
was followed by drought# Reza Khan supported Shitab Rai*s argument for 
an abatement in demand. BSC 6 Mar 1769# rguaent
3o Reza Khen te Verelst, Reed# 18 Sep 1769. CPC,II,1596.
4* RPC 23 Oct 1769o ibid# 6#T© Leycester,24 Deo 1769,BPP#X#238#
Before 1769 t**3 ou  ^t Roza Khan and Shitab Rai had sent a joint
representation to the Calcutta Government suggesting measures in which
heavy collections would not fall indiscriminately on all ryots who would
only be obliged to pay "according to the success they have had during
the season in the cultivation of their lands"# The measures were
particularly intended for Bihar which was going through successive
second year of crop failure, on account of rains and floods in 1768-69
and excessive drought in 1769-70o Observing that any pressing and
rigorous demands ,"at this season of distress", would only tend to
impoverish the country without any corresponding gains to the treasury,
they represented that
"The ryots, both of Bengal and Behar, when much reduced or harassed 
by Government, sell their children to raise money, much less do they 
spare their effects and cattle# The plough consequently stands still, 
and numbers of them desert their homes | and supposing sonethinf^is^ 
collected in this manner this present year, where will be a fund for 
the next ? It will become difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve 
the country after such a drain# Considering these and all other 
circumstances, the following seems to be the most expedient and 
reasonable plan# Let the third part of the present year* 3 crops of 
grain, and the fourth part of other productions, such as sugar, 
poppies, &c*, be given to the ryot for his 6tock and subsistence, and 
let the remainder be received by Government in payment and sold by 
Commissioners# The produce will be considerable, and the ryots being, 
on tile other hand, enabled te support themselves, will apply 
themselves to labour"# 1
The suggestion sought at least to ensure physical survival of the vast
agricultural population of the famine sticken area from the product/
of their own land and labour,for the Bengal peasants did not keep on
hand a large enough reserve of food grains to provide for even one crop
9
failure# There was as well a possibility of creating a large stock ©f 
food grains in the hands of the government for meeting the needs of those
who lived in towns and cities and generally purchased their own
3
requirementfloWith the spread of death and destruction-^the Khan had been
roused,not only by the sense of charity which his religious traditions
f# Froposal by Reza Khan and Shitab Rai#BBC 7 1769*The Council took
11© action but left the matter with Alexander# ; , c
2« AoTtSaVreet ghaflea Srant and British 3ula in India, j 35 *
3# Charles Grant, Becher’s agent in 1769-1770 ani future Director of.,the 
Company, who was a witness to the scene^observed, "The famine was felt 
in all the northern districts of Bengal as early as November, 1769' and 
before the end of April following had spread death and destruction 
through the three provinces0Rice rose gr?,dually to four,and at length
.iu«+,ait ibid.
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enjoined on him, hut also hy the need to preserve his public image. Te
the people he was now known as Khan-i-Khanan, lord ef lords, and te him
they naturally turned for help and relief0When the Council still failed
to plan relief, the Khan together with Becher put forward in February
1770, a scheme to open six centres in the city of Murshidabad for the
free distribution of half a seer of rice a day per head* This was
well received, and the Council authorised an expenditure of Rs 87,250
for this purpose, Rs 40,000 by the Company and the rest by the Nawab
and his ministers* The Nawab was to provide Rs 21,000, Reza Khan
2
Rs 15,250, Rai Durlabh Rs 6,000 end the Jagat Seth Re 5,000* In the
event the sum sanctioned was much exceeded, for as month followed month
in 1770 without the hoped-for rain, the destruotiveness of the famine
steadily increased. In May 1770 Reza Khan drew attention to the universal
agony in a report which in summary read as follows*
”Upte the present hour the writer has managed the collection of the 
revenue and every other business of the Nizamat most diligently and 
as far as he could help it he has not been guilty of any fault* But 
there is no remedy against the decrees of Providence* How can he 
describe the misery of the people from the severe droughts and the 
dearness of grain* Hitherto it was scarce, but this year it cannot be 
found at all* The tanks and springs are dried up and it is daily 
growing difficult to procure water* In addition to these calamities, 
dreadful fires have occured throughout the country, impoverishing 
whole families and destroying thousands of lives* The small stores of 
grain which yet remained at Rajganj,Diwanganj and other places in the 
districts of Dinajpur and Purnea,have been consumed by fire0Hitherto 
each day furnished accounts of the death of thousands,but now lakhs 
of people are dying daily* It was hoped that there would be some rain 
during the months of April and May, and that the poor ryots would be 
enabled thereby to till their lands, but upte this hour not a drop of 
rain has fallen* The coarse crop which is gathered in this season is 
entirely ruined, and though the seed for the August crop is sown 
during the months of April and May, nothing has been dene in that 
direction for want of rain0Bven now it is not too late and if there 
are a few showers of rain, something may be done,If the scarcity of
grain and want of rain were confined to one part of the country, some
remedy for the alleviation of the distress could be found* But when 
the whole country is in the grip of famine, the only remedy lies in
the mercy of God0 The Almighty alone can deliver the people from
such distress*1* 3
On 2 June Becher gave his estimate of the deaths ” as six is to sixteen 
of the whole inhabitants”, adding that Hoertain it is that in several
1* BPC 13 Feb I77O9
2. Reza Khan*s account of the expenses for famine relief,ftp 3 Jan 1771* 
3* Reza Khan to Cartier, Reod* 15 May 1770, CPC, 111,209,
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parts, the living have fed on the dead"© On 12 July he reported that 
five hundred persons were perishing daily in Murshidabad city alone,
while "in the villages and country adjacent the numbers said to perish
2exceed belief11©
Te meet this distress the expenditure at Lurshidabad was increased 
from the sanctioned Rs 87,250 te a total of Rs 1,52,44V 4 annas while 
a further sun of Rs 30,859- 5 annas was spent in the charitable 
distribution of rice at Pumea,]&agalpurf3irbhuii,llu£li and Tudufpur or 
Jossorof In addition,the Khan made further charitable grants from his 
own resourcesoKaran Ali, the author of tn© tmga t'fan^naaah, gave 
Rs 70,000 as leza. Khan’s contribution to the publio fund - the sane 
as the Company provided - and Mubarak ud daulah*s as Rs 50f000. The 
difference between these figures and those listed in the Company*o 
records oan perhaps be accounted for by supposing them to include 
their private charity* Both Becher and Karaa Ali agree that men of 
property gave very generously towards the relief of the poor, others 
mentioned being Munshi Sharafat Huhaamad Khan end Haji Muhammad
A
Kohsin, the future founder of the Mohsin Fund0 On 1 February 1771
the Calcutta Council gave the Company’s contributions from the
general revenues as Rs 56,911 and tnose of the Nawab and his ministers
as Rs 5^,776, adding that "exclusive of this they have severally
expended considerable suns in distribution of rice to the poor"^© This
last remark may include the Khan* s provision of rice at c^eap rates©
Becher had supplied rice from B&ris&l to the Company* 0 dependants at
1 ©Becher* s letter, 2 JuneO K3C 9 June 1770* Grant gave a more horrid 
account when he wrote,"There were persons who fed on the forbidden 
and abhorred animalf,nay, the child on its dead parents,the mother 
on h^r o did"© Quoted by Sm'eree*Charles Grant and British Rule in 
India© p 56©
2© Becher* s letter, 12 July© BSC 19 July 1770©Distressing reports were
coning from the districts, notably from Nabkishore,Ajaganaal, idrza 
Luhammad Husain and Sadrul Huq Khan,Amils of Bishnupur,Jessore, 
Rangpur and Bhagalpurj from Rajas Asaduzzaman Khan and Shib Nath of 
Birbhum and Edrakpur, Faujdar Pratit Rai of Rajraahal and from 
supervisors Ducarel,Hardwood, and Ryder in Pumea,Bharpl^ur and 
Nadia© These reports were before the Committee in Apr©B3C 28 Apr 1770, 
5© Reza Khan*s account* KP 3 Jan 1771* Grant said,"In l urshidabad, 
seventy-seven thousand were daily fed for several months..."( vide 
Entree, opecit* p 35)^hirshidabad's example was later adopted to - 
feed about 3000 men daily at Calcutta and Burdwan for which a daily 
expenditure ©f Ra 50 and Rs 20-25 was sanctioned.EPC 3 Apr 1770©
4© KN f 184. 5o Secret Cons© 1 Feb 1771© #
fifteen seers per rupee #&nd the Khan was led to make similar provision
for the employees of the liizamat# servants of the Nawab and in fact for 
everyone who oared to come to the cheap grain centre thAt was opened at
the two operations oWharsas Bechei* a supply of 55#449 mannda of rise# 
30*476 to troops at 24onefryr9 Berhampere and Furadba$3% and 24#975 Bounds 
to other immediate dependants at Kasirabazar and Kurshidabad# even at the 
rate of fifteen seers per rupee#had earned a net profit of Ha 67*595
so possibly also for private distribution, made from Becherfs Diwan and
height of the famine0 The Khan also arranged to pay workmen employed on 
construction of three buildings of the Rishat Bagh in rice instead of in
As has been seen # the Council early Issued orders to its servants
at Patna and Ilurshidabad - and also in Calcutta - to prevent hoarding of
1o Eeohor* s letter. IT 24 Deo 1770 j 12If 135<> Becher sold 55,4*49 i'da 35 
srs 2 Chhataks of Rice for a total sum of Rs 1,56,764-8-7-20 After 
deducting sundry charges amounting to Rs 4,481-14 annas, the net pric€ 
collected was Ha 1,52,282-10-7-2.In the accounts giver.#no retail rate 
is given for 16,622 Kds- 14 srs 2 Ch soli at Rurahidabad or 9#5C2-1-6 
ch. soli at honghyr#for total sums of Rs 46,246-0-17-2 and Rs32,013-12 
but 8351-1-12 ch sold to the dependants at Kasisbazar an* 21*134-16-12 
ch. sold to sepoys and Brigade at Ihiradbagh and Berhaapore were at 15 
seers of 82 Sicca weight per rupee0(Famine papers,Vol I#p35)
20 HN f 195o
3* This amount was ultimately adjusted towards the cost of additional 
expenses incurred for charitable distribution of rice from 1 I ar to 4 
Sep 1770o During the period a total sum of Rs 1*83*202 was spent*
Rs 1,52*443 hurshidabad#Rs 17*294 at Pumea, Rs5,Ob7 at. Bhagalpur# 
Rs 4*476 at Hugli# Rs2,940 at 3irbhum and iis1,062 at Yusufphr(4essorei 
(Vide Secret Cons 1 Feb 1771 and Famine Papers* Vol I, p 35)The total 
cost was met jointly, t*-e Company paying Rs 56,911 from general - 
revenue, Rs 67*595 by transfer! .g the profit(or Rs 1,24,50? in ^H) 
and the rest being paid by the Nawab (its 26,893) #Rcza Khan(Rs19*507) 
Rai Durlabh(Hs 6000),and Jagat Seth (Rs6,375)* the last three paying 
from their own resources$(Vide Secret Cons 1 Feb 1771 ^ d  Famine 
Papers, Vol I, p 36)•The Council however noted that "the first subs­
cription of the Ilabob and the ministers exceeded ours and their 
addition to it still makes the amount superior"(Secret 60ns 1 Feb 1771) 
They had ignored ths amount of profit which they transferred to charity. 
4ol3[ f 185* 5*Rsza Khan* s account.I ip 3 J&a 1771*
6. HI f V>5»Floyer,s attenpt to pay the workmen employed on the construc­
tion of Fort William similarly in rice proved "ineffectual"*33,913 Lds 
of rice had thus to be auctioned#and diverted possibly to black narket
From Jan to Far the nunfeer of workmen had risen fron 3165 to ?418(3PC 
25 vlan,6 Kar, 3 Apr 1770)
his palace# the Rishat Bagho There was#however,e bis difference between
Reza Khan’s purchases for the public charity centres and
Ganga Govind Singh of the ^anungo’soffici# were at a much higher price
5
- less than "six or seven sears per rupee of the coarsest rice"vat the
cash.
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food grains and profiteering Reza Khan had soon to complain ,however,
of such malpractices. Cn 13 February 1770 the Council thus had before
them a letter, fonrarded by Becher, "complaining that the English
Gonastahs monopolize the rice"] Both Reza Khan and Becher had issued
orders to the Aiails to prevent this monopolization and the use ef
violence in purchasing grains,for they apprehended that if these
remained uncheoked, the peasants "will not have sufficient seed for
2
the next harvests Neither Reza Khan nor Becher mentioned any particular 
incident, nor did they point out to any individual offender perhaps
because, as the Directors later suspeoted , /*thoy could be no other
3than persons of sons rank in our service* , Becher, however, proposed 
in his forwarding note that "there ought to be a prohibition of 
Europeans er their domastahs purchasing rice till after the next
4
August harvests7 Jhe Council did not , as the Directors later pointed
out, either crier an enquiry into the allegations of Reza Khan or
5
adopt "the only particular remedy*© Karan Ali comments that Roza Khan
failed to hold grain prices down because he lacked power to punish
6 7"mischievous people and trouble mongers". The "Bengali1 grain dealers,
8finding the English unconcerned, opened the path of cruelty", so that 
the situation went from bad te worse© Reza Khan certainly seems to have 
done his best to keep prices down at Hurshiiabad,and the distribution 
of charity rice and the supply of subsidised rice by Becher and the 
Khan together with payment of wages in rice uust have had a useful 
effects A black-market nevertheless flourished, and the Khan may 
well have been correct when he pointed out to the gumashtas of the 
English as the principal offenders, A curious case recorded by Karaa 
Ali may turn upon this point. He relates that the boats of Khairati Ram, 
Darogha of Bahraraganj in Eurshidabad city, who was under the protection
1© BHG 13 Feb 1770© 2. ibid.
3. Court's letter , 28 Aug 1771* 4.BPC 13 Feb 1770.
%  Court's letter, -28 Aug 1771. 6, ffl f 184©
7« By thd tern 'Bengali* Karaa Ali meant Bengali Hindu. The terms 
* •Bengali'* and 'Bengali Hindu' have been synonymous in West Bengal*’ , 
i ♦ and Calcutta where even today Muslim and Hindu localities within the ’
MS* Villa*. ar tawii are known locally aa Muaalaan Para( locality) and 
Ban*ali Para<>
a,-|« f 184® " -• —
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of Maharaja Ainrit Singh, the Khan’s Diwan, were found involved in
illegal trade in grain* The boats were seized at Bhagwangola, hut the
Darogha’a guilt could not he proved. The Khan’s agents who had taken
initiative in detecting the crime consequently 1 felt ashamed"! Karaa
Ali was a protege of the Khan, and it seems strange that he should
relate the story involving Amrit Singh, the Khan’s Diwan. However*
one reason ■why the Diwan* s protege escaped punishment may perhaps he
found in the fact that the young Maharaja was no longer solely dependant
on the Khan's favour* Already as a man with considerable independence,
the Maharaja was on excellent terms with the English© He had huilt &
palaoe, the Ayash Barfi, in the English style, and many European servants
of the Company "used to have gay time ” there, enjoying the Maharaja*8 
2
hospitality© It is perhaps likewise significant that when in February 
Becher asked for a ban on English trade in rice, the Council refused to 
issue any such general prohibition© All that they would do was to 
prohibit exports of rice from Dinajpur and Pumea except to Murshidabad, 
and to empower Becher, but not the Khan, to enquire into any clamour 
which the gomashtas might make against this partial restriction* The 
Khan's repeated complaints against these men could not but deepen his 
conflict with the monopolist interests*
Famine was very soon accompanied by pestilence, particularly 
smallpox^  which added to the heavy mortality in Bengal© Among the 
thousands who died of smallpox were the Nawab Nazim Saif ud daulah,his 
brother Ashraf Ali Khan, nicknamed Mir Jan, and Reza Khan’s relations
5
Fath ul 1 ah Khan and Haji Ismail Khan. One of the Khan’s sons was also 
smitten, but recovered^  As if famine and pestilence were not enough ; 
the drought had caused big fires throughout the country to add to the 
destruction of life and particularly of property, houses and food stores0 
In Murshidab&d oity alone a big fire caused heavy destruction with only
10 Hi * 2* HKf f 189* It was built for Mubarak ud daulah at Reza
Khan’s direction and was a two-storeyed building*
3o BPC 13 Feb 1770.
4* Estimates vary between three and ten millionoEmbree.op*ci€*p56*
5* Seir, III,25-26o
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a few houses escaping its ravages©
The sudden death of Saif ud daulah ©n 10 March 1770 opened the
succession to Mir Jafarfs fifth son Mubarak ud daulah, then aged eleven
2
or twelve. Becher, reporting the Nawab1s death asked the Council if the 
new Nawab*s stipend to be reduced, but the Council at Cartier*s sugges-
3
tion refused to cut down the Nawab*s allowances* Though for this Cartier
was later to receive strongly worded censure from London^, he was guided
by the positive orders of the Directors to the Select Committee Mnever
5
to reduce the stipend lower**i By a new agreement entered into between 
the Company and Mubarak ud daulah, the latter was recognised as Nawab 
Nazim and was formally installed on the aasnad by Becher and Aldersey 
on 21 Maroh© Hie administrative arrangement continued as under Naja ud 
daulah and Saif ud daulah, but because the new Nawab was a minor Reza. 
Khan was appointed his guardian*
This change further strengthened the Khan*s position at Murshidabad.
Najn ud daulah had never reconciled himself t© the Khan*s appointment as
Naib and Saif ud daulah also misliked his authority* Munni Begum ,widow
of Mir Jafar and domineering mother of the two Nawaba, had fomented
their ill-Wlll towards the Khan, despite his efforts to maintain good
relations with her. Now however, her position as head of the Nawab*s
household ended, for Mubarak’s own mother Babbu Begum was alive and she
did, as by custom she could, claim that position* Reza Khan sought to,
please both, Babbu Begum by supporting her right and Kunni Begun for her
eld and established status. When therefore Cartier asked for the Khan’s
©pinion in the matter,be maintained that by custom **the place of honour
rightfully belongs to his ^ Mubarak ud daulah* mother, but it would
7
be better if the two begams were given equal rank and author!ty*** It
was Cartier who decided that sinoe Mubarak ud daulah was now the Nazim
his mother should be vested with the real authority while “as
a matter of form and etiquette, she should treat the mother ©f the late
1* MN f 185. 2*Karaa Ali puts him at 11, Bucher **not above 12 years**.
(Vide KK f 182;Becher* s letter 10 I'ar.BPC 13 Mar 1770.)
3.BPC 13 Mar 1770o 4* Court’s letter, 10 Apr 1771# 5*ketter ^  Mar176&< 
if*Vide Cartier’s reply to Babbu Begum,26 May, 1770# CPC,III,231.
7*Reza Khan to Cartier, Recdt 22 May 1770* CPC,III, 224.
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Nawab Najm ud daulah as her superior"! Cartier’s fears that the Khan’s
proposal to confer equal rank and authority te both would not prevent
dispute - " for Cod has not endowed women with prudence pnd they are
naturally quarrelsome"^ unhappily proved correot despite Cartier1s
acting contrary to the Khan’s advice* Munni Eegun could net tolerate
the change, more because she could not possibly forget that from the
position of a dependant of ^ abbu Begun and a slave girl of Babbu1a
mother^she had risen since the death of KiTan and consequent dislodge-
sent of Shah Khanu*jto the position of the head of Nawab’s household
in Mir Jafar’s day with authority and power even over Babbu Begin# Finally ^
it became necessary to separate the establishment of Kunni Bogun from
that of the Nawab# Kunni Begun held gees Khan responsible for her
dislodgeneht and became a willing tool in, the hands of Reed later in
the year and of Hastings in 1772 to work against the Khan# Iiuaediately,
however, the long standing tension in the relations between Reza Khan
and the Imwab had ended0 In order to inprova upon then still further,
the young Nawab with Babbu Begun1 a consent was betrothed to the daughter
of the Khan’s sister-in-law, the grand daughter of Rabia Begum and 
4
Ata ullah Khan?
Reza Khan, as official guardian of the young Nawab, further 
strengthened his hold upon the Household by a series of appointments#Ali 
Ibrahim Khan became Diwan-i-Sarkar with complete control of expenditure, 
Nasr ullah Khan and Saiyid Ansan ud din Khan became Kir Samani,controllers 
of the household and Muhammad Niamat was appointed Darogha-i-Fil superin­
tendent of the elephant stables0Mir Nannu who had been out of favour 
under the previous Hawabs became Mir &narat, superintendent of buildings# 
Four tutors were appointed* Ali Haqi Khan, Anir Beg Khan, Khwaja Abdullah 
and Muhammad Naqi, and a solemn promise was taken from the young Nawab 
that, contrary to ^he practice of his predecessors, ha v;ould learn Persian 
and keep his beardo The Khan, it would eeen9 was determined that his 
charge should grow up a good Muslim ruler# The most notable of all these 
changes was the appointment of Ali Ibrahim Khan as Diwan, for he replaoed
1. Cartier to ReadKhan, 24 K*y 1770# CPC, 111,226. 2# ibid
3» Seir,III#147 and Reza Khan’s letter of Kay 1770 CPC#III,224«
4o f 183 and IJubarakud daulah*a letter HNS 202 w 10Q
5. MM f 132 w d  Seir, 111,26#   *
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Ra jballabh who had "been appointed Saif ud daulah* 8 household (Diwan on 
Clive* s instruction in 1767* For aome unknown reason relation between 
Heza Khan and Rajballabh and Rai Durlabh* his father# had cooled* The
replacement of Rajballabb, followed in May 1770 by the death of Rai
2 3Durlabh* (whoa Karan Ali called Hinakharan> traitor to his salt) left
Reza Khan without a rival in Ihirshidabad government©
While accident thus strengthened his hand in the Durbar* and his
charitable efforts to relieve famine in the city won him populaW regard*
the Khan did not neglect to do all that he could to safeguard his
position with the English© This* as he knew* could best be done by
maintaining the level of revenue collection His brother, Saiyid
I'uhamxead Ali Khan* Faujdar of Furhea* showed what was required* Writing
to Becher he observed*
"I have so often expatiated to you on the distressful condition of 
this district* that I an ashamed to repeat my representations \ nor 
can the full extent of our misery possibly gain credit with you 
untill someone in whom you can confide is sent from the city to be 
an eye witness of it*
The distress of the poor is now beyond description - hardly a day 
passes over without 30 or 40 people dying*From the drought of the 
season such a misery is occasioned that multitudes already have and 
continue to perish of hunger. Intent on the prosperity of the 
country I have not been wanting in ay endeavours to preserve the 
necessary grain for seed* But the ryotts of many villages* for want 
of rain, have been reeuced to the necessity ef selling their grain 
for seed, and then cattle and utensils in order to support them­
selves j in so much that they even offer their children for sale*but 
none oan be found to buy thea0
Such is the distressful state of the ryotts and inhabitants of this 
place* that impoverish*d by Tomer years calamities* and now 
reduced to extremities by the failure of their crops, setting aside 
the payments of their rents* they are perishing for want of grain* 
Mever was there in any place before so melancholy a ecene©
Often when I contemplate the prevailing misery ay compassion and 
pity are excited* Nevertheles, overruled by ay regard for the welfare 
of the government* appearing blind to their distress and deaf to 
their lamentations I neglect not the interest of the Sircar*0 5
1. Vide Rajballabh*s arzi (petition)0 HF 20 Deo 1770*
20 Rai Durlabh died on 31 Kay 1770*Becher*s letter 1 June0BSC 21 June177® 
3* LF f 186* 4oR«za Khan continued to maintain some grip upon Daoca 
affairsdn 1769*when his Diwan* Maha Singh retired to 
Kurshidabad, he was replaced at Dacca by his brother Kinmat Sin£h*who 
was equally a favourite of the Khan(I3T f 183)*
5* BSC 28 Apr 1770g
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Reza Khan wrote in sinilar vein about his own role to Cartier,
'•Your servant with a view t© Company1 s prosperity, your excellency’s 
good name, and hie own honour, notwithstanding the draughts/*"sic 7 
which have prevailed has by exerting his utnost abilities collected 
the revenue of 1176 Bengali year or 1769-70^ as closely as se 
dreadfull a season would admit* The reiaainder cannot be collected 
without evident ruin of the ryotts, desolation of the country and
a heavy loss to ensuing year"0 1
At the end of 1770, in a letter to the Controlling Council of Revenue
at lurshidabad, Becher summed up the efforts he and the Khan had made ,
under '•unfavourable circumstances”, to keep up the collections* During
1769 and 1770# he said*
"the provinces labored under the most severe calamity, that any 
country was ever afflioted with, a continued drou^t for many months 
when rain was most wanted which occasion’d such a failure in the 
crops and produced such famine and mortality among inhabitants as I 
believe history does not furnish U3 with an instance of, but will 
I hope evince that no endeavours were wanting on ay part, nor as 
far as I an able to judge on the part of the Nabob r.R.Cawn, to 
realize as large a revenue as under such circumstances, and in the
mode till then adopted and approved for conducting that branch
could be effected, with due consideration to the preservation and 
relief of the inhabitants to which essential objects I gave 
constant and assiduous attention, and large as the ballanco is 
of the calculated revenue of the last year, am persuaded that hsd 
there been the least relaxation either on my part or that of 
I.!*R*Cawn, the Ccnpany would have been much nore considerable 
eufferers"* 2
If by 1770 Reza Khan lost ground in his efforts to keep the confidence
t t
and support of the Company it wa£. hot from want of trying*
The extraordinary situation created in the countryside by the 
famine was not the only problem affecting Cartier*He had also to'suffer 
a' tremendous accession in the power and influence of the anti-Clive 
party within his own government* By December 17&9» Reed,Hare,Jekyll,Lane 
and Barwoll had all been appointed to the Council,though two of thenJ did 
not join immediately* Barwell, the juniormost member was only called to 
Council on 2 January 1770 while hoed delayed still longer at Chittagong, 
as Barwoll commented in a private letter of t  February 1770* to " do his 
utmost to enrich himself during the short period ho has to stay there",^ 
Since the old Clivites, Alexander, Becher, Aldersey, and Kelsall were
1*~Reza Khan to Cartier* Reeds 2 June 1770* HLS 202* p 65*
2*Becher’s letter* MP 24 Dec 1770* 3<* To Rumbold* BPP,XI, p 35*
permanently out of Calcutta in their stations at Patna, Murshidabad, 
Kasimbazar and Daoca respectively, the now non enjoyed a Working 
majority in the Council at Calcutta*
Had Cartier been certain of support from hone, as Vansittart had 
been from 1760 to 1764, the hostile majority might still have been 
controlled* But in the elections to the Directorate in April 1769* 
Laurence Sulivan " had returned from his years in the wilderness" , 
bringing with him Henry Vansittart whom Clive had first antagonised and 
then ineffectually sought to detach from Sulivan’s party* The old power 
block at the Direction was not overthrown but it was seriously weakened* 
Within two months of the elections the Company had decided to send out
three Commissioners with the widest possible powers for reform in India,
2
"as if we the Court of Directors were ourselves present upon the spot"* 
The decision had been im part induced by rumours of Haidar All’s 
movements against Madras and apprehensions of renewed French designs 
against the Company0 These however also caused a crash in Company stock 
which involved Sulivan, Vansittart and their supporters in near ruim* 
There was therefore prolonged negotiations between the power groups in 
the Company about the personnel of the Commission, so that it was not 
until 30 September that Vansittart of Sulivan* s party, Scraften of
X
Clive’s, and Francis Forde a supposed neutral ^sailed from Spithead in 
HMS Aurora* The decision to send out the Commission had boon communica­
ted to Calcutta in a general letter of 30 June 1769 which was sent off 
from Falmouth in the Lapwing on 5 July 1769o This letter reached  ^
Calcutta at the commencement of Cartier’s administration, and Barwoll 
reported that, as was natural, "Mr* Cartier is not very well pleased at 
the news of a commission that supersedes his authority and im fact 
annuls his power"*^
The only consolation to Cartier was that the Commission seemed
1* Sutherland, L*3*,The East India Company in the Eighteenth Century
Politico* p 190#
2* Court’s letter, 30 June a subsequent letter they added that
Vansittart on account of his past rank in Bengal was to be treated as 
"first Commissioner" and1 h6 was to be paid Military honour" in the 
same manner as is done to the Governor,whose Honours we do not mean 
should be suspended in any degree*.."(Court’s letter 15 Sep 1769)* 
3*For his biography see Forde,L*,Lord Clive’s Right Hand Man*
4«Barwoll to Thomas Rumbold, 8 FeS 1770e BPP* XI,35»
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likely te affect the interests of all - “the fevers ef the Goveraer and 
Ceuncil cannet he said te exist whilst a centreulinf autherity is vest 
-ed in ethers”, as Barwell put it1 - se that in the first half ef 1770 
there was a drawing together against the common danger* Cartier alse 
conciliated the exposition in the Council hy agreeing te haokdate the
allowances as Councillors of Redd and Hare to the dates at which Sykes
2
and Charlton resigned 9 though this ran contrary te the deliberate act 
ef Verelst in this regard*
The latent conflicts within the Council,a$d within the Select 
Committee whose working aembers at Calcutta were reduced te Cartier9 
Russell and Floyer hy the absence uycountry ef Alexander and Becher, 
could not fer very long be repressed, however*The eccasien for their 
breaking out was inevitably the reepening of the question ef supervisor* 
In this Reza Khan was very soon involved*
It will be remembered that Reza Khan*s first public reaotien te the
scheme ef supervisorships had been te welcome it* The welcome had been
backed by an offer to surrender Bhagalpur immediately for the experiment*
The aim was te save Bengal by surrendering the only Bihar district still
directly administered from Murshidabad* ( During Rumboldfs suporvisorship
ef Bihar* from 1766 tf 1769 the administrative autonomy ef Bihar had
been almost complete, .though accounts and other routine reports came te
Murshidabad for incorporation in the Diwani papers)* Bhagalpur was thus
no great loss, especially as the district was very much in ruins on
x
account ef the movement of English troops to and from Patna* That the
A
Faujdar ef the district,Sadr ul Haq Khan? was in no great favour ef the
1.Richard Barwoll te his father*8 Feb 1770» BPP* XI* 35«
2*1PC 12 Apr 1770* 5* Becher* s letter, 30 her 1770. BSC 28 Apr 1770*
4*Sadr ul Haq idiom Hastings was later to raise as Reza Khan1 s substitute 
for administering justice was born in Gujrat* When he came to Bengal : 
in Alivardi9 s day, the Nawab made him the D&regha of Adalat and once 
his envoy to the Marathas (Seir,III,102-3)•Nothing is known ef him 
during the Nizaaat of Siraj ud daulah and Mir Jafar( 1757*60)*In 1764 
he was Faujdar ef Dinajpur(CPC,1,2307)where he was posted perhaps by 
Mir Qasim* (At Dinajpur, the Zemindar was politically more important 
since Mir Qasim had dismissed Baidyanath and appointed his step brother 
Kantunath, sen ef Rmmnath.Kantu having sided with Mir Qasim in the war 
was replaced by Baidyanath by Mir Jafar on his restoration* . Vide 
George Vansittart9s letter ef 22 Deo* MP 31 Deo 1770)*Sadrul Haq who 
possibly replaced Mirza Daud at Bhagalpur had become a great favourite 
ef Nawab Saifud daulah (vide Puny ah aooount ef 1766-67.BSC 28Apr 1770) 
and was consequently no favourite ef Reza Khan*
Khan may also havo had some importance* Moreover since the Khan had 
made the surrender on the grounds that the revenue year in the Bihar 
districts commenced later in the calendar year (in Kartick or mid-Ooto 
-her) the postponement ef the experiment in Bengal districts where the 
revenue year had already commenced in Baisakh er mid-April was made mere 
plausible* As a result the Council had deferred the execution ef the 
scheme tntil the end of February 1770, except in such districts where th< 
Resident felt he could send supervisors M without any detriment te the 
celleotions”\The. &han thus gained one breathing space*
Reza Khan had urged ”the dryness ef the season” as another reason 
for postponing the innovation* The growing seriousness ef the famine 
towards the close of 1769 with increasing threat te the collection ef 
estimated revenue had been in fact the main reason for delay* Another 
was the gigantio administrative problem ef demarcating the territorial 
jurisdiction ef the supervisorships • Since in 1770-71 revenue was 
settled at Murshidabad city with 297 separate units, 69 Zemindaries and 
Faujdarles paying from Rs 10,569 te Rs 26,40,138, and 192 petty mahals 
ranging from non-territorial item like Nazr Hell&ndazi or customary
presents made by the Dutch te territorial revenues ef as little as one
2village in extent , the problem was clearly no light one* Finally there 
was also te be settled the question ef the status ef the different 
supervisors vis-a-vis the Resident at Murshidabad* Verelst, in his 
draft instructions approved by the Committee on 16 August 1769* had 
placed them all under the Resident, and neither the Committee nor the 
Council had noticed the implications ef the arrangement* The delay in 
implementing the scheme enabled members te reflect, however, and the 
Seleot Committee, on 10 December 1769 declared that the power of control 
and suspension of the supervisors which had been vested in the 
Resident should not apply to Kelsall, the chief of Dacca, who was a 
member ef the Council* Behind this move was a oovert attack on the 
influence ef Reza Khan, exercised through leeher0 This Becher spotted 
1* Secret Cons* 26 Oct 1769*
2<> BSC 15 Sep 1770* A few ether non-territorial items were prefessional 
taxes on brokers, silk winders, and ether taxes like these on silk 
bales, receipts from the English Company* The smallest amount was
Rs 45©
and in a letter ef 22 December 1769 he pointed out that if the new j
scheme was te succeed without subverting the fent ef government 
established since Clive9s day it was neoessary that the superviser ef 
Dacca should not be independent either ef the ainisters er ef the 
Resident! The issue was net then pressed9 but when the tine caae for 
posting the supervisors after February 1770 it was revived* At the sane 
tine disoussien broke out afresh about the rele ef the supervisors0 
Verelst had sought te soften the inpaot ef the sohene by asking their 
first duty that ef research into the history# custoas and resources ef
0
the districts* These who sought te extend the power and opportunities 
ef the English in Bengal were not content with so limited a position* 
This issue, tee, grew sharper as the time for implementing the scheme 
approached*
These differences first found expression within the Select Committee 
in their deliberations* of 29 March 1770* The Committee had te consider 
a letter ef 1 March from Kelsall in Dacoa* asking that the Ceaaittee 
should draw "a precise line1* ef jurisdiction between the Resident and 
himself as supervisor ef Dacca* They already had decided that Kelsall 
as a aenber ef Council should have a special status* and had had Becher9s 
letter urging subordination ef all supervisors te the ainisters and
Resident* New the Committee decided that Kelsall should normally go by
2
the advice ef Murshidabad , and if he disagreed with Becher en any issue 
he should refer this te Calcutta for decision* The resolution was passed 
by Cartier and Russell, Floyer dissenting*
Fleyer started with his own interpretation ef the funotien ef the 
supervisors, whoa he wished te see replacing, net working with, the 
Nawab9s official***1 must confess ", he minuted, "I wish net te have any 
person appointed en behalf ef the Country government te cooperate with 
the Suprayisersi the nature ef their ceaaissien being te investigate the 
great abuses which have been committed by the officers ef that govern- 
sent "o If the supervisors were te be inquisitors then Reza Khan must 
have no authority ever them, for though the Khan had shown ability and 
indefatigable attention te business and had wen high honours from the
English government, he could net be expected te ” engage heartily in an
Quoted* Banerji* D.K* ^arly Land Revenue System in Bengal an* Binar*7S 
2* JSC 29 Mar 1770* 3* ibid*
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investigation ef the many abuses committed by these very persons whoa 
he has placed in the administration of publick affairs'*! This remained 
truo9 FIoyer argued9 oven though the existing ties between Resa Khan
and the Company might * possibly engage him to shew outward signs of
2
approbation** o
If this shrewd estimate of the Khan's attitude was accepted then
the supervisor of Dacca should not bo placed under the Resident for
the latter was bound to seek Reza Khan's advice about Dacca matters9
particularly as Daoca had been Resa Khan's own charge and subsequently
under his agents Jasarat Khan and Himmat Singh* This comment was
already a departure from the spirit of Verelst's parting instructions9
but Fleyer then launohed into a personal attack upon the Khan# Ho
alleged that Reza Khan had for years deprived the Company of its
legitimate revenues from Dacca* He cl&iaed9 "Whatever increase of
revenue nay arise from the proposed investigation within the district
of Dacca Rafter the introduction of the supervisorship^ should bo
deem'd so much loss to our employers from the year they were in
3
possession of the Dewannee"* Reza Khan's answer to Mir Jafar y that 
he had not agreed to any fixed revenue settlement in view ef the 
disorder in the district was no answer t " for althe* it may bo said 
that Mahomed Reza Cawn was ignorant of their produce when he first 
took them at an annual rent ( an argument which I think he cannot well 
maintain when reminded of having celleoted their revenue9 ruled that 
country and resided on that spot for sometime before that period ^ 7657) 
it might surely have been ekpeoted that after the first year's 
experience he would have pointed out the advantage which that country 
was capable of yielding to the Company under proper management"? Reza 
Khan had boon guilty in not increasing the Dacca revenue^ until Sykes 
did so in 1767 again in not going beyond the figure set by Sykes • 
"For his silence mn the subject I must infer9 either that those districts 
are not capable of improvement or that Mahomed Reza Khan was desirous 
of reaping every advantage which could be derived therefrom" *Sinee the 
extent9 fertility and situation of the Dacca distriots all suggested
1*Floyer's minute* BSC 29 Mar 1770* 2* ibid* 3« ibid* ^  ibid*
5. ibid*
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that the revenues could have teen increased, Fleyer pressed heme the 
charge against Resa Kham t " 1 must frankly ewn that the latter is the 
inference 1 draw without the least hesitation**
2Fleyer was voted dewn in the Seleot Committee, which maintained the 
eld line, restated en 16 December 1769 ty Verelst, ef suppert fer the 
ministers* But he had voiced a challenge te that attitude with his 
demand that the eld efficials he replaced hy the English supervisors «• 
and their Banians and dependants - and his indictment ef Reza Kham*s 
administration reused the supiciens and hopes ef the Court ef Directors0 
These last, desperately in need ef money, underlined every word ef 
Fleyer9 s minute when it reached Lendem0
The next stage in the conflict between the Khan and the eld 
efficialdem and the supervisors and their dependants came when the 
English efficials actually went out into their districts* By March 1770 
four had been posted out into their districts, and te three ef these «• 
Rider in Nadia, Hardwood in Rajmahal and Bhagalpur, and Stuart^ in 
Birbhum and Bishnupur - Becher had issued definite instructions that it 
was N net the intention ef the President and Council te alter the present 
form ef Government"? Their activities were not without seme advantage te 
the Khan, Beth Hardwood and Stuart fer example were seen sending in 
reports en " the general declining state ef trade"^and * the miserable 
state'1 of their districts, and their testimony was worth any number ef 
reports from the Faujdar ef R&jmahal or the Anil ef Birbhum in convincing 
Becher and the Calcutta authorities ef the real distress* Their reports 
substantiated the Khan9 s explanation ef the causes ef tiaaum *£ 
decline in revenue and provided suppert fer his efforts, earlier un- 
successful, te secure abatements in demand and the grant ef T&qavi leans 
te the peasants* The Council had en 13 February refused any abatement,- 
but en 28 April en the basis ef the supervisors9 testimony the Committee 
agreed te a reduction ef Rs 3t37»621 In the demand, as well as te a 
1* Fleyer9s minute, BSC 29 War 1770*
2, Kelsall also was not satisfied with the Committee9s decision and'en 13 
May asked for autonomy for Dacca administration in the same way as Patna 
enjoyed it,(Kelsall1 s letter 15 May 1770* I>CB, 59*)
5.The name is given both as Stewart and Stuart* The fourth was Rouse at
4.B«chSr^?*'}§SSerl5o Deo 1769(BSC 28 J u  177fot» Hardwood,20 JantiCB, 40i 
5*Hardweed te Becher,31 Jan 1770(LCB,49W50)«
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further temporary remission of He 2,66,946* They were alee readier 
te take heed when Becher reported that the ainisters were asking fer 
nere money te he advanced as Taqavi or agricultural lean te the 
peasants fer purchases of hullecks, ploughs and ether "utensils ef 
husbandry" 2Sfcis loan, Becher assured, was repayable with twelve and 
half percent Interest per annua,
Reza Khan may alee have felt seae secret satisfaotien frea the
way in which events aoved in Nadia, This had been yielded te Yerelst
at the 1176 Punyah in April 1769 and had been taken out ef the Raja's
hands and given en three years' farn te Nabakrishna and certain ether
2
leading Calcutta aerchants ,The famers had soen demanded powers that 
would have deprived the Raja ef his "just ri^ts"^, they acted 
oppressively , and mere important, they failed te pay the revenues 
according te their agreement. The farming system was thus discredited, 
and the suppert ef Raja Krishna Chandra was won fer Reza Khan who had 
pressed his claim te take ever the district again, en the same terms 
as the farmers had efferedf
With the arrival of Rider in Nadia as supervisor events took a 
more threatening turn however, for Rider was soon in violent conflict 
with the Raja, Becher, as has been seen , had instructed Rider that the 
present form of government was not te be altered. But by 30 March
Beeher himself had shifted groundo In a letter te the Committee he
stated that he saw no need te retain the Amils who had been a "severe
scourge" te the people and no need te sake the annual settlement at
Murshidabad, since the supervisors could make settlements locally. 
Thereafter,he said, "Dither the Zemindar or an officer ef the govern*
ment will be necessary, heninally te conduct affairs, but the English
5gentlemen should ••• be spring ef every action". He proposed, as a 
corollary that "the allowances ef these ^ "governmentJ  officers nay be
1, Becher*s letter , 30 Mar 1770,BSC 28 Apr 1770, "
2, The Calcutta merchants were Jay Narayan Sharma,R&m Lochan Palit,Ran 
Tanu Datta,Balaram Biswas,Ram Sundar Bharat,Gayaran Ghese,Xanehar 
Sharma ,5ukhdev Mallik,Bhawananda Rey,Raghunath Mitter,Durga Charan 
Hitter,Hara Narayan Roy,Ganga Narayan Chatterji,and Harikrishna Bose, 
(Vide Reza Khan's parwana, CPC,II,1475)
3, Becher*s letter, 30 Mar 1770# BSC 20 Apr 1770, 4* ibid,
5. ibid.
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certainly greatly reduced* while from the sun thus gained the 
supervisors could lie paid an annual allowance of Rs 12,000 each and 
their assistants Rs 2400 each, though these suns would "appear high in 
Leadenhall Street"I With Rider at Nadia and Rouse at Nator already at 
odds with the old officials, and Becher moving away fron VerelsVs 
position, Reza Khan seeaed as threatened in the countryside as in 
Calcutta*
With the arrival in their districts of the other supervisors at
the end of April the conflict with the elder system cane fully and
violently into the open0Rider in Nadia had already heen denouncing the
2
"infamous character of the Raja" and the Raja complaining that "Hr*
3Rider is the ruler here"* Now,within four days of his arrival in
Rangpur, Grose was reporting on the abuses of the large number of paiks
or foot soldiers entertained by the government and ef the wastage of
Rs 50,000 en men "employ9d en the part ef the government", and
4
demanding "disbanding the whole tribe", together with the recall ef
every sepoy not in the Company9s pay or under the charge ef Captain
5
Mackenzie. Complaints also poured in of oppressions by the Amils and
6 7Zemindars, collusive efforts te ceneeal information; forcible seizure
of property in one case? murder in another^, and these were directed 
not only against the Amils, but against the Divans and Qanungoes also* 
Of particular importance were the complaints which really flowed fron 
the supervisors9 attempts to establish themselves as masters* One 
letter te Becher revealed the mortification ef a supervisor that an Amil
and a Zemindar had gone to Murshidabad without the supervisees consent
10or knowledge* In another case it was resentfully explained that had not 
Becher absolutely required the Amil9s presence at Murshidabad, the 
supervisor "ceu9d not have suffered him to have gene, not only on 
account of the confusion of the publiek accounts but ^ als* of the_7
1* Becher9s letter, 30 March 1770* BSC 26 Apr 1770*
2* LCB 115. 3. LCB 170. 4. LCB 1.
5. LCB 2. 6* LCB 21. 7. LCB 28.
6. LCB 26-27,33 LCB 163. 10* LCB 3#
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great demands ef individuals upon him"? Another telling instance was 
that of the agent of a jagirdar who twice refused to take notice of a 
summons hy the supervisor and his assistant saying, it was indignantly 
reported, that * he was answerable to none hut Mahomed Reza Cawn",This 
case touched the Khan very closely fer the jagirdar in question was 
Husain Reza Khan, a grandson, of Haji Ahmad, a near relation of the Khan 
and of the old royal family of Bengal, It seems that Grose, the 
supervisor of Rangpur and Robertson, Grose9s assistant at Gevindaganj,
ha* hear* that Huaaln Reza Khaa waa kaHin* a jaffir at Saltari(3elbarahl 
In Bofra) in lieu ef a pension ef Rs 3(300t an* that the jacir was 
yielding more income than this,Robertson, supposing Husain Reza Khan to 
be resident at Salbarl summoned him to meet him with all the jagir 
papersoThe agent who did reside there, disregarded Robertson9s message 
and another fron Grose to whom his assistant had complained0 The matter 
had now become an issue of prestige, and Grose had the agent forcibly 
secured and brought to Rangpur.Grose found that the agent had no papers ( 
and being told that these had been taken to Murshidabad he wrote, in 
very peremptory stylo to Becher, asking that Husain Reza Khan be
ordered te report to him at Rangpur immediately, with the original
2
sanad and other documents of the jagir.
To this rather abrupt letter from Grose , Becher replied that he 
had been misinformed about the jagir, which was a royal grant, and also 
about the papers having been carried to Murshidabad, and that enquiry 
shewed that the complaints against Husain Reza Khan were "unjust and 
groundless”,He further emphasised that Husain Reza Khan9s character was 
much respected in the country and that the family was of high birth and 
importance, Experience of the actions of the supervisors , and the 
complaints about them coming in through Reza Khan from the local authe~ 
rities of the old system as well as from older aristocracy of the land 
were driving Becher back to VerelsVs original position, and he soon 
showed himself dissatisfied with many of his young subordinates. In a
T, LCB %
2, LCB 34-35* Firninger appears to have misread Salbari as Lalbari, 
w Salbarl was possibly the simplified English rendering of Persianised 
name of ^elbarsha in modern Bogra which was Silberis,
3* LCB 132,
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letter te Stuart an 23 May 1770 he sharply observed, "If the Nabob'» 
^that is Heza Khan' % J  and ay orders are in this manner slighted there 
is an end of Government*' and he added the warning, 11 If I hear more 
complaints ef this sort I shall give such directions as will effective* 
ly put a stop to them, being determined to support the Government hero 
in its proper authority" * A month later he had to write to Stuart 
again, about the complaint of Nabakishore, the Amil of Bishnupur that 
he had been put in confinement by one of Stuart's gumashtas. Becher 
took the occasion to voioe his dislike of all such Banians and 
gumashtas,, creatures and agents of the new ruling power t "Experience 
having convinced me that there is scarce an instance of an English 
Genastah or servant when out of his master's sight, but has used his 
influence in acts of oppression and violence so that 1 cannot help 
having my apprehension that the same consequences may ensue from the 
employment of such under English Supravisors, notwithstanding all the 
care and precaution which may be taken by their masters, and which it
is their duty te do to the utmost of their power and I strongly
2
recommend to you"*
By June Becher by his warnings and advice had come out again as 
the champion of the old order against the supervisors and their Banians, 
The supervisors for their part had hardened in their hostility to the 
old officialdom* Grose, for example, on 14 July, replied to Becher «
"You mention that Bengal of late years has suffer'd much by the
oppressive measures of English Gcaastahs* It is true there has been too 
great cause of complaint against them ; however Sir, that is not what 
has hurt the country so much, as the oppressions committed by the
3
several persons employed in the oelleoxiens"* Even though the super­
visors were not yet officially intended to assume any aotivo power, 
they were already in conflict with those instruments of government whom 
it was their duty to support and maintain. This must have been quite 
clear to both Becher and ^eza Khan who had to deal with the complaints
from both the two sides*
1* Becher to Stuart. 25 May 1770» LCB 139#
2* Becher to Stuart, 22 Junel770# LCB 148*
3« Grose to Becher* 14 July1770o LCB 36#
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The problem teok a more serious turn when the settlement fer 1177 
(or 1770-71) became due. The punyah had been unusually delayed*Cartier 
refused to travel te Murshidabad because of the intense heat I Because 
of the poor collections fer 1176 all parties wished to extend the
period of collections so as to reduce the outstanding balances which had
2
risen te Rs 17#91#103 ^ d  in view ef the continued drought could not 
possibly be curtailed before July* Most important of all, however, 
the whole issue of the controlling powers of the supervisors had been 
re-opened by letters fron Reza Khan and Beoher0
Cartier received a letter from Reza Khan on 2 June 1770 saying that 
"the business for the year 1177 should be settled at this time but when 
I speak to Zemindars about the terms of the business thay flatly answer 
'we have no footing in the district, how can we charge ourselves with 
the bundibust of the present year'.Accordingly every person has delivered 
written representation to Mr. Becher who will transmit translation, 
thereof to your excellency"? The Khan added that apart from one or two 
persons long attached to him , no one would even come to Murshidabad for 
the settlement* A week later another letter was received, addressed by 
Reza Khan to Becher, relating that the Zemindars had pleaded, "when we 
are governed by twe magistrates in what manner are we to provide for the 
revenues. From two orders being circulated business will be delayed and
A
thrown into confusion"0 This was a more open threat that the Zemindars 
and Anils would not enter into agreements before being certain that the 
controlling power of the supervisors would not be confirmedoln an accom- 
panying letter Becher confirmed R^za Khan's report of the general 
unwillingness to agree to any settlement for the new revenue yearo
In his letter Becher also reported the many complaints he had 
received fron the ministers that their orders were not properly respected 
in the districts* For this he blamed the inexperience of the "young 
gentlemen" who had been posted to the countryside and more especially the 
supervisors' dependence on "Black dependants and Banians cheifly from 
Calcutta", who were themselves unacquainted with revenue matterrf**He 
therefore recommended that the controlling power which had been given to
1# Cartier to Roza Khan*CEC*,III,207*(i^ reply to Reza'o invitation)
2* Becher'a letter, 2 June 1770* BSC >9 June 1770*
3. Reza Khan to Cartier, Recdt 2 June 1770* HKS 202, p 65#
4* Reza Khan to Becher* BSC 9 June 1770*
5* Becher's letter, 2 June* BSC 9 ^770* .
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the supervisors in December 1769 should not generally lie confirmed,, "It 
has ever been ay opinion that innovations and changes in the node of 
conducting the revenues should lie gradual and tried in a few districts
powers could lie given only to a few, such as Graham* Georg* Vansittart*
Stuart and Ducarel* " I am well £ware* Gentlemen," Becher concluded*
“that it will he urged that the objections raised hy the Zeaindars are
in consequence of the art and intrigues of the people at the city* who
are unwilling to lose their influenoe which must he the effect of
2power being lodged in the suprmvisors hands"* Ho refused* nonetheless* 
to modify a demand which he know must he most unpopular in Calcutta*
The demand certainly was unpopular* Fleyer's opinion was already 
on record with the Select Committee and it reflected the opinion of 
many of the Company's servants* and particularly of those who stood to 
benefit* Even though Cartier might he willing to support Becher* and 
Russell might he very moderate in M s  views and ready to hack Cartier* 
it was extremely difficult for ihah to agree to the requests of Reza 
Khan and Becher* The Committee proved unwilling to budge an inch from 
the position they had taken with "so much circumspection and such
i
flattering hopes of success" in order only to satisfy "the pretences 
and evasion of Aurnils* Zemindars and collectors"? They pointed out that 
the demand was contrary to Becher's own plan of 30 Marchf They concluded 
hy telling Becher that the difficulties created hy the "desperate men 
who had long feasted on the spoils ef the poor native" could he overcome 
with the assistance ef Reza Khan*
The Committee had put Becher in an awkward situation* for he had 
anticipated the Committee's approval of his recommendations and had 
already given the Zeaindars and Amils the assurance they required*
increased hy the demand for a written confirmation * made hy the Amils
and Zeaindars that N in case the suprsvisors disregarding the orders of
1*Becher's letter* 2 June* BSC 9 June 1770* 2* ibid* 3•BSC f Jun 1770*
4*Becher's letter*30 Mar*BSC 28 Apr 1770* 3* BSC 9 June 1770o
6*Reza Khan's letter* Reeds 12 June 1770* HM3*202*p72 | CPC*111,251o
before it ^ jsieJ  is undertaken in general"! He proposed that full 
presumably at the Punyah ceremony on 24 May 1 difficulties wore
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the government Interfere In the natters ef revenue they are not te he 
accountable fer the ballancesfl Becher * in order tc induce the Anile 
and Zemindars te settle fer 1177t earlier given a verbal assurance 
that "the supravisors shall net interfere in any natters ef revenue and 
collection'* and that "if any ef the supravisers should interfere a 
prohibition would be Immediately issued by the government** • As Reza 
Khan wrote te Cartier* the Zemindars and Amils 9 net content merely with 
verbal assurance required-written statement from both Reza Khan and 
Becher* With his letter the Khan also forwarded a draft ef the under- 
taking which the Zeaindars and Anils were said te want* '
The Zemindars and Amils would declare as fellowst **Your servant in
compliance with your orders accepts the terns ef the bandebast ef the
parganah fer the year 1177 condition that he shall possess
full authority in revenue natters and in all ether matters appertaining
thereto* He will not be remiss in the performance ef his duty* in the
improvement ef the lands er in the collection and remittance ef the
stipulated sums* Should a supervisor er any ether person interfere in
these matters er molest the gunashtahs ef the amils* your servant will
duly report the matter to the Presence in the hope that his grievances
will promptly be redressed* But if this is net dene he will net be
answerable fer the revenues**^ In rettium they would be given the
assurancet "Apply yourself with confidence and contentment te the
business ef collecting the revenues* Should a supervisor er any ether
person interfere with you 9 prompt measures will be taken te redress
your grievances* But if this is net dene9 you will net be held respoxw
1
sible fer the balances" 0 Who had drawn up the draft is unknown 9 but in 
the absence ef any ether recognised leader* we might suspect that it 
was the work ef Reza Khan himself* With splendid tact the Khan added*
"I am from my heart and soul ready in the perfernance of your order and 
these of the Committee but I do not think myself empowered without your 
sanction te subsoribe te the prepositions since they are unprecedented 
and were never yet granted te any Aumil er Zemindar* However should 
they renew their demand which probably they will at the close ef the 
year when the accounts are te be settled* it may terminate in ay bad
name1
1* Reza Khanfs letter to Cartier* leodt 12 June 1770*HMS*202>72* 20ibid 
3oCPC*III*252|KMS*202*73* 4*CPC*111*253* 5* IS®* 202*pp 72-73*
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Reza Khan was naturally very anxious to protect himself from the 
consequences of the fall in revenue which he saw must follow from the 
failure of Becher1 s recommendation to the Comiiittee*He had asked 
Cartier to he present at Punyah and had keen told that it was not 
necessary as "Izzat ud daulah Hr* Heeher Bahadur Bahram Jang" would he 
there to represent bia^He had then sought "agreeably to Hr* Becher9s 
directions'* to bring the AmilsZemindars and farmers Mte temper** and 
to a settlement* Then he had joined with Becher in giving a public 
assurance about the supervisors* But Becher would have left Bengal 
before the revenue year ended9 and the Committee had refused to confirm 
the verbal assurance given by him and Becher0 He now sought to make 
sure that all the responsibility should not be left upon him* He 
therefore wrote his absolution into these words « ” Tou Sir and 
gentlemen of the Committee are masters* Be pleased to signify what you 
deem most expedient for the happy administration of the Company's
affairs and I shall act accordingly* But let not your servant hereafter
2
be called upon to be made answerable for the Bundibust*9*
Despite a very reasonable and strong suspicion that Reza Khan was 
behind the whole move, it was impossible to establish his personal 
involvement* He had not associated himself with the Amils and Zemindars 
in the public records* Cartier in his reply also kept him dissociated 
from his officials9 the Amils* In order perhaps to break the combinatios 
the governor also carefully avoided the Zamindars and turned his entire 
bitter attack against the old official aristocracy who also constituted 
the social aristocracy of Bengal* Cartier replied t
•As the Khan has an unrivalled knewledge of the manners and habits 
of the peeple ef this country, 'the writer hopes that he will use 
his best endeavours to expose the villainies of this wicked set*
To tolerate them would be to lend them the sanction of the govern­
ment* Let it not be said that during the writer's government and 
the Khan1 s ministry, the welfare of the mankind and the existenoe 
ef the Company were sacrificed te the interests of a few 
blaokguardsn0 3
For the Khan too there was a veiled warning from a "sincere friendN t
"The Khan has in the past rendered valuable services to the Company* 
The English sardars are fully aware of it and will always have his 
interests at heart* But now yet a greater service is required of 
him*It is to co-operate with the English sardars in making the
l.Cartier to Resa Khan* 10 Hay 177^»QPCtIII>207» 2*HH3*202 * p 73o 
'•Cartier te Reza KHan.16 dun 1770-.CPC.III.257*
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above scheme £"ef superviaorship^/ a success <> If he aoquits 
himself well in this task, he will have his reputation increased 
tenfold; hut if, which (red forhid9 he disappoints the English 
sardars in this affairt the writer is afraid that the Khan will 
lose the reputation he has already gained** 1
The Committee9s refusal te support Becher9* recemnendationb did
net end the natter* Becher had not only committed with the Amils and
Zeaindars, he had so with the supervisors also t he ceuld net draw
hack without a struggle* On 25 May 1770, the day after the Punyah was
held at Ifurshidabad, Becher had written to Grose at Rangpur pointing
out that the great problem, in view ef the faaine and very unfavourable
prospect ef approaching harvest, was te secure revenues sufficient te
neet the very large demands ef the troops and ether Company expenses.
It was his duty te suffer nothing to c o b s  in competition with the
collection, and he therefore Instructed Grose, fer this reason * to
interfere as little as possible in the collections, and in the course
of the enquiries and regulations, to take no measure that can possibly
2
affect the revenues** A similar letter was sent to Stuart,supervisor 
of Bibhum, Bishnupur and Pachetf and also perhaps to other supervisors* 
Becher in issuing such instructions to these junior servants of the 
Company had risked his whole prestige*
On 19 June, therefore, Becher again addressed the Select Committee 
pointing out the difficulties which would follow the grant of control­
ling power to the supervisors, especially by providing an excuse to the 
revenue collectors for running up balances. He was also again emphatie 
about the villainies of the * black* dependents ef the English*He made 
the further point that the bankers who, as usual, had helped the 
Zemindars to pay their revenues for 1769*70 were unwilling to advanoe 
money in future unless the authority of the Zemindars was guaranteed,^ 
Thus pressed, the Committee on 21 June agreed to accept Becher9 a 
recommendation for the curtailment ef the power of all but a few 
selected supervisors, in the hope that 6y doing so *all further diffi­
culties will be obviated and the currency of business and public -
1, Cartier to Reza Khan*1l> June 1770* CPC* 111, 257*
2* Becher to Grose, 25 Hay 1770* LCB, 127-128* * .
3, Becher to Stuart, LCB, 141-42*
4* Becher9s letter, 18 June 1770* BSC 21 June 1770*
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1
credit renewed** The letter from the Committee went out en 28 June9 and 
en 30 June Becher was writing te the supervisors ef the decision, He 
thus inferned Grose that controlling power would he granted fer the 
present season only ever districts worth seventy lakhs* * Seleotien has 
keen made fer this purpose of these provinces which are under the 
inspection ef Gentlemen that have had opportunities ef acquiring 
knowledge In that branch ef business which appears te we absolutely 
necessary for conducting it properly9 and in ether districts I have 
judged it requisite for the present season to restrain the authority 
of the English supra visors, and leave the management of the collections 
in the hands of those appointed by the Government9 heref te superintend 
them1*? Grose was informed that he was not one of those selected*
Reza Khan had scored a triumph* Becher, who in March was thinking
of transferring the settlement of revenues to the supervisors, to which
plan the Committee also had given its concurrence^, had been made not
only to reverse his plan but also te fight for and win bach the indepen*
denoe of the Zeaindars and Amils* It is true that part ef the province
had to be made over to supervisors, but the loss was slight when
compared with the gain* Moreover, of the four supervisors te whom
controlling power had been confirmed three, Graham, Ducarel and George
Vansittart were by no means undesirable from the Khan* s point ef view,
Graham at Hugli had had considerable revenue experience In Midnapur and
Burdwan and he had deep sympathy fer the old regimef He was later to
become one of the greatest supporters of the Khan in his dark days*
Ducarel at Pumea had been on good terms with Reza Khan at Murshidabad
and with the Khanfs brother enjoyed the best relations* He was also a
favourite with Becher, George Vansittart was another man with long
experience, and as brother of Henry Vansittart to whom the Khan owed so
such, could net but be welceme*With Henry Vansittart due te arrive in
Bengal as first in rank of the Company* s three Commissioners his brother
was obviously worth conciliating* This left only Stuart as an uncertain
element* His jurisdiction was to have been over three distriots, but
1. BSC 21 June 1770, *
2* Becher to Grose, 30 June 1770* LCB 129*
3o Vide Letter Ho 90 end its enolosure* LCB 126*127*
4* Vide Graham9s letter te Clive,24 Lee 17^5* BPP, V, 82* f
Graham was known as Nawab Babar Jang (vidb CPC,III, 372)
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eventually his contrel was United te Birbhum1 while Ghulaa Jtfustafa teok
ever Bishnupur* Stuart had keen polite in his dealings with Becher, hut
2
his wards had eften in then the ring ef opposition* On balance, the feur 
fully empowered supervisors were very acceptable te #eza Khan*
The victory, however temporary it seen turned eut te bet was a real 
and significant one* Reza Khan had shown skilled leadership in organi­
sing a joint front ef Zemindars, Amils and bankers, frustrating the 
efforts ef the Calcutta government te divide them* Theirs had been the 
first organised public protest against the superior power of the English 
and against the imposition ef direct Company rule* It was also the last 
successful attempt te prevent the new Banian element from extending 
its sphere of activity to land management and land control*
The triumph, like that of 17^9, was & shortlived one and productive 
ef an equally violent counter-measure* Two days before the Select 
Committee accepted Becher1 s renewed plea for the maintenance of the 
status quo in 1770~1771 and for restricting the controlling power to 
only four supervisors with limited territorial jurisdiction, a break in 
the truce between the two groups in the Calcutta Council secured* The 
Council met on 19 June 1770 in a session of their Secret Department, 
with Cartier, Russell, Reed, Hare, Jekyll, Lane and Barwoll present, and 
Fleyer away ill* Certain of the members proooeded to raise a question 
about the authority of the Select Committee in matters relating to the 
Diwani administration* They maintained that the Company* s letter of 50 
June 1769, containing instructions about the Diwani matters was addressed 
to the Council and not te the Select Committee* The instructions had been 
laid aside pending the arrival of the Commissioners from England, but as 
they now seemed unlikely ever to arrive, the opposition urged that the 
Council, to whom the letter was addressed , should take it into consi­
deration* Before that was done, however, the question of the jurisdiction 
of the Committee and Council in revenue matters should be determined* Ho 
other powers of the Select Committee were questioned*
1* The revenue of the district however was settled with its Raja, Asad uz
zaman Khan whose territory was not finally subordinated to Murshidabad
government until the time ef l£lr Qasim*
2* For example,Stuart9 s letter of 26 June 1770*LCB,148-50*
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Why was the attack upon the Select Committee*s authority in 
revenue matters launched at this time ? Briefly, one may answer, 
because the question of supervisors* powers involved powerful interests, 
both of the Company*s servants and their Calcutta Banians| because the 
caution imposed by the Commissioners* arrival had ended with their 
presumed death} and because the changes in the Directorate seemed to 
assure those opposed to the Clivites in Bengal of support from heme. 
Once Becher had committed himself to upholding the old system, the only 
way to counteract his influence as Resident was to take authority over 
the Diwani administration out of the hands of the Select Committee and 
to secure it te the majority in the Council who did not belong to the 
Committee, So long as the Committee refused to endorse Becher*s 
recommendations all was well. But after 9 June it had become apparent 
to all that the Select Committee would not long withstand the pressure 
exerted by Becher and Reza Khan i the Council majority was thus forced 
to act.
The issues in the conflict over the supervisors* powers were not 
merely administrative and political. For many of the junior servants of * 
the Company, attracted to India by the prospect of early fortunes, but 
denied them since the Regulations of 1769 • however ill enforced, in the 
commercial line, great material interests were at stake. It was enly out 
of Calcutta, in the districts, that the prospects ef gain were still 
fair, and the numbers pressing for opportunities were rapidly growing t 
in the 17&9 season , after Sulivan* s group had returned te power, forty- 
seven new civil servants were sent out to Bengal as wall as two 
dismissed servants who had been reinstated. Moreover behind these 
English aspirants for office was ranged a Banian interest no less 
greedy, it is reasonable to presume, and no less bold.
How powerful the Banian influence had by this time grown may perhajs
best be illustrated by a letter of 8 February 1770 from Richard
Barwoll, a member of Council, to Thomas Rumbold I
"Gocul delivered me a letter from Knott,and I expected,from what
1, 1.0. Personal Records, Vol 14* PP 471-472, One of the dismissed "
servants who was reinstated was Samuel Middleton, While coning to 
India Henry Vansittart was bringing his s«n Arthur whe having ,«
H V .  the rest sn the HIS Aurora. was replaced hy Henry junior in 1771* 
(Court*s letter, 10 Apr 1771)* _________________________________ ____
Wilkins said, it was from you j but whether from you or from 
Knotty Gocul* s connections certainly entitle hia to any assis­
tance I can afford ; hut faith I believe he is much more capable 
to assist ae than 1 him"* 1
The reference was to Gokul Ghosal, the founder of the Bhukailash Raj
family.When Verelst*s Banian in Chittagong he had become the sole
2
owner of the Noabad or newly planted lands in Chittagong besides . 
extending his control over Sandwip Island* Abu Torab Choudhury of, ,
■ * i
Sandwip who opposed him was branded a rebel and killed in action and
his Military commander Mulkan was publicly hanged at Verelst*s
3 .'
instance* In 1765 wi:icn Verelst beoame supervisor of Burdwan and a third
of the district was given out in farm to new men* Gokul had a big shar$i
Perhaps almost naturally ho was involved also in the Ninak or salt
Mahals of Midnapur^* In December 1765 Gokul applied for a monopoly farm
of the entire waste lands in the 24 Parganast despite Boeher** known
wish as Collector General that the quantity of land given to any one
individual should be restricted* In December 1769 Verelst had his
esteem for Gokul Ghosal9s "thorough knowledge of the business of the
7
revenue" written into the public record* By 1770-1771 he was farmer of
5 9Gaya pargana in Bihar and of Muhabbatpur in Bengal , acquisitions
probably made while Rumbold was supervisor at Patna and Verelst was
gevemor*Such men were the natural allies of the supervisors and their
assistants while the latter were still allowed the right of private
trade, and were their undercover agents when that right was withdrawn*
Becherfs success in withdrawing controlling power from most of the
supervisors hit the Banians at least as hard as it did their masters**^
Would it be too much to suggest that the Banians were also much involved
in the struggle to reverse the victory of Becher and Reza Khan?
1* Barwell to Rumbold, 8 Feb 1770* BPP, XI,35» -gen#
2* For detail Cotton,H«J«S»,Memorandum on the Revenue History of Chltta/
3* For detail Jonathan Duncan1s report on the Sundeep Insurrection,17^^-
1767.(BRF, 1 Aug 1750)together with CPC, II, 305t332# 336, p 64.
4* Vide Huq, 1/,,East India Company* s Land Policy and Commerce in Bengal^
5* NF 26 Nov 1770^ S'. Quoted in LCB 122-26* * ,
7* Verelst*s letter, 16 Dec* BPC i S Dec 1769*
8. Secret Cons. 11 Oct 1770. 9* BSC 15 Sep 1770*
10*In fact Banians had a more permanent interest than their masters who
stayed only for a short period. One ©f the results of direct Company
rule through supervisors as Hastings observed in 1773 was that
the ancient families had been pulled down *• to make way for the 
upstarts" ( Letter to Aldersey, 1 July 1773* Add Mss 29125 p 225)
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By June 1770, nine months after HKS Aurera had sailed with the 
three Commissioners from England, it was clear that some accident had 
befallen them. The opposition to the Clivites in Bengal need no longer 
consider action to be expected from the Commissioners, and could there­
fore turn to the instructions sent out by the Court of Directors on 30
June, 17^9* After April elections of 1769 they knew that they could
expect support from within the Direction* They might also have had known 
that the Directors* letter of 30 June 1769 was addressed to the Council 
as a deliberate act]as they were also possibly aware of the messages it 
contained* The Company was known to be in great need of money - there was 
£ 400,000 a year to pay to Government as its agreed share out of Compan/s
territorial revenue receipts in India and another £ 200,000 as the
2agreed indeminty on tea * Already by 1767 "the Company came under an < 
obligation to pay an additional sum of £ 128,000 by increasing the rate 
of dividend from six to ten percent per annus, and the Proprietors were 
in a lively expectation ef a still higher dividend* The Company was
also finding it increasingly difficult to make good the payments in
England of the bills of exchange drawn on them against cash payments in 
Company* s treasuries in BengaloThey had been obliged also to restrict 
such remittance even at the known risk of diverting money into the 
treasuries of their rivals, the French and the Dutch* They had been 
compelled to permit export of gold and silver to England and to buy 
pound sterling in London at a higher price against payment in rupee in
A
Bengal? Moreover the return of Sulivan and his allies to the Direction
meant that there would be new friends and dependants to be satisfied by
5
the exercise of patronage^ and there were many fortunes,ruined by specu­
lation in the Company* s stock which had preceded the election,to repair^
1* The first draft was addressed to the Select Committee^
2.By an agreement confirmed by an Act in 1767 the Company was to pay an 
indemnity for lowering the duties on tea consumed in Great Britain by 
one shilling per pound in weight and for allowing a drawback on export 
of tea to Ireland and British colonies in America.The Company had hoped 
for an advantage even after paying this sum, but friction with the Colo­
nies ruined the hope(Court*s letter,20 Nov 176?iSutherland*op*cit 227) 
3*Ceurtfs letter,20 -Nov 17674Even though the expectations had risen to 
14 % and 16 i' it was raised to 12*i#in 1771 (Sutherland*op*cit* 166-68,227] 
4#Court*s letters,l6Mar 1768, 11 Nov 1768, 30 June 1769#
5.The largest number of servants, 47 , were sent out in 1769 season* 
6*Sven Henry Vansittart was one of them and he was so much reduced to 
ruin that "nothing but an immediate return to In*ia could save him". 
(Sutherland, op*cit*192)
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though the full extent #f this need nay not have been realised in Bengal* 
The hulk ef all these expectationsv public and privatev had to he satis* 
fied from the produce of Bengal and Bihar*
The opposition in the Calcutta Counoil were also aware that in the
discussion about how Bengal and Bihar could he made to yield the
necessary resources, home opinion had been moving their way* For example,
at the 1767 enquiry held by a Parliamentary Committee presided over by
Fuller, Holwell from his twenty-eight years of experience in Bengal had
testified that Bengal could produce nine and a half crores of rupees and
that the real revenue yield was three or four times as great as that
which the Company actually received! This picture ef a vast real produce
being concealed by an interested native regime had been widely accepted*
It was made all the more plausible by the success of English adminia-
2
tration in the jagiri districts* The Directors ignored the fact that the 
encouraging results in the Company* s lands were secured in part by 
seducing peasants from the adjoining Diwani lands to new areas, brought 
under cultivation by farmers who enjoyed much more favourable terns than
these prevalent in the Diwani areas? or even in the older settled lands
4 .of the Company; They ignored also the effect upon the older classes of
officials,nobles and the gentry of the pressure of Hhglish administration*
While the Directors were full of praise for the improvements in Burdwan,
the Sr&dh or funeral ceremonies ef its Raja, Tilekohand, could only be
5
met by melting down the household plate* Ignoring the disruption of 
Bengali society , the new Direction in their letter of 30 June had 
expressed their great satisfaction at their servants* administration of 
Burdwan, Midnapur, Chittagong and the Calcutta Parganas and had condemned 
the administration of the Diwani areas M where the numerous tribes of
Fougedars, Aumils, Sikdars etc* practice all the vaieus modes of
6
oppression*** Their aim, the Directors said, was not to injure the
T* Holwell was in Bengal from 1731 to 1750 and again from 1751 to 176Q* 
For his evidence on above see R*()regory*s copy of the Proceedings 
vide Add Mss 18469, ff 12-13*
2* 24 Parganas granted as jagir to Clive by Mir Jafar,Burdwan Midnapur 
and Chittagong to the Company by Mir Qasim©
3* Vide Gokul Ghosal*s letter quoted in LCB, 123-12b0
4* Vide Graham's report* 1PC 20 Nov 17^9* 5« BPC 31 1770*
6* Court*s letter, 30 June 1769#
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Zemindars, "much less te add anything to the rents to he collected 
from the tenants*, hut rather to reduce *that immense number of idle 
sycophants who for their own emolument and that of their principals 
are plaoed between the tenants and the public treasury and of which 
every one must get his share of plunder, the whole mass of which must 
amount to a most enormous sum*!The members of the Calsutta Council, 
the supervisors and their assistants, their Banians and gumashtas 
could not but welcome such views, since they aimed at placing themselves 
the very advantageous position from which the older agencies of 
administration were to be ousted*
With Becher's renewed plea for the curtailment of the supervisor* s 
powers already before the Committee, the opposition in the Council 
moved the question of the Select Committee's authority* This was on 
19 June 1770* On 21 June June the Committee conceded what Becher had 
demanded, induced to do so, it would appear, by the Council's question* 
ing of their authority. But publication of this decision was withheld 
until after the next meeting of the Council, which took place on 27 
June* If Cartier was hoping for some accommodation with the opposition 
he was to be disappointed, for at the Council meeting the question of 
jurisdiction was again raised* Russell, backed by Fleyer who sank all 
his earlier differences with Becher in a common defence of the Commit- 
tee's authority argued that the management of the Diwani administration 
was "foreign" to the Council's rights, as the Company's letter of 12 
January 17&6 confirming authority to the Select Committee was still 
wnreveked* Cartier moved that there should be no debate on the issue* 
Reed, however, while declining any wish to “intrude os the powers of 
the Select Committee*, asked for a debate* Barwell the juniersost
member of the Council, then pressed the issue, and supported by Lane,
2
Jekyll and Hare, carried the motion by a majority vote*
The Select Committee sot on the following day, 28 June and wrote 
to Becher communicating their decision of 21 June to restrict the ' 
supervisor's powers, denouncing the Council's motion of 19 June an£
* 1
proceedings of 27 June as “highly unoonstitution&l and tending to the
i, Court's letter, 30 June 17^9#
2* Secret Cons, 19 June and 27 June, 1770 *u*d BSC 21 June,1770*
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subversion of good order in Government", and asking Becher and 
Alexander te o hey the Select Committee as lie fore*1
On 3 July# however, the opposition completed their reut ef the
Select Committee* The Court ef Directors9 letter had indicated their
resolve to establish a committee ef seme ef their ablest servants
for the management ef the Diwani revenues at Murshidabad for the
province ef Bengal and at Patna for that ef Bihar; these Councils
"to have the centroul of all the business relating to the revenue9 but
Mahmud Reza Cawn or seme ether principal person ef the country must be
appointed N&ib Duan ( that is the Company9s Deputy) and all business
must be carried on thro9 the N&ib and under his seal and signing*WLnd
in the like manner Shitabroy or some other principal person at Patna
2
for the Bahar province" * The Directors had further ordered the employ* 
ment of as many junior covenanted servants for assistants as mi^it be 
required " to be sent into the several provinces to correct abuses and 
maintain the intended reformation*^ The majority in the Council new 
voted that these orders be implemented? On 6 July they proceeded to 
nominate two ef the Calcutta Council9 Becher and Reedf two Senior 
servants, L&wrell and Graham to constitute the Murshidabad Council9 
and again one from the Calcutta Council 9 Alexander and two Senior
5
servants9 Vanaittart and Palk to constitute the Patna Council* On 
13 July they wrote informing Becher and Alexander of the formation 
ef the two Councils and laid down that they should start functioning 
from 1 September 1770* On 19 July the Select Committee made a last bid 
to recover control9 writing to Becher and Alexander that the new
7
Councils must obey the Committee* On 24 Julyf however, Barwell proposed 
and carried a resolution that Becher, who now became Chief of the 
Murshidabad Council, might neither pay nor receive any official visit 
unless accompanied by at least one other member ef his Council? By id 
August the Calcutta Council had drafted its instructions to the new
1, fee 28 June 1770o 2* Courtis letter* J O  J v n e  176?# 4)nly after
implementation of this order could Reza Khan 
be said to be holding a formal appointment as 
Naib Divan*
3«Court9s letter,30 June 17^9* 4o Secret Cons* 3 July 1770.
3*Secret Cons* 6 July 1770* 6© Secret Cens*13 July 1770*
7.BSC 19 July 1770* 8# Secret Cons.24 July 177p*
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Councils* On 17 September Lawrell and Graham reached Murshidabad ready
2
te take up their new duties, and soen after Reed alse arrived* The new 
Council met for the first time on 27 September 1770, with Reed in the 
chair* Becher had left the city some three weeks earlier en grounds ef 
111 health!
When en 28 June the Seleot Committee agreed to his requests to 
withhold controlling power from the supervisors, Becher hastened, 
within twenty-four hours, to issue confirmation of his Punyah promise 
t+ allow '•the Aumils to carry on the collections without interruption”* 
He had at least technically redeemed his assurance to the Anils and 
Zemindarso On 8 and 12 July repeotively, Alexander and Becher wrote to
5
the Select Committee approving of their stand against the Council* But 
by 28 July, Becher had acknowledged defeat, saying that he would obey 
the Committee, unless ”centrouled by a superior power”* By that date 
the Council had established itself as the superior power, and the 
Committee could do no more than appeal, in vain as it turned out, to
7
the final authority of the Directors* Two days later, on 30 July , 
Becher advised the Council of his determination to leave for Europe
a
by the end of 1770 or beginning of 1771* before new Council could 
reach Murshidabad had, with Cartier* s permission ,left the city on the 
plea of ill healtho
On 11 September the majority in the Calcutta Council in a letter 
to the Murshidabad Council of Revenue informed them of the policy 
decisions they had taken on 16 August*, The heart of the letter was the 
confirmation of the controlling power of the supervisors and the 
promise of further powers if they should prove necessary* One of the 
functions of the supervisors, according to the new instructions, was 
to "inquire into the characters and conduct of the officers ef govern-
9
Bent from the highest to the lowest”*
1. Secret Cons* 16 Aug 1770* 2* Lawrell and Graham's letterof 22 Sep*
3* It seems that Becher had and their letter ef 27 Sep jointly with
left Murshidabad on 3 Reed* (Secret Cons* 11 Oct 1770)
Sep or soon after* By 
9 Sep Cartier had received
Reza Khan1 s letter advising Becher9 s departure(HMS, 202,p 110)*
4* LCB, 47* 5* BSC 19 July 1770* 6* BSC 9 Aug 1770*
7. BSC 9 and 11 Sep 1770* The result was dismissal of Cartier and Bechei 
and transfer of Ruesell and Fleyer to Madras*
8* Secret Cons* 2 Aug 1770* 9. Secret Cons* 16 Aug 1770*
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On 21 October 1770, in a letter tendering hie resignation of the
Chiefship of Murshidabad Council and ashing for the appointment ef a
successor by the olese of December at the latest, Beoher made his
formal protest against the Council's actions,^ He registered his
personal regret that after long service of the Company there should be
such a lack of confidence in him* He protested particularly at the
requirement, inserted at Barwell's instance,that he must be accompanied
by seme other member of the Qouncil whenever he met officials of the
geverament«H&d he been inclined to retain the office to which he had
been nominated, he said, he "could not have done so with that degree
of dignity or authority necessary in ay opinion, for the advantage of
our employers,or for ay own credit under the restrictions” which the
Council had laid upon him. He then turned to the Council's confirmation
of the controlling power of the supervisors. This too he held to be
very derogatory to his station, but he attacked it on wider grounds,
protesting for Rosa Khan as well as for himself, "You cannot bo
unacquainted, Gentlemen, " he said ,”that at the season for the settling
for the present years revenue great difficulties secured in consequence
of the centrsuling power with every supravisor, and that I as Resident
at the Durbar and Mahomed Rasa C&wn as the acting minister was so fully
persuaded of the necessity of restraining some of the supravisors, that
we made strong representations to the Select Committee and obtained
their approbation for taking such measures as we judged absolutely
necessary for securing the present year's revenues. In consequence ef
this, agreements wore entered into on Mahomed Reza Cawn's and ay part
stipulating that the supravisors in particular districts should not
have the contreuling power till after the close of the present year's
collections, ♦ •• I shall here touch on the slight put on your Resident
at the Durbar and the minister appointed by the Court of Directors for
managing the revenue branch, by sending an order which cancell ^ sic^the
obligations they have entered into without even consulting or asking
them a question | Obligations, also give me leave to say, entered into
with proper authority, as they had the sanction ef the Select Committee
to which the Court of Directors had thought proper to entrust that
important branch, the Dew&nnee revenues | nor am I acquainted that to 
1,Secret Cons, ^0 Nov 1770© ’
this hour £2\ October MlQjf Court of Directors have withdrawn
that power from their Sdleot Committee?^♦ Being thus authorised , he
had with confidence,"jointly with Mahomed Reza Cawn pursued such
Measures as were judged most conducive to obtain the end desired*
People had no doubts of the validity of our agreements, they entered
on business 9 credit was restored and money begun ^ sifT' iate
2
our treasury** • He asked the Calcutta Council to consider9 "what ideas 
will they fora when they find these agreements broke 9 and in what light 
they will in future esteen II*R.Cawn and myself* He found it impossible 
to continue as Chief of Murshidabad Council " after being reduced so 
low in the eyes of the natives and even in those of young servants who 
are supravisors"*^,
Becher, so circumstanced, could resign his offioe in pretest and 
prepare to go hone to a peaceful retirement* But Rosa Khan's position 
was far harder* Admittedly he had been confirmed by the Company and the 
Calcutta Council as Nai& Diwan 9 but he could not but see that the 
Mughal society,to which he belonged and of which he was necessarily the 
protector, was now gravely threatened* He had aoted as soon as he heard 
of the conflict in Calcutta between the Committee and the Council, 
sending his vakil, Raja Kashi Nath , with a personal communication to 
Cartier, which has purposely been kept off the record* What is on 
record is a very polite reply, received by Cartier en 12 July, to his 
letter ef 16 June to Reza Khan in which-the governor had described the 
entire class of old officials as a "wicked set" of "a few blackguards"* 
Welcoming Cartier's letter , particularly "that plainness ^ which^ best 
suits your excelleny's disposition" and the "regard as calculated for 
ay interest and advantage", the Khan observed that "as the natives ef 
this country look to no further than the present, they comprehend not 
the intrinsie advantage which must arise from establishing English 
forms and regulations, and ignorant ^ fas they arej^of the happy 
consequences to themselves attending the complete introduction ef the 
plan, the Aunils and Zemindars merely because it was new to them entered 
into imaginary apprehensions, and with one voioe started all these 
ebj ections which I have already represented"* After pleading for the
lwtt«ry?l Qct> Secret Cons 56nov 1TYQ» Ibid* 3* ibid*
4* ibid* 5*Vide Reza Khan's letter,Reed 0 July»1770(CPC,III*293)»
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"ignorant* natives,to protect theAmilsand Zemindars from a nyceunterw 
action, the Khan deemed it necessary to explain his own conduct t " 1 
as your servant as ready in obedience and the vassall ^ sicJ[ of the 
Comities fearing lest ay concealing the objections of the Zemindars 
and Aunils might afterward# be wron^/ly^ interpreted 9 and convinced 
within ayself that such concealments would be prejudicial to me ,laid 
before you a minute account of all the particulars"© The Khan concluded f 
after a reiteration of "my labors for the due establishment of the 
Company’s affairs" that "I now likewise pledge that you shall behold 
/a*/? not less earnest in me ^ "sic , possibly endeavours to estab- 
lish the supravisors and effect the object of your grand design^ and 
expressed a wish t " Your well wisher offers up this prayer continually 
that you may long and happily govern and protect the people*©^
It was the more painful thereafter for Cartier to have to write
on 18 September 177®» informing the Khan of the change in his powers
and the replacement of the Resident by a Council of Revenue* Cartier
glossed over the change by saying that the Council had been appointed
because the work of Resident had impaired the health of all who had
single-handed held the office© He explained that the Council’s task
would be to look into the revenues, ascertaining what the ryots paid
and had paid, and to manage the affairs of the Diwani, but that all
orders wore to be signed and sealed by the Khan, who would be .
consulted in all things by the Council© The Khan was told that as
N&ib Diwan of the Company he should not sign any orders touching the
Company’s interests without the approval of the Murshidabad Council© Hot
a single word was said, however, about the revesting of controlling
authority in the supervisors to which the Calcutta Council had compelled
2 •
Cartier to agree© .s
Cartier’s letter was softly worded, but there was little softness 
in Reed’s proceedings© Cartier had advised Reza Khan to meet Reed at 
Daudpur? a distinction hitherto reserved for the governor, though Reed 
was officially only Second in the Murshidabad Council© Reed did not 
reciprocate the courtesy for the Khan was not invited to the first
T© Reza Khan to Cartier, Reed 12 July 1770© HKS.202.ww 90-92*
2© Cartier to Reza Khan, 18 Sep 1770© CPC.Ill, 372© 3# ibid.
Council meeting, on 27 September 1770* At the second meeting on 1 
October the Khan was given a Persian translation ef eight ef the 
sixteen paragraphs of the Calcutta Council’s letter of 11 September 
and was thus informed of the decision to give controlling powers to all 
supervisors© He was directed to prepare parwanas reporting this to 
the Zemindars and Amils and to give his opinion as to how far this 
might affect the engagements they had entered into!
Reza Khan replied that in districts where the Zemindars and Amils 
were jointly responsible fer the revenue, the Zemindar "alone might 
sufficiently answer the purpose ©•© provided the Zemindars did not 
urge the Aumil’s continuation as a plea for adhering to their engage­
ments", and that in districts where Amils only were in charge, they 
might be continued if they were prepared to act under the supervisor’s
authority, and if not then they should balance their accounts and
o
leave© Reza Khan had been assured by the Calcutta Council that the 
Zemindars "who hold certain districts by inheritance" were secure in 
their positions unless they died without heirs© His reply to Reed and 
his Council was therefore directed to safeguarding his officers, the 
Amils© His readiness to see them settle their balances and leave the 
distriots was doubtless based upon the certainty that after two years 
of famine the revenues were going to fall short of the estimates©
Bumper crops were in prospect in seme areas, but there had also been 
disastrous floods in eastern Bengalis the Anils would do well in such 
a situation to end their commitments, especially now that the super­
visor* s powers had been restored© Dual authority, Reza Khan was 
convinced, must breed confusion and discord© His own treatment by the 
Murshidabad Council showed only too clearly what his officials must ’ 
expect when the supervisors came to undertake "the examination of 
accounts and the unravelling exploring ef all transactions in the 
different districts"© He had been ordered , on 1 October, to prepare 
twelve varied sets of statements, had been told to sign nothing 
without Council approval, had had his power of receiving and disbursing 
money from the treasury taken from him© though he was still allowed to 
1. Iff 1 October 1770. 2. m i ,
3© In order to meet the rice shortage Madras was requested to permit 
rice cargo to Bengal(Fort William’s letter.BPC 24 July 1770)
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keep an agent therey and in general had keen treated as a subordinate, 
with none of the respect extended by Clive, Verelst and even 
V&nsittart*
On 29 Octoker the question of the Aiails was brought up again ky 
a letter from the supervisor of Jessore complaining of the Amil*s 
misuse of funds and collection ef salamies - " a fresh and convincing
proof", the Council declared, "of the defective conduct,and unprofit*
2akle services of government Auails"* The Murshidabad Council now asked 
Reza Khan whether the Amils were bound to make ‘good any revenue 
defeciencies in their districts* Reza Khan replied that if an Amil 
embezzled or misapplied money passing through his hands he could be 
called to account, but that "if the revenue of the district or rather 
the collections made by him , allowing for his reasonable expences, 
prove insufficient to fulfill the Khalaa Bundibust, the Aumll is not 
bound to make good the deficiency"* The Khan maintained that the Amils 
had taken office " for the sake of subsistence" and that none of them 
had either the intention or the ability to sake themselves answerable 
for deficiencies* The Council thereupon concluded that the welfare of 
the country and the interests of the Company would be better promoted 
without them, "men ef needy fortune"0
Any decision about the Amils had, however, to be deferred, for 
early in November a letter from the Directors restored control to 
Cartier and the Clivites* This letter, of 23 March 1770, restored 
Samuel Middleton, who had lost his service on account of Clive* s 
hostility* to the service and to a post in the Calcutta Council next 
in seniority to Alexander* But the Clivites still gained in that it also 
reduced the Council*s membership from twelve to nine,inclusive ef the 
governor , but exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief. Further it was laid 
down that no Councillor might be stationed outside Calcutta except for
4
the Resident at the Durbar and the Commander-in-Chief *On 3 November 
Cartier moved immediate compliance with these orders of the Directors* 
Floyer, Kelsall and Russell spoke in favour of their immediate execution, 
Hare, Jekyll and Lane meekly followed suit, while Barwell also agreed,
1* HP 1 Oct 1770* "
2* The supervisor of Jessore in his letter of 22 Oct alleged that the 
Amil had applied Rs #,999-15-9 in private £nvestaent*MP 2? Oct 1770* 
3* HP 29 Oct 1770* 4*Court*s letter* 23 Mar 1770*
at the same time offering his help to the Council if required* Barwell 
had encouraged Lane, Jekyll and Hare also to make the same offer of 
their services but all four were rebuffed and sfe quit the Councilo 
Middleton made a feeble attempt to( keep the four in Council until the 
packet lying at Madras for the Commissioners had been seen, but Becher 
silenced hjm with the argument, Uped by the opposition in June, that 
the Commissioners must be presumed lost! The Council now consisted of
9
Cartier, Becher, Alexander, Aldersey,Kelsall, Floyer, and SnsaeU,
generally Clivite in sentiment with only Middleton and Reed, recalled
from Murshidabad, to represent the opposition* Cartier could have kept
the four in office , acting for Alexander, Aldersey and Kelsall while
they were upcountry winding up their private affairs, but instead he
o
hastened to oust them* Becher,though he did not withdraw his resigna­
tion or change his determination to leave for England, decided now to 
return to his post at Murshidabad*
Reed had continued in his hostility to the old system to the last, 
reversing the policy of Becher, and also taking deliberate moves to 
injure Reza Khan* Thus he entertained complaints by Munni Begum, who 
had been encouraged by his attitude, that Reza Khan had deprived her 
both of money and estates! She explained that she had not spoken 
earlier because whenever Becher visited her he was aocospanied by the 
Khan* It was her "good fortune" , she said, that Reed, Lawrell and 
Graham had come to Murshidabad, enabling her to lay the complaint before 
them and to petition the Council^ Nothing came of the allegations since 
by early January, after both Becher and Reed had left Murshidabad, the 
Council found Reza Khan’s decision equitable! Reed likewise received 
and forwarded a petition from Raj ball abh for his continuation in his 
father’s jagir, stopped by the Calcutta authorities on R&i Durlabh’s 
death, and with it the complaint, covertly hitting at Reza Khan,
1* BPC 3 Nov 1770.
2* ibid* Cartier,while refusing the four to participate in the Council 
asked Russell and Floyer to continue in the Committed until the 
return of its new members from upcountry*Russell and Floyer had also 
lost their seals in the Committee after the recall of all senior 
servants to Calcutta and Middleton's reinstatement as Fourth in the
Council*(B3C 7 Nov 1770)„s6* also Bpc 8 Dec 1770*
3* Munni Begum’s Arzi* MP 20 Deo 177^* 4* ibidp 3 J^1 177^•
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that ha had been *' without any manner of cause displaced1* from his 
office of Diwan\ To both these ooraplaints Reed drew the particular 
attention of the Murshidabad Council in a letter of 17 December in 
which he expressed his own hostility of Reza Khan. He expressly 
opposed the Khan* s independent authority as Naib Nazim, declaring 
that this ” would be placing too much power in the hands of any one 
man, and especially an Asi&tick and one under whose management there 
is too much reason to apprehend that great abuses have been committed5
o
Becher1 s return to Murshidabad, in the second week of November^,
halted the attacks of Munni Begun, Rajbajlabh and Nandkumar who had
been busy procuring lettersauthentic and forged, which might injure 
4the Khan * Becher Also proceeded to undo the damage inflicted by Reed
on Reza Khan's authority and prestige* On 19 November, at his second
Council meeting, he pointed out that the collections for Kartik,
October - November, had fallen heavily into arrears in Bhaturia,
Birbhua, Bishnupur, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Jessore and Nadia and that if
collections did not improve in the next two months, when collections
were at their momentum, the balanoes must prove irrecoverable* He
proceeded te ask his junior colleagues for their suggestions for a
remedy, indicating his own disapproval of the measures already taken*
The security of the current year's revenue, he pointed out, was of far
greater consequence than the pressing forward ef the supervisors'
investigations* He was prepared to concede that his colleagues
1* Rajballabh had lost his post of Nizamat Diwan or Diwan-i-Sarkar in 
the changes following the Nawab Saif ud daulah's death in March,and 
he complained in December*He claimed that the Diwani was his as mud 
by right as the Xasnad belonged to Mir Jafar's sons(MP 20 Doe 1770)« 
2* Reed's letter, 17 Dec* MP 20 Dec 1770*
3* Becher had returned to Murshidabad after about two months *Before 
he had left the city* he left a note dated 5 Sep for his colleagues 
(vide MP 27 Sep 1770) .He attended Select Committee on 2 Nov and the 
CounciT"on 3 Nov at Calcutta (BSC 2 Nov and BPC 5 Nov 1770) and then 
attended his first Council me*tin£ at Murshidabad on 15 Nov 1770*
4* Among letters found in Purnea in the possessions of Nobit Roy and 
Rahaat Khan, who were employees of Golab Roy, Nandkumar* a vakil te 
Shuja ud daulah of Oudh and the Rohilla Chief Dundi Khan, there was 
one addressed by Dundi Khan to Reza Khan commending Golab Roy for a 
suitable job. The curious thing is that Golab Roy was said td have 
had instructed his agents to deliver the letter fer Reza Khan te 
Nandkumar. In the packet found there were a few forged letters tee* 
(BSC 7 Nov 1770).
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had acted in conformity with ther^instructions of the Calcutta Council . 
hut had he been present he would have delayed execution ef then until 
the grounds for altering the revenue system were presented. The earnest 
representations of Reza Khan against a restoration of the supervisor^ 
controlling powers at the nost critical period of collections ought to 
have been urged upon the Calcutta Council. As it was the attention and 
energy of all connected with collections had heen diverted to the 
preparation of papers and statements and to explaining then to the 
supervisors9 natters which could easily have heen deferred until the
i
months of March and August when collections were less important. Becher
did not bother to remind them of*his letter of 5 September in which he
warned them against any change in system and reminded them of the
2confidence so long reposed ih Reza Khan, for his minute was in itself 
sufficient to throw them fully 'on the defensive. Reedy Lawrell and 
Graham all were anxious to absolve themselves of responsibility for 
the threatened deficiency in the yearvs collections, and in a Joint 
minute of 20 November they virtually surrendered, promising to review 
their decision regarding the Amils and to unite with the President in 
framing new regulations. They also suggested that if Becher thought 
proper, they might order the supervisors to confine their researches to 
the records available in the Sadar Cutoherries until the period of 
heavy collections was over.^
Becher had regained his position and it was open to Reza Khan to 
continue his Amils in office. But the Khan had no wish to push a purely 
temporary advantage. Even if there had heen no possibility of an early 
change in the Calcutta Council. Becher was known to be leaving shortly. 
So when Becher asked for a restatement of his opinion about the recall 
of Amils. he emphatically pressed for their recall, stressing that with 
divided authority in the districts their stay would "be attended with a
A
degree ef disadvantage*. Becher could do no more than confirm the
Murshidabad Council9s earlier decision. The Select Committee thereupon
authorized the Council to recall the Amils and Paujdars from all
1. Becher9 s minute. IIP 19 Nov 1770Y
2* Yide i£27 Sep 1770.
3# Joint minute of Reed. Lawrell and Graham. MP 20 Nov 177^.
4. Reza Khan*s note. IT 20 Nov 1770*
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districts except Hugli* The ^aibat of Dacca was also to be retained,for 
the Committee explained that it was their wish to "have the appearance 
of the Country Government preser* d where it may have any connection
i
with the other European powers'* .Currently, in fact, Cartier had been
using Reza Khan*s agents, to check European ships, especially French
ships, entering the Hugli, by establishing a Chaukl, an outpost, at
2Kalpi, south of Calcutta* Accordingly the Murshidabad Council nominated 
Saiyid Muhammad Ali, Reza Khan* a brother as Faujdar ef Hugli and decided 
to continue Jesarat Khan, the Khan* s old protege, as Naib of Dacca, On 
13 December orders wore issued to the supervisors, accompanied by 
parwanas from Reza Khan, for the withdrawal of all other Amils and 
Faujdars.Ihe Khan*s officers were directed to make over charge to the 
supervisors and owe to Murshidabad for the final adjustment of their
A
accounts? By the beginning of 1771 the administration of the districts 
had passed completely out of ^eza Khan* a control*
The dispute over the powers to be given to the supervisors had
ceased to be any more important* But the heat it had generated was not
*
immediately dissipated, as became apparent when on 23 November Becher 
drafted a circular letter to supervisors restricting their enquiries to 
Sadar Cut cherries and forbidding them to call people from the interior 
of the districts. This was in accord with the earlier suggestion of 
Reed, Lawrell and Graham, but Reed now came up with an amendment te the 
effect that this prohibition should not prevent supervisors going into
5
the districts to make personal enquiries there.
The issue was by itself insignificant, and Lawrell and Graham 
anxious about their position, for Becher had now been confirmed in the 
eventual succession to the governorship, voted with Becher to throw out 
the amendment* But Reed*s decision to return to the role of champion of 
the junior servants and particularly of the supervisors against Becher 
and other senior servants re-opened the old conflict*
1, Select Committee*■ letter of 3 Dec* HP 10 Deo 1770*
2* For the Anglo-French dispute and Reza Khan*s involvement in it as 
Naib Nazim see CPC. Ill, 87,105,15$,206,213.214*24*, 261,477,493,513, 
527,634,628, 629*
3* MP 10 Deo, 13 Dec 1770*
4* *£P 13 Dec 1770* Hiramat Singh, the Dacca Diwan, and also a protege '
of Reza Khan was also another exception* ( MP, 4 Feb 1771)
5* MP 23 Nov 1770* \  . 6*ibl¥*
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On 23 November Becher Bet out his views on the Company1 s direction* 
contained in their letter of 30 June 17^9* on the Calcutta Council98 
orders in their letter of 11 September* In his long minute he also 
sought to show how a new policy might be formulated without either 
contradicting the Company1 s wishes or worsening the state of the 
country which he saw heading to ruin* tie argued that it was not 
impossible to meet the Company9 s wishes and yet preserve the older 
social classes* But to do this required a change of direction 1"Every 
Zemindar9 Talokdar, Land-holder or Farmer as well as the Aumils and 
others employed in the collections by the Government**, he maintained, 
"are alarmed by having their Acc^/pun^ts called for and seem apprehen­
sive ^ that^ they shall be deprived of all advantages they derive from
i
holding lands under any denomination" * There were many examples te 
which he could refer* Thus Higginson, the supervisor of Birbhun by 
10 October 1770 had retrenched expenses and increased the Company9 0 
income by cutting down by a third the number of persons in the Raja's
employ, from 12,833 to 8,832, resuming in the process 61,434 bighas out
2
of 150,237 bighas of land enjoyed by then revenue free* In like manner 
in Dinajpur, George Vansittart had not only resumed much uncultivated 
land but had cut the pay of the Amil9 s servants from Rs 3289 a month to 
Rs 1000, of the Zemindar's servants from Rs 6,749 to Rs 4vt>95* of 
the horsemen and matohlockmen sanctioned by Reza Khan for keeping 
law and order, from Rs 20,000 to Rs 10,000 a year, had resumed 64,473 
bighas of revenue free land out of 156,673 bighas so long enjoyed by 
the paiks, horsemen, matohlockmen and peons, and had dismissed 3*940
and in the amount of service lands had taken plaoe in almost every 
districto Against such action by the supervisors Becher now protested*
He also protested against the enlargement of the revenue demand 
and here he blamed all including Reza Khan for the first time* tie asked 
tie Council to compare the money which had gone into the Company's
1*Becher's minute* MP 23 Nov 1770#
2*Birbhua report* MP 23 Oct 1770*
3*George Vansittart's letter, 16 Oct* MP 31 Dec 1770*
Reza Khan had sanctioned Rs 24*000, though expenditure for horsemen
and matohlockmen before Vansittart's reduction was Rs 20,000 a year* 
The number of horsemen was reduced » from 77 to 10,end of matohlockmen 
from 464 to 222. Their reduced pay was Ha 20 and Rs 3 respectively.
out of reductions in numbers, in pay
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treasury with the amount colleoted by the Nawabs in the same period
of years before the grant of the Diwani. He admitted that the miseries
of the country had been increased by the oppressive measures ef the
Amils, but as a later minute makes clear, his real criticism was of
the general demand for increases of revenue " from the Court of
Directors to everyone employed in that branch1* • Shis had been M the
occasion of measures that have not tended to the general welfare of
2this country and its inhabitants'*.
Finally, Becher expressed his indignation at "the want of a free 
trade", the root cause of all other evils, The increased activity of 
the English and their Banians and gnmasht&a in the countryside made him 
very apprehensive that the native merchants would be still further, 
impoverished. He concluded with a powerful plea for reform in all 
these matters i
"Increase of revenue to the Company should in my opinion arise 
chiefly from increased cultivation and manufactures i these 
advantages tho* slow will be permanent and promote the real 
benefit of the Company, and I further think that justice to £ the^ 
principal natives require it, and that we shall never see this 
country in the flourishing state we wish it nor the future 
interest of the Company properly pursued, * till Dadney merchants 
are again established for the provision of their investment, and 
natives of family and character are allowed to reap reasonable 
advantages in the collecting branch between the treasury and the 
ryott or tenant, and surely such men have an equitable claim to 
a proportion of the good things of their covin try as well as the 
English East India Company, and I must here beg leave to express 
my disapprobation /ot/ all measures that tend to reduce the 
Zemindars and other natives of family to a lower state than they 
are in at present, and sincerely wish the reverse could be 
effected". 3
Lawrell and Graham , though they ehose to regard Becher* s minute 
as more a matter " for the observation of his superiors and employers" 
than for a debate in the Council, did not fail to answer Becherf They 
would not accept that the revenue demands since 17^5 had increased 
unduly. Even if it had,they believed "the only purposes thereby answered 
have been the promoting and gratifying every species of corruption
1 . Becher*s minute, MP 23 Nov 177^.
2. Becher*s minute, MP 3 Deo 1770.
3. Becher*s minute, MP 23 Nov 1770.
4. Lawrell and Graham* s minute, MP 26 Nov 1770*
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avarico,embezzlement thro all the classes of native officers”0 Similarly
the fall in trade could not be, they said, attributed to any improper
use of influence in the provision of goods, but rather to the political
disturbances in the markets of North India, Arabia and IranQ They were
silent about the preservation of natives of family and character urged
by Becher, but stated that it was the Company's intention to encourage
2
"Farmers and every other useful subject**, While deferring to the 
expressed wishes of the Company that the Zemindars should not be 
deprived of "their ancient profits and emoluments" they insisted that 
their gross income must be ascertained so as to step " feeding the 
insatiable thirst of avarice" with the "secretions or alienation of 
the revenues"! Since the Zemindars had been bora and bred under despotic 
government, and so "familiarized to almost continual breaches of public 
engagements, arbitrary seizures of their property and every act of 
tyrannical oppression", it wa3 not by mere assurances alone, they 
maintained, but by certain and proved experience of " the lenity, 
mildness and Justice of the authority" which then ruled over them that 
the English could expect to ensure the confidence of the Zemindars
4
and "ingratiate their affections"7 This must wait until * a more distanf 
date, and meanwhile increases of revenue must properly accrue te the 
Company, from the resumption of "illicit emoluments" and retrenchment 
of charges!
The confliot between the two systems of thought was thus once more
clearly arid forcibly expressed0Heza Khan saw that such divergent views
could not be reconciled within a government.He was later to express
again the view, which he shared with Becher, that "every European has
his Banyan, who let his master's integrity be ever so great, will avail
himself of the influence of his name, and share in the plunder"^and his
consequent opposition to the controlling power of the supervisors over
the districts*) But he could now see that the battle was lost, and that
it was useless and dangerous "to Join natives and Europeans in the
7
management of the collection"* It was this realization which made him
determined to withdraw his officers, the Amils0
1.Lawrell and Graham*s minute. Iff 2£ Nov 1770• 2. *ibid^  3* ibidp 
4* ibid* 5* ibid. 6orVide Francis Mssd.O.Eur E 28, 347o 
7* Reza Khan as quoted by Francis in a letter to Clive dt 21 Kay 1775* 
Francis Kssa l.O.Eur E 1}» 241A? 241B*
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CHAPTER TEN
RF.7A KHANfS LAST DEFENCE OF THE OLD ORDER 
AND HIS ARRESTf 1770-1772*
Despite the temporary restoration to full authority of Becher,Cartier 
and others of the Clive school in the autuan of 1770, Reza Khan wade no 
attempt to restore the old Mughal revenue structure* He could no longer 
hope to exclude the supervisors and their attendant Banians and gunashtas 
from the districts, and rather than suffer a dual authority in the 
countryside ho recalled his Amils and abandoned the field*
But though he had yielded ground in the Diwani he was still firmly
resolved to defend those other areas of Mughal authority in the Nizaaat*
This he made clear when on 1 October 1770, at his first meeting of the
Murshidabad Controlling Council of Revenue, he asked how he was to conduct
himself ” in the administration of justice in general and relative to
orininal cases in particular"I The question was not just an administrative
point t Reza Khan was reminding Rood and his Council that their legitimate
power did not extend beyond the Diwani, and that the Khan,Naib Nazim though
2
formally designated -BOW as Naib Diwan , could not be treated merely as a 
servant of the Company*
Murshidabad referred the question to the Calcutta Council* However on 
22 October they proceeded to prejudge the issue by laying down that all 
criminal cases should be tried in the existing Faujdari Adalat, but that 
sentences before execution should have the approval of the Council* It was 
further decided that causes relating to property in land and to revenue 
should be referred to the Khalsa Cutcherry, and causes for debt to
1* KP 1 October 1770. :
2* Until the Court of Directors had asked in their letter of 30 June , 1769 
to appoint somejone at Murshidabad and another at Patna as Naib Jiwan 
there was no separation of Diwani administration from the general 
administration of the provinoe*The new order became effective on1 Oct 1770
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a different Adalat, these two courts to he constituted of all the members
of the Murshidabad Council* Reed and his Council further ordered Reza Khan
to say whether any parwana was necessary for the arrest of persons accused
of robbery and murder, and he was directed to give then copies of all
parwanas then in force or issued in future0 Reed had thus taken away the
1whole judicial authority of the Nazim as exercised by the Khan*
The Calcutta Council's reply when it cane was a non-committal " the
administration of justice should remain as usual** ; but with the addition
that all transactions " relative to government" should ultimately come
2
before the Murshidabad Counoil* Becher* however, opposed Reed's claims and 
supported the Khan's independence in Nizamat matters© In a minute of 23 
November he argued that the Council might properly eontrel every action of 
the Naib Diwan and the district officials engaged in Diwani matters, but 
that in criminal cases» causes of property, quarrels and complaints under 
Nizaaat jurisdiction the English should avoid appearing as principals* he 
stressed that the destruction or denial of that independence would harmfully 
affect the Company's relations with the French and other European powers 
and doubtless earn the disapprobation of Parliament&awrell and Graham who 
had earlier concurred with Reed in usurping the Nizamat powers now revises 
their stand and maintained that in the absence of any clear direction on 
the matter from the Company there was scope for more definite directions 
from Calcutta}
On 3 December 1770, Reza Khan indicated where he thought a proper line 
of authority should be drawn between his two offices of Naib Diwan and Naib 
Nazim i
"It formerly was the practice them the Nazim and Duan were appointed 
by the King, for the former to transact whatever related to His Majesty 
and the latter whatever related to the Vizier, yet nothing was executea 
by the Duan without orders and approbation of the Nazim* Accordingly 
all these forms of conducting business are now before the Mutsudees 
of the Dewannee and are still observed in regard to Sunnuds Acta, but 
whatever mode you gentlemen please to adopt shall be complied with — —
1* MP 22 October 1770.
2* Fort William Secret letter of 11 Oct* MP 22 Oct 1770* In October the 
opposition dominated the decisions of the Calcutta Council*
3* MP 23 November 1770* Becher,while upnoldlng the independence of the 
Nizamat in Diwani areas, wished to act as a check on the Adalat to
prevent injustice*
4* MP 26 November lllp*
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Account of what belongs to the Duanny^DiwaniJ  
The appointing of Aumils into Luffussul;
The Collections and whatever belongs thereto;
The settling a Bundihust ef the Pergunnahs;
The examining of Dewanny Sunnuds ^ irhich were issued^under the 
signature of the Nazim for Taloks* charity lands and religious 
donations of Berhameter ^ Brahmottaxy^ Deoter^Devottaxj^*
The investigating the districts and foraing a Hustaboodf 
The uniting and separating one district fren another*
The placing and displacing the Zemindars with consent of the Nazim;
The cultivation of the Country and whatever tends to increase its 
revenue*
The examining [otj complaints against Aumils and Zemindars /^about 
their^aaking illegal demands*
The limiting the boundaries of a Zemind&ry and adjusting complaints 
not deserving of capital punishment*
The examining of Taloks* and adjusting the rights of Talokdars;
The writing of Perwanas to inforce payment of revenue and the recalling 
of Aunils from the Muffuasul en any complaint*
Account of what falls under the Nizanut*
Household affairs of the Nazim,Mirsumany^ir-i-SamaniTBhela and Sepoys^ 
The placing and displacing of Naibs and Cazees Ytisabs^Thtisa and 
Naib of Adawlut and Fougedars0 ^
The sentencing and inflicting of capital punishment*
The calling ef robbers &ca out of the Meffussul ^"meaning perhaps the 
rooting out of robbers from the countryside^ 2
The protecting of Talokdars from the oppression of individuals?
The Khan made it clear that he intended te act aocording to this rule.
Ignoring the claims Reed and the Council had advanced in October* He
memorialised the Council accordingly t
"The Council at Calcutta having determin'd and express'd it in their 
instructions 4 that the Naib Duan shall make no appointments f nor issue 
any order under his seal without first obtaining the approbation ef you 
gentlemen* I am in that case subject te your commands and will never 
carry anything ef importance into execution that appertains te the 
Dewannee without your consent and advice*But there are several matters 
ef less consequence* which if not immediately settled will excite 
complaints from the poor* and create confusion* These ••* if you 
approve ef it 1 will perform the writing part and immediately acquaint 
the Chief; after which the particulars shall be laid before the Council^  
All affairs relating to the Nizamut* I will as usual carry into 
execution under my own seal"* }
1* At Dacca* however* Jasarat Khan * the Naib '•exercised a power of life 
and death in capital offences* without reference ...to Kuxadabad**(vide 
Kelsail's letter*15 Nov 1770, MP 27 Dec 1770.)
2* Reza Khan's statement* *P 3 Dec 1770*
3* Reza Khan's memorial* MP 3 Dec 1770*
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For functioning in his newly formalised office as Naib Diwan of the 
Company he had had a new seal also prepared*
The Murshidabad Council forwarded Reza Khan’s memorial with a further 
request for guidance from the Calcutta Council about the distinction 
between the Diwani and Nizamat in the administration of justice* They 
pointed out that the practice had been for justice to be administered in 
the districts by an officer of the Nazim, or more correctly a deputy of the 
Sadar Adalat of Murshidabad, acting under the orders of the Faujdar or Amil* 
Since the Mughal officials had now been withdrawn from the districts and 
replaced by English supervisors, it would be necessary, were the adminis­
tration of justioe allocated to the Nizamat, to say what establishment
2
should be set up in the district* The posting of supervisors also raised
two further problems : the Murshidabad Council was directed to obtain
Reza Khan’s advice on district matters and all orders were to be issued
under the Khan’s seal and signature* To obey the first injunction required
that all accounts and statements from the supervisors should be intelligible
to the Khan , they therefore suggested that they should be accompanied "by
3
an exact Persian translation"! to obey the second required some Mughal 
official to whom the Khan could direct his correspondence in every district 
Cutcheriy* The Murshidabad Council suggested both measures for adoption^ 
which ensured continuance of some of the old officials in service , though 
on lower salary, but at the same time undoing all that Reed had done in 
October as Chief of that Council*
Reed had ceased to attend the Murshidabad Council after 23 November,
5
though he did not leave the city until 18 December .However, he had kept
        '    _
1* MP 23 Nov and 3 Deo 1770* The inscription of the new seal as approved by 
the Murshidabad Council declared the Mughal Emperor as sovereign, the 
Company as Diwan and "Rulers of Affairs" and the Khan as Naib*As apparen­
tly incorrectly rendered in English,it read i"A_loyal subject of the 
Victorious Emperor Shaw Allua(King of the World)The English Company,Ruler 
of Affairs Dewan of Soubah Bengali,*}ahar and Orissa, Naib,the Champion of 
the Empire, the Ally of Fortune,Cawn of Cawn Syed Mahomed Reza Cawn 
B&h&der, Victorious in War"*
2. MP 3r Deo 1770*
3* Accounts in districts were kept in Bengali and these used to be transla­
ted in Persian and sent to Murshidabad .With the posting of Englishmen 
as supervisors there was a further translation in English* Thus three 
languages were used until the transfer of Khalsa to Calcutta in 1772 
when ^ere was 110 aore need of using Persian in revenue matters*
4. ISP 23 Nov 1770* 5. Vide letter to Fort William, MP 20 Deo 1770*
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bin3elf inforued of the Council's proceedings^and on 17 December he sent
a leng letter to the Council laboriously refuting and opposing Becher1a
views and denouncing the Khan. He argued that since the country was in
English hands, it was duty incumbent upon them to save the inhabitants
from flagrant injustioe t only the English could protect them from the
enormities " rooted as it were in the constitution of the Moorish govern-
mentM. Te avoid an overt interference which would lead to complications
with other European powers, however, he urged that cases should be
2
decided " in our houses and not in publick courts"*
Though Reed maintained this attitude when the Port William Council 
took up the matter on 17 January 1771» the Council agreed that the Khan's 
parwanas should be addressed to the principal Zemindars and that his 
judicial orders should be sent to the Maulvis of the Sadar Cutcherries.
They thus accepted Reza Khan's and Murshidabad Council's main recommenda­
tions, though they still sought clarification about whether the Diwan 
could take cognizance of misdemeanours, riots and matters of property, 
and of the apparent contradiction between the Nizamat power of protecting
the Taluqdars from oppression and the Diwani power of examining and
4adjusting the rights ef Taluqdars* However, before Reza Khan could olear
5
up these points, the Murshidabad Council had been driven by the actions ef
Grose to a full-blooded enunciation of the principle that all districts
under the Nawab's government were " subject to the Moorish jurisdiction 
6and usages** Supervisor Grose had allowed himself to be driven by the
French into the position of judicial authority in his distriot, accepting
f * As evidenced his reference to Ducarel's letter of 3 Dec and Hard­
wood's letter of 29 Nov 1770 (MP 13 Dec 1770)in his letter of 17 Deo 177C
2* Reed's letter of 17 Deo* KP 20 Deo 1770*
3* Secret Cons* 17 Jan 1771*
4« Fort William letter* MP 4 Feb 1771.
Reza Khan clarified the apparent contradiction between the Diwani and 
Nizamat powers regarding Taluqdars by asserting the superior power of 
the Nazim* According to him, the disputes regarding boundaries,settle­
ment of Inheritance,complaints of illegal demands and oppressions on 
ryots, debts to merchants were matters of the Diwan to settle "with the 
consent and approbation of the Nazim*9 Referring as proof to the old 
sanads, the Khan further maintained that "in all Dewanny sunnuds whether 
for Zeaindaries or Talookdaries or the like,it is expressed that tuey 
have been granted agreeably to the terms sign'd by the Nazim**(vide 
Reza Khan's note. 11 Feb 1771)*
6, Letter to Grose. IT 4 Feb 1771*
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letters from the French chief at Chandemagore and requests from the local 
French agent at Kurigraa te send a merchant Brindaban to Chandemagore for
i
examination* Murshidabad therefore overruled him, ordering him to leave the
matter to the local Adal&t and " not to Interfere therein** t and issued
their statement about "Moorish jurisdiction" over the districts* Their
action was approved by the Calcutta Council which wrote from its Committee
of Revenue on 21 May 1771 i "Although we wish to interfere as little as
possible with the business as appertains to the Nizamut, and established by
long usage of the country, yet as we are desirous of checking the arbitrary
proceedings of the Moorish court of justice from a duty we owe to the
happiness and security' of the inhabitants,we must therefore desire that
you Murshidabad CoundlJTwill give the strictest attention to prevent
injustice as much as possible by your representations to government, as
2
occasions offer "*
The position of the Calcutta Council was tnus one of overt acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the Nizamat , that is of Reza Khan, but also of 
covert interference* This was a far cry from the orders of the Directors, 
given on 16 March 1766 that " the English are never to appear as Principals, 
nor even to pretend to an influence , but leave all such disputes as nay 
arise in the lands of the Dewanny to the Durbar at Moorshedabad"? but it 
proved to be in line with the latest thinking of the Directors* On 20 
Decenber 1771 the Calcutta government informed Murshidabad that the 
Directors had ordered that all s&n&ds appointing judges for Muslims and 
Brahmins for the Hindus were to be registered, and that the judges1 power 
of imposing "arbitrary fines" and other taxes or duties upon plaintiff and 
defendant, and of exacting security for the payment of Chouth ( fees) in
4
arbitration cases was to be abolished?
1 * For letter from Grose and letter to Grose MP 4 Feb 1771•
2. Fort William letter. 10 June 1771.
3. Court*s letter, 16 March 1766* The Directors had further directed that 
even in case of disputes in Burdwan those were to be left "to the Rajah 
and his ministers, and to answer directly to no disputes, but such as may 
happen in the Company*s lands"0This technically restricted the judicial 
authority of the English to Calcutta and 24 Parganas for the other two 
districts, Midnapur and Chittagong, were,like Burdwan,jagiri districts* 
But legal disabilities did not prevent the English from exercising active 
power in these districts,The Faujdari power, for example in Chittagong, 
was on a reference from Reed, ordered to be exercised by the Chief and 
Council,(BPC 27 June 1769).
4. MP 4 Jan 1772.
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Reza Khan reacted very firmly to these proposals* He pointed out that
fees and Chouth had "been before prohibited", and urged only that the
prohibition be more strictly enforced! But he refused to accept the orders
touching the power of judges to impose fines and the appointment of
Brahmins* These touched the legal and constitutional sovereignty of the
Empire and consequently the supremacy of the laws of Islam, and would
mean " an innovation in M&hommed&n laws and religion"* "The case is this",
he elaborated, "that from the first propagation of the faith ^ "that is the
establishment of Muslim political power in India_^the power of deciding all
disputes and controversies has been vested in the Kussulmen, Brahmins never
having been appointed for the tryal of Indoos many of whose disputes are
settled agreeable to the Mahonmedan laws and others such as relate to the
customs of the cast , their rules of society and the like after being
referred to the arbitration of Brahmins and people of their own cast are
2
ultimately decided by Mussulman" 0
Warren Hastings and his Council, replying on 13 April 1772» concurred 
with the Khan , stating that they had never proposed " any alteration in 
the established Courts or forms of justice or to adjudge crimes or 
misdemeanors by arbitration"* They denied any intention to "subvert any of 
the established laws, but to facilitate the course of justice”. They seemed 
to agree "that all cases of inheritance, marriage or other matters for 
which Mahomedan law has made a provision should be decided by the estab­
lished magistrate with the assistance of the expounders of the law"* and 
in the like manner, "that all matters respecting inheritance and the 
particular laws and usages of the casts of Gentoos should be decided by the 
established magistrate assisted by Bramins and the heads of Casts 
according to Gentoo law"* This they professed to be their understanding of 
"the invariable practice of all Mahomedan Governments in Indostan"*Arbitrac­
tion they had suggested only for civil cases regarding debts and disputed 
5
accounts*
This gloss upon their orders was far from satisfying Reza Khan, who
1* Reza Khan*s note* M? 26 Hav 1772* The delay was due to the month of 
Ramzan which intervened and kept the Khan virtually off from much work* 
2* Reza Khan’s note* MP 26 Mar 1772*
3* Port William letter of 13 April 1772* MP 20 April 1772«
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sat out his objections in a statement to the Murshidabad Council t
“ I must remark that ever since the Mahomedan religion has been 
established in Hindostan it never has been customary to decide matters 
regarding the participation of the estate of the deceased persons, 
inheritance or other disputes with the assistance of the Bramins or the 
heads of several sects in any Mussulman government or jurisdiction1* • 1
This could not be, for the Hindus as a subject people were subject to
the laws of “true faith"• Hence
“to order a magistrate of the faith to decide in conjunction with a 
Braain would be repugnant to the rules of the faith, and in a country 
under the dominion of a Mussulman Emperor it is improper that any order 
should be issued inconsistent with the rules of his faith8 ^"andj^that 
innovations should be introduced in the administration of justice" • 2
Hindus were not obliged to bring their disputes to court if they could
settle them amongst themselves# But if they failed to decide the dispute and
cane to the court they must accept the court9 s decision as binding* There
were two good reasons why they should* The magistrate, by his training was
fitted to decide causes with greater accuracy “than what could be effected
by the degree of penetration and discernment possessed by Bramins and heads
x
of Gentoo tribes"# And,“was the magistrate to disregard the rules and usages
of his jurisdiction and conform in his decree with the determinations of a 
»
Brarain, the foundation of the system of justice, which has for long series 
of time been binding on the whole body of the people whether 1'ussulmen or
A
Jentoos, must undergo a subversion" # This constitutional and religious 
point was the heart of Reza Khan* a objection, but he also pointed out the 
conflict and difficulty which would follow from any attempt to apply Hindu 
law when the Hindus had such a multiplicity of laws, varying according to 
their castes and place of origin* This alone was sufficient reason why 
“none of the former emperors down to the present ever appointed a Braain
5
to assist a magistrate" *
Reza Khan, upholding Mughal sovereignty and the existing legal system
based on the supremacy of Islamic laws, also reacted sharply to the aocusa-
tions of defects in the existing system expressed in official communication
1# Reza Khan9s statement* HP 4 May 1772* 2* ibidj 3* ibid# 4« ibid0 "
5# ibid# Before this statement was considered by the Murshidabad Council 
on 4 May Reza Khan had been arrested on 27 April 1772#Islamic laws,unlike 
laws of modem national states were meant for the Hillat or community and 
conferred absolute autonomy to non-Muslim communities in Muslim states#
This led to the enjoyment of extra-territorial rights by the European 
colonists in the Mughal empire.
276
and to the prevalent English attitude of contempt for Muslim or Mughal 
institutions© He refused to admit any fault in the system t if the instru­
ments were at fault then the remedy lay in the punishment of the guilty.
He claimed that there could lpe "no defect or abuse in the administration of
1
justice without treachery and malversation"• Therefore, "let repeated orders
be sent on this subject into every Zellah, and let the Supravisors be
written tof that whenever any of the officers of justice are detected of
committing any abuse or oppression to send them immediately to Moorshedabad,
in order that they may receive the reward of their deeds —  By these means
2
no defect er abuse will take place" © Reza Khan's defiant defence was 
silenced by his arrest on 27 April 1772, and it was only after his removal 
from Murshidabad that the two Sadar Adalats were transferred from that city 
to Calcutta© Hastings justified the transfer on the grounds that criminal 
jurisdiction was " so connected with the revenue and the Mahometan courts 
are abominally venal, that it was necessary"J but he admitted also
that the change was "almost an act of injustice, the criminal judicature
A
being a branch of the Nizamut"© Reza Khan would have agreed with the latter 
judgement - except for the word "almost"©
The conflict over the courts, begun in 1770# was but one of a series 
of rearguard actions which Reza Khan fought between 1770 and 1772 in defence 
of the Mughal system* One minor skirmish which he won was over the fate of 
duties payable by Muslim and non-Muslim merchants© Hardwood, the supervisor 
of Rajmahal complained that at Akbamagar (Rajmahal) the Hindus paid double 
the Muslim rate0 The Murshidabad Council , desirous of remedying the "evil" 
by fixing one rate for all, asked for Reza Khan's opinion© He opposed the 
"innovation" and the Council was oblised to fix the rate at three per cent
5
for Muslim and five ysr cent for non-Muslim merchants ©
The Khan fought with no less success to preserve the dignity of the
Nizamat when Becher in his last letter to the Murshidabad Council , on
24 December 1770 suggested that from the next revenue year, 1771-72 one
or two supervisorships might be created for the area around Murshidabad
1©Reza Khan's statement* KP 26 Mar 1772© 2* ibid©
3. W.Hastings to Dtfro, 8 Oot 1772. Mss 2912577? 156-57. 4. ifrU.
5*The supervisor had complained that the rate of duty applicable to •Moors" 
which was 2i per cent had by additional exactions gone up to per cent® 
The Council's decision did not restore the old basis, but it did retain 
the distinction* KP 27 Dec 1770©
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for which he 9 as Resident9 had been responsible? When asked his opinion 
about such a change in the Huzury Zil&, Reza Khan vehemently opposed any 
such insult to the dignity of the Nazim* It had been proper , he declared, 
"when Mr. Becher applied for their being left under him", so as tOv 
manintain "a proper dignity over the inhabitants without which both
2
himself and the Nazia would appear light in the eyes of the people"0 But* 
he added pungently# " it gives me surprize that that gentleman should 
afterwards ^writeJTto the Committee and Council to have these districts 
^aade in^to Zelahs because in his own time he endeavour'd to preserve his 
own dignityf but after his departure took no care for his successors 
The appeal to amour-propre of the Murshidabad Council worked, and they 
endorsed his plea* So, by a letter ©f 7 May 1771» did the Port William 
authorities, though not without comment upon Reza Khan's boldness of 
speech - "a reflection thrown on our late Resident Mr* Beecher, which we 
deem very improper to come from the Naib Duan and desire you will
4
acquaint him that it meets with our disapprobation** Their displeasure
was given tangible fora when at the close of the year 1770-71 th^y
recovered Rs 45#000 from Reza Khan’s salary when Ram Chandra Sen, f&mer
5
of Lashkarpur , a part of the Huzury Zila , fell into arrear*
Another question touching the dignity of the Nizaraat which Reza Khan
took up was that of Khilats for the Punyah ceremony* By a letter of 18
March 1771 Fort William had laid down that the only Europeans to receive
Khilats should be the Governor, and the Chief anri members of the Murshidabad
Council, and then sf net higher value than Rs 5#000, Rs 2,000, „and Rs 500
respectively* A Khilat of the usual value Bhould be continued for the
Nawab Mubarak ud daulah, one of not more than Rs 4#000 for Reza Khan, and
for all others the order was te retrench expenditure as much as possible*^
Reza Khan knew that the orders stemmed from the Court of Directors, who
were involved in a financial crisis, but he,nevertheless, opposed then* The
i* Becher's letter* KP 24 Dec 1770. The Huzury Zila included part of the 
Rajshahi Zemindar! south-west of the Fadaa, Maida, Lashkarpur and their 
adjoining Taluqs*
20 Reza Khan's statement. KP 4 Mar and 11 Mar 1771o
3* Reza Khan's statement* 11 Mar 1771*
4# Fort William letter of 7 Kay 1771. iff 23 May 1771.
3. Ram Chandra Sen who was a nominee of Becher1 s Diwan had defaulted a sum
Rs 46.552 account of Lashkarpur and another sum of Rs 72,873 on accourd
of Saiyidpur* Out of these two sums Rs 45#000 was recovered from the Khan
6, rod^i.»rfUM V Ve farn#r 3-1111 Rs.74,425,(BPJ?,XIII, 100).
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Khilats given to the Governor and members of the Council were meant te 
augment their dignity - those preposed would "only tend to render them 
inconsiderable"! Khilats to the Zemindars and T&luqdars were tokens of 
confirmation of their appointments and to deny them would be tantamount to 
dismissal* The same was true of the Khilats given to the officers of the 
Nizamat s were they not granted it would "spread through the whole world 
that the Nizamut is abolished"* while to offer them Khilats of inferior 
value would reflect discredit on all who received them. The Khan offered 
to forjge his own share of the Khilat t " it is no matter ; because nobody 
shall know it"0 But he urged " if ay officers do not receive them the 
name of the Neabut Dewanny will also be abolish*d"*
Reza Khan also raised the further argument that if the Company
discontinued or curtailed expenditure on Khilats then the Ra2,25,000
retrenched from the Nizamat allowanoe to cover this item should be
restored* The grant of dresses of honour was an essential ceremony t
"it had long been customary for the Nazim of the province in behalf of 
His Majesty to invest the Dewaa and his officers with this honour, and 
for the Dewan to replace the expence of it to the Nazim from the 
Khalsah"* 4
Clive and Sykes had recognised this in the financial arrangements of 1766, 
and if the Company wished to renounce responsibility then it was necessary 
that "the sum of 2,25*000 Ra be restored to answer this addition of expenoe 
to the Nizamut| and that the Nazim of the country agreeable to the ancient 
custom in behalf of His Majesty yearly invest the several officers & ca 
with Khelauts according to their respective stations"*
The Murshidabad Council supported Reza Khan and they reacted sharply
to Calcutta*s reluctance to revise their original stand* They re-enphasised
trie need of observing the oereaony in its "full force and influence" and
suggested that total abolition would be better than parsimony* However,
the Calcutta government would agree to the expenditure of no more than
Rs 60,000 I a tremendous reduotien from the Rs 2,16,670 spent on Khilats
1* Reza Khan* s note* MP 15 Apr 1771* 2* ibid* 5» ibid*
4* ihid* ibid*
6, Port William letter of 24 dpril and Murshidabad Council*s reply of 
9 May 1771* 9 May 1771*
7* Port William letter of 20 May * MP 27 May 1771# Calcutta had sanctioned 
Rs 60,000 against Murshidabad*s minimum estimate of Rs 70»°00«
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in 1766# They naturally ignored the suggestion of a restoration of the cut 
in the Nizamat allowance*
Reza Khan had been defending the dignity and power of the Nisam&t,
reminding the Company and its servants that Bengal was still a part of the
Mughal empire9 and that the Company was no more than the Diwan of the
province* He also continued to defend the old order on the Diwani side
against Englishmen who more and more acted as though the country was
theirs by right of conquest* Since the Khan had withdrawn his officials t
the Amils, from the districts it was upon the Zemindars and Taluqdars that
the hand of the supervisors fell - those "sovereigns of the country »••
2
heavy rulers of the people" as Hastings called thea0 In Burdwan the Raja* s 
private estate, his "Dowry* lands had been left for his maintenance^. In 
the Diwani districts, such as Nadia or Rajohahi, these were handed over 
with the rest of the Zemindari to the farmers installed by the Company©
Reza Khan had therefore to intervene in support of such Zemindars* claims 
to a maintenance allowance suitable te their ancient status* Thus in July 
17711 he pleaded for the Nadia Raja who had asked for Rs 3,00,000, saying 
“his request is reasonable, because his Zemindarry is hereditary and in 
case the collections of the district are made *** on an accurate investi­
gation he can have neither advantage /n7or influence remaining*He has a
numerous family, and many dependants* His ancestors lived with affluence 
1
and respect** In view of the eminence of the Raja, the number of his
dependants and the fact that his income from the Zemindari had been as much
as Rs 3,5^,000, the Khan considered Rs 3,00,000 a reasonable demand.However,
since the district was much exhausted the Khan did not press for more than
5
Rs 2,00,000 as the Rajafs allowance* In like manner he supported the claim
of Rani Bhawani of Rajahahi to an allowance of Rs 3,50,000, her usual
6income, but suggested that Rs 2,50,000 might de* His recommendations in
1. Out ef Rs 2,16,870 spent on Khilats in 17&> (-the amount was still lesser
than what was deducted from the Nawab*s allowance)-a sum of Rs 76,605 
was spent for Zemindars and PaujdArs, Rs 46,750 for English gentlemen,
Rs 3s,®00 for the Nawab, hiB family and ministers,Rs22,634 for Cutcherxy 
servants,Ra 22,525 for Nizamat servants, and Rs 4,357 for the people 
belonging to Clive, Carnao and Sykes* (BSC 28 Apr 1770)
2* W*Hastings to Jonas Du Pre , 26 far 1772* Add Mss 29126 p 13®#
3* Lawrell and Graham* s minute»KP 26 Nov 1770*As late as 1770 the Burdwan 
Raja used to be treated with respect due*In that year the Governor
presented the Raja and his Diwan with elephants*(vide CPC,III,278)
4* MP 25 July 1771. 5* ibid* 6. MP 8 Aug TT7T*---
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both oases were aooepted by the Council, who hoped to gain more from 
the lands than they paid out in allowances to the Zemindars# The actions 
of the Company1 s servants put the profits — and more important still - 
power and influence of the Zemindars in jeopardy0 Reza Khan secured the 
recognition of the old principle that if the Zemindar was ousted from 
management he was entitled to provision appropriate to his status'#^
In the case of the Tusufpur Zemindari , in Jessore, he secured receg*
nition of a further principle - that the state had positive as well as
negative responsibilities to the Zemindars# The case there was of an
2
estate involved by its Diwans in debt while the Zemindar was a minor e Reza
Khan here supported a claim to a maintenance allowance of Rs 2,000 a month
during the minority, with such addition as was possible after further
%
enquiry and settlement of debtSo In other words the Btate assumed respon­
sibility for the minor©
Reza Khan also sought to establish the exclusive right of Zemindars 
te oreate independent Taluqs, and their right to create revenue-free 
charitable grants within their estates# The first issue was raised when 
Lokenath Nandi bought land in various Zemindaries and sought confirmation 
of his purchases from government# Reza Khan laid the principle involved as 
follows t
"It has been the established usage of the country, that when Zemindars 
dispose of Talooks of their own free will and accord, they first grant 
Cubaulas ^"kabala or deed of sale_7 under their own signature, and 
afterwards conformably to them, Sunnuds are issued from the Nizamut and 
Dewanny# For this reason if any one, without having previously procured 
Cubaulas and Sunnuds from the Zemindars, should obtain Sunnuds from the 
government, it would be deemed oppressive, illegal, and unusual,uniess 
in such cases where in consequence of misbehaviour on the part of the 
Zemindar, the government think proper to bestow his Zemindarry on 
another"#,4 *
The second issue concerned Ratan Chand do3sain, who held the village of
1# By December 1771* two other Zemindars(Dinajpur and Birbhum)had applied 
for increase of allowances.HP 27 Sep and 12 Dec 1771o 
2# The mother of the minor Zemindar Srikanta had of her own accord applied 
for the Zemindar^ administration to be taken over by the supervisor and 
to be relieved of persecution on account of debts0She had asked for 
an allowance of Rs 5*000 a month, though the family* s income from all 
sources was shown as Rs 90,000, or Rs 30,000 more per year#(KP10 Dec 1770
recommended Rs 2, >00 a month "for her own exponass"#
4* NP 14 Mar and 30 May 1771#
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Rahirapur as a revenue-free grant from the Zemindar. On this the Khan,
himself creator of many chari ties\ declared
"it has long been the nature of institution of Bharjahy( sequestration 
of land for religious uses) that when particular villages or lands aro 
alloted to this purpose by the Zemindars, or established from the 
presence gleaning the Nawab or Government^, the Zemindar in lieu of 
the revenue thus alienated levies a proportionable encrease from the 
several Talooks under his jurisdiction and makes good the amount to the 
government, and the villages or lands so sequester*d are appropriated 
solely to the purposes of Berraooter,l)ewuttur, the entertainment of 
travellers and the like. None of the officers under former Nazims were 
opposed it^ or discountenanced this usagej as it had therefore been 
a practice of long duration I granted Sunnuds to the Gossein. The 
Bharjahy is a charitable institution, and in consideration of its being 
an ancient usage it ought to be preserved”0 2
In both these cases Reza Khan was defending decisions he had earlier made,
but which had come under scrutiny by the supervisors.
At much the same period the Khan was also busy defending the old 
official classes of Qanungoes, Muhtasibs, Waq&inigar, Sawanigar, and 
Akhbar-navis from the same hostile supervisors. Thus Rous,Loushlngten,R+oke, 
Kelsall, Wilkins, Higginson and Rider^all reported that the Qanungoes were 
useless. Reza Kh?n agreed that in the districts with big Zemindaries, whose 
records were kept at Murshidabad, the Qanungoes were not vital to adminis­
tration, but he pointed out that in Faujdari districts, with large number 
of small estates, they were still useful, as the favourable reports from 
Hardwood in Rajmahal and Grose in Rangpur indicatedfrhey were needed also 
at Dacca and Hugli where they alone could furnish authentic information.
Were the district Qanungoes to be abolished, he argued, ” the original 
revenue, the state ef the Talooks and the tenure by which they were held 
which are now known at the Suddur must in future be obscured”. To accusation 
that they misled the Zemindars, he replied with the denial of the Sadar 
Qanungoes and their promise of severe punishment for any who could be proved 
guilty. He concluded his defence of the Qanungoes by an appeal to the 
constitution of the Empire t ”as this office has been instituted ever since
T. Vide Kelsall*s letter from Dacca dt 24 Feb 1771o HP 4 Mar 1771o ^
2. Reza Khan*s note. KP 11 Apr 1771o
3* These gentlemen were supervisors respectively of Nator, Hugli,Jessore, 
Dacoa, Tipperah,Birbhum- Bankura, and Nadia.
4o IT 2 July 1771o 
5. ISii.
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the first dominion of the emperors , as Lutchmynairrain and nd r r ^ j  n 
T^akshrai Narayan and Mahendra Narayan^ hold their appointments by right ef 
inheritance, and as the procuring of all papers depends on their Duftur 
,,, and in consideration of the long time this office has descended in the 
families of the said Canoongoes, the continuance of it is necessary*! (The 
Council decided to continue the Sadar and Mufassil Qanungoes and ordered 
the supervisors to pay their usual salaries, making full use of then*2
The Khan felt that the case for retaining the office of Muhtasib,
censor or superintendent of morals, was much weaker, since it had little
utility by this date. He made the case, however, that Muhtasibs and Qazis
had been appointed ever since the Muslims reached India, according to the
laws of religion. He admitted that "in the process of time as the Hindoos
became entrusted with important offices in the finance, and invested with
power and authority over the districts* the administration of Ihtesab had
grown relaxed and irregular, while the authority of the Muhtasib had
dwindled in some districts to the regulation of weights and measures, Sut
the Muhtasibs were often still engaged , as far as lay within their power,
in preventing forbidden and unlawful actions and in guiding and correcting
the morals of the people. Apprehension of complaint by the "numerous tribe
of Hindoos* had limited the efficiency of the institution, but its purpose
was still the improvement of mankind. He also pointed out that except in
Rangpur the dues of the Muhtasibs|did not come from the government revenues.
He then summed up the reasons against abolition as follows t
"In the first place such a measure will be repugnant to the revealed 
laws and the dictates of the Prophet t and in the second it will be 
promulgated throughout the four quarters of the world that the 
foundation of religion in Bengali, is shaken" • 5
The Council, deeming it " too delicate a point to think of subverting it",
4
continued the Muhtasib9s office as a religious establishment,
Reza Khan did not seriously try to defend the mufassil staff of
Waqainigar, Sawanigar and Akhbar-navis, the various grades of official
-i. KP 2 July 1771. 2« H U .
3. HP 2 July 1771. 4. ljbid.
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newsreporters. This was perhaps in accordance with his usual strategy of
sacrificing the inconsequential in order the better to defend what was
important. He explained their original functions t
"It was established in ancient times that wherever there were Hazim3, 
Naib Nazims, Fougedars, or other rulers there should also be stationed 
Gomastahs from these offices who had free admission to their presence. 
Many papers regarding important disputes in the districts were rendered 
authentick, by their seals, and they are now amongst the attendants 
necessary for the support of the dignity of the Nizaunutt their 
rissooms ^ "meaning customary allowanceare extremely small, and 
/arej^  not imposed on the revenue collections, or the produce of the 
lands....The persons in whom the offices .♦*♦ arc vested hold them 
hereditarily**. 1
He then suggested that the mufassil offices might be abolished, but that
those at Murshidabad should be retained, so that their holders mi$it
"attend in the Presence, and that the names of these offices which are of
2
ancient institution may not be entirely extinguished" . The Council agreed 
with the Khan* s recommendations and the three officers at Murshidabad were 
allowed to continue on fixed monthly allowances^0
Reza Khan can also be observed busily defending the interests of the
old community of bankers against the reforming hand of the Company, in
an old controversy over coinage which dragged cn with greater intensity
from 1768 until the end ox* 1771. 'fupees coined in the Mughal mints bore
the regnal year of the Emperor in which they were struck. The Sicca rupees
with the issue of new coins of the following year became known ts Sanats
and with the elapse of each successive year they declined in value.inkers
accenting Sanats in payment therefore charged a batta or discount upon
theoi. On 11 November 1768 the Court of Directors had given positive orders
to abolish the batta system, caomenting,
"the only objection that occurs to us ...is how to get the better of 
the combination that will certainly be among the bankers, but we 
suppose if the ministry will zealously adopt it an absolute government 
can never be defeated in a measure so calculated for the public good 
and as you have by perseverance broken the combination tlx ere was 
against the currency of the Calcutta Siccas, so we presume you must 
finally in this in which no doubt but you will be supported by all the 
foreign nations. The abolition of the batta on Sonnauts must therefore 
be carried into execution".
j. Reza Khan1 s note. IIP 2 July 1771* ibid.
3. The three officers confirmed were Subhan Ali Khan (Sawanigar) ,Ainuddin 
Ali Khan(Waqainigar) and Akram Ali Khan (AkhbarwNavis)on salaries of 
Rs 200, Rs.100, and Rs 50 per mensem respectively. (IT 2 July 1771)*
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Despite these positive orders, Verelstfs government was induced to 
support the native bankers and leave the system unchanged. Apart from other
reasons* the payment of batta could not be entirely abolished so long as 
many types of rupee circulated in Bengal - Arcot, Viziory,BenaresfNaraini7 
as well as Dacca, Murshidabad, Patna and Calcutta Siccas - whoso use
least to prevent the charging of batta upon Sanat rupees ( that is old 
Siccas of Bengal and Bihar mints). In 1770 they suggested that Sanats and 
Siccas should be accepted at the same rate In payment of revenue, Reza Khan 
further advised that to obliterate the distinction, all rupees coined in 
future at the Murshidabad, Patna, Dacca and Calcutta mints should be of one 
wei$it and fineness and dated 11 Sun, that is the eleventh regnal year of
second thoughts0 The change he saw would injure the shroffs and bankers, 
the only wealthy native class remaining in the country - "if the Siccas of 
the former years pass for the same value as new Siccas from where is the 
advantage of the shroffs and merchants to arise •••?", The shroffs,he added 
"seek up Sunnauts at different places to carry to the mint in order to have
j
such as are short weight recoined, pay a duty to government, •••** As
the Council was currently employing Roza Khan's influence with the shroffs
to secure urgent remittances of money to Bombay and Surat by Hundi or 
5
banker's draft, they abandoned the proposed change to conciliate the 
native bankers.
In September 1770 Reza Khan proceeded to strike Siccas of 12 Sun at 
the Murshidabad mint and sent the usual Hazarana with specimens of the new 
Sicca to His Majesty Shah Alam and to Cartier, There was no response from
4* Roza khan wad primarily roponsiblo for the decision of Yerelst's goverxv* 
ttent in 1769m Besides supporting the case of the native bankers in 
his joint letter with Becher dated 30 April 1769(BSC 8 Jul 1769)Verelst 
said on 11 Aug (vide BSC 11 Aug 1769)that "when Mahomed Reza Cawn was in 
Calcutta Marc^7 and during my stay at the city he represented that 
the numbers of shroffs and merchants - a set of men who were wont to 
serve the government on emergency have been reduced to beggary or forced 
to relinquish their business since the revenues have been received 
according to the specie in which they are collected*1, A large number of 
bankers had already left Bengal.(Also Reza Khan's note, BIG 28 Mar 1
2, For spocifio uses of these coins,BPC 12 Apr 1770* 3 # 1 2  Apr 177 -
4, BPC 8 May 1770.
5, Vide Reza Khan's note, MP 23 Dec 1771*
entailed money-changers' operation* But Cartier's government decided at
when the Calcutta Council agreed to this * the Khan had
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from Cartier, so in May 1771 Reza Khan wrote privately to Cartier, and by
way of the Murshidabad Council, pointing out that it was getting late for
2
the new coins to be circulated .The Council replied by reviving the reform
i
proposals of 1770 and calling the Khan’s attention to his plan for perpetual
3
circulation of 11 Sun rupees, asked why he had struck 12 Sun coins• The 
Khan, In evident difficulty, could only say that he had deduced from the 
Council* s long silence that reform had been abandoned t without positive 
orders he could not make such a break with custom. He pointed out,however, 
that with the mint idle revenue was being lost and a quick decision was 
needed* "Besides it is necessary if they establish the 11 Sun Siccas 
forever", the Khan added, * that they give intelligence thereof to His 
Majesty**** If now the new Siccas be struck, a Nazzer be sent to the 
Presence, and they afterwards not be circulated, it will be an impropriety 
towards the King and a slight to the Throne"f The Murshidabad Council 
supported the Khan and provided the additional argument that unless the 
regulation could be enforced in adjoining kingdoms Calcutta’s ends would 
never be achieved* They also agreed with the Khan that there would be a 
flight of bullion to Allahabad, Benares and other mints where Siccas 
enjoyed a premium, thus decreasing bullion supplies and mint revenues and 
throwing on the Company the expense of recoining the old Sanats remaining 
in Bengali
The Port William government decided that " the annual coinage of 
Siccas shall hereafter continue to be marked as usual with the current year 
of the King’s reign" and also that all coins beginning from 11 Sun coins 
"shall not fall in their value" nor pass into "the state of Scn&uts"* On 
2 September 1771 Reza Khan therefore proceeded to issue coins for the 13th
7
Julus or regnal ye&rj his last issue as Naib Nazim and Naib Diwan, He had 
contrived to assist the old Indian bankers to survive against the determined
hostility of the Directors , and to maintain in Bengal the continuity of
0
Mughal mint trad£tions,though very much in & mutilated form*
1. Reza Khan to Cartier, ifrodt 20 Hay 1771. CrC.III.753. 2.‘f ig Kay 1771.
3. Port Williaji Letter,23 Mayo ]£ 30 May 1771. 4. IT 24 June 1771, 5»ibi<U
f# MP 20 Aug 1771. 7. Reza Khan to Cartier, KecXT 9 Sep 1771 »CPC,III ,901
8* Not until 1773 when Hastings started his new banking scheme wa3 there any 
further attempt to dislodge the old banker class from their control of 
the internal . 1 money-market*
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In tha great issue vexing the Calcutta authorities, that of English 
private trade, Reza Khan took no part* He had spoken out in December 1770 
against monopolies in the rice traae, representing to the Murshidabad 
Council that "notwithstanding this is the time of harvest, the price of 
rice instead of falling rises daily in and about the city, he -there/toref 
requests ^EhatJ^ orders may be sent to the different Supravisors, to enforce 
an entire freedom of purchase and sale of this article in the districts, 
to take every measure in their power to prevent monopolies and to remove 
every obstacle to the transportation of grain from place to place"* lie did 
not name the culprits,for he was too cautious - more cautious than before- 
to press complaints against the servants of the Company* That he left to 
the Calcutta Council, whose members, confined to Calcutta by the Directors' 
orders of 23 March 1770* found themselves at a disadvantage in their pursuit
of private trade0 The Company had granted them freedom of private trade so
o
long as this did not conflict with the Company's own intarest9 but as 
Middleton, Aldersey, Floyer and Reed jointly complained, " it is evident, 
that the share which the members of the Council are to enjoy in such trade, 
is subjeot, as the matter now stands, to the determination of the gentlemen 
employed in the different parts where it is carried on, who it is natural
3
to conclude will give preference to their own interests"; Cartier ,Jekyll,
Lane and Daores complained of "a secret influence which operates in every
district of the country*? The gumashtasof the Council members were helpless,
for no one would dare accepting their advances "without an order for so
5doing from the Resident of the district". The private trade interests of
the junior servants which Reza Khan, Becher and Verelst had fought in 1769
*
with temporary success, had now triumphed.
The renewed power of the supervisors in the districts also caused 
another round of conflict with the Company's servants in the commercial 
branch, and with their gumashtas and agents* The opposition to the latter 
which had been headed by Reza Khan and Becher in 1769, was now led by the 
supervisors. The supervisor of Jessore, Rooke, informed the Murshidabad
1, MP 6 Dec 1770, Beoher was still at Murshidabad,
2, Court's letter of 23 Mar 1770 and Fort William letter of 14 Mar 1771o(vid€ 
MP 21 Mar 1771).
3, BPC 27 Dec 1771.Th«se four had even formed a joint stock venture to trade
in salt, betelnut and tobacco*Kelsail disapproved the idea,while Russell 
and Hare joined for a time,
4, BPC 27 Dec 1771. 5* ibid.
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Council that he dally received cozaplaints of "every specie of oppression
towards the inhabitants" committed by the Company* s gumashtas despite his
repeated orders to them "to desist from the unwarrantable proceedings they
have toe long practised*.*"0 Hardwood in Hajmahal complained that the
2gumashtas used Company sepoys to oppress the ryots. The supervisor of 
Dacca had to use force to prevent the gross frauds on the revenues by 
misuse of Company dastaks (passes) in the tobacco trade? The commercials 
countered with complaints against the supervisors and their agents* The 
gumashtas of Jangipur thus complained against Hardwoodf the Kasimbazar 
factory renewed Alderseyts demand for a share in the authority of the 
government9 while the Commercial Resident at Malda declared that the 
Directors* demands for an increased and improved investment could not be 
met unless "the share of credit and authority necessary for the well 
conducting the investments entrusted to their management" were restored to
5
the gumashtaso The clear orders of the Directors, issued in March 1770* 
that the Investment must be sustained since it was the only means of 
tranferring funds from Bengal to England to answer the demands on thenffled 
the Council at Fort William to consider granting more authority to the 
commercial branch* Before actingf however, they decided to ask Reza Khan 
and the Murshidabad Councilo The Khan thus found himself involved once more 
in the dash of interests between the various branches of the Company* s 
service* He refused to comment on Kasimbazar* s demand for a share in the 
governmental authority, but he made it clear that he believed that any 
deficiency in the silk Investment could only be met by restoration of 
absolute freedom of trade. It was the oppressions of the Pycars and Dalals 
in their purchasesJcoupled with the famine mortality which had caused a
1o Rooke*s letter, 9 Hay. LOP 20 Hay 1771«
2. Hardwood*s letter, 21 April* MP 25 Apr 1771»
3* MP 18 Nov 1771# 4o Kasimbazar letter, 23 Apr* HP 25 Apr 1771o 
5* Kasimbazar letter, 23 Apr* and Bathoe*s letter 23 Feb*MP25Apr,7Har 1771© 
(Bathos was Commercial Resident at Malda, after the residency was 
re-opened under orders of the Court of Directors),
6* Court*s letter,23 Mar 1770 and Fort William letter,28 0cto MP 2 Nov 1771< 
7* The Murshidabad Council maintained that the artisans and peasants had 
been reduced "to a state /off actual slavery", the process being that 
"the original advances having been studiously made, so as to leave a 
hallance at the close of the year...thAs ballance becomes immediately 
burthened with an exorbitant rate of interest,which continues to 
accumulate in such a proportion so as to leave the poor labourer totally 
incapable of ever, satisfying F  his7merciless creditor*'.Any attempt to 
V*£*11 £ v  1771)" 01143 ^  " beggary and total ruin".
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decline! If the government placed its authority behind the gumashtas, the
artisans would "be disprited and abandon that branch of culture", even if
higher prices were offered. Similarly he opposed Calcutta*s suggestion that
mulberry cultivators and silkworm rearers might be induced to * pay such a
2
proportion of their rents in kind" as would provide for the Investment, He 
commented,"it does not occur to my weak judgement, that this measure would 
remove the obstacle ih the purchase of silk, but that it would rather 
increase them", since the peasants, once they had to pay their rents in 
kind, would look upon that article as " seized upon by government" and 
"entirely fling up the business". Freedom of trade, strict protection from 
arbitrary proceedings and oppressions by Pycars and Dalals, and positive 
encouragement for mulberry cultivators and silkworm rearers - grant these 
the Khan argued, and the "produce of silk would be increased and become 
plentiful and cheap". He ended, however, on a note of resignations "As to 
the rest, you gentlemen are judges, and may do what is best"^ The
Khan was putting up a lone fight fer almost a lost cause, for monopoly 
continued. The dispute was ever who should have the monopoly,the commercial! 
Off-the revenue branch. The Khan could have felt some technical satisfaction 
when the Fort William Council, aoting on the latest orders from London,had 
On 18 December 1771 v resolved to re-introduce the Dadni system.
But already by March 1771 the Khan had quickly reacted to the new
threats to peace and prosperity, as he saw them in Murshidabad Council9 s
proposal of its members going on circuit for settling the revenues of 1173
or 1771-72f The Khan opposed the proposal, as adviser to the Council, and
his advice fell oh deaf ears. As the Khan may have anticipated, LawroU9 s
circuit of the districts of Dinajpor and Rangpur, which was not free from
£
subsequent allegations of making of private profits by him, resulted in
7
further "dismission of Chowdries and inferior collectors"‘and their replace­
ment by an additional set of Calcutta based fanners and revenue agents* The 
Khan was emphatic that the promotion of agriculture and population and 
increase of Comapny9s revenues and reputation could not be possible "till 
the affairs of the country were committed to the natives,,e"for they alone,
o
and not outsiders, had* "a thousand ways of intercourse one with another"o
•fjiP 2 Nov 1771. 2. 1*1*. 5. Ibid, 4. BPC 18 Dec 1771.
5.MP 11 Mar 1771. By than banditry had eicn into a serious prob 1 en, even 
peaceful rural people being driven to it "to procure themselves a subsis— 
soldie£a»«id othera’.—  15 *pr 1T71)an* certainly joined in by disbanded
6.MP 23 Mar 1772. 7.MP 16 Sep 1771. 8. MP 11 Mar 1771.
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By October 1771 Reza Khan was faced with yet another onslaught on 
the old Mughal order. This was Cartier’s request to the Nawab Mubarak ud- 
daul&h and Reza Khan to disband the Nawab1s troops - described as 
disorderly rabble - and to replace them with four battalions of English
9
troops, to be paid for from the Nizamat allowance of sixteen lakhs of
rupees! As guardian of the minor Nawab the difficult task of resisting the
oEnglish demand fell upon Reza Khan, The Nawab1s reply, doubtless drafted
by Reza Khan, expressed appreciation of Cartier’s concern for the "increase
of honor and dignity1* of the Nawab, but denied that the Nizamat troops
"pay an improper attendance**o Shat allegation he was sure was based upon
unfounded reports. The Nawab then reminded Cartier of the great reductions
since Najm ud daulah’s day in the Nizamat allowances, from which " the
relations, domesticks and the chiefs of the city who have a right upon me
,*• and are [aof to say inseparable from the Nizamat, all receive their
wages, • ,," He pointed out that except for certain matohlookmen employed on
Faujdarl and Cutcherry dutiesr the horse and foot of the Sawary were old
servants "fixed upon the door of the Mahal" , He pleaded that "if my
relations, connections9and principals of the city who after repeated
curtailments have only their mere livelyhood ,,, are to be turned from the
« _
service it will be considered as the greatest reflection ^ upon ray honour
and dignity^", Stressing that the " allowances cannot be further curtailed* 
the Nawab* s letter rang with an emotional note i " Whilst they receive not 
the means of livelyhood, without regarding my honor and dignity, even my 
own subsisting is not proper, •••" Moreover, though he was ready to main­
tain the proposed English force, he was at a loss to understand how he 
could pay them0 He concluded with a reminder to the Company’s treaty 
obligations i "If therefore the Company’s Seapoys are to be considered out 
of the 16 lacks of rupees there is not only an impediment in the honor and 
reputation which X receive from the gentlemen but even the greatest bad 
name and a weakness £aicj in former promises and engagements"’,
Reza Khan also sent a letter of his own. Giving a resume of how, in 
the Company’s interest, he had gradually reduced Nizamat expenses by some
1, Reza Khan’s acknowledgement was received by Cartier on 29 Oct 1771*
HMS, 203, p 137» (also CPC,III,972),In this Reza Khan promised a reply,
2, Mubarak ud daulah to Cartier,Recdi8 Nov 1771 ,H1S,203,pp138-401 CPC,III,973
3, Reza Khan to Cartier, Recdt8 Nov 1771* HMS, 205 §pp140-431 CPC,III »97^q
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twenty lakhs of rupees* he repeated the faots in the Nawab*s letter* He 
maintained that the governor*a wishes could not be fulfilled unless all 
the men maintained by the Nizamat were dismissed* This could not be done© 
These people were connections and relations of both the present and former 
H&wabs and se inseparable from the Nizamat* To refuse to recognise their 
claims would be the greatest indignity for the Nazim and the Nizanato 
Among the servants of the household* the Khan maintained* he had left no 
superfluous persons for further retrenchment* Nor would it answer to 
dismiss the matchlookmen employed in the Faujdaries and Cutcherries and 
for night patrol and attendance upon the Nazim* This would involve great 
loss of dignity to the Nizamat while the savings which would accrue would 
not suffice to maintain even one Company battalion* It was not worthwhile* 
he declared* ” for such a trifle as this to make the noise of dismission 
of the servants of the Nizamut"! It does not appear that Cartier pressed 
the matter any further*
On 6 December 1771* however* the Calcutta government received a letter 
from the Court of Directors* written on 10 April 1771# which increased the 
pressure on Cartier to seek some relief for the distressed state of the 
Company*s finances* Among other reflections on Cartier* the Directors 
included an undeservedly harsh comment on the financial terms of the treaty 
made with Mubarak ud daulah at his accession* Cartier had obeyed earlier 
orders of the Directors by continuing to the Nawab the Nizamat allowances 
paid to his predecessor Saif ud daulah* For this the Directors now attacked 
him t
"When we advert to the encomiums you have passed on your abilities and 
prudence* and your attention to the Company*s interest *•© we cannot 
but observe with astonishment that an event of so much importance as 
the death of the Nabob Syful- Dowla and the establishment of a 
successor in so great a degree of non-age should not have been attended 
with those advantages for the Company which such a circumstance 
offered to you in view*'*2 *
Their criticism was not of the recognition of a minor* but of Fort Williaa*s
folly in continuing to him "the b tip end alloted to his adult predecessor** * ^
1* Reza Khan to Cartier* Recdi 6 Nov 1771 • HM5* 203* PP 240-43o 
2* Court*a letter* 10 April 1771* 3* ibid*
2.91
 ^ Necessity knew no law, and in violation of the publicly pledged 
treaty with Mubarak ud daulah concluded in their name, the Directors now 
ordered Cartier to reduce the Nawab98 allowance during his minority by 
nearly half, to sixteen lakhs of rupees*They added sententiously that they 
would consider "every addition thereto as so much to be wasted on a herd 
of parasites and sycophants who will continually surround him".
Though the Calcutta Council had asked Cartier to inform the Nawab of
the reduction (on 9 Deoember), he was in no hurry to do so, for his letter
2
to Mubarak* ud daulah was only despatched on 11 January 1772* He could afford 
to take his time for since 26 February 1770 his Council had directed the 
Resident to keep stipends as much in arrear as he could* By 1772 the arrears 
to the Emperor, the Nawab and Reza Khan amounted to £ 60,406, £ 125*085 and
. A
£ 26,373 respectively* The Khan was doubly affected by this underhand 
manoeuvre for most of the arrears to the Nawab were in respect of the 
Nizamat administration which was his responsibility* He found himself 
powerless, however, either to help the Nawab or himself* On 8 August 1771* 
despite his usual delicacy, he was compelled to complain to the Murshidabad 
Council «
"The amount of my expences and the demands of my servants who receive 
from me monthly allowances are so obvious that it is unnecessary to 
enlarge on the subject* The stipend appointed me by the Company compre­
hends the whole of my income* This also is manifest to all the gentlemen 
Was my stipulated allowance to be paid me regularly every month it 
would not suffioe to discharge my expences^Nevertheless,there is a 
ballanoe due on account of last year and 4 months are now elapsed of the 
present, and how shall 1 describe to you my exegencies and urgent
demands of my servants who compose a numerous body and are reduoed to a
state of distress"*5 
When this had no effect he made a further representation to Murshidabad 
Council explaining that had he been an isolated individual he would have 
somehow continued to support himself, but that his servants and other 
dependents were very numerous*
The Khan's petition was sent to Calcutta,but the authorities there , 
by a letter dated 20 August, refused to pay the arrears as they felt it 
i* Court9s letter, 10 April 1771o
2. BPC 9 Deo 1771 and CPC*III*1Q1& 3* BPC 26 February 1770* „
4* PP» Fourth Report of the Committee of secrecy, 1773* P 102*
5*1JP 8 August 1771. 6. ibid.
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would distress the Company to pay so large a sum, and would open the door
1to other claims upon them* The Khan received the disagreeable news with as
much grace as was possible. "If putting myself to an inconvenience by
delaying the receipt of my allowance will prevent the embarrassment of the
Company**, the Khan observed, “no doubt my satisfaction and interest
2
consist in doing it“0 Th© Khan could secure Justice neither for himself v 
nor for the Nawab*
Cartier had only postponed payment of Reza Khan's arrears of salary* 
The Directors, however, by April 1771 had decided that the continuance of 
his salary of nine lakhs was unnecessary* As early as 15 September 1769 
in their instructions to the three Commissioners they had drawn attention 
to “the immense salaries and allowances *•* paid to Mahomed Reza Cawn“ and 
urged their reduction to "moderate bounds"! Now they ordered a general 
onslaught on the ministers9 salaries, writing to Cartier that “ At a time 
when every justifiable measure should be adopted for availing the publick 
and the Company of all the advantages we had in prospect from our possession 
of the Dewanny - we cannot but reflect on the dissipation of a considerable
4
part thereof by the allowances to the Nabob9 s ministers" * Having thus
declared their breach with Clive9 s policy of uniting the leading natives
to the Company by ties of gratitude and interest, they ordered that the
annual allowance to Jagat Seth as assistant to Reza Khan be stopped * they
were well assured that he had never afforded them " a single instance of
service", and that his salary(of one lakh of rupees per year)was a drain on
the revenues* They agreed to continue Rai Durlabh*svsalary(of two lakhs of
rupees per year)in view of his age and past services, but ordered that on
his death it should not be given to any other person whatever* Finally,
they ordered Reza Khan9s salary to be reduced to five lakhs, observing in
an echo of the words used by Saith^in October 1769 that "how great soever
the application of Mahomet Reza Cawn and his adherence to the Company9 s
interest, may have been, his rewards have been more than adequate thereto"*
The Directors had never reconciled themselves to the commitment forced on
I.Fort William letter,20 Aug. MP 2 Sep 1771* 2*Reza Khan's notoolJP 5Sep1771 
3*Sinha.N.K..Fort-William~India House Correspondence.Vol V, p 242*
4*Court9s letter,10 April 1771•
5*They were ignorant of Rai Durlabh9s death in 1770*
6*Smith9s minute in the Secret Consultations of 26 October 1769 appear 
underlined in red in India Office copy*
7*Court9s letter, 10 April 1771*
them by Clive* The introduction of the supervisorships had now given them
an excuse for going back upon it* They explained to Calcutta that, the
supervisors having mastered " the business of the collections", there would
be need of "little or no assistance from the minister", and no reason ,
therefore, for continuing his then salary* That would be a waste of the
resources essential for the security of the Company* s possessions and the
extension of the investment in Bengal. It was only because of the need to
appoint someone of experience to be guardian to the young Nawab that they
1
recommended the salary of five lakhs of rupees now granted to Reza Khan©
Cartier was in no hurry to communicate the Company* s orders to the Khan*
2
He wrote to the Khan on 11 January 1772» the same day as he wrote to the 
Nawab about the reduction of the Nizamat allowances©
The delay was partly due to the upsetting news brought by the Lord 
Holland from England which reached Calcutta by 6 December 1771p It carried 
a copy of the Company’s orders dated 10 April and their subsequent orders 
dated 25 April 1771? The letter of 10 April notified the appointment of 
Warren Hastings, then second at Madras, to be second at Calcutta and that of 
25 April notified the dismissal of Cartier and his Clivite colleagues* 
Hastings* appointment was due in part to the canvassing of his friends in 
England, men such as Sykes who soon became his attorney theref in part to 
the general awareness of the fast deteriorating conditions in Bengal* The 
outgoing Court of Directors of 1770-71 in their final General letter to 
Bengal,dated 10 April 1771# intimated their appointment of Hastings "Second 
of Council at Port William and to succeed Mr. Cartier, as President and 
Governor of Bengal and we have accordingly directed Mr, Hastings to proceed 
to Port William as expediously as possible"* There was no word of dismissal 
of Cartier though his actions and policy had been commented upon very much 
unfavourably*
On 10 April 1771 again a new Court of Directors was elected which 
included Laurence Sulivan, Clive’s bitterest enemy and Robert Gregory,
1.Court’s letter, 10 April 1771®
20Cartier to Reza Khan, 11 Jan 1772* CPC, 111,1015*
3*The Lord Holland sailing from England on 14 May reached Calcutta apparently 
earlier than the ship Colebrooke which had sailed on 30 April1771«®ven 
before the official intimations had reached)rumours of changes in England 
were known in Calcutta, (BPC, 2 Dec and 6 Dec 1771)®
4. Hastings to Sykes,2 Pet, 1771. Add Mss. 29126 f 55*Add i,iss 29154,ff226,2>4.
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Nandkumar* s attorney in England. On 17 April the various committees were 
formed, including the Committee of Secrecy. On 25 April the new Direction, 
dominated by Sulivan even though he had not secured the chair, struck down 
their opponents. Orders were sent that "Mr. Cartier do resign the govern­
ment to Mr. Hastings'*, "Hr. Becher be dismissed from our Council in Bengal" 
and that "Mr. Claude Russell and Mr. Charles Floyer be immediately removed 
from our service in Bengal and that they return to Madras with all con­
venient dispatch"! The justification of the move was the alarming disunion 
among the Company9s servants in Bengal, for which Cartier, Becher,Russell
and Floyer were held guilty* for the attempt by the Select Committee to
2
prevent the positive orders sent out by the Lapwing from being put into 
execution.
In their rush to oust the known Clivites in the Calcutta Council the 
new Directors apparently forgot that their orders about Becher were poinV 
less, since he was ‘already on the way home. They showed themselves blind 
to administrative needs by originally ordering that Cartier be sent home 
by the first ship of the season, though on second thoughts they did extend 
the period of his handover to Hastings by allowing him to sail on the last 
ship of the season.In dismissing Floyer they took no note of the fact that 
except for one occasion when he supported the Select Committee*s claim to 
authority in revenue matters, he had uniformly supported the junior members 
of Council in denouncing Reza Khan and in upholding the cause of supervisors 
Finally, they took no note of the Select Committee* s reasons for opposing 
the Council in June 1770, of the fact that the junior members of the Council 
had been as remiss as the senior in not putting their orders by the Lapwing 
into immediate execution, and that in any case those orders were for the 
Commissioners whose appointment they had reported less than a week before
5
the Lapwing sailed. The truth was that their arguments had but one end in 
view, to provide the occasion for clearing of the Clivites out of the Bengal 
government©
1. Court9s letter, 25 April 1771•
2. The letter of 50 June 1769 was despatched by the Directors by the Lapwing, 
The first draft of the letter was addressed correctly to the Select 
Committee, but on second thou^ts the Directors had addressed the Council, 
Nowhere in the letter did they say anything about the change in the 
powers of the Committee or of the Council,
3. The appointment of the Commissioners was announced in the Court’s letter 
of 30 June 1769 and the Lapwing carried the letter, sailing from Falmouth 
on 5 July 17o9»
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The Directors having swept Cartier,Becher,Russell and Floyer awayf 
sought to reward those who had rebelled against the old guard by 
nominating them to the Calcutta Council, whose number went up from nine to 
fourteen again* Moreover, by assigning a specific place to each, they 
rendered impossible any such exclusion as Cartier had practiced when the 
Court* s letter of 23 March 1770 arrived. To the heroes of the fight against 
Cartier they added only two names, those of Dacres and Rumbold, fifth and 
twelfth, with Lane thirteenth and Barwell "fourteenth and last of Council**
Reza Khan could not but be alarmed at the news of the revolution in
Calcutta«His main support, the Clivites, were under orders of dismissal.
In addition, the various measures ordered by the Directors in their letter
of 10 April 1771t*hich arrived by the same ship that carried the orders
about Cartier and other Clivites, were all ominous for Reza Khan, since
they constituted a direct attack upon the whole scheme of government
provided by-Clive. But for the Khan personally even more ominous was their
revival of Old doubts about his handling of Dacca revenues and the voicing
of new ones about his management of Nizamat expenditure. Paragraphs 66 and
67 in the Company*s letter implied that the Directors had information
suggesting that there was something wrong with the post-1765 Lurshidabad
accounts,as also with the D&00& revenue accounts prior te Rfeza Khanvs
transfer to Murshidabad as Naib. The Directors having mentioned a sum of
forty lakhs on the Dacca account observed, "Although it cannot be supposed
that the materials from whence the ... statement is collected are so
explicit, or that they are an authority sufficient to warrant a positive
determination of any speciflck sum being due from Mahomed Reza Cawn to the
Clrcar they are nevertheless an undoubted proof that he has not fully
2
accounted for the very considerable sums above mentioned" <; An accompanying 
letter from the Company*s secretary related to the checking of accounts 
of the receipts and disbursements of the Nizamat which suggests that in 
this field too, the Company now entertained doubts about Reza Khan*s 
integrity? The Directors did not disclose the sources upon which they 
based their accusations against the Khan* It was probably soon an open 
secret, however, that Nandkunar was their origin. Having repeatedly
1. Court’s letter,25 Apr 1771 ♦ Before, however, this letter reached on 6 
Dec 1771»Lan§ and Barwell had been called to the Council on 2 Deo vice 
Russell and Kelsall who had left for home in Nov.(BPC 2 Dec 1771)*
2. Court*s letter,10 Apr 1771.
3. Two letters from the Company1s secretary dated 6 May 1771 were received 
on 6 Dec and acted upon*(BPC 6 and 9 Deo 1771.1^ 30 Dec,1771:23
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failed to dislodge the Khan, he had now successfully played upon the 
Company*s hope of relief to their finances* The Company had already ignored 
their treaty obligations to the Nawab and his ministers, they were now to 
be persuaded that further relief could be secured by outright overthrow of 
Reza Khan*
The Company1 s orders regarding investigation into the Nizamat
accounts did not come up before the Murshidabad Council before $0 December
1771 hut already the changes in Calcutta government the news of the
appointment of Warren Hastings must have made Reza Khan very much uncertain.
It was certainly much more embarrassing for Reza Khan than the coming of
Middleton and Barwell as Chief and Second of the Murshidabad Council in
January 1771* It was the Khan1 a statement in 1765 which was used by Clive
to secure Middleton's dismissal from Company's service and again it was
his recorded statements which helped the Calcutta Government in preventing
Barwell9s posting to Dacca in 1767© When Middleton was posted as Chief
of the Murshidabad Council, the Khan was assured by Cartier that "the
gentleman has forgotten and effaced from his mind the feeling of irritation
that formerly existed between him and the addressee'* Reza Kh&nl Cartier's
2
assurance ultimately proved true, but the Khan had reasons to be uncertain 
of Hastings's attitude towards him* Kver since Hastings's return to India 
with a posting to Fort St* George, Reza Khan had Bought to establish 
friendly contacts with him* One such attempt, it seems, was made before 
11 April 1770 and another a little later when some presents also were sent 
to Madras* On both oocasions Hastings had replied, but had taken care that 
his letters were seen on their way by Cartier* Such overcautiousness must 
have been noted by the Khan, perhaps as a veiled rebuff* He may well have 
recalled Hastings's friendliness to llir Qasin, the Khan's bitterest enemy, 
and the fact that it was while Hastings was with Kir Qasia that his 
application for the Faujdari of Hugli had been rejected, despite Vansittart 
supporting him* Jhen Hastings reached Calcutta on 17 February 1772, Reza 
1* Cartier to Reza Khan, 16 Jan'1771 • CPC, III* 557•
2* Middleton during his visit to Dacca recommended confirmation of Himmat
Singh Diwan for the Huzury Mahal(estates which formerly and until idr
Qasim9s day paid directly at Murshidabad) and maintenance of separate
identity of the Nizamat Mahal as a concession to Jasarat Khan and to "ths
small remains of his authority and consequence”*KP 25 Apr,24 May 17710
Both Himmat Singh and J asarat Khan were Reza Khan's men*
5*11 as tings to Hancock, 11 Apr 177^* A.dd Mss 29125 f 32, also ff 71—72* 
T*S*Hancoc^ acted as Hastings's private trade agent in Bengal*
297
Khan sought to establish a friendly relation with him and sent Ali Ibrahim
Khant an old favourite of Mir Qasim and a friend of Hastings in the old
daysf to Calcutta to prepare the grounds*When Hastings assumed his new
office as governor,the Khan was anxious to meet him. But his request for
an interview was politely turned down, saying that meeting the Khan1 s envoy
Ali Ibrahim, "whose excellent qualities have long been known" to him was
"really like having half an interview with the Hawab hi; elf", The coolness
of Hastings together with his disagreement with the Khan’s assertion of
Mughal sovereignty and supremacy of Muslim law,on the very first day of
2Hastings’s governorship were indications enough of the shape of things to 
come. The augury was not good.
Within a fortnight of Hastings’s assumption of office as governor Reza 
Khan had been placed under arrest and was on his way from Murshidabad to 
Calcutta as a prisoner©
In the evening of 23 April 1772 the ship Lapwing reached Calcutta with 
a letter from the Committee of Secrecy addressed to Hastings personally© On 
24 April Hastings wrote to jiddleton, cnief of the Murshidabad Council,that 
he had the previous evening received a letter from the Secret Committee of 
the Court of Directors in which they "direct and enjoin me immediately ,,, 
to issue my private orders for securing the person of Mahomed Reza Cawn,an« 
to bring him to Calcutta". He could have asked the commanding officer of 
Berhampur brigade to carry out these orders, but fearing this would be 
"productive of much disturbances", he entrusted the task to I.iddleton. He 
was told that the orders were peremptory and required immediate compliance 
and all secrecy. The only delay allowed was such time as the Khan might 
require for "furnishing himself with such conveniences as he may want on 
his way". The Khan was to be treated with "every mark of tenderness and 
respect" consistent with the execution of the order. Hastings suggested, 
however, that it would be best for Midaleton to avoid any personal meeting 
with the Khan, though this was left to his discretion. After Reza Khan ana 
Amrit Singh had been despatched to Calcutta, guards should be placed on Reza
Khan’s house so that nothing might be removed until further instructions
T. Warren Hastings to Reza Khan, 17 Apr 1772. CfC,IV,2 
2, Port William letter, 13 Apr 1772. 20 Apr 1?72«
3« Hastings to S. Middleton, 24 Apr, Secret Cons 28 Apr 1772*
2.98
from Calcutta^ No explanation of the reason for this arrest of the Khan 
were given#
Middleton received these orders on 26 April# Quite early in the
morning of 27 April , eight companies of sepoys from the Berhampur brigade
2
took control of Murshidabad city to prevent ” any evil consequences”. Then 
while Anderson, an assistant of the Murshidabad Council went to Reza Khan9s 
palace to communicate the disagreeable orders received from Hastings,
i
Middleton himself, with a part of the Berhampur force and some companies of 
Pargana sepoys, hastened "to the Killah with a view to explain the matter 
to the young Nabob and to obviate any consternation or surprise which mi$it 
have seized him from an event thus sudden and unexpected, and at the same 
time to prevent any irregularities which at this critical juncture the 
Nizamut sepoys or the Nabob9 s own servants might have been tempted to 
commit**#
The precautions proved unnecessary# Reza Khan showed no wish to oppose
or impede the execution of the order, but as Middleton reported, ” made a
voluntary resignation of himself and effects to the officer who was deputed
to take him into custody”# Middleton added,
”1 should not do justice to the calm submission with which he ^ "Reza 
Khan 7 ®0t his unhappy fate was I not to notice the readiness he 
manifested to comply with your orders in the fullest extent and so far 
from wishing to protract the period of his departure from hence, I can 
venture to assure you, you cannot be more anxious for his arrival in 
Calcutta than he appears to be”# 4
The Khan9 s palace* ,Nlshat Bagh, and Nau-Sakht were quietly taken ever and
his / force ©f 100 horse and 530 sepoys was replaced by the Company9s
troops# Before day broke on 28 April Reza Khan who, in Hastings9 s language,
"was in every thing but the name the Nazim of the provinces and in real
5authority more than the Nazin", was on his way down the river Hugli as a
prisoner,escorted by two companies of English troops,under the command of
Lieutenant Lucas# Accompanying him, also as prisoner, was his Diwan,Maharaja
Amrit Sin^a and their dependants! the party required a convoy of three
budgerows and fifteen baggage boats, besides boats for the service of the
7
escorting troops# Thus was completed the fourth and last of the "revolution^
1# Hastings to Middleton, 24 Apr 1772o Secret Cons# 28 Apr 1772o 
2# Middleton9s letter to Hasting30 Secret Cons. 28 Apr 1772* 3* /
4# ibido 5# Hastings to Secret Coamitte,1Sep 1772A4d Mss 29125, f 134
6# Letter to Fort William, IT 28 Apr 1772# 7#ibid#
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to have occured within fifteen years in the. city of Murshidabad, and the 
least violent of then all*
If there was no violence, there was a demonstration of a new and
impressive kind* Ghulam Husain, that critic of the Khan, had to note that
"a vast concourse of people" followed the Khan in their own fashion down
1
to Plassey and some even to Calcutta* This silent demonstration was not 
lost upon Hastings either. Four months after the Khan’s arrest he reported 
to the Committee of Secrecy that "Mahmud R* Cawn#s influence still prevail­
ed generally throughout the country* In the Nabob’s household and at the
capital it was scarce affected by his present disgrace* His favour was
2
still courted and his anger dreaded" * Still later he wrote to Dupre that
he was informed that it had at one time been resolved in the Nawab*s
private circle that the Nawab "should solemnly protest against them, claim
the administration of his own affairs, or declare his resolution to
3
abdicate and retire to Calcutta" .Even Munni Begum,"who had her mind so
obscured by the dust of boldness and discontent as to wish for Mahmed-reza-
4
qhan’s disgrace" also forgot her enmity? The Khan’s personal tragedy had 
evidently been taken by the principal persons in Murshidabad as their 
common calamity*
This identification was to cause further personal miseries to Reza 
Khan,for not only the Company’s interest required "extirpation"^af the 
Khan’s influence, but execution of Eastings’s projects.also required the 
destruction of his public image* The consequence,natur&lly, was the 
commencement of what Barwell later described as " our inquisition business^
j.Seiivail. 39-42*
2.Hastings to Committee of Secrecy, 1 Sep 1772, Add Lias 29125 f 136. 
J.Hastings to Dupre, governor of Madras, 8 Oct 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 156* 
4*Seir, III, 40*
5*Committee of Secrecy to Hastings,16 Apr 1773* Add Mss 29135 p 513* 
6*Barwell to Becher,30 Nov 1774* BPP fXII, 90*
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
REZA KHAN'S TRIAL AND REINSTATEMENT, 1772 - 1775*
On 27 April 1772, Reza Khan was arrested and Murshidahad went through 
a revolution* But It seeaed nohody exactly knew why was it necessary and who 
had it set in action* The Nawab was possibly the first to ask the question* 
In a letter to Hastings he asked to know what grave offences the Khan had 
committed and to stress that Reza Khan had both served him faithfully and 
had the Company's interest at heartj
It was not surprising that the Nawab should ask why Reza Khan had been
arrested, for the whole affair had been shrouded in seorecy0 Middleton knew
nothing beyond what Hastings had said in his letter of 24 April, and to the
Khan himself Hastings had written only to say that ho was sorry that in view
of the latest orders of the Directors he could not continue the cordial
2
relations which his predecessors had maintained with him* The Khan was also 
asked to refer to Middleton for further details^while Middleton was asked
4
to avoid personal meeting with the Khan7 Reza Khan then wrote to Hastings
through All Ibrahim Khan asking for a translation of the Company's orders,
but Hastings in his replies of 13 May did no more than assure the Khan and
5
the Nawab that the particulars would be sent soon* Even the Calcutta
1*Vide Hastings's acknowledgement of the Nawab's letter*CPC, IV,25o 
2*Hastings to Reza Khan, 30 April,1772* CPC,IV*13o(This letter is dated 
three days after the Khan's arrest and removal from ilurshidabad) *
3«ibid* 4o Hastings to Middleton, 24 Apr* Secret Cons*28 Apr 1772*
5*The Khan had first been told of the Company's intentions verbally through 
Graham who was deputed by the Council to receive the Khan on his arrival
in Calcutta* The Khan had first asked for the charges against him, bv a 
letter through Graham and was told in reply that the particulars would be 
sent coon? Mailing to get the particulars the Khan again asked for the 
charges through Ali Ibrahim Khan, and received the same reply*( Vide
Hastings's letters to Reza Khan,5 May?6 May,13 Kay1772»CPC,IV,18,20,26)
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Council were left in ignorance until 28 April t when they were told that
the Khan was under arrest and on his way to Calcutta# Ke explained that
he had been given sufficient authority to act alone, and had done so "to
1
avoid the risk of an opposition to put the matter beyond dispute** • He had 
obviously feared opposition to the Company’s orders, for he commented " I 
could not suppose him ^ *Reza Khan^ inattentive to his security, nor 
ill versed in the maxims of eastern policy as to have neglected the due 
means of establishing an interest with such of the Company’s agents as by 
actual authority or by representation to the Hon’ble Company might* be able 
to promote or obstruct his views*’# Even when Hastings reported his aotions 
to the Council he did not explain the purpose behind the arrest, quoting 
only so much of the letter from the Committee of Secrecy as established his 
right to arrest the Khan#
It would also appear that the orders of the Committee of Secrecy had 
been conoealed from the Court of Directors in London# Sykes for example, 
despite his close contacts with Verelst, elected a director in.1771, knew 
nothing of them# It is true that the Directors* general letter required, 
in paragraph 22, a strict enquiry into the allegations against the Khan, 
and ended, l# we have directed our President to order him to repair to 
Calcutta, there to answer to the facts which shall be alleged against him**f 
But the allegations, most of them,were not new - they had been voioed in 
the letter of 10 April 1771 • and the summons to Calcutta was merely a 
repetition of that of 1765 when the Khan was called to explain his 
expenditure from the Nawab* s treasury before the Seleot Committee# It seems 
very probable that the nature of the revolution intended by the Committee 
of Secrecy was unknown to the Court of Directors as a whole#
The Committee of Secrecy’s orders for Reza Khan’s arrest were not the 
only secret instructions from the Directorate meant for Warren Hastings 
alone# The Company's secret letter ef 18 December 1771 to Hastings,was to 
"be delivered to him only and in ease of the deoease the same to
1# Hastings to Committee of Secrecy, 1 Sep 17720 Add Mss 29125 f t34o 
2# ibid#
3# Hastings quoted paragraph 2 of the secret letter Ivide Secret Cons,
28 Apr 1772)# Signifioantly there is no copy of this secret letter
bound up in the regular volume of the official despatches to Benralo
4. Vide Court’s general letter of the same date, 28 Aug 1771#
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be returned** unopened, to the Directors! But the letter of 18 December had 
been signed by the Directors as a body, just as was a later letter of 16 
April 1773 to which the Directors added that "notwithstanding this letter 
is signed by us, the Court of Directors we mean it as secret, and transmit 
it confidentially to you ^ "Hastings^y^ onlyi and we leave to your discretion 
to lay the contents or any part thereof before the Council, if circumstanoes 
should in your opinion render it necessary or if you should judge it for 
our Interest so to do and not otherwise"* The orders for the arrest of 
Reza Khan were therefore quite exceptional in that they had been signed by 
the Committee of Secrecy alone. The propriety of their action is doubtful* 
The function of the Committee of Secrecy, as set out after almost every 
election of Directors, was " to take such precautions as they shall judge
necessary for the safety of the Company*s outward and homeward bound 
shipping"? Their orders ** for this purpose" were binding, provided they 
were signed by at least three members* But the order to arrest Reza Khan 
was not a shipping matter, and it is probable that the order was itself 
illegal and that Hastings in carrying it out incurred a personal liability 
for the damage done to the Khan* Sykes told Hastings on 16 December 1775 
that the Company*s counsel told him that "you are responsible in your own 
fortune for the injury done 11 R C by obeying, an order from the Select
A
Committee consisting of five when the Company* s bylaws expressly say that 
no governor is to obey any order but from a majority of the Court of
5
Direotors"*
Why was this probably illegal method adopted ? It would seem that
those who took it believed that they might not carry a majority if they put
it before the full Court, but that the deed once done they might secure
retrospective approval ~ as indeed they did0 As Dr* Lucy Sutherland has
shown the 1771 election was in effect a truce between the Clive group and
Sulivan, backed by Lord North* s ministry, and the whole issue of Reza Khan*s
position may have been thought too closely tied to the old quarrels to be
safely aired* If this be the case, it must still be asked who had initiated
the move against the Khan* Sulivan would seem the most obvious candidate for
the role* He had been the arch enemy of Clive in past years, and he was
i7rhi3 direction was given in the general letter of 18 Dec 1771#
2oCourt* s letter,16 Apr 1775* 5o exaaple,Court*s letter,26 Apr 1765® 
4«The Committee of Secrecy , again , had eight members, not five*
5#Sykes to Hastings,16 Dec 177S-*dd P 451«__________________  _ _
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I
certainly a vigorous exponent of the policy of raising Nandkumar* § 
consequence at the expense of Reza Khan*s. In 1772-73 when he shared the 
chair with Sir George Colebrooke he strongly supported tlfat policy as 
he explained in a letter to Hastings on 16 April 1773 after he and Cole­
brooke lost their position t
" Upon mature considerations it has been thought right to detain these 
ships to give a short letter approvingyour measures for an entire 
silence added to the late revolution £ i n  the Direction^ depriving you 
of Colebrooke and me, it was thought might allarn you* I told the 
Direotor who asked my opinion, that I considered the appointment of 
Nuncoraar* s son as a great political manoeuvre and in the present hour 
perfectly right to raise Nunoomar*s consequences at the expence of 
Mamud Reza Caun, nor is the Direction so much altered as to check your 
persevering boldly0 I think you have powers sufficient to lay the axe 
to the rooto I wish you would not stop, for perhaps no extra-ordinary 
commission will go from hence $ if there should, the measure is at a 
distance* Maraud Reza Caun amuses himself in vain when he thinks there 
will be a change in his favour. Those times are forever at an end "• 1
But if Sulivan heartily approved of the downfall of Reza Khan, and he was
2
a member of the Committee of Secrecy which ordered it on 28 August 1771 ,he 
nevertheless disclaimed leadership in the move* Sulivan was later to say to 
Hastings, on reading a letter to him from Reza Khan,that it wsh clear that 
the Khan had "been taught to consider me as the leader in this prosecution,
5
when the chap who set the wheel in motion hugs himself in the deceit"vAnd 
in the same letter he says, " As the materials against this man ^ Reaa KhanJ? 
were handed to us by a snake, who was one of our body, I knew what use
A
would have been made of a refusal"*
Who then was "the chap who set the wheel in motion", and who was a 
member of the Direction at this time ? Almost certainly Robert Gregory**, one 
would think, possibly abetted from outside the Court by Camac* These two 
had been insistent with Clive in 1763 that Nandkumar be reinstated in the 
Murshidabad government. They wore the London correspondents of Nandkumar - 
Sykes reported to Hastings "..ol dined yesterday with Gregory when Camac 
and others^rere presen^Lixd find Nundcomar writes then everything wch 
happens and something more, by every ship* This is a fact for I found they
T* L. Sulivan to Hastings, 16 Apr 1773* Add Uaa 29133 P 515*
2. Other members of the Committee then were Chairman John Purling,Deputy 
Chairman George Dudley, and Harrison, Iianship,Pigou,Rous,Savage*
(vide Court*s Minute 17 Apr 1771)#
3. Sulivan to Hastings,20 Dec 1774o Add Mss 19135 I* 407* 4* ibid*
5. Gregory had been for twenty years a private trader in Bengal*(Vide his 
evidence before a Parliamentary Committee, 1 Apr 1767*Ad4 Msa 184^9 F 3$)
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had everything from him". From Sulivan we also find that Gregory acted as
2
Nandkumar’s attorney in England 0It was Gregory again who presented to the 
Directors Huzurimul’s' accusation that Reza Khan had participated as a 
monopolist in the rice trade during the famine - and it does not seem at 
all impossible that Huzurimul’s accusations were in fact furnished by 
Nandkumar? When Hastings in Bengal asked Huzurinul for information about 
Reza Khan’s monopolising grain, he declared he could give none. In just 
the same way Hastings received a letter supposedly from Hunni Begum, be fore 
he left Madras, denouncing the tyranny of Reza Khan and referring Hastings 
for further information to Maharaja Nandkumar - and when in Bengal she was 
asked for details the Begum '•solemnly disowned her having ever written such 
letters, or authorised such a commission*
It does not appear that Gregory had any reason to be vindictive 
against Reza Khan in particular* Rather he distrusted all Indians, and 
particularly those leading men "who has ever had any office or connexion 
with political affairs"^*Gregory would therefore to have been the channel 
through which Nandkumar sought to influence the Directors against Reza Khaitc 
The materials on which the Court had earlier based their estimate that some 
forty lakhs of rupees were due from Reza Khan on account of the Dacca 
revenues was certainly supplied by Nandkumar, for this was one of the
1.Sykes to Hastings, 6 Feb 1774* Add Mss 29134 f 298©
2.Sulivan wrote to Hastings on 20 Deo 1?74 ( vide Add Mss 29135 ^ 402) that
*Nuncomar by Mr. Gregory his attorney* sued Burdett ( of Spencers Council 
in Bengal in 1765) for a principal sum of £ 5»200 and obtained a decree 
for £ 11,200 including ten per cent interest,
3#The Committee of Secrecy’s letter of 28 Aug 1771 to Hastings said that 
they received the ” information of Mohammed Reza Cawn’s having increased 
the calamities of the poor, during the height of famine by a monopoly of 
rice and other necessaries of life* from Huzurimul’s letter to Gregory© 
They had also sent an extract from that letter to Hastings.(Francis Mss
I.e., Eur E 28 pp 99-100).
It may be noted that the Sikh merchant Huzurinul,brother-in-law of 
Umichand of the 1757 conspiracy notoriety, was an influential merchant of 
Calcutta. Clive used to be his tenant in Calcutta from 1 Feb 1757 to 31 
Jan 1760, the monthly rental of the house being Rs 125»(BPC 4 Feb 1760)0 
He was associated with Hastings’s private trade as late as 1770(vide 
Add Mss 29125 f 356).During Najidkunar’s administration of Nadia as the 
Company’s Tahsildar, UMichand, and after Umichand’s death in Nov 1758, 
Huzurimul participated in it as security.(3PC 26 Oct, 13 Nov 175$»1sop 17®!
4#Hastings to Sulivan,20 Mar I774(vide G.R.Gleig, Memoirs of Rirfit Hon0 
Warren Hastings. Vol I, p 391)
5•Hastings to Committee of Secrecy, 24 Mar 1774(vide M.E.Moncktom-Jones, 
Warren Hastings in Bengal.1772-74. p 197) ----
6©Iiints from Mr.Gregory to P.Francis (Francis Mss*I.O.,Eur-E 12,p 169)
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allegations made by Najm ud daulah against the Khan, at Nandkumar*s
Instigations, when the attempt was made in 1765 to prevent his appointment
as Naib at Kurshidabad# The materials.on which the Court were now acting
seem scarcely less certainly to have been supplied by Nandkumar 0 The
instructions sent to Hastings by the Committee of Secrecy on 28 August 1771
can only lead to this conclusion© The Committee wrote s
"In this research your own Judgement will direct you to such means of 
information as may be likely to bring to light the most socret of his 
transactions. We however cannot forbear recommending to you to avail 
yourself of the intelligence which Nundcomar may be able to give 
respecting the Naib’s administration; and while the envy, which 
Nundcomar is supposed to bear this minister may prompt him to a ready 
communication of all proceedings which have come to his knowledge, wo 
are persuaded that no scrupulous part of the Naib* s conduct can have 
esoaped the watchful eye of his Jealous and penetrating rival* lienee 
we cannot doubt that the abilities and dispositions of Nundcomar may 
be successfully employed in the investigation of Mahommed Reza Cawn*s 
administration and bring to light any embezzlement, fraud or malversa-* 
tion, which he may have committed in the office of the Naib Duan, or 
in the station he has hold under tho several successive Subahs"* 1
They added 1
"And while we assure ourselves that you will make the necessary use of 
Nundcomar*s intelligence, we have such confidence in your wisdom, that 
we have nothing to fear from any secret motives or designs which may 
induoe him to detect the maladministration of one, whose power has been 
the object of his envy, whoso office the aim of his ambition ; for we 
have the satisfaction to reflect that you are too well apprized of the 
subtilty and dispositions of Nundcomar, to yield him any trust or 
authority which may be turned to his own advantage, and prove detrimen­
tal to the interest of the Company# t
Though we have thought it necessary to intimate to you how little we 
are disposed to dele'gate any jpower or interest to Nundcomar, yet should 
his information or assistance be serviceable to you in your investi­
gating the conduct of mohammed Reza Cawn, you will yield him such 
encouragement and reward as his troubles and the extent of his services 
deserve"# 2
One further question remains to be answered t why did the Directors, 
or part of their number, choose to take such drastic action against Reza 
Khan at this particular time ? That Reza Khan had no further usefulness on 
the revenue side had long been clear, and he himself had opposed any 
attempt to continue the dual system when tho supervisorships wore revived
in October 1770* Lawrell and Graham in the Murshidabad Council on 26 Novem­
ber 1770 had recorded their opinions that the Naib was no longer necessary .5
i©" The Committee of Secrecy to Hastings, 28 Aug 1771 (Francis Mss,I.O., 
liur- S 29,pp 95-1^1 )
2a ibid. 3. IIP 26 Nov 1770.
The Directors also had come to this view when in their letter of 10 April 
1771 they ordered the continuance of Reza Khan as Naib Nazim only,during the 
NawaV s minority at a reduced salary of five lakhso ’ow these were still 
their orders as late as 14 !--ay when tho Lord Holland sailed for Calcutta 
with their orders and instructions of 10 April and 2$ April# What then 
led them to decide sometime before 28 August upon Reza Khan* s arrest ?
Fart of the explanation must be in the steady worsening of the 
Company*s domestic situation. The high hopes excited by Clive*s despatch 
from Bengal in September 1765 had led the British government to demand a 
large share in the expected territorial revenues# The share-holders 
clamoured for higher dividends, while the free-traders demanded that all 
should have a place at the trough©Thanks to the clash between Clive and 
Sulivan the affairs of the Company had become party political issues, while 
the return of the new class of get-rich-quick "Indiana** or "Nabobs" roused 
the jealous alarm of the old ruling classes0 both in the Directorate and in 
Parliamento The repeated attempts by the Company to obtain greater control 
over their servants through Parliamentary intervention had failed, and the 
hopes pinned to the despatch of the three Commissioners Van3ittart,Scrafton 
and Forde had foundered with their ship. By the end of 1770 the accounts of 
the Bengal famine had started arriving in iingland, and by August 1771 Clive 
had already guessed that the Company must be in serious difficulties^, 
though this remained a closely guarded seoret0 The Directors were also only 
too well aware of the conflicts within the Calcutta government, for so many 
people had an interest in the India trade and everyone of them had his 
correspondents in India to send reports coloured by their own prejudices 
and interests about the failings of men and institutions there# Reza Khan 
as a key figure in the Bengal administration could not but be involved in 
theso reports, true or false#
That another financial and administrative storm was brewing for the 
Company there could be little doubt0 The Directors required some scapegoat, 
without partner or patron among their members or servants, upon whom blame 
could be safely pinnedo :teza Khan was just the figure they required.
1# Lord Clive to Hastings,! Aug 1772ft Add Mss 29132 f 434* In thin letter 
Clive had hinted that his suggestions were not being listened to by the 
Directors and that the latter might put all blame on their.servants#
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The charge which they levied against him, of monopolist activities
during the famine, was particularly apt to their purposes. They had failed
to take any serious note of the official information of the outbreak of
famine which they received from the records of the Bengal government for
1769* Even when they received a full picture of its virulence in 1770* they
had not thought it necessary to devote more than one of the 162 paragraphs
of their general letter of 10 April 1771 to the subject. And in that one
paragraph their concern had been limited to the oomment "The repeated
accounts we have received of the excessive drau^it which is so long
continued throu^iout the provinces affect us with the utmost concern for
the consequences which are to be feared from it - for while we lament the
distresses to which the inhabitants may be reduced thereby, we cannot
divest ourselves of the anxious apprehensions concerning the effects which
a continuance of the draught may have on the collections of our revenues0
However, we are willing to hope that this calamity will not extend to any
great degree. It affords us some consolation to find that your collection
1
at the time of your advices suffered any considerable diminution**. They 
said nothing about relief, rehabilitation or the behaviour of their 
servants, and in their subsequent letter of 25 April were completely silent 
about the famine. By 26 August 1771 however the new Direction felt obliged 
to take note of the subject, for the famine had caused not merely alarm 
about its effects upon the Company’s finances, but much humanitarian oaneejarj 
especially as ugly stories became increasingly current in England about 
the way in which the servants of the Company and their native agents had 
exploited the situation to their own ends? In their general letter of 28 
August 1771 they answered public criticism. 33iey expressed their approval 
of "every well meant and generous effort to relieve the miseries of the 
poor inhabitants**, and commended those servants who had sought to alleviate 
distress. Then they expressed their indignant horror at finding charges of 
monopolising grain levied even at Englishmen and their agents, by Becher 
and Reza Khan. They had expected to hear of strict enquiry and exemplary 
punishment in Bengal for those who had dared **to counteract the benevolence 
of the Company1*, and to "entertain a thought of profiting by the universal
1. paragraph 69 of Court's letter of 10 Apr 1771, — —
2. As Sutherland (op olt.222) quoted fromPalk's letter to Goodlad,"at an 
unlucky time,mankind in general being willing to suspect that so many 
great fortunes cannot be fairly acquired**0
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distress of the miserable natives whose dying criest it is said, were too 
affecting to admit ef an adequate description*1 - instead they found no 
culprit specifically named by Becher and the Khan* and the remedy suggested 
from Murshidabad, H ef totally prohibiting all Europeans in their private 
capacity or their Goiaastahs from .dealing in rice", ignored. This could only 
suggest that the guilty were persons of some rank in the service with 
influence sufficient to prevent an enquiry into their proceedings# The 
Directors ordered that any Englishman found guilty should be dismissed and 
shipped home as a warning example. The Court of Directors thus cleared its 
public conscience, threw the burden of enquiry on Calcutta, and answered 
its critics in England#
But while Calcutta was left to enquire into the faults of Englishmen, 
the Directors proceeded to announce in London the guilt of Reza Khan# In 
the same letter of 28 August 1771»thqy declared “Notwithstanding we 
observe that Mahomed Reza Cawn has complained of a monopoly of rice being 
carried on by other persons « we have received information that he himself 
in the very height of the famine has been guilty of great oppressions - 
that he has bean guilty of stopping merchants* boats, loaded with rice and 
other provisions intended for the supply of Muxadabad £ liurshidabad^ 
has forcibly compelled the owners to sell their rice to him at a price so 
cheap as from 23 to 30 seers p^ er/^  rupee and resold it afterwards at the 
rate of 3 or 4 seers p, rupee and all other eatables in proportion* and 
that this conduct of Reza Khan,which was * so inhuman and so very unworthy 
the station* he held,had “operated in the destruction of many thousands ef
p
people"# In denouncing the Khan the Directors contrived to end the last 
remnant of the Clivite regime and to satisfy,their criticsr All at no oest«
T, Courtis letter, 28 Aug 1771 • Hastings was further empowered personally 
(vide letter of 18 Deo 1771) to make strict enquiry against all civil and 
military servants involved without any “biass ef friendship"# Enquiry 
was made and no Englishman was found involved (vide an article on the 
subject by Nanigop&l Choudhury in the Indian Historical Quarterly#1945 )• 
The secret was that Hastings was unwilling to antagonise anyone,In a 
letter to Dupre he wrote on 8 Oct 1772 i*I should have added to the li3t 
of things to be done, an enquiry into the trade in salt,betelnutt,toba­
cco rice,carried on by the principal persons of this government - 
which their commands have directed me to prosecute,a mark of distinction 
on which my friends in England congratulate me - Such partial power tend 
to destroy every other that I am possessed of, by arming my hand against 
avery man, and every man* s of course against mo" (Add Mss 29125 p 157)
2, Court1s general letter, 28 Aug 1771 (para,18),
to themselves•
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One other reason for the Company’s attack upon the Khan was their wish 
to clear themselves of any claims on account of " such injuries, as indivi­
duals may have sustained by tho exercise of his .power or the effects of his
2
avarice"* They had recently been much harassed by two Armenians who had 
arrived in England along with Bolts from Bengal in 1769 in order to olaim 
damages on account of loss of personal liberty end freedom of trade with 
the dominion of the Nawab Wazir of Gudh. They were prevented by Verelst,e 
government and Reza Khan from violating Clive* s agreement with Shuja ud- 
daulah to exclude the servants and dependants of the English from his 
dominion, since they were regarded no more than agents of Bolts, an ex­
servant of the Company who after resigning his service had taken to an 
extensive private trade employing in most cases Armenian agents. The Armeni­
ans were imprisoned by Reza Khan while Bolts was confined in Calcutta and 
shipped to Europe in 17680 ~~ In England, the Armenians were backed by
Bolts and Johnstone*s party and in 1775 were awarded £ 8,000 damages against 
Verelst, whom the Company refused to indemnify^ In 1771 the Directors were 
wishing to keep themselves clear of any further liability by throwing the 
burden of responsibility upon Reza Khan, though certainly he acted in 
accordance with the instructions of the Company's government in Bengalo
1 * There is an interesting parallel in the Directors® technique here and 
in 1768-69 when they heard of the monopolizing of Bombay cotton by a 
ring of senior servants* Uien they had ordered the Coiaroissioners (vid.c 
Court's letter of 15 Sep 1769) to "pay a 3trict regard and attention lu 
prevent monopolies of any kind*** in which the Influence and authority 01 
Mahomed Reza Cawn has been improperly exerted over the Zemindars, to 
oblige them to buy it"*(N*K*Sinha,Fort Williao-India Office Correspondent 
oe, Vol V, p 244)* Now in 1771 they found it once again much easier to 
attack the Khan than their own nen. For the last Clivite administration 
in Bengal, which already stood dismissed( vide Court's letter 25 Apr 1771 
there was however an implied censure that the Khan's conduct had been 
"overlooked by those in power"(para 18 of Court's letter,28 Aug 1771)*
2* Para 22 of Court's letter, 26 Aug 1771#
3* The Armenians Gregor© Cojanaul and Johannes Padre Rafael had unsuccess­
fully applied to the Company for redress on 12 Sep 1769 and later 
applied to Parliament on 18 May 1772 (PP,Second Report,1772,pp265-6,28V) 
About Bolts the Directors had ordered on 11 Nov 1769 approving Calcutta * 
suggestion of "obliging him to repair to Europe by the first opportunity 
which if not already done must be carried into execution by the first 
ship"* Before the order had reached Calcutta Bolts was sent to Europe
(vid« letter to Court dt 24 Sep 1769)*In the circumstances,on his return 
v^^eist was never given rest by them*(Sykes to Hastings,20 Dec 1774 
, 16"Pep 1i75.Add Mss 29135 tf 394~5| 29136 f 431)
Indeed the Directors must have hoped to make a profit from their 
manoeuvre* They had out Reza Khan's salary from nine to five lakhs of rupees
r
a year, keeping even that in arrears, now that sum too oould he saved* And
from their other charges against him, of misappropriation of part of the
Dacca revenues and embezzlement ef Nizamat allowances they might expect a
further windfall, most welcome in their current financial distress* Their
orders of 28 August were clear on this point, "while we enjoin you to
pursue your researches with unremitting care and attention we expeot you to
obtain not only a just and adequate restitution of all sums which may have
heon withheld from the Sircar or the Company either by embezzlement or 
1collusion"*
Whether the Company had any competence to enquire into these matters
p
is not clear* The Company in cutting the Nizamat allowances from 32 to 16
lakhs had argued that this was necessary as a temporary measure^ also to
3liquidate certain pre-Diwani debts * But if pre-Diwani debts were the 
Nawab1 a responsibility, then the Dacca affair was the Nawab's business too* 
The Nizamat disbursements were of course by treaty the Natfab's affair and 
nothing to do with the Company* It nay also be doubted whether the Company 
had any intention of parting with such restitution as it might secure. In 
1763 Sykes had despoiled the servants of the Nawab* s government whoa he 
dismissed, arguing that they had been guilty of fraud in the past, and put 
the prooeeds to the Company's account* In like manner when the Company had 
declared the cash presents received by their servants from N&j®ud daulah 
to be illegal and contrary to their engagements, the intention was not to 
restore the sums to the Nawab but to confiscate them to the Company * The
1* Para 22 of Court's letter,28 Aug 1771©
2* This is perhaps for the first time that the Company openly interfered in 
what it so long recognised as the internal affair of the Nawab* In 1765 
Nandkumar was brought down to Calcutta for an enquiry, but then the Nawab 
though compelled to agree to the enquiry, did not permit the English to 
bring him^ to Calcutta under escort of their own troops*The Raja was sent 
undrr escort of Nizaiuat troops, who were later joined on the way by the 
English troops*
3* The pre-Diwani debts listed (in Court*s letter, 10 Apr 1771) were Kir
Jafar*3 promised donation to army,balance on account of restitution which 
Kir Jafar was made to agree to pay in respect of illegal trade of the 
Company servants and their dependants which had suffered because of M r  
Qasln and war with him0Col» j.iunro*s two lakhs which was said to have been 
promised by Mir Jafar,money advanced to government by Bolakidas,annual 
sum of one lakh to Jagat Seth accordings to Clive* s arrangeaento
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Directors1 eagerness to ensure restitution from Reza Khan seems,therefore,
to have been prompted less by concern for the Nawab1 s finances than for
those of a Company, which being foroed by various considerations early in
1771 to raise the dividend t© the maximum of 12i per oent\ was soon to find
2
itself obliged to stop all payments for want of cash in 1772 4 It was 
probably in order to give the Company a locus standi in the matter of the 
jurisdiction to put the Khan on trial and to impose restitution from him 
that the Directors included,a number of allegations of injury to the 
Company1 s interests and disobedience to the Company1 s orders as Naib Diwan, 
in their letter of 28 August 1771©
j
These charges of injury to the Company* s interest, later to be virtu­
ally ignored by Hastings and his Council in their conduct of the trial,were 
four in number,First, there was a general allegation that "large suns have 
by violent and oppressive means been colleoted by Mohammed Reza Cawn on 
account of the Dewanny revenues, great part of which he has appropriated
to his own use, or distributed among oreatures of his power and instruments
3
of his oppression* •No specific evidence was adduced for this charge which 
was possibly based on Smith*s minute in the secret proceedings of the 
Calcutta Council dated 26 October 1769©^
Secondly, Re2& Khan was charged with assisting the monopoly trade in 
salt, "in direct contradiction of the Company*s orders*. This was based en 
a single act of the Khan* s granting a parwana to the Zemindars of Jessore
and Nadia permitting a native merchant, Tiloke Ram, to produce salt in theii
5
lands for three years ,The Calcutta merchants and possibly certain Company 
servants raised a clamour against the grant, and when Cartier was made 
aware of the oT&nt, he stiffly ordered Reza Khan to withdraw the parwana. 
Such was the pressure on him that Cartier himself also wrote to the Zemin­
dars cancelling it,The Khan,in complying with Cartier*s orders,said that
1, Lucy Sutherland, op cit , 227*
2, Sykes in a letter to Hastings on 28 Jan 1773 described the reaction that 
the Directors "have been treated in a very free manner by the proprie­
tors and their character struck at*,(Add Mss 29133 P 347)©
3, Para 21 of Court* a letter,28 Aug 1771©
4© Hastings described the charges as "general without any specificates of 
time, places or persons",(Vide Secret Cons, 24 Mar 1774)o5ee supra 
5© The date of the parwana is not known, but it could not be too long
before 20 Apr 1770 when Cartier wrote to the Khan and to the Zenirwiarr,.
(CPC, 1X1,175,176,177 and ms. 201, pp 29-30)
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he had granted the parwana on a representation that salt manufactories were
unoccupied and the merchants discontented# The Directors disapproved ©f
Cartier*s lenienoe, disbelieved the Khan's explanation and suggested that
the merchants1 discontent was probably caused by the Khan's exercise of 
2
undue influence0
From this second charge against the Khan9 the Directors developed 
their third - that the grant to Tilbke Ham had been indicative of the cause 
of a decline in the revenue from salt duties; The Khan had forewarned the 
decline in 1769 when the Calcutta government arbitrarily fixed an exorbitant 
duty of Rs 50 per 100 maunds^and by 1770 th« decline had been apparent# 
Becher then had explained it in a letter to the Select Committee as the 
result of a large amount of salt having "passed up the country" duty free 
"with Dus tucks from the Committee of Trade"? The implied accusation of 
misuse of passes by the gentlemen in Calcutta and their gumashtas was 
promptly repudiated by the Select Committee • They prefered to cast suspi­
cion on the Faujdar of Hugli as either "extremely negligent in his duty or
£
dishonest in the management " of his charge*, The Directors now went one 
better, blaming both Reza Khan and Cartier* s government# How could the Fort 
William authorities " advert to the fact of salt being monopolized und ;r 
the express authority of Mahomet Reza Cawn", they asked, " and not be aware 
of the consequences, namely, that he having presumed to transgress the 
Company* s commands would also avail himself of his station and screen his 
agents from paying duties or compel them to compound with him for the same 
to the damage of the Company" # The charge was absolutely hollow, for the 
grant to Tiloke Ram ©f the right to manufacture salt had not exempted hja 
from payment of duty, and it had in any case been promptly cancelled# To 
accuse Reza Khan served however to divert attention from Becher*s authori­
tative complaint against the Committee of Trade and from the creation in 
February 1771 of a salt combine among certain members of the Calcutta 
Council#
Reza, Khan to Cartier, 15 May 1770. CPC,III,210#
2# Para 15 of Court's letter, 28 Aug iTTT# 5#Paras 14 and 15, ibid#
4. See supra Chapter 8 . 5# 3eoher*s letter.BSC 15 Sep 1770#
6# BSC 15 Sep 1770# 7* Para 15 of Court*s letter,28 Aug 1771o
8# Joint letter of Middleton,Aldersey, Floyer and Reed#RPC 27 Dec 1771#
These four had formed a combine in which Russell and Hare also joined
for a time# Russell later withdrew and Hare died# They were to trade 
in salt, betelnut and tobacco#
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The fourth and last charge of the Company against Reza Khan was that
w the diminution of the Dewanny revenues have been owing to the misconduct
or malversation of those who have had the superintendenoy of the collection?
namely Reza Khan and his officers who had disappointed them in their
1
expectations of " a considerable increase in the revenues" 0 Even if the
Directors were onoe again firmly prejudging the outcome of the enquiry,
they were not9 it seems, too far away from Floyer’s accusations against
Reza Khan made at the Select Committee on 29 March 1770* They concluded,
therefore, by saying
" we should not think ourselves justified to the Company or to the 
publick were we to leave to him in future, the management of the 
Dewanny collection and as the transferring the like trust to any other 
minister would yield us little prospect of reaping any benifit from tho 
change, we are necessitated to seek by other means the full advantage 
we have to expect from the grant of the Dewanny" ,3
The decision was against not Reza Khan alone, but against all native
instruments* Their usefulness was over,Consequently, their determination
was "to stand forth as Dewan'i and by the agency of the Company’s servants
A
to take upon themselves the entire care and management of the Revenue",
One final aspect of the situation existing in the autumn of 1771* which 
led to the Directors orders for the arrest of Reza Khan, requires some 
comment t the renewal of the attacks upon Clive and those associated with 
him* Sykes puts the point in a letter written after the event to Warren 
Hastings*
*
"The Directors came to a resolution of telling the public that their 
distress was owing to the rapacity and bad management of their servants 
abroad, and in order to support their argument employed one Wilks at 
£600 p. annua to examine the Company’s records from 1756 to this present 
tiae^or every circumstances of a civil or military nature**,.This work 
they certainly had in view, at the time they ordered 1.; R C to be 
confined, in order, if possible to find matter to support their argument 
and draw all attention of the publio upon the conduct of their servants?
5
Dr. Lucy Sutherland has shown how the case brought by Bolts and his two
Armenians against VerelBt was taken up by the Johnstone party* They
T. Para 20 of Court’s letter, 28 Aug 1771, 2* See supra Chapter 9 
3# Para 21 of Court’s letter, 28 Aug 1771* ^ ,
4, ibid*The Directors blandly ignored the fact that revenue management had 
passed from Reza Khan and his officials to the supervisors and Council
at Murshidabad in October 1770# Reza Khan retaining only an advisory rolec
5, Sykes to Hastings, 8 Bov 177 5* Add Mss 29134 ff 116—19•
6* Lucy Sutherland, ow cit» 219-21,
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extended the attack to Clive9 against whom John Petrie 9 one of the officers 
cashiered by Clivef now laid charges before the Directors* From the Court 
of Directors the confliot was then extended to the Press9 by Bolts In his 
Considerations on Indian Affairs,and then by Dow# in a third volume to his 
History of Hindostan* Finally, upon the Company*s failure to pay their 
dividend in 1772» the attack upon Clivef his associates and Verelst was 
carried to the House of Commons* A Select Committee of the Commons under 
Burgoyne was set up to investigate "the most atrocious abuses that ever 
stained the name of civil government**
This succession of events had a double effect upon Reza Khan*s case0
It meant#*'in the first place# that when news of the orders to arrest the
Khan became known in England *many months after*^ the sailing of the Lapwing
his friends there were unable to assist him since by then they themselves
were subjects of enquiry and attack* In the second# it meant that Reza Khan
was himself made a subject of the Press attack unleashed by Bolts and Dow*
The latter in particular ensured that the Directors* attack upon the Khan
within the Company was reinforced by the creation of a violent prejudice
against him# his officials# and the bankers and Zemindars of Bengal #
among the public at large*
"In the year 17&5# upon the demise of Jaffler ^ fltir Jafar 7whom we had# 
for the first time# raised in 1757 to the government for his convenient 
treachery to his master# Nijim-ul-Dowla# his son by a common prostitute* 
was# in his eighteenth year of age# placed upon the throne# in the 
capital of Murshedabad..• The wretched Nijia-ul Dowla was a mere name; 
a figure of state more despicable if possible than the meanness of his 
family* The whole executive government turned upon Mahomed Riza* A 
resident was sent from Calcutta to chbck the accounts of the nominal 
government j as if one man who knew very little of the language# 
manners and opinions of the people# could prevent the fraud of an 
artful minister# and ten thousand of his dependents, versed in the 
management of finance* The consequence might be foreseen with little 
penetration. Unable, and perhaps unwilling to oppose the current#the 
resident fell down with the stream# and became so far a check upon 
Mahommed# that he appropriated to himself a part of what the minister 
might otherwise have thrown into his own treasure"* 2
i. Sykes in a letter to Hastings on 28 Jan 1773# said that*the orders sent 
on this occasion ^ to arrest the Khan^ was in the meet secret manner by 
the Committee, unknown for many months after#even to the Directors*.
(Add Mss 29133 p 348)
20 A.Dow# History of Hindustan, Vol III# pp XC-XCI.
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The gratuitous comments did not end here* Dow continued i
"Mahommed Riz&, as a small salary of office, received annually, one 
hundred twelve thousand and five hundred Pounds with tliree hundred and 
seventyfive thousand a year to he distributed among his friends* The 
minister, with his other good qualities, had no other local attachment 
to friendSo They were of various complexions and religionsj fair faced 
Europeans, as well as swarthy Indians! and, though possessing 
Mahoifjnedanism himself, he was so far from being an enemy of the 
uncircumcised, that it is said the most of his pensions and gratuities 
were bestowed on good Christians bom in Great Britain and Ireland, 
Mahon:, ed, however, did not take up his whole time with acts ef 
benevolence to our nation. He applied himself to business and he was 
more rigid in executing the government which the revolted Nabobs had 
established in Bengal, than fond of introducing innovations more 
favourable to the prosperity of the country4*, 1
At a time when public concern was mounting in England at the Company’s
increasing difficulties in meeting its financial coumiitments at home, Dow
did not miss the opportunity to indicate where the money was being spent.
For example, comments Dow, the Khan squandered 2J£ per cent of the oountry*s
revenues, locally at kurshidabad, upon the annual Puny ah ceremony, an amount
shared " between Mahommed Riza, his friends and the bankers of Murshedabad*,
obliquely pointing out at the same time that "The place of the Company’s
resident at the Durbar,,0 was honestly worth one hundred and fifty thousand 
2
Pounds a year4*,
Realising perhaps that he had been too abusive about his fellow
countrymen, Dow then hastens to add that
uHahommed Riza made it his invariable policy to keep the servants of the 
Company in ignorance of the true state of affairs j and when one deception 
was practiced another was formed to conceal it from view. He entered 
into collusion with many of the farmers. Occasional accounts were framed; 
and the usual accounts were studiously involved in inextricable 
confusion. Hen, averse to trouble, throw them aside| and neglect their 
duty in their indolence. The servants of Mahommed Riza not only escape
censure but retain their places| and this iniquity furnishes to itself
a new field, for a repitition of its execrable talents*, 3
It will be remembered that. Dow was no ordinary pamphleteer^© His two earlier
volumes based on Firishta’s works had established his reputation as an
\0 A, Dow, History of Hindostan, Veil III, pp xci- xcii,
2, ioid, p xciv, 3<> ibid, p xxviii,
4, horace Walpole noted in his Journals, "Some books had been published, 
particularly by one Bolts and Hr, Dow, the first a man of bad character,
the latter of a very fair one ,*0* • Quoted by Lucy Sutherland, op cit,,
P 221,Caillaud# an ex-military servant of the Company in Bengal,however, 
consented to Hastings on 27 Har 1772 (Add Has 29133 f 90)iMIf Hr, Bolts 
has bruised where he has intended to strike,Hr,Dow cutts with fine edge".
historian, his third volume was a respectable work designed for the King’s
perusalo Upon an ill informed public its effect was therefore more complete. 
Whatever punishment the Directors might wish to impose upon Boos 
Khan, it could not hut ho regarded by tho British public so woll deserved.
And in any case, in public eye in England, the enquiry against Clive and his
associates in England had become linked with that against Reza Khan in
BengalJLnjdjOusly,therpfcrw,Sykds wrote to Hastings in January 1773*
"Situated as the House of Commons, now are, their minds inflamed,the 
diabolical disposition of the present Directors, makes many of us, 
gentlemen anxious to have the result of U Reza Cawn’s conduct being 
enquired into,,..whatever consequences this may have affecting disposi­
tions, characters at home and abroad, I cannot tell, but I fear it will 
in a greater or less degree, the whole will depend on the mode of 
enquiry and the line of conduct given Li, Reza Cawn",t
Something has been seen of the mixed motives which led the critics and 
enemies of Reza Khan in England to approve and order his arrest. It is now 
time to consider the attitude* displayed towards the Khan by the Company’s 
servants in India, and in particular by Hastings, who was charged with the 
duty of arresting the Khan and bringing him to trial0
Hastings had no personal grudge against Reza Khan, Indeed the Khan, 
involved in Hastings’s private trade in Dacca tobacco, had won Hastings’s
displayed towards the Khan’s overtures, and the coldness towards the Khan’s 
appeals shown by Hastings when governor of Bengal had their origin in the 
wider political plans and ambitions of Hastings. He wished to utilise the 
fall of the Khan, like the Directors’ #g£er* to stand forth as Diwan, to 
effeot changes in the structure of the Company’s power in Bengal which he 
had long seen to be necessary.
coolness which Hastings at Madras had
1. Sykes to Hastings,' 28 Jan 1773* Add Mss 2913? f 34&o
2, Hastings to Hancock, 11 Apr 1770, Add Mss 29125 ff 31-32.
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One major problem, to which as early as March 17^7 he had traced the
insubordination of the Company* 3 servants in India, was the oomplete
dependence of the annually elected Directors upon the unstable court of
proprietors* This prevented the formulation of long term policies for India,
left the Company*s servants there without reliable guidance and emboldened
them to defy the orders of the Company in the hope that their defiance
would be condoned by whatever new Directorate was in power when news of
their insubordination at last reached England! This problem was not in
Hastings*s power to solve, but he could feel some assurance of stable
support from the fact that he had been nominated governor before Sulivan
2
returned to power, and approved after that event. As Lucy Sutherland puts 
it;"he seems to have owed his nomination to a widespread appreciation of 
his high qualities as an administrator rather than to party manoeuvres©
The reconciliation of parties , •» gave a good augury for the support he 
might expect from home,,,," ^
The second problem facing Hastings was the absolute helplessness ef
the governor against his subordinates, both within the Council and without.
In a letter to Sykes, from Madras, on 2 February 1771 he laid down that
whoever governed Bengal w must have great authority**,^ Within a week of his
arrival in Calcutta in 1772 Hastings made this point again in a letter of
thanks to John Purling, chairman of the Court of Directors declaring
*• o« that the powers of this government are more ostensible than real.
If the several districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the inferior 
servants of the Company, if the business of the revenue is entrusted to 
the chiefs and Councils of Murshedabad and Patna, though subject to the 
Presidency which can only judge of the propriety of their transactions 
from their own materials — I will take upon me to affirm that ye ^ th«^ 
authority of the Presidency is in these points merely nominal nor 
ought it to be charged with the consequences of any mismanagement, if 
any may have been committed in the country**, 5
A month later he was harping upon the same theme in a letter to Colebrooka 1
"The government of this country consists of three distinct powers,the Supra^
visors, the Boards of Revenue at Murshedabad and Patna , and the Governor
1•Evidence of Hastings on 51 Mar 1767 (Add Mss 184^9 p 20)
2,hastingsfs appointment was ordered on 10 April 1771 by the outgoing
Direction, The new Direction which was vote - to office on 10 April 1771
hastened Hastifig*s succession by ordering Cartier* s dismissal (
Court*s letters of 10 and 35 April 1771)*
5* Lucy Sutherland, op cit,, p 205,
4# Hastings to Sykes, 2 Feo 1771* Add Mss 29126 f^55t „ ^
5, Hastings to Purling, 22 Feb 1772. Add Mss 29126 f 126.
and Council at Calcutta**, He added wrily, that the order in which he named
them was * not accidental hut consonant to the degree of trust, power and
emolument",( By ’emolument* Hastings clearly did not mean official salary
only, hut also the profits of private trade, perquisites and positive 
o
corruption,). To Dupre, governor of Madras, Hastings wrote, "This is the 
system which it seems my predecessor was turned out for opposing and I will 
be turned out too, rather than suffer it to continue as it is"?
Finally, Hastings also saw the need to finish the process of making the 
Company supreme in Bengal, The order to stand forth as Diwan gave him the 
opportunity to complete the change already initiated by the grant of effect­
ive power to the supervisors. The order to arrest the Khan opened the way 
to a thoroughgoing invasion of the Nizamat authority.
To Hastings, determined to undo the existing system in Bengal, the 
Company* s orders of 28 August 1771 came as a godsend. Ha was already 
fortunate in that the rapid changes in the Council, begun in November 1771 
(with the departure of Russell and Keloall for home) and speeded up by the 
Directors* orders for the dismissal of Cartier, transfer of FIoyer and 
enlargement of Council membership from nine to fourteen had temporarily 
obliterated party groupings. Before party lines could be redrawn Hastings 
was armed with authority to relax promotion by seniority, and then, on 
receipt of secret orders dated 18 December 1771# with personal power of 
enquiring into the past conduct of all servants, civil and military. He was 
thus very much more strongly armed than Cartier had been, as well as beiiig^ - 
perhaps because of his long years as a Resident^- more determined to exercise 
active power and to intervene in the internal politics of the Indian princes.
Nevertheless, Hastings felt obliged at first to move with caution.He 
was not sure yet how much support he could depend en within the Direction, 
and dare not go too far on the strength of instructions from the Secret 
Committee alone. It was no secret that the Directors had a plan to send out
1. Hastings to G.Colebrooke, 26 Mar 1772, Add kss 2912Y f 15« '
2. By January 1774 Hastings had increased his fortune .Appointing Sykes as
his at torney in England, in addition to J.Woodman and W.Wallei£ Hastings 
explained,in a letter to Woodman on 2 Jan 1774(Add Mss 29134 f 234),that 
it was "necessary ...as my remittances are likely to become considerable",
3. Hastings to Dupre, 26 I-ar 177^* Add Mss 29126 f 138©
4. He assisted Scrafton at Murshidabad from 1757 and then held independent
charge from 175® to I7600lt was he who introduced Mir Qasim to the Englisi 
and waa Resident at his court In ‘ 71762.At Madras he dealt Arcot affairs
further cQiomissioners, and though the threat was thwarted by Parliamentary 
action in December 1772, it was not until he received positive orders from 
the Directors, in their secret letter of 16 March 1773 that he was entirely 
reassured. Meanwhile until he had won support within the Council, Hastings 
was not ready to act boldly,
These doubts dictated the course of action Hastings pursued towards 
Reza Khan, He was vaguely apprehensive lest the Khan should prove to have 
some influence in the Company at home, and even more afraid that if he 
proceeded at once against the Khan there would be strong opposition within 
the Council. To delay the trial of the Khan, therefore, became a part of 
his political strategy.
That such a policy was wise was demonstrated by the reactions of the 
Council on 23 April 1772 to the news which Hastings gave them of the arrest 
of Reza Khan.The arrest was not opposed, but there was a dispute about what 
the next step should be,and in particular about how the Khan should be 
received in Calcutta. It was agreed that consistently with the Company* s 
orders he could not be shown the honours " paid him on the occasion of his 
fonaer visits to Calcutta*^ .But here the agreosaent ended* A majority of the 
Council, Dacres, Lane, Harwell,Lawrell and Graham, voted that "considering 
the rank of His Excellency Mahomed Rezza Cawn, the station he has filled, 
the character and consequence he has held in the empire of Hindustan by the 
honours and dignity conferred on him by the King at the particular instil*"* . 
ticn of Lord Clive and his Council on the part of the Honorable Company, 
judge it proper that one of its members be sent to intimate to him the 
cause of his seizure, and to inform Hi£ Excellency on the points on which 
the Hon'ble Company express their displeasure, and that they look to us to 
obtain satisfaction from him for the injuries which they concieve their
2
affairs have sustained by his mismanagement and corrupt administration" ©
They resolved in consequence that "Hr. Graham be appointed to wait upon His 
Excellency on his arrival”, with a letter from Hastings, and with offer of 
option to the Khan either to stay at Chitpur or to proceed to his own house 
in Calcutta© Graham, while telling him in general terms what were the main 
heads of accusations levied against him, was also to reassure him about his 
1© Secret Cons, 28 Apr 1772. 2. ibid© " ~
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personal safety by making clear that the arrest was designed " merely to 
make him amenable to a due course of justice",^
Hastings, with AJLdersey, Harris and Goodwin entered a dissent to this 
majority resolution, Goodwin while expressing the hope that ^eza Khan would 
ultimately " prove himself innooent of the crimes the Company suspect him 
guilty of", pointed out that the Company would scarcely have gone to the 
* expence of sending out a packet on purpose* if they had not got subs­
tantial grounds for their proceedings© To act in the manner proposed was
contrary to the Company1s evident intentions and would discourage the
2natives from voicing complaints against the Khan,
Harris could not agree to the proposal of the majority as a member of 
that tribunal before which the Klian was ”to prove his innocence or stand 
condemned" for he maintained that fteza Khan "must be considered as a 
culprit till he has vindicated his conduct* , He argued that though the 
majority,doubtless, acted from a "most humane sentiments, their proposed 
marks of favour and distinction to the Khan must " bias the weak minds of 
the natives in general and of those whose 'evidence may be necessary in 
particular? The President*s assurance of a candid and fair trial, and his
3
own "conscious innocence" should be a sufficient consolation to the Khan,
Ald^rsey took a moderate line. Every appearance of compliment to the 
Khan should be avoided as "inconsistent with the intentions of our employers 
both as to the mode they have prescribed for making a scrutiny" and to the 
"express commands" they had received from then. He held that a communication 
from the Council throucfr the hands of the Secretary or the Persian Transla-
A
tor should be sufficient,
Hastings opposed the majority motion no less temperately, evidently 
weighing the reactions of his Council without committing himself too deeply. 
Thus he agreed that it was proper "to shew Lahommed ^ezza Cawn every mark 
ef attention and even of respect due te the station which he has so lately 
filled in the administration of these provinces, and still proper, - - 
while his conduct is only a subject of enquiry". He went further, recording
1, Secret Cons, 28 Apr 1^72, 2, ibid0 3* ibid, ~~ 4, ibid.
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his . opinion that it was only " "becoming the dignity and justice of the
government to >ive him suoh assurances as a man in his situation may stand
in need of* whose ideas of the consequences of ministerial disgrace have
been originally formed on the despotism and violence of Asiatio manners ;
that however rigidly prosecute the enquiries which the Company have ordered
to he made into his conduct, no personal ill will shall he allowed to take
place against him, and that equal and strict justice shall he done him"! he
showed that in his private letter to Reza Khan he had assured him that the
Khan night count upon him in his private capacity for every testimony ef
goodwill and attachment# But then, having disarmed criticism, Hastings went
on to declare that it would he * very unbecoming the character and dignity
of a member of this admi2ii3tration to he employed o# a public deputation to
a man who stands accused by the Court of Director themselves of the most
criminal conduct" • here was a dear, if veiled warning to any who might he
tempted to support the Khan, that to do so would he to associate themselves
in the eyes of the Directors with the Khanfs criminal conduct# Hastings then
went on to stress once again that for Graham to visit the Khan in his
official capacity would lead to the creation in the public mind of the idea
2
that the Khan* s power "is but suspended"# Eastings was determined that Reza 
Khan should never be restored to his eld position as Naib Nazim, whatever 
the outcome of the trial0
Hastings*s determination to bring the Nizamat under the Company*s 
control must have been strengthened when he found time to read Reza Khan* s 
cojamcnte upon his judicial proposals, and in particular the stiff declara­
tion that * in a country under the dominion ef a Mussulman Emperor it is 
improper that any order should be issued inconsistent with the rules of his
faith, and that innovations should be introduced in the administration of 
x
justice"; To a man who five years earlier had asserted that there was no 
real king in India, and that the English "must be considered as the master 
and governing power** £ such a defence of the rights of the Kizamat oould 
scarcely have been pleasing# Hastings’s reaction was to defer Reza Khan*s 
trial for as long as possible while he won the support of his Council for 
an extension of the English control over the Nizamat, and ensured that he 
wiis supported by the Directorate#
1 ,'iuoret Cona'o23 Apr 'f'/Vl!. 'I, lbi£. J.su^ra, Jh. '1U.
4#nastings*s evidence before Fuller Committee,1767© (Add Hs3l34o9 f 2p;
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For Reza Khan an early trial was. essential if he was to retain his
influence and save himself from financial ruin. On 4 May, the day he reached
Calcutta, he expressed his hope to Graham that he would soon he furnished
with an exact copy of the charges against him, so that he might confront
those who had complained to the Company, * to the prejudice of his honour
and good name**Graham reported to the Council on 5 May that the Khan had
"insisted a good deal more on the subject of the enquiry which all tended
te express his anxiety for an opportunity being afforded him of justifying
his oharaoter frem the present heavy reproaches^^Has^tings acknowledged the
receipt of Reza Khan*s request for a copy of the charges, but it was not
until 13 Hay, after a further request had been made by the Khan through Ali
2Ibrahim Khan, that Hastings promised that a copy would be sent to him soon0
On 16 Hay the charges were set out in five " Articles of Impeachment" by the
Council, and it was resolved that a day should be fixed for the trial as
x
soon as the Khan's reply had been received. On 22 May a Persian translation 
of the charges was formally sent to the Khan^* To these the Khan had replied
by 18 June , with a request that he might have an early opportunity to
confront those who had lodged accusations against him with the Company® 
Hastings then arranged that the matter be postponed until the return of the 
newly formed Committee of Circuit, then just about to set out for Kasimbazarc 
It was presumably in reply to a reminder that the Khan's case was still 
unattended to that Hastings wrote to Aldersey from Kasimbazar on 24 June 
saying " I thought it had been formally resolved that as so great a part 
of the Board would be absent the enquiry into the conduct of K.R.C. and
R.S.R. ^Raja Shi tab Rai_7 should be postponedo I remember a minute was
i
formed to that effect and I think I recollect that it was agreed to let it 
rest till K . R . C . # *  s answer was received. Something should be said t if more 
than tiiis, nobody can better express it than you"^0 Hastings evidently 
wished Aldersey to fob Reza Khan off once more, and perhaps write something 
into the record to soothe the Directors..Vhat Aldersey told Reza Khan is not 
known, but by September the Khan was certainly pressing Hastings agaiii for
1# Grahaa,s Report te Council , 5 May 1772* Secret Cons. 7 Kay 1772o
2. Hastings to Reza Lhan, 6 May , 13 May, 1772* CPC, IV, 20, 26*
3. Secret Cons. 16 May 1772* 4* Governor to Reza Khan,22 May 1772*CPC,IV,33 
5* The rejly nust have been sent sometime before the Council took it up
on 18 June 1772. The Khan was evidently very quick in replying,
6. Hastings t© Aldersey, 24 June 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 100.
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an early enquiry, in letters sent through All Ibrahim Khan, for on 29
September Hastings replied to him* He was sorry to hear that the Khan was
suffering9 repeated his promise to institute the enquiry soon9 but
explained that as a servant of the Company he could not ignore their orders!
2In the event Hastings chose to take up the trial of Sbitab Rai first , and 
it was not until 22 January 1775 that he asked Reza Khan to produce his 
accountsf and hot till 12 February 1773» after nine and a half months of 
confinement and suspense that the trial of Reza Khan was formally opened*
It is evident that in the early months of his governorship! charged 
with a complete reformation in the administration of Bengal9Hastings was a 
much preoccupied man* Moreover! as he hinted to Dupre on 8 October 1772 and 
was to state again more fully to the Committee of Secrecy on 24 March 1774# 
the Directors9 charges against the Khan were "general9without any speci­
ficates of time9 places or persons"! so that he had "neither witnesses! nor 
vouchers nor materials of any sort to begin with"* It was necessaryvthere­
fore, to call publicly for information about any misdemeanour of the Khan,
4
though this was only done in August 17727 Perhaps the gigantic- nature of
the enquiry,requiring "some months" to conduct it, also made him, as he
5
told Sykes in December 1772, afraid of "entering upon it"* It may be also 
that he was not anxious to proceed with so important a measure as the trial 
until he was sure again of the backing of the Directors* His secret letter 
to the Directors on 1 September 1772, reporting that Reza Khan and Shi tab j
I
Rai "had conceived hopes of a relaxation of the Company9s orders* Mahmud R*
Cawn had even buoyed himself with the hopes of a restoration to his former
authority by the interest of his friends and a change in the Dirootiom"f j
may have been designed to sound out the situation, while proclaiming ,
himself in effect a party man of Sulivan and Colebrooke* (If so, his letter
was successful, for it drew a secret reply, signed by all the Directors on <
lTHasting3 to Reza Khan* 29 Sep 17t2* CPC* IV* 62* It is not clear what 
Hastings wanted to convey by referring to the Company9 s orders* It was |
never ordered by the Company to delay tho trial* I
2*Shitab Rai9s arrest and trial were ordered by the Council, and not by the 
Directors* Secret Cons* 28 Apr 1772* '
3*"Here now I am ... with the trials •••to bring on without materials, and j 
without much hope of assistance" (Hastings to Dupre ,8 Oct 1772*Add Mss 
29125 f 157)* See also Monckten Jones, op cit, 195«
4*Proclamation issued by the Governor and Council* CPC* IV,63o
5*Hastings to Sykes, 10 Dec 17729 Add Mss 29125 f 183*
6*Hastings9s secret letter to Court,1 Sep 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 137* I
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16 April 1773* assuring Hastings that "although sundry changes have lately 
taken place in the Direction ... those changes will not in the least affeot 
the measures in which you are engaged"^). But even after giving the fullest 
weight to these considerations, it seeas impossible to acquit Hastings of 
the charge of having deliberately denied Justice to the Khan until all the 
neasures necessary to ensure the destruction of the {than and of his office 
of Naib Nazim had been pushed through* While in Septenber 1772 Hastings was 
assuring the Directors that though “It nay at first sight appear extraordi­
nary that Mahnud Rizza Cawn and Rajah Shi tab Roy have been so long detained 
in confinement without any proofs having been obtained of their guilt or
neasures taken to bring them to a trial" the delay had valid reasons and
2that " neither ... complained of the delay as a hardship" 9 he was about 
the same tine explaining the delay , as seen already , in a letter to the 
Khan, as due to the orders of the Company.To Graham* Hastings wrote on 24 
October 1772 saying that "Mahmud Rizza Cawn is desirous of being brought to 
a hearingo Had it been possible his desire should have been fulfilled efer 
this - Ibraheen z f o m f  wanted no encouragement^# but both chose to
throw the choice on me"* Hastings perhaps was conscious that he was being 
cruel to the Khan Just because he had become tho symbol ef the Nizaaat powers, 
but it could not be avoided. He wrote, therefore,to Sykes in March 1773*when 
the trial also had formally commenced, saying that "in one point only I am 
against him. I will never suffer him, if 1 can help it, to regain his power. 
The Directors are mad if they do| for the government of the province is now 
entirely at their disposal, without a competitor for the smallest share of 
their authority".^
This then was the good use to which Hastings put the delay in bringing 
Reza Khan to trial .He had begun by ignoring the Directors1 Instructions te
5
appoint a new Naib Nazim; hoping perhaps to see the office lapse by default.
On 21 May, however, the issue was raised by a letter from Murshidabad Council
stressing H the necessity there is for speedily appointing a Naib to the
Nizamut as the business of that department particularly the course of Justice
here as in the Mufussul is suspended for want of a person properly authorized
to confirm the decrees of the several courts of Justice and to pass sentence
1. Court*s letter(secret to Hastings),16 Apr 1773* 2.Add Mss 29125,ff135-37 
t ibid. t 165* 4. Gleig, opcit, I, 283.
$.In paras 24*25*26 of Court*s letter(general) of 28 Aug 1771*the Directors 
had ordered appointing a substitute on a salary of,three lakhs a yearq k
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on criminals| besides various ether natters ef business wherein the
interposition of the Soubah is immediately necessary"1.Murshidabad went en
to suggest Ihteran ud daulah9 (Mir Kazim) 9 Mir Jafarvs brother9 the eldest
male survivor of the Nawab9s fanily and thus the natural guardian ef the
young Nawab* as a suitable candidate* They also forwarded a letter fron hin
stating that he had been invited by Manni Begun to accept the post of 
2
guardian* Hastings* having quite ether plans for the Nlzamat* persuaded his 
Council to recommend to Murshidabad that they should ask the Nawab to 
authorise the Adalat officers to use the Nizamat seal for the tine being* 
until the natter could be finally determined*
A minority of nenbers of the Calcutta Council including Graham eeatl*
nuod9 as Hastings told Alderseyf to "adhere to the letter of the Company9 s
3
orders which authorise the appointment of a Naib Subah"* Nevertheless9 on
11 July 1772 at a nesting of the Ceamittee of Circuit at Kasimbazar*present
Hastings9 Middletonv Dacres* Lawrell and Graham* it was decided that a new
Naib Nazim was not necessary* The Committee agreed that since the only
purpose in having a Naib Nazim was for "holding out the authority of the
Country Government to European powers* in all cases wherein their interests
may interfere with those of the Company" 9 there was no need to grant " an
extra-ordinary permanent authority to any single minister of the Nabob"
Any Nawabi officer* of whatever rank* might be appointed to act for the
Nawab when occasion arose to deal with ether European nations* To install a
regular Naib Subahdar * at three lakhs a year* "merely for the sake of
giving eclat to the negociations or authenticating the priviledges of their
rivals in trade" was folly* when the purpose could be achieved by other
means* Having thus appealed to the Company9s cupidity* the Committee proceed*
ed to agree on political grounds against the retention of the post of Naib
Nazim* whereby "the rights and prerogatives of the ancient government will
still be preserved and the minds of the people* instead of being familiarized
to the authority of the Company will be taught to look forward to the time
when the Nabob shall resume the sovereignty ••••“ They held that "whatever
faith may be due to treaties subsisting" a divided or dual government could
not last * but must end in conflict and bloodshed* It was essential*
f* MP 18 May 1772 and Secret Cons* 21 May 1772* fe* MP 18 May T772*
3* Hastings to Aldersey, S July 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 102.
4* ^oceodings of w  Committee of Circuit (later PCC) *Kasimbazar,
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therefore*, to seize the invaluable opportunity of tke Nawab’ b ninority 
"to retain openly an* in our own hands the whole conduct of the govern- 
■ent for the present* to accustom the people tp the sovereignty of the 
British people and to divide the officers of the Nizamaut and to suffer 
no person to share in the management of the done stick affairs ^ "of the 
Nawab_7 who from birth* rank* personal consideration or from actual 
trust nay have it in his power to assist his naster with neons or ever 
to inspire him with hopes of future independence*9 \
Hastings from the start had been detemined not to allow the
restoration of Reza Khan or the appointment of anyone else as Naib Nazim*
who “would of course become the principal as Mahoned Rizza Cawn did" •
He intended to bring all authority down to Calcutta and to grasp it
himselft But how had he won over his Council* of whoa in April a
majority had shown themselves unwilling to break with Reza Khan* and a
ninority until July still anxious to see the office ef Naib Nazim upheld?
Mainly* it would seen* by his manipulation of the instructions he had
received from the Committee of Secrecy* the full tenor of which he
carefully concealed from both colleagues and friends? ihe fact that he
had been armed with the power to enquire into “the trade in salt*betel»
nutt* tobaoco and rioe carried on by the principal persons of this
government19 m s  doubtless a useful instrument of persuasion* though as he
pointed out to Dupre he had no intention of using a power which N by
arming my hand against every man*9* necessarily armed everyaan*s against 
4him* More useful* however* was the opportunity his seoret instructions
provided for spreading the notion that he had been instructed to destroy
“the ancient system of government19 • So on 8 July 1772 he wrote to
Aldersey HThe Company have ordered a new system to take place* which
totally subverts the ancient system of government - they express their
apprehensions of the influence and power of Mahomed Reza Cawn and order
5*
us to use every means to destroy it*9© fhe Company had been nothing like
f©PCCt Kasimbazar* 11 July 1772-TlAlao Siorei dons© fc lug T T " V T
2e Sailings to Dupre* 8 Oct 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 156.
5* Hastings to Secret Committee * 1 Sep 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 139©
4* Hastings to Dupre* 8 Oct 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 157*
5* Hastings to Aldersey* 8 July 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 102.
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so decisive and clear sighted, hut when Hastings presented such a Measure 
as was designed apparently te establish the sovereignty of the Coup any, it 
was unlikely that ’the Members of the Council would oppose it© The chances of 
opposition had been to a great extent reduced by splitting the Council , 
some members constituting the Committee of Circuit and going up country for 
settling the revenues while another group remained stationed at Calcutta* 
Hastings had indeed won over most of his Council colleagues also by the use 
he sought to make of the Company* s orders of 28 August 1771 • to stand forth 
as Diwan* He was to use it for transferring the executive authority in 
revenue matters from the subordinate agencies in the districts to the 
members of the Calcutta Council* The Directors, by their orders of August 
1771 • had meant "by the agency of the Company* s servants te take upon 
themselves the entire care and management of the revenue"^ f but , as Hastings 
had observed in a letter to Dupre in January 1773* "the change had taken 
place £±n 17727 Xear3 before I arrived1* in Bengali Having therefore 
nothing further to do in the matter Of Europeanisation ef revenue administra­
tion, Hastings had deemed it necessary "to undeceive the Company” by 
redesignating the supervisors as what they really were, collectors, and also 
to transfer full authority in revenue matters to the Calcutta Council*wfhe 
collectorships are more lucrative than any post in the service (the 
government itself not excepted • ••)" Hastings had availed of the Company*s 
new orders to attempt a reversal of the situation "for who would rest 
satisfied with a handsome salary of three or four thousand rupees a year to 
maintain him in Calcutta who could get a lac or three lacs,*** and live at 
no expense in the districts?*? After Hastings had taken the move that was to 
benefit the councillors, opposition was most likely to weaken, though 
Graham in the Committee of Circuit and Barwoll stationed at Calcutta conti­
nued to offer opposition to Hastings for sometime more* By December 1772 
Hastings had decided to use Graham* s abilities in revenue administration and 
they were " on friendly terms"* Barwoll*s posting to Dacca in 1773 reduced 
the chance of open clash in Council until Sulivan intervened to patch up 
the differences between Hastings and Barwoll? Having in this way 
1* Para 21 of Court* s letter, 28 Aug 1771«
20 Hastings to Dupre,6 Jan 1773«Gleig, op cit»268-69» 3# ibidQ 
4* Hastings to Sykes, 10 Dec 1772* Add Mss 29125 f 183o 
5* Sulivan to Barwell,20 May 1773 (Add Mss 29133 f 5^1){Letter to Court, 16 
Aug 1773* Barwoll opposed the transfer of tne Khalsa to Calcutta and 
suggested that 13 members of the Council should be reponsible for differ^ 
ent zones (Sec ret Hans*. 3 Aug *72) -—
msecured his Council's approval for measures presented to thea as required
by the Directors, Hastings vas then able to write %dLtk eenfldenee to the
Court of Directors urging the advantages of abolishing the Naib Nizaaat and
"the necessity of prefacing the enquiry by breaking his /Reza Khan's 7 
1
influence".
Having wade sure that no new Naib Nazis was created as an obstacle te
»
his plans, Hastings could turn to the task of destroying the eld incumbent 
of the office# It*is clear that Reza Khan vas regarded by Hastings as the 
one effective defender ef the old order# This appears also from the very 
different treatment given to Shitab Raiv whose arrest together with Basant 
Haiv his Diwan, and Sundar Singh, his peshkar# had been orderd by the 
Council on 28 April 1772 as soon as it came to know of Reza Khan's arrest# 
According to Kalyan Singh's history, troops were sent to Barh a few days
before his arrest so that he could join thea as if proceeding to Calcutta,
p
as formerly he did, accompanied by a military escort# His departure from
x
Patna was "saluted with a discharge of cannon by the Chief of Patna" , his
son,Kalyan Singh , was continued in the management of his private and public 
4affairs, and his request that the sepoy guard over his house at Patna should
c
be withdrawn was attended to J Finally he was brought to trial before Reza
Khan# While the injury to Shi tab Rai's dignity and importance was thus
minimised, that to Reza Khan's influence and standing was not#
»
Reza Khan had applied, as Shitab Rai had done, that the guards posted 
on his house be removed# He sought an interview with the President and 
Council writing i
*1 flatter myself that I may be honored with an interview with you and 
the gentlemen of the Council that you will issue your directions for 
withdrawing the guards of the Sircar, for they being stationed over me, 
is the occasion for many evils#Xn the first place my helpless children 
both here ^ alcutta^/and Moorshedabad are terrified s in the second place 
being dismissed from my station it is requisite, that I should consider
1# Hastings to Secret Committee, 1 Sep 1772# Add Mss 29125 £ 137* — —
2? Khulasat ut Tawarikh (Eng translation in the Journal of the Bihar and 
Orissa Research Society or JBORS,vol VI, p 430)
3# Ironside to Caillaud,23 Dec 177^* Orae Mss, OV 41-13 t 140#
4# Kalyan Singh in his Khulasat# JBORS# VI9 427-30#
5# Hastings wrote privately to Vansittart on 12 June 1772 "requesting that
you may grant him on the subject ###all relief which depends on you and 
which you deem within your power consistent with orders##, from the Board"* 
(Add Mss 29 125 f 92).
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my expences, and plan for the payment of the loans of the merchants 
which are very great; and the writers £  meaning private clerical staffj^  
on account of the centries cannot have access to me with their
papers and accounts* And it is not probable that without understanding 
the accounts of the merchants and /off my servants , that I can plan fer 
lightening my expences. I have particularly represented my circumstan- 
oes; whatever your understanding the repository of justice point outf 
$ oxl may^ direct /soj that I may not be sunk under the weight ef my 
expences, and that I nay no longer be ruined in the eyes ef the public!|o
While Hastings responded to Shi tab Rai's plea, writing privately to George
2
Vansittart about the matter, Reza Khan’s request does not appear to have bee 
been considered at all*
Similarly, whereas Kalyan Singh was allowed to act for his father at 
Patna, Hastings, with the concurrence of a majority of his Council, cho3e 
to appoint an old opponent of the Khan, Kunni Begum as guardian of the 
Nawab, and Raja Gurudas, son of another avowed enemy Nandkumar, as the 
Nawab’s Diwan* In appointing Munni Begum Hastings had ensured the destruc­
tion of Reza Khan’s influence within the Nawab's household* And in appoint* 
ing Gurudas he had carried the Secret Committee’s orders to make full use 
of Nandkumar against the Khan, without permitting Nandkumar to secure any 
share in the management of the Nawab's household* This had been a difficult 
manoeuvre* By Hastings's own admission Nandkumar had been his personal 
enemy from 1759 "to the time I left Bengal in 1764 t a majority in 
the Council had also been opposed to any appointment which gave power ,ever 
indirectly, to Nandkumar.Opposition to Raja Gurudas had also come from 
Uunni Begum, who referred to the "villainies of his father", and Raja 
Rajballabhf Rai Durlabh's son who was soon to become Rai-Rayan heading the 
Khalsa on its transfer to Calcutta# However the appointment served 
Hastings well,both by inciting Nandkumar to provide material against Reza 
Khan, and by fomenting palace intrigues at Murshidabad which he could 
manipulate, through Samuel Middleton,who after the abolition of the Council 
at Murshidabad again became Resident at the Durbar in September 1772#
\0 Reza Kh&n*s letter* Secret Cons, j^June 1772*
2. We do not know officially the action that followed, but Vansittart's 
attitude in the matter is known from his ffficial communication speaking 
of the "uneasiness which such an act of violence/as the arrest and pla­
cing ef guardj^T may occasion among men of credit^S ecret Cons*l6Hay1772). 
5# Hastings to Secret Committee, 1 Sep 1772# Add Mss 2912J f 139#
4* Nandkumar to Hastings ,18 June 1772 (Add Mss 29133 f 160) and Hastings to 
S* Middleton , $ July 1773 (Add Mss 29125 f 218).
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The changes at the court of the Nawab yielded further dividends* Hastingi 
was able f while executing the Directors* orders of 10 April 1771, to reduce 
the Nizaaat expenses froa thirty-two t© sixteen lakhs of rupees a year, to 
further lessen the influence of Reza Khan* The effecting of so vast an 
economy was largely Has tings* s work, and he reported his achievements to 
the Directors in a general letter of 10 November 1772 which read t
s/ "To bring the whole expenses of the Nizamut within the pale of 16 lacks 
it was necessary to begin with reforming the useless servants of the 
court and retrenching the idle parade of elephants,menageries etc*,which 
loaded the civil list* This cost little regret in performing, but the 
President ^ Hastin^s^ *** suffered considerably in his feelings when he 
came to touch upon the Pension list* Some hundred of persons of the 
ancient nobility of the country, excluded under our government from 
almost all employments civil or military, had ever since the revolution 
depended on the bounty of the Nabob and near 10 lacks were bestowed that 
way* Xt is not that the distribution was always made with judgement and 
impartiality, and much room was left for a reform, but when the question 
was to cut off the greatest part, it could not fail to be accompanied 
with circumstances of real distress* The President declares that even 
with some of the highest rank he could not avoid discovering under all 
pride of eastern manners, the manifest marks of penury and want* There 
was however no room left for hesitation* 1
But however much Hastings suffered while cutting the pension list, he had at
Iwit m i  cons.latien, m u I ;  all tbM« f o  w m r m  r a m i  war. t ^ d i t M i
of Reza Khan* According to a report from Middleton those who previously
been maintained from the Hizamat public funds could be categorised as follows?
Appointed by Men Women Horses Amount involved 
per month 
in rupees*
Number of 
"Dustakut* or 
signatures or 
orders©
Mir Jafar,1763-65.
Mirza Muhammad 
Erich Khan, Naib
366 11 46 7602-8annas. 425.
Nazim, 1763-65* 276 10 33 3287-8 " ro VM •
Najm ud daulah 
1765-66
6 6 - 2336-8 H 19.
Saif ud daulah 
1766-70
10 - 1 358-8 " 15.
Hubarak ud daulah 
during 1770-72
3 — - 725-0 " 4a
Reza Khan, Naib 
Hazin,1765-72*
1437 90 181 41,488-13 ■i
686*
Quoted} luoncktonJones, op dtp 192
if § lit 195«
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That the numerous body of servants and pensioners taken on >y Reza Khan I 
should be the most hit by Eastings* s economy measures vas understandable* 
but the severity they felt could net appear but as the result ef a policy* 
Notice vas being publicly served that to be connected with Reza Khan would 
henceforth be a disadvantage!
Hastings can be seen in 1772 systematically preparing the destruction
of 3eza Khan* a influence and the transfer of the Nizaaat functions into
English handso He was careful to disguise the full extent of what he was
doing from those in England who might have opposed him; writing to Clive
for example that he would abide by his Lordship's "good advice"* and that it
would be his study "to confirm without extending the power of the Company
2
in this country...." But his skill in making change* profitable to the 
Company and in presenting his actions as the general policy ef his Council 
ensured that he would receive the Directors* support. His reward came in the 
secret letter of 16 April 1775» signed by the whole Court of Directors*which 
gave their general blessing to his measures'. The letter categorically stated 
that
"the extirpation of Mahmud Reza Khan's influence was absolutely nece­
ssary* and the apprehending of Shitabroy equally so s as the latter had 
been too long connected with Mahmud Reza Khan to be independent of hin. • • 
and as to any hopes Mahmud Reza Khan may entertain of profiting by 
changes in the Court of Directors those hopes must steadily vanish ; for 
however different their sentiments may be in some particulars* they 
heartily concur in the propriety and necessity of setting him aside and 
of putting administration of the Company's affairs in the hands of 
persons who may be rendered responsible in England for their conduct in 
India". 3
The Directors also expressed their approval of Munni Begum's appointment as
guardian to the Nawab* and of Raja Gurudas as Diwan. They added
"the use you intend making of Nundcoraar is very proper} and it affords us 
great satisfaction to find that you could at once determine to suppress 
all personal resentment* when publick affairs seemed to clash with your 
personal sentiment relative to Nundcomar"04
The Directors may not have been aware of all that Hastings intended* but
they gave hin all the support for his attack upon the Nizamat which he could
have wished for.
1 . Hastings carried on discrimination against known dependents of Reza Khan
even privatelyQFor example* he told Harris on 31 July 1772#"I shall never
consent to anyone of the dependants of Himmat Sing"for appointment as 
Diwan of Jessore.(Add Mss 29125 f 123b).Himmat Singh was the Khan's proteo^
2<> }uotedt Monckton Jones* op cit.182. 3*Add Mss 29153 £ 516• 4* ibido
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The trial of Reza Khan formally began on 12 February 17731 with a 
special session of the Council attended by Eastings, the Comaandeivin-Ckief 
Sir Robert Barker, Aldersey, Reed and Goodwin# At this session the Company* s 
letter of 28 August 1771 was re-read, together with the five charges framed 
on the basis of that letter by the Council on 16 May 1772# The charges then 
framed had been s
%  That Reza Khan had withheld the payment of a large balance due from 
him on account of Dacca revenues;
2# "That of his own authority and knowing the same to be contrary to 
the express order of the Company and the regulations of the Select 
Committee, he did grant perwaimah to certain merchants for a monopoly 
of the trade in salt for 3 years and thereby occasioned a loss of 
the Company’s duties on that article"|
3# That besides being guilty of many acts of violence and injustice
towards the natives and subjects of the province of Bengal by various 
means^had contributed "to the destruction of many thousands of the 
people";
4# That by abusing the trust reposed in him as I'laib Diwan the Khan had 
caused by his misconduct and malversation the diminution of the 
Diwani revenues and had appropriated to his own use the large sums of 
money that were collected by violent and oppressive means g and
5# That the Khan had misappropriated to his own use sums that were 
placed at his disposal on account of the stipend of Najm ud daulah 
and Saif ud daulah# 1
The Council, which had before it the Khan's denial of these charges, given 
2
in June 1772, proceeded to reframe thea, omitting the second, relating to 
salt, though this was the only one in which the Company's interest had been 
directly engaged# The remaining charges were reduced to four main topics,
1# The monopolizing of grain during famine,
2# The embezzlement of or neglect in accounting for the Dacca revenues,
3# Mismanagement of the revenues as Naib Diwan, and
4* Mismanagement of the Nawab's stipend# 3
1# Secret Cons# 16 May 1772# 2# Secret Cons# 18 June 1772#
3* m ” lQM 0f the GoanCil *>1* fr* the trial of
Hastings recommended that the four Items should he taken In the above order* 
"beginning with the first as the most flagrant"! However* before the day's 
9rseeodings concluded he had added a new charge* of treacherous correspond 
dence with the Emperor and the Harathas* based on Barker1 s letter of 18 
June 1772 wherein the general had spoken of "some secret business carrying 
*n fcetve«n His Majesty Alam j  and ifuktmnud Hezsa Cawn".2
To support the first charge ©f profiteering during the faminefHastings 
publiely advertised for complaints* had given a free hand to Nandkumar to 
procure evidence and witnesses against the Khan* and had allowed a free use 
of his own and the Company* s name* He now told the Council that he had 
obtained the depositions of several witnesses (eleven in number) and asked 
that as it would take some time to go through their depositions*"and in the 
mean time the witnesses will be exposed to be tampered with"* that the
3
witnesses should be called in "and sworn to the information now produced"*
Hastings's anxiety to bind the deponents what he had with such effort
procured is understandable* It is no less understandable why he should have
arranged that they should submit prepared written statements (te him
personally)* to which they swore ( in the absence of the Khan who was
already a prisoner for ten months in Calcutta)* rather than make their
deposition in person before the Council* For* in Hay (1773) such ef what
they had deposed was exposed as contradictory and fictitious when Reza Khan
cross "examined them * and submitted his written statement in replyfhespite
Hastings's efforts to establish the trustworthiness ef his witnesses not
a single member of the Council in the end proved ready to accept their word
in order to convict the Khan of monopolising grain during the famine0 The
furthest that George Vansittart would go was to say that
"My opinion coincides in general with the President both as to the 
creditability or rather plausibility ef the evidences and the frivolous­
ness of many of the objections made by MBC in his defence* I Bay 
plausibility because there are some considerations which render me 
suspicious of them all"* 5
He then proceeded from his own experience* supported by extracts from
official records* to show that while it was true that Reza Khan had procured
grain from various places* this had been done on the orders of the Fort
1* jtf* Ip 12 Feb 1773* 2, ibid*
3. ibid* 4. TH,I, 14 May 1773.
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WilliGii authorities to supply the Berhaapur garrison* Ha concluded 
unambiguously, " I do not think these evidences sufficient to prove that 
Mahomed R C had himself a property in the grains*! Graham9 oho likeoise 
quoted from personal experience as veil as official documents, vas even 
more scathing in his criticism of Hastings as veil as his witnesses* Ho 
summed up t
•The President has gone through the evidence with great minuteness and 
attention* He has pointed out the consistency and connection of the 
depositions , and with a few exceptions he has allowed their credibility* 
The witnesses in general do not appear to be either faithful or uniform 
in their deposition but as even the whole sum of evidence does not in 
ay opinion9 if admitted collectively, amount to a proof of the 
charge*•••* 2
It had not helped Hastings's case9 of course9 that one of the eleven
deponents had to be imprisoned by the Council t during the course of the
trial, on a charge of perjury* Hastings wrote to Aldersey on 1 July 1773
reporting that "Sevooram, one of the grain dealers who complained against
II* R*C* is in confinement for false evidence - I leave him to the justice
of the Board, yet I could wish they would let him g©***^  Hastings's hopes
were not fulfilled, and although the Council's formal verdict on the first
charge was not given until March 1774, they had virtually acquitted the
Khan on this point by August 1773# In their general letter of 16 August in
the Secret Department they informed the Court of Directors,
•we have only yet been able to go through the 1st article of impeachment 
viz* the charge of monopolizing the grain during the famine* We have 
examined a number of evidences in support of this charge, but we must 
acknowledge that they do not establish any clear or conclusive proof 
of the Naib's guilt} on the contrary the belief which prevailed in the 
country of his being concerned in that trade ^ eems in great degree to 
have taken its rise from the notions of the people, who not having 
access to better intelligence blended and mistook the duties of Mohut» 
med Reza Cawn's public station in the measures which he pursued for the 
relief of the city during the height of the famine for the exertion of 
sordid views to gratify and promote his private interest** 4
Hastings had not relied solely on the eleven witnesses who submitted
depositions, or wholly on the abilities, observation and active malignity
of Nandkumar*He had taken ” such other precautions as were most likely to
5
produce information"against Reza Khan* He also secured an attestation,
1. B?, I 210 ( 3 17^4)* 2* Graham's minute,3 Mar 1774.Iff,II,213*
3* Add Mss 29125 f 228* 4* Vide Monckton Jones, op pit* 193* fEe letter
appears more as a justification”of the Khan's accusers and was possibly a
take particular pains to defend Euzuxinnl in his 
letter of 20 Mar 1774 to Sulivan(Gleig, op cit* I 391)*
5 Vide Monckton Jones, op cit , 195*
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signed by seventy persons* containing various allegations about the Khan*s 
grain purchases and activities during the famine* This was procured fey 
Shaikh Kuhajnmad Naseea, " servant of Mharajah Nundcomar"* and besides 
attacks upon Heza Khan also included encomiums on the Maharaja* s great 
concern for the sufferings of the natives!
Shaikh Naseea*s memorial was a reply to an earlier one procured by Mir
Sadr ud din on behalf of his client Reza Khan* Sadr ud din had appealed to
the "knowledge of men of station* rank and family and all others the
inhabitants of Moorshedabad etc"* upon the conduct of the Khan during the
2
whole period of his Naibat* He asked them in particular to testify on two 
points t
a* Had not the Khan "continually exerted himself to promote the
happiness and security of the people and demonstrate his attachment 
to the Company*9* particularly during the famine; 
b* "Whether he did not to the extent of his abilities expend large sums 
of money in the charitable donation of grain and refrain from all 
trade in this article which both the sacred law ^ ~of religion^ and 
general opinion deem illicit* and in a time when scarcity prevails 
is the very worst of actions”0
Sadr ud din then set out four charges of making private profits by abuse of
official position during famine made against the Khan* calumnies "brought
by the corrupt seduction* support and Instlcatlen of wwliofaffliff persons who
entertain inveterate hatred and envy" against his client* and asked for
testimony "without variance and exaggeration" to refute them* To his
memorial Sadr ud din secured two hundred and oightyseven signatures or
attesting seals* Some gave particular answer te the questions and charges*
others merely appended their seal or signature testifying in general te
the Khan* s innocence* Among these signatories were fthfljich Paiz ullah* the
Sadr of Bengal* Muhammad Mohtadi* the Mufti of Bengal* Muhammad Ufa* the
Chief Qazi* Jagat Seth Khoshal Chand and Maharaja Udaichand* the Seth
brothers* Aqa Ali and Aqa Muhammad* merchants* the market superintendents
of Jafarganj and Bahramganj * Rai'Gulab Singh* superintendent of the mint*
twelve grain merchants of Hansurganj* and three grain merchants of Shahmat-
ganj and Makbaraganj* The high standing of many of the signatories is
i. TP,II, PP 73-84. (26 Nov 1773). 2. B?, II, pp 17-72 ( 26 Nov 1773)
evident ( there being none higher in Murshidabad left out except the Nawab 
himself)* but even more telling was the evidence they offered ef the 
quality of the contrary evidence procured by Nandkumar for Eastings* They 
reported that Nandkumar had been trying to secure depositions against Reza 
Khan by offers of service or of payments upto Rs 100 a month* while his 
son Gurudas had been using his official position to put pressure on 
individuals* even by posting guards and peons upon them* One signatory 
enclosed a note in Nandkumar9 s hand offering a remission of arrears due to 
the government and his service into the bargain in return for evidence 
against the Khan*^
Hastings9 s own comment on the two memorials* in a private letter of 20
March 1774 to Sulivan was
"Mahommed Reza Cawn has produced the attestation of above 200 persons* 
mostly of credit* in vindication of his conduct during the famine * His 
adversary ^ Nandkumar^ has produced a similar paper ef attestation 
against him signed indeed by fewer names and those little known* Neither 
merit the smallest consideration* No honest man in this country would 
have set his hand to the latter* though he believed it to be true* Few 
would have heart to refuse signing the former*although he believed it 
to be false"* 2
It was convenient to discredit all native testimony when the great weight
3
of it was cast so clearly against his charge*
By February 1773 again Hastings was privately engaged in procuring
materials that " may indeed corroborate the information or accounts which
I expect from Nundcomar" regarding the second charge against the Khan*
relating to the Dacca revenuesf though the Council formally took up the
case on 5 August 1773* Roza Khan admitted that the first contract for these
which he had signed was for an amount considerably greater than any he had
subsequently collected* But he was able to show that the original contract
had been forced on him by the Nawab Mir Jafar under pressure from Nandkumar
and that he had later secured on undertaking from the Nawab that he would
be held to account only for what he actually collected from that very
i* The aitestation procured by Mir Sadr ud din* TP* 11*17-72 (26 Nov 1773)• 
20 Gleig, op cit*I* p 391#
%  Reza Khan9 s activities during the famine have been detailed in flh* 9 
4# Hastings to Middleton, 24 Feb 1773# Add Mss 29125 ff 199-200*
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distracted district# Shis undertaking, in Mir Jafarfs writing, the Khan 
submitted in evidence to the Council! A letter from Middleton enclosing 
extracts from contemporary correspondence provided additional support for 
Reza Khan*s argument; Having made the point, the Khan went to show that his 
accounts of collection tallied with those locally collected,
Nandkumar,however, produced his accounts to show that for the period
1169 to 1171 that is from 1762-63 to 1764*65 ( which included a year
before Reza Khan* a appointment at Dacca) there was an outstanding balance
of over twenty seven lakhs due from the Khan# The Council requested Hastings
to ask Nandkumar to furnish proof of these allegations to Harwell and the
Dacca Council who were conducting local enquiry. From 20 December 1773 te
^ January 1774? the Dacca Council devoted six sittings to an epea enquiry
in this matter, examining the office staff and almost all the Naibs of
those Zemindars who paid over Rs 1,000 in revenue. Everyone of thea
declared under oath that they had paid no more than was shown in the account*
'That was more, the Dacca Council found that every item of receipt and
disbursement tallied with the Khan9s acoountS# Bien, just as the enquiry
was closing one M r  Ismail handed another paper to B&rwell, who was then
on a visit to Calcutta, wherein the outstanding balance was shown as 57
lakhs. This paper was handed to Harwell at Nandkumar9 s instigation and when
Nandkumar was asked to produce the man so that he could prove his allega*
tions, the Maharaja reported that the M r  had gone to Hugli where he had
sickened and died# Hastings was careful that the paper had been submitted
apparently without his knowledge or permission# It is clear that Nandkumar
was ready to submit a fresh charge whenever the enquiry seemed about to
conclude, and a further set of accounts was submitted, it is said by Hastings
in which the outstanding balance was set over 93 lakhs of rupees,However,
despite every attempt to secure same flaw in Reza Khan9 s accounts, none was
found# The only possible further check would have involved a verification of
all the papers in the zemindars9 s cutcherries to see whether there were any
I# Reza Khan had submitted a memorial to the Council,(Vide TP#9 June 1773»
I, 190-201).
2# BP, 5 AuS 1773«e In,a letter to Middleton on 24 Feb 1773 while asking 
for proof to corroborate Nandkumar9 s account againt the Khan, 
commented t m I can learn nothing from your book of correspondence that 
can serve as a p*oof"(Add Mss 29125 f 200)v
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payments additional to those sworn to by the Zemindars and their Naibs0 
The task would have been inordinately lengthy and costly# and even then 
could not have established the guilt of the Khan* who could not be held 
liable for excess payments taken by his subordinates* By the Khan's
own account there was a balance due from him t but only ef Ra 1,812-14*-8-3t 
a slip in accounting rather than a deliberate malversation!# The verdict 
of the Council could not but be "not guilty*1 and so it watf,
Reza Khan was found not guilty on the third count of mismanagement of
the Diwani revenues# Here the Council proceeded to verify the amount
credited to the Company and the disbursements from that stmt# They found
that during the Khan's five year administration, from 1765-66 to 1770-71
the revenue account stood as follows
Demand Rs0 9,35,84,745— ^  3—2#
Collected Rs, 8,59*94#232-13- 6-1#
Balance*, Rs, 84,67,985- 5** 8*4)#
Of this bal&noe an abatement had been authorised in the
sum of Rs© 81,97*692-11- 7-2, leaving a
Final balance of Rs© 2,78,290-* 8- 0-2,
The Khan accounted for the whole of this final balance and the charge on
thi3 head was therefore dismissed.
For his management of the Kh&lsa and Household expenditure Reza Khan
submitted full accounts of receipts and disbursements! every item of iriiich
was proved correct by Middleton by reference to the records, vouchers and
2
statements of individuals at Murshidabad, Gurudas, however, spotted that
the Khan had not accounted for the special fund arising from batta on the
3
cash disburs^ionts, hut as soon as the omission was pointed out the Khan 
produced full accounts of the amount so received and of its expenditure 
upon the maintenance ef traditional expenses,* The Khan held a balance of 
Rs 1,215-15-19* Once again the charge against the Khan proved untenable,
1; TP, II, 86-87.
2o TP, II, 124-29 and 204-8, , ^
3* 31*. 11*202-3, Die Khan, it would appear, was forced to th? creation of 
this fond only te m&inatatn certain public servants, to continue to 
pay certain traditional expenses such as gratuities to A mils and others 
during certain festivals, in order to preserve the traditional image 
of the government after he had been deprived of all ether means to do so.
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Bastings In disappointment complained to Sulivan s
*1 have taken every measuref by proclamation^ protection and personal 
access, to encourage evidences against hin £  Reza Khanj^, and have given 
many valuable ..hours 9 the whole days9 of ay time to the multiplied and 
indefinite accounts and suggestions of Nundcomar* 1 presided in every 
examination* one day excepted9 and was myself the examiner and inter*- 
preter in each* The proceedings will show with what wretched materials 
1 was furnished** 1
The last charge, of treacherous correspondence with his sovereign, was 
also dropped as it was found that the Khan was in no way personally involved* 
In 1772 Zain ul Abedin, a relative ef the Khan, had gone to Delhi to escort 
his sister to Bengal, but hearing of the situation in Bengal ( created by 
the Khan9s arrest)»had decided to seek employment in Delhi* So this end he 
had posed as a representative of the Khan and had caused the Khan9s seal te 
be forged for this purpose* Hastings did not attempt to press the charge 
against Reza Khen, who was declared innocent*
On 15 March 1774 the Council declared Reza Khan innocent ef all the 
charges and recommended his release from confinement* The Khan was asked 9 
however, to give an undertaking not to leave Bengal until the pleasure of 
the Court of Directors was known* The approval of the Khan9s acquittal was 
given on 3 March 1775 and- reached Calcutta in October*
By the time the trial closed with an acquittal Reza Khan had been in
a state of arrest for twenty three months, fourteen of them under very dose
arrest with guards over his houses, making it impossible9as the Khan had
complained, even for his personal staff to come in or go out and •easing
terror to his children* The Council had recommened the withdrawal of guards
on 16 June 1773* might otherwise "appear to the world an act of wanton
severity*** The Khan9s movement ever since was restricted to Calcutta, which
now after his acquittal was still confined to Bengal* The delay in starting
T* Hastings to Sulivan* 20 Mar 1774* (Gleig* op cit*, I* 391^» This letter 
was written five days after the Khan had been acquitted by the Council of 
all charges*
2* JE, 16 June 1773# I# 273* By then the Council had had all evidences 
against the Khan before them* Tine had cone of "receiving his defence 
and passing judgement upon then** They felt that "other charges which 
remain to be enquired, into relate solely to the matters of accounts for 
investigating which information already received and the public records ««« 
are the only materials wanted**
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proceedings, the slowness with which they were conducted, had both been
deliberate , Hastings was determined to establish a new system, in which
"there can be but one government and one power in this province"^, and for
this it was essential that the Khan should be rendered powerless for as long
as possible. On 8 October 1772 Hastings explained his plan to Dupre t
"For the better management of the Dewannee it was proposed and agreed 
to, to bring the collection to Calcutta, Hither too we have brought the 
superior courts of justice. We have established two at the Presidency 
for appeals of civil causes, and for the inspection and .confirmation in 
capital cases) and two inferior courts of like kind in each district,3y 
this arrangement, and the government of the provinces will center in 
Calcutta, which may now be called the capital of Bengal, The esatablish­
in ent of the courts of justices in Calcutta was almost an act of injus­
tice, the criminal judicature being a branch of the hizanmt,,,It met 
with no opposition and it is now a point determined, although neither 
of these courts have yet begun to exercise their functions for want of 
proper places to sit in", 2
He might have added that this act of injustice had set with no opposition
because the one man who might have raised it*, Reza Khan, was confined under
guard,He continued’ to be held without trial for nearly ten months, while
Hastings used all the means open to him to spread the belief that when the
trial did come it would end in the Khan*s conviction,Thus when Cartier
expressed a wish to call on the Khan before sailing for England, Hastings
first delayed a reply and then vetoed the proposal. On 4 January 1773t
Hastings wrote to Cartier
" My opinion is that your visiting Mahmud Risa Cawn will furnish occa- 
ssion for false surmises and conjectures with respect to the issue of
his present disgrace. However he may have been injured by the original
authors of it, untill he is brougit to a formal trial it will be 
impossible ,,, te counter the opinion that he has such protectors as 
may effect the restoration of his former authority and consequence, as 
the same impression will prove of detriment also to the system newly 
adopted untill it shall be well established ,,, but I shall be perfectly 
satisfied with any determination which you may form upon it according 
to your own discretion", 3
Hastings was determined that the great opportunity opened before him 
of establishing the "sovereignty of the British people" over Bengal, and
1, nastin&3 to Committee of Secrecy, 24 Mar 1774,Cllonckton Jones,op cit,198)
2, Hastings to Dupre, 8 Oct 1772, (Add Mss 29125 ff 156-7)
3, Hastings to Cartier, 4 Jan 1773( Add Mss 19125 f 191)o The Khan was by
then held without trial for eight months.
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•f himself within it should not he lost* He explained to Dupre that he
needed the period of the Nawab*s minority " to establish and confirm the
Company1 s authority in the country*, though he had hopes that the ymng
Nawab would be entangled thereafter in enmity with Munni Begum "because
she now rules him*. At the same time he was writing to Colebrooke asking
for additional powers for himself*"A system of affairs so nee*, he wrote,
"requires a new system of government to conduct" .He explained that this
meant that the governor must have "such a degree of aetu&l eontrel as may
enable him to support with credit the character of the ostensible head of
Government to give vigour to its decrees and preserve them from inconsis-
tencies"* And later in the same year, (1773) t he was dropping broad hints
to Sulivan that he ought to be confirmed for some considerable period in
his governorship, with comments upon the "well known infirmities of ear
constitution according to which the governor is changed frequently"? With
the power of the Diwani and Nizaaat brought down to Calcutta, and with
himself installed as governor with enhanced power for a term of years, he
could hope to satisfy his desire to direct affairs in India and also secure
for himself and his Council those possibilities of profit which Cartier had
allowed to fall into the hands of the supervisors and members of the
liurshidabad and Patna Councils# By September 1772 the Council at Murshidabad
was abolished, Middleton reverting to the post of the Resident at the Durbar;
and by January 1773 Hastings was reporting to Dupre that he had allowed the
supervisors to continue under & new title of collectors "but their power is
retrenched; and the way is paved for their gradual removal"* This cautious
move was necessary, Hastings explained, because " it appeared that there
were amongst thea, so many sons, cousins,or sieves of directors,and i
intimates of the members of the Council, that it was better to let thea
remain than provoke an army of opponents against every act of administration
4
by depriving thea*ef their emoluments** He had so built up the case against
the supervisors that the Directors felt obliged to order their recall in
their letter of 7 April 1773# By 2 January 1774 Hastings was appointing a
third attorney in England, this addition being "necessary as a guard against
{♦Hastings to Dupre, 6 Jan 17t5* (Gleig, op cit, 2^9-70)
2*Hastings to Colebrooke,7 Har 1773* (ibid, 290-91)
3*Kastings to Sulivan,11 Nov 1773* ( lbidg 3^9)
4#Hastings to Dupre,6 Jan 1773« (ibid, 269)
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what may happen, as my remittances are likely to become considerable from 
some engagements into which I have lately entered*! All these plans hinged, 
as would appear, on rendering the Khan politically impotent*
However, as has been seen Hastings continued to do all he could to
destroy the Khan*s authority by appointing his enemies and critics to posts
of confidence in the Durbar and by dismissing his pensioners and proteges
who formed a great part of the ancient nobility of Kurshi dabad+Ke also
turned down the Khan1 s pleas, of June 1773t *or relief from the financial
distress into which his arrest had plunged him. The Company owed a great
deal to the Khan on account of his salary as Naib Diwaa? as he pointed out,
and even before he was brought down to Calcutta he had incurred debts to the
extent of five or six lakhs of rupees to the Murshidabad bankers) from whom
2
he had borrowed to tide over the irregular payment of his salary* Reza Khan
did not raise the question of his arrears of salary until after his release 
*
in 1774* but in June 1775 he did ask Hastings to buy his house for the 
Company - it stood near the Government House in Calcutta - so that he could 
meet the demands of his creditors* The Khan bad bean obliged to .'offer his 
house for sale for he found no other alternative* He had repeatedly asked 
the governor for a loan but Hastings did not bother even to reply* The Khan 
could not agree to sell the effects in his house for that was humiliating* 
His pride prevented him from selling the house to a new rich Banian* Ee 
therefore offered it to the Company and suggested that if the Company could 
not pay him in cash they might give a bond which he could endorse in favour 
of his creditors* The proposal was tumed down^but the Council intervened 
and agreed to take the house on lease at a monthly rental of Rs 1,000 from
July 1775.6
By 15 March 1774* when the Council declared that Reza Khan was innocent
of the charges against him Hastings had so firmly established his new system,
and so weakened the Khan* s influence and authority that he was willing to
propose the Khan*s release from arrest ( which however was any longer
untenable after his innocence was established)* Hastings nade it clear that
f* Hastings to * Woodman, 2 Jan 1774* Add Has 29134 t 234c
2. Reza Khan to Hastings, Rec4» 24 Hhy 1774.CPC,IV,1045. 3. iM.g#
4* Reza Khan to Hastings, Recdt 9 June 1773,CPC, IV,354,
5* Hastings to Reza Khan, 20 ( 14 ?) June 1773. CPC, IV,377.
°« Hastings to Reza Khan, 24 ( 14 ?) June 1773. CPC, IV,394.
he did so because he believed that he had broken the Khan:
* I have said I have no political motives to desire his continuance in 
arrest* The influence which his long established authority gave him in 
these provinces, might have been a powerful and dangerous impediment to 
the introduction of the authority which the Company themselves have 
thought proper to exercise without a foreign intervention, in the 
character of Dewan of these provinces, had he remained free and at large 
when their orders to this effect were required to be carried into . 
execution* The system which they have dictated has since been completely 
and radically established nor have a shadow of apprehension left for 
any efforts which he might make, supposing him so inclined, to subvert 
or obstructtp&^1
However, Hastings was not one to leave anything to chance, and while he was
explaining to the Council that the Khan,s sufferings had been a temporary
necessity, he was writing to the Committee of Secrecy of the Court of
Directors pleading with them not to restore the Khan to his former office
or authority* In his letter of 24 March 1774 he said,
"Whatever your resolution may be concerning the future fate of Mohammed 
Reza Cawn, it is my duty, although I believe it unnecessary, to represent 
that whatever reparation you may think due for his past sufferings, the 
restoration of any part of the power which he before possessed will 
inevitably tend to the injury of the Company9 s affairs, and the 
diminution of your influence** 2
The strident assertion that there was no "shadow of apprehension left"
that Reza Khan once acquitted could undo the new order in Bengal, coupled
with the private plea to the Secret Committee that the Khan should not be
restored to any "part of the power which he before possessed", suggest that
in reality Hastings was still anxious about outcome of events*He had cause
for anxiety* The Company9 s financial distress had led to the intervention of
Parliament and to impeachment of Clive, his associates and Reza Khan* Sykes
on 28 January 1775 reported to Hastings
"The Court of Directors ushered into the House of Commons a kind of 
complaint against MRC, Becher and myself for instituting an arbitrary 
tax in Bengali ••• never heard of before, unauthorised,unsanctified, 
drawn from the bowells of the inhabitants, and a variety of languages 
of this nature"o 5
But by 21 May 1775 the attack upon Clive had ended with praise for his 
4
achievements , three days earlier M i l  for the Regulating Act was introduced,
i* Hastings minute dated 14 Mar 1774« HP,11, 242-45»
2, Hastings to Committee of Secrecy, 24 Mar 1774*(Monckton Jones,op cit* 197-3'
Sykes to Hastings,28 Jan 1773* Add Mss 29155 f 550.
4# Clive wrote in October 1775 to report this triumph over his enemies to
. T Hastings•( Forrest, Clive, II, 410)
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and by 13 October Sulivan was writing to Hastings to hurry through his
revenue and military reforms before General Clavering, Colonel Monson
and Philip Francis could reach Calcutta as memebrs of the new five-man
government set Tip under the Regulating Act, with Hastings as Governor-
General and Barwell as another representative of the Company1 s interest
in the new set up* Sulivan had added,
" I could also wish you to have the whole credit in Mahomed Rezah 
Cawn,s business, for it is my opinion that these matters are intended 
to be probed to the bottom*** 1
Uncertainty about developments in England may wall be at the back 
of Hastings’s attempt late in 1773 to ease his personal relationship with 
Reza Khan* there seems no other explanation for his sudden invitation to 
the Khan’s two sons, Nawab Saiyid Husain Ali Khan Bahram Jang and Nawab 
Saiyid Muhammad Taqi Khan Dilawar Jang to attend a theatrical performance 
in December 1773• which was followed by others in Janu&r^Hoy and July 1774t 
together with one to the Khan himself immediately after his acquittal in 
March* Hastings's proposed in that same month for the Khan's release from 
arrest seems to be another move to guard himself against a reversal in 
English attitude towards the Khan* Shitab Rai, it should be noted, had 
been tried before Reza Khan, quickly acquitted, and in 1773 re-appointed 
Naib Nazim and Rai Rayan for Bihar, though on half his previous salary and 
with his income from Patna customs duties 8topped*But he was an aged man, 
brought up in the highest circles in Delhi, and could not survive the
3
humiliation inflicted on him* He died soon after his return to Patna*^It
was against this background that on 14 Mardh 1774, Hastings urged the
Khan's release «
“Allow me, gentlemen, to add my feelings both for myself as an 
individual and for the reputation of the Hon'ble Company with which, no 
less than their interests, 1 am materially charged as their first 
representative in this administration, when 1 reflect on the 
consequences which may happen from an extension of the disgrace and 
confinement under which Mahmud Rezza Cawn has long laboured* Few are
the instances of such a reverse of fortune befalling a man of his
important station which has not hastened the period of his death, and
the world is ever prone to attribute an event of this kind to the
causes of the most criminal reproach, equally affecting the personal
1*Sulivan to Hastings, 13 Oct 1773. Add Mss 29134 f 70*
Klia»t 22 Dec 1773# 15 Jan 1774,23 May,26 Jul,27 Jul 1774 
(C?5#i^#7‘13t764t1042,?182,1185)*Ali Ibrahim Khan was also an invitee* 
3*Monc2cton Jones, op cit, 198-99* See also Khulasat (JB0RS*Y1*436)*
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character of the imnediate agents Of Government f and the justice and 
honour of the supreme power in whose name and for whose behalf the 
original act of authority first issued wch ^ "which^ may have been 
followed by such a catastrophe*** 1
Lt the same time,in a letter to the Committee of Secrecy he made the nature
of his fear still clearer t
•
"I am aware of the violent prejudices which were taken taken up at once 
against Mohamed Reza Cawn by all ranks of people both here and at home*
I am also aware that in England, where the very name of enquiry into the 
management of past affairs in India flatters the passion of the times, 
and raises expectations of great and important detections, the result 
may balk those expectations and turn the torrent of publio clamour 
another way*** 2
Letters from Eecher and Verelst to Barwoll were to indicate that Reza Khan’s
z
old friends were still concerned about his fate* ( Verelst, of course, was
4*still in debt to Reza Khan*)* But Sykes, Hastings’s confidant and agent
made it still clearer that sympathy for the Khan was live and growing* He
asked anxiously about the Khan, who had assisted him to fortune and political
influence* On 30 March 1774 Sykes wrote to Hastings expressing his hope
that " MRC has come off with honour" and asking Hastings to convey his
respects to the Khan, *• for whom I have a great regard*** Before the year
was out he was writing more openly, to tell Hastings
*2ae people here are much shocked at the treatment to MRC* The Directors, 
I mean those who signed the letter for his being seized, deserve to be 
hanged* I was with some of them today and told them so* They seen 
determined to do something for him wch , 1 think they ou|£it to do, or X 
would prosecute them for false imprisonment1** 6
Such sentiments can scarcely have been palatable to a man who had taken upon
himself the task of destroying the Khan in every possible way0
Hastings, however, had problems nearer at hand than public sentiment in
London* He had brought the Nizamat authority to Calcutta, and had himself
undertaken the supervision of criminal justice conducted through Sadr ul
Huq Khan, who had been the chief of the Sadar Nizaaat A dal at t the author of
the Seir observed, the post was "by all means above the old man’s capacity
1* Hastings’s minute, 14 Mar 1774* TP, II, 243* 2*Monckton Jones*op cit* 196*
3* Barwoll reporting the outcome ofThe trial proceedings to Becher saii( on
30 Nov 1774), *1 think they cannot fail to give you satisfaction** ( Vide 
BPP* XII,90)
4« see supra Chapter 7®
5# Sykes to Hastings, 30 Mar 1774* Add Mss 29134 ff J62~ 363#
6* Sykes to Hastings, 20 Dec 1774* Add Mss 29135 f 593*
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and strength” « The burden therefore fell the more heavily upon Hastings
who wrote in July 1774 to George Vansittart complaining *1 am fatigued and
2
plagued to death by the Fowjdaries and Adawluts”, Hastings needed someone 
of authority to whom he could transfer his burden* end he needed a Muslim 
to administer criminal justice for and on behalf of the NawabJ
Unfortunately, therefore, the party he had chosen to elevate against 
the Khan was quite unfit to be entrusted with thd task* Munni Begum was a 
woman; Nandkumar and GUrudas, however high they might be placed, were 
unacceptable, Nandkumar was quite ready to help deprive Reza Khan of the 
Nizamat powers, but he was no more ready than the Khan to see the Mughal 
sovereignty pass to the Company, As Hastings reported to the Secret 
Committee in March 1774, Nandkumar, soon after the appointaent of his son 
Gurudas as Nizamat Diwan, was sending drafts of letters by way ef him te 
Munni Begum " which he recommended her to write to me, enumerating the 
many encroachments which had been made by the English government on the 
rights of the Nizamut, and reclaiming them” for and on behalf of the minor
A
Nawab? Again in the attestation against Reza Khan procured by Nandkumar 
through Shaikh Muhammad Naseea, the claim had been made that *tke /Sughal^ 
King had committed this country to the Company9 s management, to the end 
that the people being maintained in security and happiness ai$it pray for
5
the King9 s and the Company9s prosperity”. When Hastings failed to conviot
Reza Khan, and was trying to ease his personal relationship with the Khan,
the disappointed Nandkumar was quite ready te ton against him. It may also
have been that Nandkumar, judging from his own failure to produce convicting
evidence against Khan, had foreseen the ultimate victory of Reza Khan and
had, therefore , become beforehand with new rumours not merely to explain
what must have become apparent as the likely result of the case, but also
to prevent Reza Khan9 s restoration to favour, this time involving his two
enemies, Reza Khan and Hastings, By 1} January 1774, over two months before
the Khan was acquitted in India, Sykes was warning Hastings from London that
i, Seir, III, 91, 2, Hastings to G ,Vansittart>30 July 1774»AddMa8 291125
f »9.
3, Muslim law continued to be the criminal law of the country until the 
passing of the Indian High Courts Act in 1861, Till then Muslin law offi­
cers were essential for administration of oriminal justice,
4, Monckton Jones, op oit0, 197,
5, Shaikh Muhammad Naseea9s attestation- TP, II, 73
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a rumour had been spread by his enemies that he was about to return to
England having made * a fortune by M R C ’*# It was believed that Nandkumar
through his correspondents in England had helped float the rumour .Has tings
for his part was soon revealing to the Directors his fear of
wthe dark and deceitful character of Nundcomart whose gratitude no 
kindness can bindf nor even his own interest disengage him from the 
crooked politics which have been the study of his whole life*# 2
For a variety ef reasons Hastings was thus driven to seek a reconci­
liation with Reza Khan# the natural enemy of Nandkumar# After the arrival 
of Clavering# Monson and Francis# who sought to use the Maharaja a^inst 
Hastings# the advantage of winning over Reza Khan became even more obvious# 
Ghulam Husain records that Ali Ibrahim Khan was used by Hastings as a 
go-between in an effort to win over Reza Khan by harping on Hastings* s
role in saving ^eza Khan* s life and honourf
•
Reza Khan was a ruined man and he knew the situation he was placed in)
but he did not respond to such belated offer of friendship# Nor# however#
did he participate in any way in the Hastings Nandkumar tussle that
ultimately ended in Nandkumar*s conviction in the Supreme Court en
charges of forgery and execution by hanging on 5 August 1775# For one with
less strong - traditional sense of dignity it would have been perhaps
difficult # if not impossible#to resist the temptation of joining
hands with the enemies of Nandkumar# He was set very eathfcdiasti# either
when Philip Francis made approaches to hin through Goring# She latter wrote s
"The Nabob ^ Reza Khanj^complains loudly of the indignity and want of 
respect shown him at the time of his confinement by Mr# Hastings and 
that the proceedings against him were carried on more on the stile of 
a felon than of the first Black Man in the country”#
Goring further reported that the Khan
"is unwilling to say anything at present respecting what has passed
1* Sykes to Hastings#13Jan 1774# (Add Mss 29134 f 260) ™"
2# Monckton Jones# op cit## 196-97♦
3* When proposing the release of the Khan from the state arrest# Hastings
observed on 14 Mar 1774 that the Khan "cannot quit the country without
sacrificing all his interests in it# and his hopes of future fortune
and protection* (IF#II#242)# It is not clear if he was also offering
"hopes of future fortune and protection" #though indirectly#
4# Seir,III#80# Ghulam Husain appears to be combining a fact, that of Ali
Ibrahim* s acting as a go-between with a very common belief which grew 
after Nandkumar* s execution for forgery# which could never be taken as a
India#It was commonly believed that Nandkumar P3^  
with his life because of enmity with Hastings,_________________ ______
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between him and several gentlemen here as he esteems it beneath his 
digsity to inform against anyone and imagines his character would 
suffer by it but is ready at all times to give the best advice in his 
power for the future management and welfare of the country and longs 
exceedingly for a personal interview with the General and Colonel*
KhanJ^  is perfectly sensible of the high commission the gentlemen 
newly arriv’d bear and sincerely wishes to hear of same salutary 
measure pursued by them by wch /which^ the whole country may know that 
they are come out to protect and save it from destruction, for till 
such measure is put in , execution all men of eensequenoe will 
keep aloof*** 1
Goring*s report of December 1774 thus gives a glimpse of the Khan’s
feelings about Bastings,the man who had dragged him through mud and mire
and had done his best to destroy the old Mughal authority in Bengal* He
was indeed bitter about Hastings’s treatment with him, but **he esteems it
beneath his dignity to inform against anyone**1* dll that he wished was
that something should be done positively to save the country ".from
destruction**• Unless measures were taken in that direotion, he decalred,
no Indian "of consequence" would come forward and co-operate with the
English rulers* As for himself he was prepared to give "the best advice
in his power** Since Goring was on a mission to sound out the possibility
of the Khan’s joining the Clavering, Konson, Francis party he was induced
to hint his willingness to do so, "provided he found protection and
favour" * Until that assurance was forthcoming "he would peacably remain
where he was , at the same time acknowledging his obligation for the
kindness shew’d him ^ £"by Francis^ in sending a gentleman to enquire after 
2
him"* The Khan might have been waiting also to hear the Directors* decision 
on Calcutta’s recommendations for his acquittal*
It was not until 3 March 1775 that the Court of Directors signified
their formal agreement} but on 16 February 1775 Sykes had reported te
Hastings that the Directors, despite the opposition of the Johnstone group,
had assured him that they would endeavour to get for the Khan the best
of floe they had yet at their disposal* Hie Directors’ orders of 3 March
1775* declaring their repugnance to the continuance in office of Raja
Gurudas, in view of the "inconsistent and unworthy" conduct of his father
Nandkumar, and their desire to see the re-appointaent of Reza Khan without
H* Goring*s report to P*Francis, Dec 1774* (Francis Mss, I*C*,Eur C 7 9tf7-Q) 
2* ibid* 3» Sykes to Hastings,16 Feb 1775o(Add Hss 29136 f 57),
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any * improper degree of power" being given to him led eventually to a
dispute over interpretations , between Hastings and Barwoll on the one
hand and Clavering, Monson and Francis on the other* On 18 October 1775#
however, the majority prevailed and ordered
"that the Secretary acquaint Mahomed tteza Cawn that the Hon'ble the 
Court of Directors have been pleased to approve of the proceedings of 
the late Board on the investigation of his conduct.»• and that he be 
further acquainted that the Hon*ble the Governor and Council have 
therefore , been pleased to recommend him to the Nabob Mobarek 0*Dowla 
to be llaib Soubah or minister of the Sircar and guardian of his 
minority with authority to transact the political affairs of the 
Sircar, to superintend the Faujdari Courts, and the administration of 
criminal justice throughout the country and to enforce the operation 
of the same on the present establishment or to new-model or correct 
it. As the Board wish that he shall have full control of the criminal 
courts in the character of Naib Soubah, they propose to remove the 
Nizamat Adalat, now in Calcutta to be held in future at Moorshedab&d".
The Khan thus returned to power, but he was already involved in the
controversy over the restoration of Mughal authority in Bengal. He had
found in Philip Francis a staunch supporter for his ideas, while Eastings
was seeking to establish English supremacy. He was necessarily involved
thereafter in the fluctuating fortunes of the struggle between Francis
and Hastings.
It is not intended here to trace the further career of Reza Khan in
any detail. It should be noted that Reza Khan had sought to come to terms
with Hastings when the latter was first appointed Governor of Bengal. His
approaches had been rejected and he was thereafter subjected to personal
1
humiliation and financial ruin of a deliberately prolonged trial while
Hastings encouraged Nandkumar to a campaign of malicious accusations.Even
after the trial was over, when Hastings found himself thrbwn on the- -
defensive, outvoted in his own Council, the Khan was reluctant te join
the triumphant majority against him, just for personal reasons0 Francis,
1. The Khan who was heavily indebted to Yankers at the time of his arrest 
was never in a position to repay his debts0 He was indebted to the 
Jagat Seth to the extent of three lakhs of rupees, and as the Calcutta 
Gazette editorially noticed on 10 July 1788$ "Juggat Sett, when visited 
in his last sickness by Mahommed Reza Khan, tore the latter* s bond for 
three lakhs of rupees, as a return for the kindness and protection he 
had received from him, as well as from personal regard". (Seton-Karr,C.S, 
Selections from Calcutta Gazettes»If259)*
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who came out from England with the blessings of Clive 9the Khan* a original
patron, tempted the Khan with proposals for a reversal of Hastings* s
administrative measures, but the Khan refused the offer, Francis reported
to Clive in a letter of 21 May 1775* which Clive did not live to receive,
“Mahomed Reza is almost the only man of any credit and consequence 
left in the country. My good opinion of him was very much confirmed by 
his declining the offers I made him. They were such as hardly any 
other black man would have refused. His objections were in general to 
the inutility or danger of any system that was to join natives and 
Europeans in the management of the collection. Yet he confessed that, 
in our situation, and with the executive magistrate against us a total 
change in the mode of collecting would be too hazardous a measure , • • 
liable to fail of success - and as to himself, he should be disgraced 
and rendered incapable of serving us hereafter0 1 acquisced in reasons 
which I could not answer.• 1
Hastings showed no such forbearance towards the Khan when, by the
death first of Monson and then of Clavering he was restored to power. In
March 1778 on an engineered complaint from the Nawab, Hastings removed
2
the Khan from office. It was necessary for the Directors to overrule and
*
censure Hastings, and order Reza Khan* s reinstatement in their letter of 
4 February 1779t before Hastings* s vindictiveness was finally rendered 
ineffective against himself, though not against the system and the powers 
given to him in the majority resolution of 18 October 1775. Reza Khan 
was restored to the post of Naib Nazim in 1780 and continued to hold the 
office with decreasing power until the office itself was abolished by 
Cornwallis on 1 January 1791* On 1 October of that same year Reza Khan 
diedo He was buried in the Nishat Bagh, beside the grave of his brother 
Muhammad Husain Khan, the Nawab Mubarak ud daulah, the Nawab Nazim of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa assisting at the funeral ceremonies^
1, Philip Francis to Lord Clive, 21 May 1775* (Francis Mis.,1.0,,Eur E 13* 
f 241 ) Lord Clive died in England on 22 Nov 1774(Forrest,Clive,II,411)*
2, Hastings made another attempt to win over Reza Khan through Anderson 
but on the Khan*s refusal declared him as his enemy (Has tings to Sykes,
23 Apr 1778. QP cit, 11,189-92).
3* 2Jit476, Roza Kharf five children, three sons,two dau{£rter3,His eldest 
son Huasian Alifl^ jSelrem Jang) had predeceased him. His second son,Dilawar 
Jang who was earlier recommended b/i£han to "Sroicceed him became the 
rounder of the Chi tour Nawab faailv*
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A S E L E C T  B I B L I O G R A P H Y .
This has been divided under two major heads,‘’PRIMARY AND CONTEMPORARY 
SOURCES} and 'SECONDARY AND LATER SOURCES", Of these, again the former has 
five sections,"I, Original Official Records in manuscript", "II0Published 
Official Records11, "III,Contemporary Private Papers in English (unpub­
lished)","^, Contemporary Published works in English", and "V,Contempo­
rary Persian works" 0The second group has however four sections only and 
they are, "I0Works in English","II, Unpublished theses (London University)} 
"Iir,Works in Bengali", and "IV, Articles in Bulletins, Periodicals and 
Journals in English",
PRIMARY AND CONTEMPORARY SOURCES,
I, JDrigiml^OfficiaT Records in manuscript* In the British Museum
Parliamentary papers in manuscript being Robert Gregory* s copy of
the "Evidence taken before an open Committee ^ chairman ,Mr, Fuller^
of the House of. Commons on the state of Bengal in 1767" (in March and j
April)-, The British Museum Add Mss, 18469,
. In the India Office Records ( Commonwealth Relations Office), •
A 0 Abstracts of Despatches to Bengal, Vol I (24 Jan 1753-27 Jan 17&5) ■
3, Abstracts of Letters received from "Coast" and "Bay",
Vols, 5 a^d 6 ( 5  Sep 1744 - 3 Mar 1760)
0, Bengal Board of Revenue Miscellaneous Proceedings -Committee of 
Lands, Range Vols 10-12 ( 1759 to 5 Sep 1762) ;j
Do Bengal Public Consultations ( or BPC)
Range 1 Vols 14-51 (4 Jan 1740 - 28 Apr 1772)
2 » 1-15 (4 May 1772 - 11 Mar 1776). ;
E, Bengal Secret Consultations ( or Secret Cons.)being minutes of ’ 
proceedings of the Council at Port William( commencing 22 Aug 1768);
Range A Vols 16-54 (22 Aug 1768 - 29 Eeb 1776)
Range 68Vols 52^53 (10 Jan 1772 - 50 Dec 1773)
F, Bengal Secret and Military Consultations ( or BSC) being minutes ■ 
of proceedings of the Fort William Council in the Secret 
Department ( since 1756) and of the Select Committee ( from May 
1765). Range A. Vols 1-15 ( 22 Aug 1756 - 19 Mar 1774)
G, Board of Revenue proceedings( Sayer)
Range 89 Vo3< 43 ( 1796)
A
H® Court Minutes (Minutes of Proceedings of the Court of Directors) •
tols 79 and 80 (11 Apr 1770-10 Apr 1771; 10 Apr 1771- 7 Apr 1772) ;
1. Despatches to Bengal ( original drafts)
Vols 1-7 (28 Nov 1753 - 15 Dec 1775)
B61 10 (20 Jan 1779- 27 Oct 1779)
J* Factory Records:
a, Dacca Vols 2»ri20
Vols 2-5 3Ji Range 68 No 4T(Nov 1736-Dec 1748)
No 48(Jan 1757-Dec 1757)
No 49(Jan 1762-Dec 1762)
No 50(Jan 1765-Dec 1763).
Vol 6(in Range 69 No 1)being proceedings of inquiry into
Reza Khan’s accounts(29Dec1773-6Jan1774) 
Vols 7-^2(in Range 69 Nos 3-7) being consultations of the
Provincial Council of Revenue(from 9 Dec 
1773 to 27 May 1776).
b. Kasimbazar , Range 70 Nos 7-14 (4 Dec 1740-28 Feb 1759)
o* Murshidabad :
i* Letter Copy-Book of the Resident at the Durbar,
Range 70 No 4. (Sept- Oct 1770)
Range 69 Nos 54-56 (14 Dec 1773- 28 Dec 1775) 
ii. Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue,
Range 69 Nos 47-53 (27 Sep 1770-8 Sep 1772)
K0 Horae Miscellaneous Series ( Vide"Catalogue of the HMS in the 
India Office Records"by S.C,Hill,London, 1927) or HMS
Voluraes with direct relevance to Reza Khan are 68,102,115,122,201 
202,203,584 and 739 while those having relevance to this study 
are 24,36,47,78,92,94-5,98,100-01,106,119-21,123-25,191-93,196, 
198-200,204,212,217,228,23O,260,262,369,381,424,455,455D,456F,521 
629,634,765-66,768-9,773,804-06, 808-10, and 814.
L0 Index to Despatches to Bengal, Vols 2 and 2 (1753-1786)
M# Letters received from Bengal (or Letter to Court)
Vols 1-14 (3 Jan 1709-20 Jan 1776) and Vol 30 (4 Aug 1791-11 May
1792)
N. Miscellaneous Proceedings* Vols 39 A and 39 B being defective 
typed copy of special proceedings of the Calcutta Council 
relating.to Reza Khan’s trial (1772-1774) from the only original 
document now in the National Archives of India, New Delhi0
O. Nizamat Accounts of the Nawab Mubarak ud daulah: Range 154 No 380
P* Personal Records* Vol 14o
Q0 Proceedings of the Calcutta Committee of Revenue(consisting of 
the entire Council):Range 67 Nos 53-60(1 Apr 1772-28 Dec 1775)®
R* Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit:
Range 69 No 17 (June- Sep 1772) at Nadia and Krishnagar0
7,0 No 15 (Oct - Nov 1772) at Dacca,
68 No 54 (December 1772) at Rangpur,
No 55 ( January 1773 ) at Dinajpur<>
S« Report on the Sundeep (Sandwip ) Insurrection( df 1766—67) by 
Jonathan Duncan*
(Vide Bengal Revenue Proceedings of 1 Aug 1780) Range 50 Vol 270
T. Special proceedings of the Fort William Council on the trial of 
Nandkumar: Range 68 Vol 16( 13 Jan-19 Neb 1761)
Vol 17(31 Jul- 4 Oct 1762)o
In the National Archives of India, New Delhi. 3 S3
Special Proceedings of the Fort Y/illiam Council relating to the 
trial of Maharaja Shitab Rai and Muhammad Reza Khan*(A microfilm 
copy was obtained but references are to the typed copy in 1*0*)
IIo Published Official Recordst
A* Assam District Recordss Sylhet, Vol I (1770-1785)©Shillong 1913o
B* Bengal Government Records ( "Bibliography of Bengal Records'11632- 
1858" by C.W.Gumer, Calcutta, 1925 may be seen).
1. District Records*
a, Chittagong District Records,Vol 1(1760-1773).Cal. 1925© 
b* Midnapur District Records,Vols I-IV(1765-1774)©Cal.1914-26* 
Co Rangpur District Records,Vols I-VI(1770-87)• Cal. 1914-28® 
do Supplement to Bengal District Records,Vol I, Rangpur,
( 1770-1779). Calcutta 1925.
2* Letter Copy-Book of the Resident at the Durbar at Murshidabad. 
(or LCB) a* Two vols (1769-70) in one * Calcutta 1919*
b* Letters (28 Sep 1772 to 2 Mar 1774) published 
along with Vol XII of the Proceedings of the 
Controlling Council of Revenue(2 Jul -8 Sep 
1772)o Calcutta 1924©
5* Letter Copy-Book of the Supervisor of Rajshahi at Nator 
(-Letters issued 30 Dec 1769-15 Sep 1772)o Cal.1925.
4© Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit^ or CCP or PCC)
a.Krishnagar and Kasimbazar, Vols 1-3 ( 10 June- 17 Sep 1772); 
biDacca,Vol 4 (3 Oct - 28 Nov 1772); and
c.Rangpur, Dinajpur,Pumea and Rajmahal, Vols 5-8 (16 Dec 1772 
- 28 Feb 1773): . Calcutta 1926-27.
5® Proceedings of the Controlling Council of Revenue at
Murshidabad ( or HP)
Vol I Sep- Nov 1770 ). Calcutta 1919.
Vol II 3 Dec-31 Dec1770)o Calcutta 1920.
Vol III 3 Jan-14 Feb 1771)o Calcutta 1920.
Vol IV 18 Feb-28 Mar 1771). Calcutta 1921.
Vol V 1 Apr-15 Jul 1771). Calcutta 1S-22.
Vol VI 18 Jul-26 Aug 1771). Calcutta 1922. *
Vol VII 2 Sep-28 Nov 1771). Calcutta 1922. *
Vol VIIA 2 Sep-21 Oct 1771). Calcutta 1923
Vol VIII 5 Dec-30 Dec 1771)o Calcutta 1922. *
Vol IX 4 Jan-28 Feb 1772). Calcutta 1923o
Vol X 2 Mar- 4 May 1772). Calcutta 1923.
vol XI 7 May-25 Jun 1772)* Calcutta 1924©
Vol XII 2 Jul-8 Sep 1772). Calcutta 1924. **
NJB * Vols VI-VIII published in one .
^  Vol XII published with Letter Copy-Boofy6f the Residento 
60 Proceedings of the Select Committee (1758). Ed W.K*Firminger0
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C* Government of India Publications;
a, Calendar.of Persian Correspondence - or CB0(1T vols] 
particularly Vols I-IV (1759-1775). Calcutta 1911-25. 
bo Selections from Records of Bengal Government,1748-1767.
Ed* J* Long* Calcutta, 1869.
D0 India Office Records, Parliamentary Branch* or PP
a. No 6. Reports 1-5 Select Committee, of the House of
Commons (Chairman, Col *Burgoyne, 26 May 1772-18Jun1775)
bo No 7* Reports 1-9 of Committee of Secrecy appointed by
the House of Commons(7 Dec 1772 - 50 June 1775)o
E0 The National Archives of India, New Delhi*
Port William India House Correspondence(or FWIHC) 9 vols* but 
particularly Vol V (Public Series letters of 1767-69) edited 
by N.K.Sinha* Delhi 1949o
F0 Published by order of the Honourable the Court of Directors for 
the; Affairs of the East India Company0
,rA Bengal Atlas containing maps of the theatre of war and 
Commerce on that side of Hindoostan, compiled from the original 
surveys..*•" by JoRennell0 London 17810
Note _: Other records are noticed under the names of their editors 
- in a subsequent sections
IE, Contemporary Private Papers in English (unpublished)
In the British Museum0
Warren Hastingsfs papers (consist of 264 vols)0 Those consulted are
Add Msar' 29096 Letters written by Warren Hastings during his
residence at Murshidabad (Nov 1757 - July 1760)*.
29097 Letters written by Hastings during his residence at 
Mir Qasim’s Durbar (in Bihar) in 1762 and also those 
Y/ritten at Calcutta in 1765 and 1764o
29098 Copies of Hastings’s correspondence with Fort 
William ( Mar- Jul 1762)*
29099 Memoranda on relations with Mir Qasim (176O-1763) 
29122-25 Letters from natives of India(translations)0 
29125-27 Hastings’s correspondence (Sep 1769- Sep 1776) 
29131 Clive to Hastings original letters (Feb 1?58-Octl775) 
29132-36 (5 Vols) Correspondence (1758-1775)
29209-10 (2 Vols) Hastings’s notes on various subjects*
In the India Office Library (Vide “India Office Library Catalogue oi 
manuscripts in European Languages'’, Vol II, Part I by S.C.Hill, 
London 1916, and Vol II Part II by G.R.Kaye and E.H*Johnstone, 
London, 1937 )
a* Charles Grant’s “Observation on the State of Society Among the 
Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain, particularly with respect to 
morals, and on the means of improving it'r,1797. Eu? S. 95. 
b» Orme Mss (Collections of Robert Orme - 0*V* and India volumes) 
particularly Vols* IX,XVII, and J*
Co Philip Francis’s Papers ( 1.0. has its own numbering but 
the volume numbers given below are those given in Kaye and 
Johnstone catalogue)
Vols 47-8»50-53157 > 60,64-5,73-6,78-80,82,85 and 102* 
Contemporary Published works in English
Anonymous
Barwell, Richard 
Bolts, William 
Boughton-Rous, C.W<
Caillaud, J,
Clive, Robert
Debrit, J.
Dow, Alexander
Francklin, W0 
Gladwin, F*
Grand, G.F.
Grant, James 
Hastings, Warren 
Holwell, J.Zo
A State of British Authority in Bengal under the 
Government of Mr0 Hastings in his conduct in the 
case of Mahomed Reza Khan with a debate upon a 
letter from Mobareck ul Dowlah, Nabob of Bengal0
London, 1780* 
Letters (1765-1780)0Published BPP.VIII-XVIIIpCalo
Considerations on Indian Affairs 0London 1772o
Dissertation concerning the landed property in 
Bengalo London 1791o
A Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760o
London 1764.
A Letter to the Proprietors of Bast India Stock0
London 1764o
Transactions in India- from 1756 to 1785$
London 17860 
History of Hindostan, (Translated from the 
Persian of Firishtah,Vols I, II, London 1770)
Vol III. London 1772.
History of the Reign of Shah Aulum the Present 
Emperor of Hindustan(1798)0 Allahabad 1915*
“Transactions in Bengal11 from the Persian
Tawarikh-i-Bangala0 Calcutta, 1788*
The Narrative of a Gentleman long resident in 
Indiao(Cape of Good Hope 1814). Calcutta 191Q.
Historical and Comparative Account of the 
Finances ox Bengal. (First published 1786)
Vide Fifth Report, Vol II, Calcutta 1917o
Memoirs Relative to State of India.
(containing also English translation of Mirza 
Jawan Bakht’s account).' London 1786*
inly to hisAn Address to Luke Scrafton in 
Observation on Vansittart’s Narrative.
( Vide India Office Tract No 378)o
Interesting Historical Events Relative to
Bengal and the Empire of Indostan.- ( in two parts
London 1765 and 1767©
Ives, E. A Voyage from England to India in the year
Nota Manus alias 
Raymond alias 
Haji Mustapha
Orme, Robert 
Pattullo
Pearse, Col© T.D© 
Scott, Major J#
Scrafton, Luke
r
Stavorinus, J.Se 
Steuart, James
Stewart, C© 
Vansittart,Henry
Verelst, H.
Watts, William
MDCCLIV.
London 1773*
Translation of Seir Mutaqherin as' “View of 
Modem Times Being an History of India*11
Published 1789. Reprinted, Calcutta 1902o
Historical Fragments of the Mogul Emnire0 
( Published London 1782) London 1803V
A History of the Military Transactions of the 
British Nation in Indostan from the year 1743 
to which is prefixed a Dissertation on the 
Establishment made by the Mahomedan conquerors*
London 1803o 
An Essay upon the cultivation of Lands and 
Improvement of the Revenues of Bengal0
London 1772.
A-Memoir. (1768-1789}:©: Vide 3PP,II-VI, Calcutta
A Narrative of the Transactions in 3engal 
during the administration of Mr. Hastings.
London 1788*
Reflections on the Government of.Indostan
London 1770o
Observation on Vansittart1 s Narrative
(Vide India Office Tract 378)
Voyages to the East Indies. (Translated from
Dutch from S.H.Y/ilcocke) T , „„nQ' London 1798©
Principles of Money applied to the Present 
State of Coin in Bengal.
London 1772.
The History of Bengal. London 1813.
A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal
from 1760 to 17640 ( Warren Hastings had"a
hand in its draft) T , „r7r/' iLondon 17660
A View of the Rise, Progress and Present State 
of the English Government in Bengal.
London, 1772o
Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengali
London 17&4.
Contemporary Persian works:
( in this connection, two works, namely, "Hie History of India as 
told by its own Historians’* by H.M.Elliot and edited and 
continued by J* Dowson, Vol VIII, London ^ WH^and^Persian 
Literature, a Bio-Bibliographical Survey” by cTX.Storey, London, 
1939 may also be seen)
Ahwal-i- Alivardi Khan by Yusuf Ali
(vide extracts and translation in J.N*Sarkar 
Bengal Nawabs, Calcutta 1952)
An Account of the death 
of Nawab Muzaffar Jang
(no Persian title found) Anonymous. (Copy obtained from the Tubingen
Staatsbibliothek through the kindness of the 
German Consulate at Dacca).
Chahar Gulzar Shuja*i
Jami ut Tawarikh
Khulasat ut Tawarikh
Muz af f amam ah
Naubahar i Murshid Quli 
Khan
Riyaz us Salatin
Hari Charan Das (vide extracts and translation 
published in Elliot and Dowson*s History 
of India, Vol VIII)
Fakir Muhammad ( vide extracts and translation 
in Elliot and Dowson*s History of India.VIxI )
Kalyan Singh, Maharaja Intizam ul Mulk Mumtaz 
ud daulah Bahadur. (English translation by 
S.H.Khan in JBORS, Vols V and VI (1919,1920)
Karam Ali of Alivardi*s family.
(a part in extracts and translation in J.N. 
Sarkar, Bengal Nawabs, Calcutta, 1952)
I.Oo Persian Mss No 4075*
Azad al Husaini
(vide extracts and translation in J.N.Sarkar, 
Bengal Nawabs, Calcutta, 1952)
Ghulam Husain Salim.
(Text published, Calcutta, 1890-91* English 
translation by A. S&lam, published, Calcutta 
1902-1904)
Seir Mutaqherin
Tawarikh i Bangala
Saiyid Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai ”an 
actor and spectator”, written 1780-81. 
(English translation^by Haji Mustapha or 
Nota-Manus. First published 17&9*
Reprinted, Calcutta 1 Mar 1902 )0 
Munshi Salimullah ( English translation 
by F. Gladwin , published in Calcutta in 
1788 under the title of ”A Narrative of the 
Transactions in Bengal during the Soobahdar- 
ies of Azeem us Shan^Jaffer Khan,Shuja Khan 
Sirafraz Khan and Al&nsdy^yCyEqSj
Tarikh-i-Mansuri
Tarikh-i-Muzaffari
Tarikh-i-Nasrat Jangiy
Extracts translated by H.F.Blochman in the
JASB, Calcutta, 1867,-#e±4=$$sfa mid 19th c,
r**rZiNo'\l Persian work) 
Muhammad Ali Khan ( a part in extract and 
translation in Elliot and Dowson* s History 
of India, Vol VIII)
References are to the British Museum Mss.
(History of East Bengal and Dacca from 
Akbar*s Time to 1735-86)
Text Published by Karinath De as a Memoir 
of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 
in 1908. The work took its name from that 
of Nasrat Jang a descendant of Jasarat Khan 
who succeeded the later as Naib Nazim of 
Dacca.
SECONDARY AND LATER SOURCES.
I. Works in English. 
Ascoli,F.D.
Aspinall, A. 
Auber, P.
Aziz, Abdul
Early Revenue History of Bengal and the Fifth Report. 
1812. Oxford 1917.
Cornwallis in Bengal. Manchester 1931 o
Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.
London 1837.
The JMasabdarl System and the Mughal Army.
Lahore 1945«
Baden-Powell,B.H. The Land System of British India, Oxford, 1892*
Balkrishna
Banerji, B.N. 
Banerji, D.N.
D
Banerji,P.N.
Barat,A.
Basu, B.D. :■ 
Beale,T.W. . 
Bell, Major E,
Commercial Relations between India and England. 
1^01-1757 ~  London '1924..
Begams of Bengaly Calcutta, 19420
Early Land Revenue System in Bengal and Bihar0
Calcutta, 1936o
Early Administrative System of the East India Company 
in Bengal, Vol I. (Printed inIndia' but published
London 1943)o
Indian Finance in the days of the - Company.
London 1928*
The Bengal Native Infantry - its organisation and 
discipline0 17 96-1852. Calcutta, 19^2*
Rise of Christian Power in India. Calcutta, 1931®
The Oriental Biographical Dictionary. London 1894®
The Bengal Reversion. London 1872.
Bernier,Francois Travels in the Mogul Empire (tr. Archibald Constable)
Hid© V.A.Sinith. Oxford.1934.
Beveridge, H0
h
I f
Bhattacharya, S«
Boulger, D®C* 
Broome, A*
Bruce, J0
Buckland, C.E®
Busteed, E.E.
Carey, W.H*
Chak r ab ar ty, R. M. 
Chandra, Satish
Chatterji, Nandalal
•i
< 4
Chaudhuri, S«B.
Cotton, H.E.A*
*
Cotton, H.J*S. 
Crawford, B.C.
Dacca University 
Dasgupta, A*P. 
Datta, Kalikinkar
H
h
A Comprehensive History of India0London 1862*
The District of Bakarganj, its history and 
statisticsa London 18760
The Tidal of Maharaja Nandkumar0 Calcutta 18860
The East India Company and the Economy of 
engala London 1954*
Maharaja Dehy Singh (Nashipur Raj family)
Calcutta 1914o
History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal 
Army & Calcutta, 1S500
Annals of the Hon*bis Bast India Coapany0
London 18100 
Dicxonary of Indian Biography 0London 1906 
Echoes from Old ualcuvca0 Calcutta 1897©
The Good Old Days of the Honorable . .
John Companyo Calcutta,1907®
A summary of the changes in jurisdiction of 
districts in Bengal9 1757-191 o<> Calcutta, 1918*
Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 
1707-1740® Aligarh 1959*
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